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FORUM LEADERS:  
 
Recognising and reaffirming our endorsement of the Biketawa Declaration in the year 2000 and 
recalling the principles underpinning the Biketawa Declaration such as commitment to good 
governance, belief in the liberty of the individual under the law, upholding democratic processes and 
institutions and recognising the vulnerability of member countries to threats to their security; 
Recalling our vision and values for the Pacific under the Framework for Pacific Regionalism, as a 
region of ‘peace, harmony, security, social inclusion and prosperity so that all Pacific people can 
lead free, healthy and productive lives’; 
Recognising our endorsement of the ‘Blue Pacific’ identity to drive collective action in support of our 
vision under the Framework for Pacific Regionalism; 
Recalling our agreement at the 48th Forum Leaders’ Meeting in Apia, Samoa, to build on the 
Biketawa Declaration and other Forum related security declarations and agreements as the 
foundation for strategic future regional responses; 
Recognising the importance we placed on an expanded concept of security inclusive of human 
security, humanitarian assistance, prioritising environmental security, and regional cooperation in 
building resilience to disasters and climate change, including through regional cooperation and 
support; 
Respecting the principle of non-interference in the domestic affairs of Forum Members; and; 
Recognising the need to strengthen regional security cooperation and collective action through 
the assertion of Our Will and the voices of Our Pacific Peoples.  
 
HEREBY DECLARE AS FOLLOWS: 
 
1. (i)  We reaffirm that climate change remains the single greatest threat to the 
livelihoods, security and wellbeing of the peoples of the Pacific and our commitment 
to progress the implementation of the Paris Agreement; 
2. (ii)  We recognise an increasingly complex regional security environment driven by 
multifaceted security challenges , and a dynamic geopolitical environment leading to 
an increasingly crowded and complex region; 
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3. (iii)  We affirm our stewardship of the Blue Pacific and aspire to strengthen and 
enhance our capacity to pursue our collective security interests given our 
responsibility to sustain our Pacific peoples and our resources; 
4. (iv)  We respect and assert the sovereign right of every Member to conduct its 
national affairs free of external interference and coercion; 
5. (v)  We reaffirm the right of Members to individually and collectively address security 
issues and concerns; 
6. (vi)  We reaffirm the importance of the rules-based international order founded on 
the UN Charter, adherence to relevant international law and resolution of 
international disputes by peaceful means; 
7. (vii)  We affirm an expanded concept of security which addresses the wide range of 
security issues in the region, both traditional and non-traditional, with an increasing 
emphasis on: 
1. Human Security, including humanitarian assistance, to protect the rights, 
health and prosperity of Pacific people; 
2. Environmental and resource security; 
3. Transnational crime; and, 
4. Cybersecurity, to maximise protections and opportunities for Pacific 
infrastructure and peoples in the digital age. 
8. (viii)  We recognise that national security impacts on regional security, and therefore 
commit to strengthening our respective national security approaches by: 
1. developing our national security strategies; and, 
2. strengthening national security capacity including through training. 
9. (ix)  We commit to strengthening the existing regional security architecture inclusive  
of regional law enforcement secretariats and regional organisations to: 
1. account for the expanded concept of security; 
2. identify and address emerging security challenges; 
3. improve coordination among existing security mechanisms; 
4. facilitate open dialogue and strengthened information sharing; 
5. further develop early warning mechanisms; 
6. support implementation; 
7. promote regional security analysis, assessment and advice; and, 
8. engage and cooperate, where appropriate, with international 
organisations, partners and other relevant stakeholders. 
10. (x)  We commit to continuing regular Leaders level discussions on the expanded 
concept of security as part of securing our Blue Pacific. 
Nauru, September 2018
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666 Perspectives of Pacific security: An Introduction 
Pamela Thomas and Meg Keen, The Australian National University 
Regional and national security challenges are mounting in the Pacific Islands and 
demanding new approaches to respond to them. Currently, COVID-19, climate 
change and geopolitics are adding to pre-existing concerns related to human, 
environmental and traditional security. This special issue considers how Pacific 
Islanders are navigating through these pressures and charting new ways to secure their 
resources, food, health and way of life. The ways in which the Pacific manages these 
new and future security currents will affect development trajectories and the 
relationships critical to finding a ‘Pacific Way’ to safeguard culture, place and agency.  
This special issue of the Development Bulletin draws on the Boe Declaration 
on Regional Security (page viii), and its expanded concept of security to frame our 
analyses and provide direction for improving long-term resilience. We examine 
fresh perspectives on security and the ways in which many security issues in the 
Pacific are interconnected and need to be addressed through collaborations across 
sectors and society – a ‘whole of nation’ and ‘whole of region’ approach. The 
importance of connectivity, inclusion and culture provides the foundation for most 
of the papers in this journal. While the Boe Declaration speaks of different types of 
security, it is acknowledged that they all overlap and interact, requiring a more 
systemic approach that takes us out of our harbours and onto uncharted waters.  
This journal also marks the first year of ANU’s Australia Pacific Security 
College which has supported this publication. The College is committed to creating 
platforms for collaboration and knowledge exchange to support a Pacific approach 
to the region’s security. We hope this Special Edition with its collection of authors 
from the Pacific and those with long-term associations makes a significant 
contribution. 
Security governance and collaboration 
In her paper, ‘Security through a Pacific lens’ Meg Keen examines the interplay 
between security challenges and emerging initiatives to better coordinate across 
countries and sectors – a key theme of the Boe Declaration. Competing geopolitical 
and national interests, evident in climate change negotiations, still need to be 
navigated and new alliances formed to advance Pacific interests. At the regional 
level, the cohesiveness of the security agenda is growing, but can ‘falter if there are 
perceived threats to sovereignty’ that affect information sharing and concerted 
action on transnational issues. Part of the challenge is the limited reach and 
resources of many governments to address pressing security issues. More could 
be done to leverage community groups and involve them in the security agenda.  
The Boe Declaration encourages Pacific Island countries to develop national 
security strategies, which Tim George considers will equip governments to 
successfully handle national security issues – if they are realistic, the product 
of widespread consultation, and embedded in the cultural fabric. The need for 
security initiatives to have cultural integrity is taken up by Steven Ratuva in his 
examination of the newest security challenge, COVID-19, which is displacing 
attention to climate change and geopolitics. COVID-19, he writes, has reimagined 
the security landscape ‘starkly revealing the fragility and lack of resilience of the 
neoliberal system’. The social solidarity economy (SSE), he maintains, is a key to 
survival with its foundation in recognition of ethical values which prioritise the 
wellbeing of people and planet over profit. 
The geopolitics of Pacific security 
Girard, Amin and Watson raise the issue of climate change and the lack of con-
nection between the major perpetrators and those in the PICs living with its negative 











2 Development Bulletin 82 
Pacific. They point out that PICs are often in situations 
where the actions of their geopolitical allies are in direct 
conflict with their security needs. James Batley reflects on 
the gap in the security approaches pursued by Australia and 
the Pacific region. Traditional partners are stepping up with 
new commitments and opportunities which can be lever-
aged by increasingly confident Pacific voices, but they will 
be selective. 
Anna Powles reflects on the New Zealand ‘Pacific 
Reset’ and critically examines how identity narratives shape 
security engagements but also pose risks when the nar-
ratives of donors diverge from perceptions in the region. 
Just as Australia and New Zealand have increased their 
engagement with the region through their Pacific Step-Up 
(NZ) and Pacific Reset (Australia) policies, so too has 
China which is also creating a narrative about its Pacific 
associations as a regional player. Denghua Zhang outlines 
the ways in which PICs are relevant to China’s security  
and considers the prospects for China–Pacific security 
engagement. Although the PICs are distant from China, 
Zhang states, they are relevant to China’s geopolitical 
interests, and in China’s view, share development interests.  
Food, environment and livelihood  
Securing access to nutritious food has always been a vital 
concern in Pacific Island countries as all the authors in this 
section stress. Mike Bourke writes of ‘famine foods’ – or 
food varieties that could withstand climatic shocks and 
maintain community food supply while Suliasi Vunibola 
discusses traditional and contemporary approaches to 
enhance food security, particularly in times of famine. 
Crimp and colleagues point out that subsistence food pro-
duction provides a significant part of household nutrition 
and income in rural areas but there is a widespread 
deterioration in the quality of foods eaten as an increase 
in cheap, long-lasting store-bought food becomes more 
popular. With a positive note, Bourke states that there can 
be improvements in food security with the introduction of 
new food crops and hardier varieties that can withstand 
climate change. Changing demographics and demand also 
requires that food distribution systems be given more 
attention.  
Crimp and colleagues consider the many factors 
transforming food systems including changing climates, 
demographics, trade and technology, and how an ‘all 
hazards, multi-sectoral approach’ which draws on local 
innovation will be needed to achieve resilient food systems. 
The papers indicate that across the Pacific there is con-
siderable concern about the security of both ocean and 
coastal fish stocks. Joeli Veitiyaki writes: 
Secure access to productive fish stocks is fundamental 
to sustaining Pacific livelihoods and on-going manage-
ment of the region’s coastal resources is imperative for 
food security.  
For transnational fisheries resources, such as tuna, a 
regional approach is logical but will require innovations in 
management practices to ensure responses are evidence-
based, coordinated and enduring. 
Human, health and gender security 
The Boe Declaration considers health as a core human 
security issue which, as the authors in this section show, 
requires critical consideration of power dynamics, and the 
interplay between policy and politics. Henry Ivarature points 
out, COVID-19 profoundly reconfigured human security 
relations between state and society in PNG with the 
enactment of new legislation that required citizens to 
momentarily forego democratic rights, liberties and free-
doms in the interest of national security. While relations 
between state and society have been brought into focus dur-
ing the pandemic, so have relationships across government. 
Nick Thomson discusses the new partnerships that COVID-
19 has fostered among health, security and social protection 
agencies. An on-going concern in many of these papers is 
how health, gender and empowerment are tightly interwoven. 
Lilly Be’Soer’s personal reflection of the brutal treatment of 
women in the highlands of PNG makes chilling reading. But 
her way of addressing it provides hope with her stories of 
‘home-grown organisations’ that provide women with 
‘choices, empowerment and security’. However, government 
is still largely missing in action with NGOs remaining the ‘de 
facto’ leaders of change.  
Be’Soer’s conclusions are supported by Philip Gibbs 
and Lorelle Yakam. They conclude that perpetrators of 
violence still face few repercussions as a result of policy and 
service gaps. Women are struggling to find secure places at 
home, in markets and at the voting booths; even accessing 
their traditional lands can be fraught – the currents of 
change that will provide greater security for Pacific women 
remain weak but will involve stronger NGO-government 
cooperation. To get forward momentum, Vijay Naidu 
argues analysis needs to move beyond its preoccupation 
with analysing the securitisation of the state and develop-
ment agendas, and apply a human security lens which he 
believes has the potential to be a transformative concept 
through its emphasis on ‘partner-centred approaches’ and 
greater education and advocacy on issues which impinge on 
people and communities. 
Security issues in Pacific cities  
Urbanisation is an increasingly obvious current of change 
affecting Pacific security as land competition escalates, 
informal settlements mushroom, and services and jobs fall 
far short of demand. Luke Kiddle and Paul Jones both 
consider the human security difficulties of Pacific Islanders 
living in informal settlements where floods, inadequate 
sanitation and water supplies, and poor housing undermine 
security. With the large and growing informal settlements 
on the fringes of most Pacific Island cities there is an urgent 
need to address the lack of urban planning and social 
tensions flowing from insecure land tenure, marginalised 
populations and elite politics. Jennifer Day highlights how 
new local networks and governance structures, including 
community associations, can strengthen urban environ-
ments, but considers that a patchwork of community 
initiatives cannot replace the need for a more coherent 
vision for Pacific cities and their management.  
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Communication for security  
Throughout this section authors stress the importance of 
sharing insights to new and emerging security trends, and 
holding Pacific leaders to account. Jay Caldwell describes 
the security priorities emerging from regional consultations 
across the region relating to a push for more capacity to 
shape national security agendas, to address pervasive non-
communicable diseases and weak health systems, to 
mitigate climate and resources security issues, and combat 
growing cyber and transnational crime threats.  
These papers recognise the politicisation of the media, 
and the need for press freedom to bring greater account-
ability to the security agenda. Steve Sharp, an experienced 
journalist in the Pacific, writes that: 
there is an urgent need in the Pacific for recognisable, 
independent and credible media discourses on national 
security that are disaggregated from the noise of self-
appointed influencers on social media. 
He calls for better trained and more mature journalists. 
The Boe Declaration, he writes, is a recognition of shared 
security threats and by implication the need for coordinated 
security strategies to meet them. In his opinion ‘countering 
the security threats … will rely on informed and vigilant 
publics’ but ‘the unwillingness of politicians and officials 
to engage in dialogue is undermining the media’s account-
ability role’. Amanda Watson critically assesses the tele-
communication sector through a security lens. Mobile 
phones, she writes, are increasingly being used as the main 
channel to access information, yet networks are vulnerable 
on a number of fronts including the ownership monopolies, 
the susceptibility to severe weather events, and the growing 
incidence of cyber-crime. Cyber-security, she states, is an 
important area of concern and has been highlighted in the 
Boe Declaration as requiring greater emphasis.  
Policing and transnational security 
Transnational crime is an important and increasing security 
threat for most PICs. Danielle Watson and colleagues argue 
that there is very limited police capacity in PICs to respond 
to transnational and organised crime which is characterised 
by complex and multi-layered networks. ‘These networks 
are mobile, well-resourced and strategically co-ordinated, 
enabling them to operate across porous borders.’ She notes 
that there is limited data to assess the extent of transnational 
crime but the specific areas of concern include environ-
mental crimes related to illegal fishing and resources 
extraction, sex trafficking, trafficking illegal drugs and 
precursor chemicals.  
Sinclair Dinnen and Grant Walton analyse the growing 
complexity of crime in the Pacific and consider the 
changing shape of security governance in PNG and the 
prominent move to private security. Current crime trends, 
lack of police capacity, and new pressures on policing like 
COVID-19 provide an opportunity to rethink the security 
landscape. They conclude that ‘the role of private providers 
in PNG’s networked security will be crucial for reframing 
more effective … security provision’. Anouk Ride extends 
this critical reflection and concludes that police and legal 
reforms that open access to justice for communities, and 
create greater social accountability would go a long way to 
making the security landscape more fertile. Jone Kalouniwai 
and colleagues describe their efforts to take a fresh 
approach to national security and Fiji’s unique approach 
to integrating values and traditional concepts into con-
temporary security dialogues.  
This Special Edition on Pacific Security is provoc-
ative reading. We hope it stimulates more thought on how 
we can secure the future of the Pacific and build resilience 
together.
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666 Security through a Pacific lens 
Meg Keen, The Australian National University 
Introduction  
The security challenges affecting the Pacific island region are steadily mounting, 
most recently the combination of COVID-19 and Tropical Cyclones Harold and 
Yasa have strained health systems, economies and services to near breaking point. 
In the words of the current Secretary General of the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF), 
Dame Meg Taylor: 
For the Pacific, COVID-19 amplified the persistent vulnerabilities that continue to 
challenge our resilient development and our security. Therefore, far from being the 
cause of current social, economic and political challenges, the COVID-19 
pandemic has exacerbated existing vulnerabilities, in some cases deepening and 
broadening them, and in other cases accelerating their arrival.1 
The interplay of different security challenges has long been appreciated in  
the Pacific. Recently, it was highlighted by Pacific island leaders’ 2018 Boe 
Declaration on Regional Security2 which defined an ‘expanded concept of security’. 
Climate security was recognised as the primary threat to regional security, but other 
security concerns were also noted – human security, environmental/resource security, 
traditional security (transnational crime, cyber security, and border protection). The 
complex interplay between these security challenges and limited resources raises the 
need for regional and national cooperation to build resilience.  
Some persistent and pervasive security threats, such as climate change, require 
commitment at multiple scales. International action is a necessity for effective 
mitigation and adaptation, and national and local action are required for adaptation 
and sustainable development. Resources for both are inadequate. Even prior to the 
harsh economic hit of COVID-19, financial and mitigation commitments to address 
climate change impacts required ‘scaling up’ to adequately address small island 
state vulnerability (Watson and Schalatek 2020) and meet global financial com-
mitments.3 Resources are likely to decline or be diverted now with the mounting 
COVID-19 induced financial woes of donors and Pacific governments.  
The urgency for action across a range of security issues remains a consistent 
theme in leaders’ statements, but also consistent are differences over priorities in a 
very diverse region with competing interests both within the region and between 
regional players. Donors often focus on traditional security issues such as border 
security and political stability, partially to protect their interests and to deter foreign 
powers perceived to have competing priorities in the region (Hunt 2017; Fry 
2019:167–189). Climate and human security issues get donor attention, but often in 
an uncoordinated manner that is not systemic and enduring. The Boe Declaration is 
an effort to get a better balance of attention between different forms of security.  
In particular, there is a push by the Pacific island governments for stronger global 
action on climate change consistent with their primary security concern, and their 
disillusionment with the commitments of the global community, including 
Australia.  
Advancing security issues of high priority to the Pacific often require coalition 
diplomacy and advocacy on the international stage – and those coalitions need to 
reach beyond traditional partners, evident from the Pacific’s demands for climate 
and environment protection action, and their leveraging of likeminded nations such 
as those in the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS). But there are also con-
siderable security challenges at home. Conflicts over resources and land, tension 
among ethnic groups and power elites and corruption have destabilised govern-
ments around the region. Human security issues related to health, education, 
livelihoods and equity also pull at the social fabric and can be destabilising. 
With limited government reach and resources, but strong subsistence and 
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Pacific security agenda. The ‘Pacific Way’ (Mara 1997) 
reflects a commitment to cultural values and relationships 
that can lay the foundation for social stability, a view 
reiterated in the published National Security Strategies of 
Samoa and Vanuatu. Fiji’s Prime Minister Bainimarama 
projected the importance of culture and traditional 
approaches onto the international stage when he introduced 
the Fijian concept of ‘Talanoa’ to the UN Climate Change 
Conference (COP23) (Talanoa Dialogue 2017). This init-
iative, and the ‘Blue Pacific’ reframing of Pacific security 
and development issues put a high value on narratives that 
convey security issues and approaches through a Pacific 
lens.  
This article analyses some of the prominent issues and 
concerns that are shaping current security discourses and 
their practical implications. What is revealed is a stronger 
Pacific framing of security issues, but the security agenda is 
often not well coordinated between sectors and levels of 
government. Pressing domestic security issues related to 
human security (e.g., health and gender) struggle to get  
policy and practical traction. The predominantly state-centric 
approach to security can exclude key community groups 
from shaping the agenda and contributing to resilience. 
Stronger domestic action, more diverse partnerships, and new 
or reinvigorated platforms that support collaborative action 
can all help create a more stable and resilient future. 
Security through a Pacific lens  
The Boe Declaration provides a succinct overview of security 
challenges affecting Pacific islands forum countries, but 
rather than breaking new ground, it reasserts the security 
issues which have long been of concern in the region as 
reflected in previous Declarations (Box 1). The Pacific 
narrative and lens on security have been remarkably 
consistent across the full range of security issues since 
independence. A range of human security topics have been 
raised in past Declarations, but often left to nations to deal 
with the delicate issues of sovereignty, services, and equity. 
New issues such as cyber security are emerging but do  
not yet rival more enduring security concerns on the policy 
agenda. Quantitative analyses, such as presented in Box 1, 
while informative, still require a closer look at the trends 
and the socio-political dynamics that drive security agendas. 
In the subsections to follow, four key security issues are 
explored in more detail: regional collaboration, climate 
change, human security and geopolitics. 
Regional collaboration: The ideal and the reality 
Approaches to Pacific security are still predominantly top-
down – from international and regional declarations to 
national and local actions. They often become ‘lost in 
translation’ when regional priorities transition to the local 
level (PIFS 2013). Competing priorities and the advance-
ment of vested and elite interests are national security 
stumbling blocks, particularly evident in fishery, forestry 
and mining sectors where granting licences can benefit a 
few at the cost of community and environmental security, 
as appears to be occurring in PNG’s MOU with China for a 
fishery industrial park in Western province (Smith 2020).  
National action on regional security issues falters if there 
are perceived threats to sovereignty resulting in a reluctance 
to share national information and data to address trans-
boundary security challenges, for example sharing data about 
oceanic resource exploitation across sectors. The need for 
regional cooperation is a recurring theme in the Pacific island 
security narratives since the establishment of the Pacific 
Islands Forum. The 1992 Honiara Declaration on Law 
Enforcement Cooperation called for a more ‘comprehensive, 
integrated and collaborative approach to counter trans-
national crime threats’. Later in 2016 the UN Transnational 
Organised Crime in the Pacific report again noted that 
cooperation among PICs would help to develop more robust 
collaborative and independent efforts to fight transnational 
crime and cross-border threats (UNODC 2016:77–81). 
Recent research has highlighted that when law enforcement 
agencies collaborate across jurisdictions progress is possible, 
such as the recent successful drug seizures in Tonga and the 
French Pacific, and the progress of the Asia–Pacific Group 
on Money Laundering; and when security responses are 
‘networked’ across formal and community sectors systems, 
such as police, private security and village leaders, resilience 
is enhanced (Walton and Dinnen 2020).  
While coordinated regional action on security issues 
raises delicate sovereignty issues, it is not an insurmount-
able challenge. The 2000 Biketawa Declaration enabled the 
Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI), 
a collaborative effort across Forum island countries, led by 
Australia. There is no doubt the collective action had a 
significant impact on the security of Solomon Islands and 
the policing capacity of the region (Putt et al. 2018), but  
the power balance between Pacific island and Western 
influences on security framing and interventions was raised 
(yet again) by a Pacific Island Forum review:  
Though RAMSI is often seen as a stellar example of 
regional cooperation, the mission might have been better 
served by drawing more constructively on that regional 
element, not simply in terms of personnel, but also as 
regards command structure (Fraenkel et al. 2014). 
Resource constraints at the national level often make 
support from regional and donor agencies a necessary, 
though not sufficient, measure. The PIF Forum Officials  
Sub-Committee on Regional Security provides a platform for 
dialogue among Forum security agencies and stakeholders to 
work together. It is also a means to encourage joint training 
and capacity building across security agencies dealing with 
law and order, customs and immigration. While this has 
value, well-coordinated action, information sharing and 
strategic analysis across countries remains weak with some 
notable exceptions such as the Pacific Transnational Crime 
Coordination Centre, and the Pacific Islands Forum’s 
Fisheries Agencies’ Regional Fisheries Surveillance Centre. 
The Boe Declaration on Regional Security and its 
Action Plan attempts to bridge the regional–national security 
space, recognise the growing geopolitical stresses, and 
reiterate the need for collaboration driven by Pacific states. 
The commitment by all nations to implement national 
security strategies has the potential to achieve multiple 
objectives that often undermine regional initiatives: nations 
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translate regional security priorities into national security 
strategies tailored to place and values (to date through intense 
community consultation). Leadership and commitment is 
advanced through a multi-agency national security secre-
tariat; and, national security strategies can better shape donor 
engagement and link to budget and policy priorities. 
To date only two national security strategies have  
been produced and published in response to the Boe 
Declaration – Samoa (2018) and Vanuatu (2019) – both 
give high priority to issues related to climate security, 
human security, cyber security/safety, and border security 
(Figure 1). More strategies are forthcoming in 2021. They 
have the potential to provide a more assertive shaping of the 
security agenda by PICs.  
Climate security: Falling short globally and at 
home 
Pacific leaders frequently express frustration about the lack 
of responsiveness to their calls for action on climate change, 
an existential threat to many Pacific communities. The 
urgency for action is increasing as recent research suggests 
that climate change may be occurring more rapidly than 
previously assumed (Cheng et al. 2019). At the most recent 
UN annual climate change conference, COP25, the former 
Tuvaluan Prime Minister lamented ongoing ‘climate 
denialism’, and still more explicitly, the 2019 Pacific Island 
Forum Kainaki II Declaration didn’t mince words with its 
clear title “Declaration for Urgent Climate Action Now”, 
calling for international action on emissions reductions, 
climate finance, and mechanisms for loss and damage 
compensation.  
The PICs have played a strong and assertive role in 
international climate forums. They have leveraged inter-
national groups to project their voices beyond what their 
relatively small political/economic heft would predict. The 
UN Pacific Small Island Developing States (PSIDS) group 
has leveraged resources and carefully coordinated negotia-
tion strategies to magnify influence. Strategic alliances have 
also helped to project their concerns and preferred solutions 
onto the global stage, including AOSIS, the G77 plus China, 
and the UN Asia Pacific Group. 
These non-traditional (or perhaps more correctly, post-
colonial) alliances are deemed to be necessary when 
security interests diverge from more traditional partners. 
While PICs have increased their influence on climate 
negotiations, frustrations remain at global outcomes and the 
increasing climate impacts on national security and devel-
opment prospects. The ADB (2013) estimates that by 2100 
in a business-as-usual scenario, climate change will cost the 
Pacific 12.7 per cent of GDP each year, dwarfing any 
economic growth – the human toll is incalculable. Predicted 
sea level rises threaten the very existence of atolls. 
But challenges are not all on the global stage. Domestic 
action to improve climate security has been mixed in its 
efficacy. Sea walls have shifted impacts, not always 
eliminated them (Piggott-McKellar et al. 2020); rapid 
urbanisation without strong planning is creating more 
climate vulnerability (Connell and Keen, 2020); and water, 
sanitation and food security are being adversely affected by 
the interplay of population pressures, resource limitations 
and climate change (PIFS 2018a). As climatic events get 
more severe, they will continue to magnify existing security 
and development deficits. Much more political, human  
and financial investment will be required to build local 
resilience.  
With few resources, PICs are tapping into global 
climate funds and donor supported programs to enhance 
local action, but resources continue to fall short of needs. At 
the national level, disaster risk reduction policies and funds 
are reducing damage costs and providing a means to build 
resilience (PIFS 2018a), but future prospects still look grim. 
The interaction of climate, human and resource strains are 
likely to result in destabilising trends, including a decline in 
coastal fisheries productivity, rising costs of extreme 
climate events, and exacerbation of health challenges (PIFS 
2018b). Making better progress locally will require a trans-
formation of resource management practices and far better 
engagement with community groups able to enhance social 
connectivity, sustainability and action. 
Human security: security for whom? 
Human security issues are pressing in the Pacific, and 
predominantly left for national action, particularly in  
the areas of health, gender inequality, urbanisation, and 
informality/social exclusion, to name only a few. On the 
health front, activities to address COVID-19 and other 
infectious diseases are increasing, but health issues related 
to non-communicable diseases (NCDs) remain poorly 
addressed although they too are at epidemic levels. NCDs – 
heart disease, cancers, respiratory diseases and diabetes – 
cause up to 80 per cent of deaths in the region (The Lancet 
2019), and the trends are moving in the wrong direction, or 
improving too slowly. 
Gender security also poses significant and persistent 
challenges despite occasional regional and national com-
mitments, for example, the 2012 PIF Gender Equality 
Declaration, and national support for the international Con-
ventions on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women (CEDAW). Gender-based violence and 
inequality remain at globally high (and unacceptable) 
levels. Greater security will require systemic change 
affecting values, leadership and economic opportunities for 
women. There are some inspiring activities such as the UN 
Women’s work with market vendors and action against 
gender-based violence, but we have not yet tipped the scales 
to transformational change. 
All these human security issues are related to another 
concerning trend that has the potential to be destabilising – 
growing inequality in the region. Limited economic 
opportunities constrain the ability of households to respond 
to external shocks and invest in health, education and 
shelter (Dornan 2020). Social protection measures in the 
Pacific are few, with most reliant on customary networks 
and social capital, yet recent research has questioned how 
strong and enduring these more traditional safety nets are in 
the rapidly urbanising Pacific (Mecartney and Connell 
2017). Following COVID-19, more social protection 
programs are emerging (ESCAP 2020), but fine tuning is 
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still needed given that access can be limited for those 
without formal employment or land titles, or who are among 
the growing youth bulge. 
Geopolitics: messy, but not a sea-change  
In 2017, the PIF leaders added a new perspective to the 
security narrative with their commitment to the ’Blue 
Pacific’ to advance future prosperity and wellbeing through 
a stronger collective vision and action agenda. The PIF 
Secretary General, Dame Meg Taylor (2019) applied the 
concept to the geopolitical competition between Western 
countries and China. She observed that prosperity and 
security was about balancing external engagements, the 
right to be ‘friends to all’ and to nurture genuine relation-
ships with those countries that offer development and 
economic opportunities. China’s Belt and Road Initiative 
(BRI) is particularly appealing with its promise of large 
infrastructure investment, but it will not be free from 
external influence, elite capture or corruption.  
Western jitters about the loss of influence and the 
growing reach of China in the region, has resulted in 
accusations of ‘strategic denial’ (Herr 1986; Fry 2019). 
Critical assessments of Chinese engagement in the region 
have urged more evidence-based analysis – with Fox and 
Dornan (2018) arguing that fears of the China debt trap may 
be overblown, though the trends are concerning. Those 
chasing economic development through loans and debt 
could contribute to national instability if elite interests, 
accountability frameworks, and resource exploitation 
activities are not well managed, as Pala (2020) argues in the 
case of Chinese investment in Kiribati. The switch to 
recognise China over Taiwan in September 2019 by 
Solomon Islands also posed political and security divisions 
reminiscent of the ethnic tensions that proceeded the 
Tensions (Cavanough 2020).  
The Blue Pacific concept brings the security of the vast 
ocean spaces of the Pacific islands to the fore, along with 
resource contestation. The Blue Pacific covers more than 98 
per cent of the region. Many tuna rich countries of the 
Pacific islands will find their revenues dropping sharply as 
climate change forces fish to migrate to cooler waters, and 
unregulated and unreported fishing persists – currently 
draining over US$100 million per annum from Pacific 
island countries (MRAG 2016). Many PICs look to their 
traditional allies to help manage resource contestation and 
degradation through regional and bilateral assistance, such 
as the Pacific Maritime Assistance program (patrol boats 
and aerial surveillance to protect ocean spaces).  
Partnerships can help enhance security and balance 
geopolitical pressures. The Pacific island countries have 
proven adept on the international stage, particularly on 
climate and ocean security. Partnerships with traditional 
partners have remained strong and productive, but on occa-
sions also strained. Australia remains the primary develop-
ment partner and an enduring friend with historical and 
cultural ties. But differing priorities and perceptions can 
boil over, as evident from the Samoan Prime Minister 
Tuilaepa Sailele’s (2018) reflections on Western analyses 
of Pacific island relations with China:  
…some might say there is a patronising nuance, 
believing Pacific nations did not know what they were 
doing, or were incapable of reaping benefits of close 
relationships with countries that will be in their region 
for some time to come. 
Stronger security outcomes could emerge if there was 
better cooperation between those with common interests. 
There are a few good examples which have yielded positive 
security outcomes, including multi-nation ocean surveil-
lance exercises, the recent COVID-19 response under the 
Pacific Humanitarian Corridor, and the successful collab-
oration of fisheries rich nations under the Parties to the 
Nauru Agreement. But much more needs to be done to 
maximise security dividends from regional efforts through 
stronger regional architecture that is well linked to national 
institutions.  
Security reflections 
The concept of security in the Pacific has always been broad 
and even prescient about the complex interplay between 
different drivers of instability. There has been a consistent 
desire by PICs to enhance security across environmental, 
human and traditional areas, and to tap into genuine and 
enduring partnerships that can support national efforts. 
While regional initiatives are important, the main action on 
security will occur at the national level and the success of 
regional initiatives will depend on buy-in from national 
leaders and strong national integration. 
What appears to be persistently weak at all levels are 
the collaborative platforms that are trusted and can support 
security cooperation between national and local levels in 
ways that are inclusive of non-government and community 
groups, and can coordinate action between regional and 
national levels. There is some promising movement with 
greater inclusion of community and non-government 
groups in priority setting by the Pacific Island Forum, and 
in responses to major climatic events through the multi-
stakeholder national disaster response systems that span 
global to local.  
It is not possible to devise the ‘perfect’ security system 
which can act on every security threat, but the broader 
definition of security under the Boe Declaration and the 
emerging national security strategies are a positive step 
forward. Creating documents will not be enough, there also 
needs to be the institutional architecture and policy support 
to translate the words to action, and boost accountability. 
There have been some exemplary first steps in relations to 
Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Response, Pacific 
Transnational Crime Units, and Pacific Fisheries Surveil-
lance Centres – we just need to get better at sharing the 
positive lessons, working together, and leveraging efforts 
for transformational change. 
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Box 1: Pacific Voices – Security Issues in PIF Leaders’ Declarations 
Over the last 50 years, the Pacific Islands Forum Leaders’ Declarations have dealt with a wide range 
of security themes (see chart below). The most recent Declaration dealing directly with regional 
security, the Boe Declaration, explicitly recognises the ‘expanded concept of security’, but this is not 
new. The Pacific security lens has always been ‘expanded’ and reached far beyond issues of national 
border protection, law and order, and geopolitics.  
Climate change has been recognised as a major security challenge for over three decades. Since it 
was first mentioned in the 1988 PIF Leaders’ Declaration, climate change has been high on the 
security agenda, when it was noted that ‘The Forum expressed concern about climatic changes in the 
South Pacific and their potential for serious social and economic disruption in countries of the region’.  
Unsurprisingly, resource and environment security have consistently been raised in Leaders’  
Declarations given the strong cultural associations with land and water, and thriving subsistent 
economies. Similarly, the desirability of collective action has also been regularly recognised, if not 
always translated into action. Even geopolitics and donor engagement/external relationships have 
figured large – but in recent times the challenges of balancing external and internal agendas have 
been far more assertively advanced.  
New security issues are creeping into the Declarations in recognition of a globally connected and 
digitised world that is reaching its tentacles into the Pacific, creating development opportunities but 
also new security challenges (e.g. cybersecurity and transnational crime).  
Note: Only themes that had significant text were recorded in this rapid assessment, not those 



























Security References in PIF Leaders' Declarations
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Figure 1: The Pacific Island ‘Expanded Security Concept’ and issues highlighted in National Security 
Strategies 
 
Note: The graphic is an adaptation of the Expanded Security Concept from the Pacific Islands Forum Boe Declaration on Regional 
Security. The outer circle provides examples of issues given prominent attention in the published National Security Strategies of 
Samoa and Vanuatu which were written in response to the Boe Declaration.  
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Pacific Island security: What role can national  
security strategies play? 
Tim George1 
Introduction 
Over the last 20 years the majority of countries globally 
have developed their own national security strategies or 
policies. But this has not been the case in the Pacific Island 
Countries (PICs) with the exception of Papua New Guinea, 
which completed a National Security Policy in 2013 and 
Fiji, which undertook substantial work on a policy over 
several years. Now, with gathering momentum, national 
security strategies are part of the Pacific regional agenda. In 
2018, Samoa and then Vanuatu, commenced work on their 
strategies completing them in 2018 and 2019, others are 
forthcoming in countries such as Solomon Islands, Tonga 
and Cook Islands. The concept of such strategies received a 
major boost from regional leaders in 2018, who, in the Boe 
Declaration on Regional Security, committed to ‘streng-
thening our respective national security approaches by 
developing our national security strategies’ (PIFS 2018).  
This position was reinforced the following year in the 
Boe Declaration Action Plan, agreed to by leaders at the 2019 
Tuvalu Forum, which foreshadowed ‘supporting Forum 
members, as may be required, in the development of national 
security strategies/policies’ (PIFS 2019:21). A number of 
development partners have provided support for the develop-
ment and implementation of national security strategies, and 
a new source of such support is the Australia Pacific Security 
College. Several Pacific Island countries are now well 
advanced in the development of national security strategies, 
with more countries proposing to do so. 
Typically, a national security strategy provides an 
overarching framework that outlines the nation’s strategic 
context, identifies security challenges and opportunities, 
articulates the nation’s vision and agenda, sets priorities for 
coming years, and sets in motion reforms to strengthen the 
national security community. Can such strategies better 
equip governments to handle national security issues? The 
answer is a strong yes – providing the strategy is realistic, 
the product of widespread consultation, and effectively 
implemented.  
The expanded concept of security is now 
widely accepted 
Historically, national security has tended to be viewed 
principally in terms of sovereignty, territorial integrity and 
defense of the homeland including maintenance of internal 
stability through prevention of major civil unrest, terrorist 
acts or other significant breakdowns in law and order. An 
expanded concept of security has, however, received wide-
spread acceptance in recent years. Firstly, there is the 
realisation of the gravity of the global threats posed by 
‘problems without borders’ – such as climate change, the 
spread of infectious diseases, and cyber attacks. Secondly, 
there is recognition that human security and a just society 
are fundamental to national security.  
Pacific Island leaders have been forthright in articu-
lating the main security priorities for the region. In the Boe 
Declaration, they affirmed an ‘expanded concept of security 
which addresses the wide range of security issues in  
the region, both traditional and non-traditional, with an 
increasing emphasis on: 
• human security, including humanitarian assistance, to 
protect the rights, health and prosperity of Pacific 
people; 
• environmental and resource security; 
• security from transnational crime; and 
• cybersecurity, to maximise protections and opportun-
ities for Pacific infrastructure and peoples in the digital 
age’ (PIFS 2018). 
The priority given to human security in the Boe 
Declaration was prescient – the COVID-19 crisis represents 
the gravest security challenge to the region in the post-
independence era. 
What does a national security strategy look 
like? 
Globally, national security strategies vary considerably in 
scope, length, focus, and level of ambition. Pacific Island 
nations too each have their own distinct characteristics, and 
there is no single framework that could be applied across 
the region. Nevertheless, the countries of the Pacific region 
face many of the same challenges, such as: 
• climate change and natural disasters;  
• the vastness of the region and its huge exclusive eco-
nomic zones (EEZs), sparsely populated by mostly 
small island states remote from each other;  
• small formal economies a great distance from major 
markets, with high costs and heavy reliance on develop-
ment assistance;  
• resource constraints and depletion of natural resources;  
• illegal fishing and weak borders; and  
• increasingly sophisticated transnational crime.  
In addition, the Pacific region faces, to varying degrees, 
major human security challenges such as rising inequality, 
expanding and restive youth populations, and gender based 
violence. Health security is a particular challenge – not  
just because of the threat of the COVID-19 virus and  
other infectious diseases – but also an alarming non-
communicable disease crisis in much of the region. So it 
makes sense for countries of the region to work together, 
and share their experiences and goals as they develop their 
 
February 2021 13 
national security strategies. The starting point is the Boe 
Declaration Action Plan 2019, which states that: 
A national security strategy or policy is an adaptable 
framework for a country to meet the basic needs and 
security concerns of citizens (human security) and address 
external and internal threats to the country. National 
security frameworks will enable Members to coherently 
and holistically identify their national security priorities 
and what they require (capacity and capability) to address 
them. In addition to this, reflecting key issues such as 
human security, oversight and accountability, human 
rights and gender ensures relevance, legitimacy, owner-
ship, and sustainability thus improving the efficiency of 
how security is provided (PIFS 2019:21). 
A national security strategy will typically include the 
following: 
• a vision and objectives for national security; 
• an outline of the security environment – national, reg-
ional and global – prioritising threats and opportunities;  
• an outline of the capabilities needed to meet challenges 
and maximise opportunities;  
• an action plan for specific initiatives, and a more general 
statement of directions the government proposes to take 
to reinforce national security over the short and long 
term; and 
• a description of the government machinery and other 
measures proposed by the government to implement the 
strategy. 
Strategies should take full account of the nation’s 
governance and development context, be fully aligned 
with national, regional and international goals and com-
mitments, and not duplicate or seek to replace existing 
plans, strategies and machinery in the different areas of 
government. 
Finally, strategies should be clear, concise and read-
able documents – well understood and disseminated both 
within government and the wider community. 
Developing a strategy – consultation is the 
key  
An effective process for the development of a national sec-
urity strategy firstly requires strong whole-of-government 
leadership and direction, and secondly, a comprehensive 
program of consultation. Wide consultation is essential to 
gain a full understanding of the most pressing security 
issues across the nation, and to strengthen national owner-
ship of the strategy. Consultations – and the lively debates 
often produced – are also a valuable awareness raising 
mechanism, whether on discussions of cyber security, 
gender-based violence, illegal fishing, or other national 
security issues.  
Samoa and Vanuatu provide two examples. In the 
development of Samoa’s National Security Policy and  
the accompanying Implementation Strategy, the Chief 
Executive Officer of the Ministry of Prime Minister and 
Cabinet oversaw all stages of the project, keeping the Prime 
Minister regularly updated, and led the community con-
sultations on the two main islands, Upolu and Savai’i. In 
addition, more than 60 consultations were held with stake-
holders in ministries and other government bodies – and 
with representatives of village councils and other com-
munity leaders, the churches, civil society and the private 
sector. 
In the case of Vanuatu, the Prime Minister and several 
ministers kept abreast of the development of the National 
Security Strategy throughout the process. The consultation 
process was led by the Director General of the Ministry of 
Prime Minister and Cabinet, the Director General of the 
Interior Ministry and the Acting Police Commissioner/ 
Commander of the Vanuatu Mobile Force. In addition to 
individual consultations, a number of major seminars were 
held, involving civil servants, police, the Malvatumauri 
(advisory body of chiefs), and representatives of churches, 
other community organisations, civil society and the private 
sector. Consultations were held on the islands of Santo and 
Tanna, as well as in Port Vila. 
Best practice demands that national security strategies be 
treated as live documents which remain under regular review. 
It is important that strategies be updated as circumstances and 
perceived risks change, and that the nation’s security institu-
tions retain the flexibility and resources needed to respond 
quickly to new challenges as they arise. 
Values and institutions  
Security strategies typically set out a vision for a safe, 
stable, sustainable and prosperous nation, based on the 
foundation of the nation’s constitution, culture, trad-
itional knowledge, and – in the case of many Pacific 
Island countries – Christian principles. Security strategies 
also address the attributes and capabilities nations need to 
safeguard national security, ranging, for example, from 
strong and effective institutions; to political stability and 
good governance; justice and human rights for all; a strong, 
well-managed and resilient economy; and an effective 
promotion of the nation’s external interests.  
An additional need in some countries is stronger due 
diligence to weed out foreigners involved in transnational 
crime or those seeking to exploit offshore financial centres, 
citizenship schemes, and other areas. A fundamental require-
ment for security forces, whether they are police, armed 
forces, border protection, or other front line officials, is  
that they be professional, well trained and equipped, and 
accountable. 
In the case of PICs, there is a particular institutional 
need for resilient national systems for disaster preparedness, 
response and recovery, and climate change adaptation. 
Countries of the region are well served in this regard and 
natural disaster relief mechanisms, involving declarations 
of states of emergency are generally well practiced, effect-
tive, and enjoy widespread public support. Such mech-
anisms are now being utilised in managing the COVID-19 
threat, where the region overall has had conspicuous 
success to date in keeping the pandemic at bay. 
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Tradition and culture play a key role in 
underpinning social cohesion  
Communities and traditional institutions in the PICs – to an 
extent not widely appreciated outside the region – play a 
strong role in maintaining social cohesion, security and 
harmony. Their representatives normally would have a 
prominent role in the consultation process as a security 
strategy is developed. A priority is to find the right balance 
between traditional values and the requirements of the 
formal justice system, as well as between economic devel-
opment and land use. This will be increasingly challenging 
in our globalised and modern world. 
Regional collaboration is fundamental  
Many national security challenges are obviously global 
issues. For example, climate change, pandemics, trans-
national crime, cyber security, all of which demand inter-
national and regional collaboration. At the same time 
Pacific Island countries share many similar security chal-
lenges and values. They have a strong network of devel-
opment partners and regional organisations to work with – 
notably the Pacific Island Forum. The case for very close 
regional collaboration on security issues is compelling and 
should be highlighted in security strategies, particularly as 
most island countries are small with limited resources. 
In an increasingly contested and complex region, it is 
more important than ever for member nations to be able to 
promote and defend their interests abroad. Small island 
countries need strong foreign ministries and networks  
of missions abroad, although the cost of such networks  
is often prohibitive. Pacific Island countries have success-
fully pooled resources at their diplomatic mission to the 
United Nations in New York, and it would be opportune to 
examine such pooling models in other capitals of regional 
importance.  
Implementation of a strategy will determine 
its success 
The most important outcome of a national security strategy 
developed by a Pacific Island nation will, in many cases, be 
the implementation measures – notably those dealing with 
new or strengthened government machinery. Most nations 
of the region currently have only a very modest national 
security system, or not one at all, and only few personnel 
specifically assigned to cover national security issues. 
The key element of government machinery likely to 
emerge from a security strategy is a senior level national 
security committee or council, with the authority to take 
decisions and make recommendations to Cabinet. The 
essential requirement is that all relevant agencies be repre-
sented on such a body. A widespread problem in the region 
is poor collaboration and information sharing between 
government agencies on national security issues, and more 
generally the absence of a deeply rooted ‘whole-of-
government’ culture.  
Samoa and Vanuatu have opted for slightly different 
models in their national security machinery, although both 
nations have preserved the essential requirement of a 
whole-of-government body. 
In early 2019, Samoa established a National Security 
Committee, comprising representatives of relevant gov-
ernment agencies, at the level of chief executive officer or 
equivalent. The Committee meets regularly and has been 
playing a valuable role in coordinating advice and action on 
a range of security issues. In Vanuatu, a Bill for the estab-
lishment of a National Security Council, comprising spec-
ified ministers and agency heads, was passed in Parliament 
in December 2019. Work is now well advanced for the 
establishment of a National Security Council Secretariat and 
appointment of a National Security Adviser. 
National assessment capacities need 
boosting 
An important element of a national security strategy 
concerns a nation’s assessment capability. The Pacific 
region is weak in this regard, with a number of countries 
lacking capacity for their own independent assessment – 
essential for sound decision making on national and 
regional security issues. More generally, the lack of good 
quality data is a widespread problem in the Pacific region, 
whether related to crime, socioeconomic issues and liveli-
hoods, the economy, health, or climate change. Now is the 
time to boost national assessment capabilities, drawing on 
the growing amount of information and analysis available 
from open sources, as well as from regional organisations 
and trusted bilateral partners. 
One encouraging development is the establishment in 
2019 of the Pacific Fusion Centre. Australia is working in 
the Centre with regional security agencies and governments 
to strengthen information sharing and maritime domain 
awareness in relation to some of the threats outlined in the 
Boe Declaration, such as illegal fishing, drugs trafficking, 
and other transnational crimes. The Centre is also proving 
valuable in strengthening analytic practice and policy dec-
ision making processes within Pacific Island governments. 
Working together is the way forward 
Pacific Island nations have only limited scope to influence 
global trends. However, the region has shown that on some 
fundamental questions of human security, such as climate 
change, and the future of small islands states, it can have  
a strong voice globally. Pacific Island nations have also 
shown the world an innovative example of collective action, 
with the decision by Forum Foreign Ministers in April 2020 
to establish the ‘Pacific Humanitarian Pathway on COVID-
19’ under the Biketawa Declaration (PIFS 2020). 
In 2018, Forum leaders took the far-sighted step of 
embracing the concept of national security strategies. The 
COVID-19 crisis has generally reinforced the importance 
of sound decision making as nations face the plethora of 
security challenges ahead. National security strategies, if 
effectively implemented, will be a major boost to govern-
ments in dealing with the tough and finely balanced 
decisions that are becoming all too common in this complex 
world.  
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1  Tim George assisted the Government of Samoa develop its 
National Security Policy and Implementation Strategy in 
2018, and the Government of Vanuatu develop its National 
Security Strategy in 2018/2019. A former Australian 
diplomat, he was Special Coordinator to the Regional 
Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI) from 2006 
to 2009. These are his personal views. 
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Rethinking human security: COVID-19 and the social  
solidarity economy in the Pacific 
Steven Ratuva, University of Canterbury, New Zealand 
Introduction  
During their Nauru meeting in 2018 the Pacific Island 
leaders declared that climate change remains the ‘single 
greatest threat to the livelihood, security and wellbeing of 
the peoples of the Pacific’ (PIFS 2018:1). However, 
COVID-19 has overtaken events and changed the global 
and indeed regional security narratives in unprecedented 
ways. The sudden impact of COVID-19 has forced people 
into rethinking security and reframing development in our 
region. The pandemic has starkly revealed the fragility and 
lack of resilience of the much touted neoliberal economic 
system – which had to be bailed out through direct state 
subsidies and other forms of economic nationalisation 
(OECD 2020). Many in the Pacific – who relied on the frail 
market system for most of their lives – had to resort to the 
social solidarity economy (SSE) when they lost their jobs, 
state social protection resources ran dry and reliance on the 
formal economy looked bleak – SSE was key to survival in 
the midst of the seemingly endless effects of the pandemic. 
The pandemic has become the dominant security threat in 
the region and the world even displacing climate change 
and geopolitics from daily headlines.  
COVID-19 is unique as a human security threat because 
the virus has a domino effect on other human security 
conditions such as unemployment, poverty, psychological 
depression, collective trauma, sociopolitical unrest and insta-
bility, social risks and wellbeing hazard (UNDP 2020a). 
Social protection resources and mechanisms by the state are 
limited, especially for poor states and communities, which 
means that innovative alternatives have to be sought (ILO 
2020). For many Pacific Islanders, this means falling back 
on the SSE – which has been part of their lives for centuries 
– despite dramatic social transformation resulting from 
globalisation and deepening incorporation into the market 
economy.  
This paper examines the critical role of the SSE in 
Pacific Island communities in providing a vital human 
security response to the social and economic impacts of 
COVID-19. Human security is a term – first used and 
officially introduced in the 1994 United Nations (UN) 
Human Development Report – which refers to sustaining 
and protecting people’s economic, political, health, per-
sonal, food, environmental and community wellbeing and 
dignity (Jolly and Ray 2006).  
A central aspect of the Pacific SSE is communal 
capital, which refers to cultural mechanisms, norms and 
practices used to maintain collective social life, respond to 
crises and reproduce societal values, collective identities 
and communal institutions (Ratuva 2014). Since the advent 
of the capitalist system and colonial rule, Pacific Island 
economies consisted of a mixture of the introduced market 
system and SSE. Today, Pacific communities live at the 
intersection of these two systems – one of which is based 
on market exchange of individualised commodities – while 
the other is based on people-to-people social relations. 
Communities act as agencies for social life by selectively 
choosing aspects from both systems which they find con-
venient to suit particular circumstances – the result often a 
more nuanced system consisting of various degrees of both 
(Ratuva 2004). Thus, it would be nonsensical to talk of 
purely subsistence or purely capitalist economies because 
of the complex admixtures relating the two modes of pro-
duction (Ratuva 2014).  
When there is a crisis in the market economy people 
readily fall back on the SSE for sustenance and survival – 
exactly what is happening as a result of COVID-19 where a 
threat to human security has forced communities to seek 
alternatives as the crisis of the market economy deepens. 
This paper is divided into three main sections. Firstly, I 
examine the concepts of SSE and communal capital and 
their relationship to human security. Secondly, I provide an 
overview of the impact of COVID-19 on Pacific Island 
communities. Thirdly, I provide an example of how these 
communities have utilised aspects of the SSE and com-
munal capital as alternative survival strategies when the 
reach of the state and the effectiveness of the market system 
are limited.  
Social solidarity economy and communal 
capital: Conceptual narratives  
The notion of SSE has a long historical genesis but in the 
1990s, the significance of SSE in mainstream discourse was 
being recognised – especially when debates about altern-
ative means of development raged amongst scholars and 
policy makers (Rafaelli 2017). A global conference organ-
ised by ILO on the subject agreed to define SSE as a 
‘concept designating enterprises and organisations, in par-
ticular cooperatives, mutual benefit societies, associations, 
foundations and social enterprises, which have the specific 
feature of producing goods, services and knowledge while 
pursuing both economic and social aims and fostering 
solidarity’ (ILO 2009:1). This was in response to the need 
for alternate or complementary development paradigms  
to ‘re-balancing economic, social and environmental 
objectives’ (ibid). 
One of the basic foundations of the SSE is the recog-
nition of the significance of ethical values which prioritise 
the wellbeing of people and planet over profit and blind 
growth in economic development. The mushrooming of 
SSE based strategies, policies and programs in the last three 
decades has been attributed to:  
• deteriorating living conditions and deepening poverty of 
people around the world; 
 
February 2021 17 
• reaction against the commodification and trivialisation 
of humans as dispensable entities to be bought and sold 
in the market as part of neoliberal logic; and  
• unscrupulous environmental degradation and extractive 
commercial behaviour causing global environmental 
pollution and climate change (Rafaelli 2017).  
Thus, the growth of SSEs has been more or less spon-
taneous and grassroots led as communities rediscover 
traditional practices and cultural traits that they adapt to 
new technologies in the rapidly changing global climate 
(Peterson and Taylor 2003). SSE encompasses a wide range 
of programs that span multiple dimensions – including 
economic, social, environmental, political, communal and 
psychological spaces. The SSE is framed in different ways 
but some common principles on which it is built are equity, 
diversity, inclusion, democratised distribution of power and 
collective participation. The reaction against the predatory 
excesses of neoliberalism and the increasing inequality and 
marginalisation of the poor have raised issues about the ethics 
and morality of maximisation of profit at the cost of economic 
subjugation of others (Carrier 2018).   
SSE draws meaning and identity from local histories, 
culture and local socioeconomic realities while simul-
taneously being transformative. The idea of SSE has been 
around for centuries, and became a rallying point in res-
ponse to the predatory, extractive and exploitative nature  
of capitalism (Laville 2010). SSE is now being promoted  
by international organisations such as the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP) and International Labour 
Organization (ILO), civil society organisations, scholars and 
grassroots communities. During the Rio+20 Summit, there 
was growing demand for the UN system to be more active 
in promoting and mainstreaming SSE into its programs – 
which led to the formation of the United Nations Inter-
Agency Task Force on the Social and Solidarity Economy 
(UNTFSSE) in 2013. The UNTFSSE consists of 18 UN 
agencies and the OECD as members, 13 civil society organ-
isations as observers and ILO the Chair and Secretariat. The 
UNTFSSE approaches SSE as a system of: 
production and exchange of goods and services by a 
broad range of organizations and enterprises that pursue 
explicit social and/or environmental objectives…guided 
by the principles and practices of cooperation, solidarity, 
ethics and democratic self-management, among others, 
and can take the form of cooperatives, social enterprises, 
self-help groups or community associations, among 
others (UNTFSSE 2017:1).  
At the UN level, the SSE is seen as a mechanism to 
facilitate the realisation of the Sustainable Development 
Goals (SDGs). Debate on the nature and role of SSE has, 
however, continued to yield new discourses. For example, 
dominant discourses on SSE ‘remain poorly positioned for 
understanding the diverse models across the global South’ 
(Martinez et al. 2019:1). These alternative forms of pro-
duction, exchange and consumption have found traction 
because of the failure of the market economy to protect the 
wellbeing of the poor and vulnerable in society globally – 
especially in the wake of the 2008 global financial crisis.  
 
Some UN member states have put in place legislation, 
policies and programs to frame and support SSE programs – 
and some states even formed an International Leading Group 
on Social and Solidarity Economy (ILGSSE).  
Pandemic and human security in Pacific 
communities  
Although the COVID-19 infection rate in Pacific Island 
Countries (PICs) was uneven – with some having relatively 
high infection rates and some without any infection at all – 
the impact on human security in such areas as poverty, 
unemployment, lack of income, and state and other services 
has been deep and overwhelming. No PIC has been spared. 
WHO figures of 15 October, 2020 show the number of 
confirmed COVID-19 cases in the PICs had reached 16,909 
(WHO 2020a). The most affected countries are French 
Polynesia with 10,971 confirmed cases and 52 deaths; 
Guam with 5755 cases and 91 deaths and Northern Mariana 
with 100 infections and two deaths (WHO, 2020b).  
When the pandemic started, a total of 13 countries in the 
Pacific declared a state of emergency – American Samoa, 
Federated States of Micronesia (FSM), Guam, Nauru, Com-
monwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI), Palau, 
PNG, Republic of the Marshall Islands (RMI), Samoa, 
Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu and Vanuatu (UNESCO 
2020). Around six countries had a combination of partial 
and full lockdowns and curfews – Guam, Fiji, French 
Polynesia, New Caledonia, Tonga and Vanuatu. Schools 
were closed in almost all the countries with some later re-
opened (UNESCO 2020). As in other countries around the 
world, the lockdown in the Pacific was accompanied by 
challenges in information dissemination, misinformation on 
COVID-19, anxiety, psychosocial stress, and stigma. Those 
who were infected, as in the case of Fiji, became targets of 
online abuse and threats. Another associated challenge is 
physical distancing, especially as it is common for many to 
sleep and live in the same room in small houses (Lindsay 
2020). A number of initiatives have been established, such 
as the Vanuatu WASH project, to teach students at school 
to hand wash and cough into their elbows. One of the 
challenges is that some schools do not have hand washing 
and toilet facilities.   
Loss of jobs as a result of the collapse of the tourism 
industry has severely impacted Pacific economies and 
undermined young people’s employment prospects with the 
labour market’s ability to recover a huge challenge (ILO 
and ADB 2020). Some countries have been able to respond 
to this through wage subsidies but by and large these were 
not sufficient to mitigate the ever deepening economic 
crisis. People had to resort to the SSE. Many PICs had to 
seek emergency assistance from traditional aid donors to 
address their budgetary shortfalls adding to their already 
mounting debt levels (World Bank 2020a). Amongst other 
forms of assistance by various donors, for example, the 
World Bank provided US$20 million for PNG and US$7.4 
million for Fiji for COVID-19 response programs (World 
Bank 2020b). The Solomon Islands government issued a 
SI$120 million bond to absorb excess liquidity in the  
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market and minimise the impact of COVID-19. In addition, 
the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and China offered 
financial assistance as part of budgetary aid. Due to close 
contact with their diaspora population which make up  
the highest infection rate in the US, the Marshall Islands 
have been quite cautious but optimistic about their resil-
ience based approach, developed from their climate change 
adaptation strategies. The World Bank provided a US$2.5 
million assistance package to help strengthen the Marshall 
Islands resilience program.  
Apart from declaring emergencies, closing airports and 
ports and keeping strict watch on gatherings, there was also 
a challenge associated with general policing to ensure 
compliance with the regulations and political security, 
given the history of political instability in some PICs (The 
Guardian 2020). Vanuatu, like Fiji, had to confront the 
double jeopardy of COVID-19 and the destruction by 
tropical Cyclone Harold. Vanuatu’s exposure to the cyclone 
path has made it more resilient to disasters as well as 
receiving constant humanitarian aid. Vanuatu’s neighbour, 
New Caledonia, began easing social movement after a  
few days without any new cases of COVID-19. Samoa has 
followed a similar approach as it has been COVID-free 
from the outset, while taking strict measures to close the 
border to avoid a similar situation to the measles epidemic 
imported from New Zealand in 2019. French Polynesia, 
where infection has taken place, has relied largely on the 
French government to provide financial resources for its 
responses to COVID-19.  
The relative isolation of most PICs also acts as a sort of 
safety net against large scale infection despite the fact that 
in human security terms, the Pacific Island Countries and 
Territories (PICTs) are a very high risk category because of 
their susceptibility to non-communicable diseases. Ten 
countries in the Pacific have the highest obesity rates in the 
world – and there is a prevalence of the triple affliction of 
malnutrition – a condition where undernutrition, micro-
nutrient deficiencies and obesity coexist (FAO 2020). The 
leading cause of death in these countries is non-commun-
icable diseases, a result of a dramatic change in diet from 
fresh traditional food from the sea and land to high carb, fat, 
sugar and salt processed food. In some Pacific communities, 
imported food constitutes more than half of the population’s 
food intake. The Pacific Humanitarian Pathway has allowed 
the flow of imported food supplies to the islands as people 
focus more on family gardening.  
Disruptions in food chain supplies due to port and 
airport closures resulting in high prices of imported goods, 
together with the surge in unemployment, drastic reduction 
in cash income and demise in corporate and state services, 
has compelled people to seek solace in alternative and more 
sustainable forms of production, sustenance and wellbeing. 
Many have fallen back on the SSE as a way of sustaining 
their wellbeing when the market economy which they had 
put so much faith in was no longer delivering goods, 
employment, food and other basic necessities of life, which 
they have been dependent on for a long time. I will now 
examine this in detail.    
Human security, social solidarity economy 
and communal capital: The example of the 
barter system  
Since the impact of the COVID-19 lockdown was felt, most 
Pacific Island communities resorted to alternative means of 
sustenance – the most familiar and one they naturally 
associated with was the SSE (UNDP 2020b). This is not to 
suggest that the SSE is new, but rather its significance has 
been heightened by the shortcomings of the market econ-
omy and the onset of unemployment, poverty, social depri-
vation and food insecurity. The relationship between the 
market system and the SSE has been a feature of Pacific 
socioeconomic life and human security systems. This 
syncretic relationship can be very complex and involves a 
dynamic synergy between a series of life narratives and 
worldviews, such as: 
• subsistence production and capitalist exchange; 
• individual ownership and collective rights to land and 
property; 
• traditional cosmological narratives and Christian ethos; 
and  
• indigenous episteme and globalised commodified 
knowledge (Ratuva 2014).  
These narratives are not necessarily opposing binaries 
or dichotomous. Rather, they have created nuanced patterns 
of relationships over time, where various norms and prac-
tices oscillate across the cultural ‘boundaries’creating new 
forms of cultural synthesis, accommodation and symbiosis. 
At the same time there can be conditions between these 
narratives, or more dominant values may prevail in certain 
contexts. Contrary to the deterministic deficit assumption 
that Pacific Islanders are helpless and always vulnerable to 
external and global forces beyond their control, the reality 
is that – despite their marginal position in the global neo-
liberal order – Pacific Islanders are still able to make 
conscious and rational choices in relation to both Western 
and indigenous modes of production, governance and 
innovation – as part of their adaptation and resilience 
strategies. These choices become much more urgent and 
distinct in times of crises as people become desperate to 
decide on the best priorities for their circumstances and 
available resources to support these priorities and responses. 
During the COVID-19 pandemic, transformative effects 
of communal choices and expressions of community power 
provided the basis for SSE. Due to the dramatic demise in 
the availability of cash, an urgent task was to resuscitate the 
practice of barter system or what ethnographers refer to as 
generalised reciprocity. The regional barter system init-
iative started in Fiji as the ‘Barter for Better Fiji’ project and 
the idea spread to Tonga, Samoa, Vanuatu, New Zealand 
and other PICs (Williams 2020). Tora describes the situ-
ation in the Guardian article of 8 May 2020 thus: 
The barter system is experiencing a resurgence across 
the Pacific with similar Facebook pages in Tonga – 
‘Barter for Change’ – two in Samoa ‘Barter for Better 
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members – and one in Vanuatu ‘Barter for Nambawan 
Life Vanuatu’ – as the island nations are beginning to face 
economic difficulties due to Covid-19 (Tora 2020:1). 
Since May 2020, this barter system has expanded in 
geographical reach and demographic participation and is 
now a major component of many PICs’ economies. The 
traditional version of this reciprocity system in Fiji is 
referred to as veisa, which literally means to pair up, 
exchange or balance up. Various forms of reciprocity were 
common throughout the Pacific. For example, the Kula 
trade connected different islands and communities in PNG, 
while trade on red bird feathers, mats, canoes and other 
artifacts existed for centuries among Fiji, Tonga and Samoa.   
While the barter system still exists in some form or 
other in various Pacific communities, the ‘new’ initiative 
eclipsed this system taking centre stage as a dominant mode 
of exchange and also utilising virtual space as the arena for 
digital exchange, rather than face to face negotiations. 
Interested buyers and sellers would publicise their intents 
online to which people would respond with deals being 
settled virtually and the actual exchange of goods taking 
place face to face. Some examples of these forms of exchange 
are outlined below in the 8 May article in the Guardian:   
Two piglets for a pre-loved kayak, a taxi fare in 
exchange for fresh produce, hot cross buns for online 
tutoring, an old carpet for a professional photography 
session, vegetable seedlings for homemade pies, and 
offers to have backyards cleaned for prayers. These are 
just a few examples of the hundreds of barter trades that 
are taking place across Fiji since a Facebook page 
‘Barter for Better Fiji’ was created a few weeks ago in 
response to sharp falls in employment due to coronavirus. 
The page now has more than 100,000 members, in a 
country of just under 900,000 people (Tora 2020:1). 
The use of new virtual technology and a modern range 
of goods has transformed the veisa, based on small-scale 
communal exchange, into a mass exchange system facil-
itated by modern digital infrastructure. Rather than just 
calling this ‘barter exchange’ – which would confuse it with 
traditional exchange systems such as veisa – I propose to 
call it adapted virtual barter exchange (AVBE).   
AVBE has a number of advantages. Firstly, it can be 
used transculturally without much ethical or normative 
restriction. All ethnic groups have adopted AVBE in Fiji as 
a common cultural norm in these times of economic 
difficulties and uncertainties. Secondly, because of AVBE’s 
reliance on social media for community connection, the 
process of negotiation and exchange can be instant across 
geographical boundaries. In a population with high mobile 
phone coverage such as Fiji, the AVBE system can spread 
quickly encompassing a large group of people within a very 
short time. Thirdly, direct financial input is minimal, in  
fact in many cases, there is none, which augurs well for 
traditional subsistence-based communities such as those in 
the Pacific. Fourthly, AVBE is inclusive and equitable in 
terms of the power of the traders, gender and socioeconomic 
status. The system unpacks and reconfigures the unequal 
and often exploitative class divide and gender division of 
labour – characteristic of the capitalist system. Each trader 
has the power to negotiate, determine the value of goods 
and services exchanged and the right to engage in the actual 
exchange. The value of goods is determined by their social 
function as seen by both parties rather than actual ‘market’ 
value. Lastly, AVBE is underpinned by the moral virtues of 
trust and social solidarity – using communal capital rather 
than finance as the basis for building networks, com-
munication and exchange.  
By following the trading and discussions online, it is 
quite apparent that in some ways the AVBE has created a 
strong trans-ethnic, class and system bond which has 
nurtured a powerful social solidarity connection between 
people within communities. Through months of evolution 
and innovation, the AVBE has become more than just an 
economic activity – expanding and deepening – to become 
an economic and social system of production, exchange, 
networking and cultural transformation.  
Apart from AVBE, other forms of SSE activities have 
mushroomed in response to COVD-19, which – to name a 
few – include:  
• the ‘green thumb’ model for local farming;  
• rise beyond the reef economic empowerment for women 
in rural communities;  
• incubator and seed funding for start-ups by those losing 
their source of income;  
• smart farms Fiji;  
• Pacific Blue farming; and  
• alternative communities trade (UNDP 2020b).  
Land is an important part of the social and solidarity 
economy because of its socio-cultural and economic value. 
It has become a sought after entity – not as a form of real 
estate capital – but as a key aspect of community livelihood. 
Communally owned land in most Pacific communities has 
acted as a social safety net during times of economic 
difficulties, enabling ordinary people to access and utilise 
land for farming. Had land been privately owned, as some 
neoliberal economists have been advocating for a long time 
in the Pacific (Duncan 2014), this would have been a very 
different story.  
Community-driven innovations such as AVBE are the 
basis of the emerging SSE which provides an efficient 
social safety net for thousands of Pacific peoples across the 
world’s largest ocean. SSE is based on the utilisation of 
local communal capital to expand the depth and reach of 
the social safety net. The significance of aspects of com-
munal capital such as kinship based social networks, 
reciprocal goods exchange, collective labour, group rights, 
cultural connections, common ethical principles and shared 
intellectual property are important human factors which 
drive and sustain the AVBE as an example of SSE.  
Conclusion: Rethinking human security 
One of the most durable lessons COVID-19 has taught 
Pacific communities is the need to look inwards, utilise 
existing communal capital and develop community based 
resilience in response to threats to their human security. The 
pandemic has literally decimated the core of the market 
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economy such as tourism in many PICs which has impacted 
dramatically on people’s wellbeing forcing people to think 
about alternative systems of exchange, production and 
means of livelihood.  
This paper has provided a snapshot of how human 
security of Pacific communities has been impacted by the 
pandemic and how communities have resorted to mitigating 
strategies rooted in their sociocultural systems of adaptation 
and building resilience. Over the years, Pacific commun-
ities have engaged with the market economy and their 
traditional SSE in a syncretic manner, and have been 
selective in using aspects of both systems to suit their pur-
poses in a dynamic and conscious way. This has developed 
a sense of resilience which has enabled Pacific communities 
to adapt to dramatic transformation brought about by 
natural disasters and human induced crises. When COVID-
19 struck, many of these communities were in a position to 
mobilise their communal capital to respond to the socio-
economic impacts of the health calamity. An example of 
this was the organisation of the AVBE which combined 
both traditional concepts of reciprocity and the capitalist 
strategy of virtual marketing and networking. The result is 
a multipurpose and functional system, which combines both 
economic redistribution and social solidarity, underpinned 
by the principles of equity, diversity and inclusion. An 
important component of SSE is land utilisation to provide 
for family food security. Land – often defined as a com-
modity in the capitalist discourse – is now seen as a safety 
net for community wellbeing. Other projects associated 
with land and the SSE have mushroomed across the PICs as 
communities become conscious of the need to utilise their 
communal cultural capital in a world where commercial 
capital can no longer provide for their basic needs.  
These dynamic developments and creative initiatives 
have made us rethink human security. The conventional 
view is that external intervention in the form of human-
itarian aid, social protection programs and expert strategic 
thinking are required to address the situation of ‘vulnerable’ 
communities such as those in PICs. This dependency 
approach has been brought into question by COVID-19 
which has provided conditions for rethinking the signif-
icance of SSE as a basis for addressing basic human security 
issues such as poverty, unemployment, hunger and lack of 
income. Harnessing the power of communal capital – such 
as the interconnecting synergies between reciprocal sys-
tems of trade, kinship networks, collective labour and skills, 
social and spiritual relationship to land and environment 
and connection with the ancestral and wider cosmology – 
provide a lifeline to the PICs’ longterm human security 
issues. Even if the market economy does not deliver the 
goods, the SSE will still form the basis of people’s 
livelihoods – in bad and good times. 
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666 Reframing security in Pacific Island Countries 
and Territories1 
Christian Girard and Sara N Amin, University of the South Pacific and  
Daniel Watson, Queensland University of Technology  
(In)security in Pacific Island Countries and Territories (PICTs) has been subject to 
neocolonialist framings of small, remote areas in ‘need of help’ from larger powers – 
ideas that have been challenged by Pacific peoples who emphasise the vastness, global 
significance and influence, connections, and strengths found in indigenous knowl-
edge, relations and practices (Hau’ofa 2008). There is a need to reframe security in 
PICTs to take into account contexts and interconnectedness, and encompasses human 
and environmental security.  
Aligning local and global priorities  
In security studies, there has been a tendency to separate domestic and external 
security threats and prioritise the latter. Concerns about global security threats 
motivate countries with stronger economies to engage with PICTs in order to assist 
with setting their security agendas and ensure alignment with external priorities. 
Australia, New Zealand, the US, China, and Japan have all influenced and helped to 
develop the security agendas of several PICTs (Fry and Tarte 2015). It could be argued 
that domestic security challenges are becoming blurred with regional and global 
external security considerations, particularly so with PICTs where domestic and 
external security issues are often linked in both direct and complex ways to global 
issues, such as climate change, often perceived as the most important security threat 
currently faced by the region. For example, water security, usually considered a 
domestic issue, is a national issue in the Pacific given the limited access to fresh water 
supplies and the challenge of waste disposal (Manton 2014). Climate change is 
exacerbating water and food security issues in the Pacific. Chand and Taupo (2020) 
argue the nature and scope of climate change as a security threat in the PICTs include 
the potential loss of sovereignty and nationhood, making the common distinction 
between domestic and external security inadequate. 
PICTs continue to find themselves in situations where the actions of their 
geopolitical allies are often in direct conflict with their security needs. As an example, 
during the most recent Pacific Islands Forum meeting in August 2019, Tuvalu and 
other PICTs articulated the urgency of climate change for their security. In response, 
Australia pledged AUD 500 million to fight climate change in PICTs, while 
simultaneously expressing an unwillingness to examine its use of coal, seabed mining 
and extractive industries as major contributing factors to climate change, not to 
mention voicing strong concerns about China’s growing influence (Clarke 2019). This 
type of conflicting dynamic is common, as highlighted by what Glover (2012) defines 
as ‘Australia’s Policy Paradox’ on fossil fuels and carbon emissions; what Barrett, 
Kurian and Wright (2015) refer to as the ‘Contradictory Politics of New Zealand’s 
Climate Change Policies in the Pacific’; and what Dvorak (2020) describes in relation 
to the US’ nuclear agenda in the region. These actions and policies not only contradict 
the very discourse of many allies supporting the PICTs, but come into conflict with 
PICTs’ own security agenda. 
A key issue here is the tendency to separate different types of securities from 
each other as though they were not intertwined. For example, Elliott (2015:11) 
points out that environmental security tends to be ‘divorced’ from human security: 
The concept of environmental security, on the other hand, has become increasingly 
divorced from its potentially heterodox and critical roots in human security. Rather it 
has been captured by an orthodoxy that focuses primarily on non-traditional threats 
to traditional referents (i.e., the state) and that increasingly perceives ‘environmental 
security’ as a synonym for the threat multiplier dimensions of climate change. Rather 
than empowering a people-centred approach that places emancipation at the centre of 
human/environmental security, the author argues (following Mason and Zeitoun) that 
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This is particularly important and problematic for PICTs 
as the international agenda and environmental movement 
sometimes neglects the impact on livelihoods and the socio-
economic challenges and needs of vulnerable populations see 
(Forsyth et al. 1998) even though it is acknowledged that 
environmental security and sustainable development are 
linked and are also key to poverty reduction.  
The crucial point is that climate change is about much 
more than traditional environmental concerns with parks, 
pollution, preservation, and population. According to 
those who specify climate change in terms of national or 
human security, it is a much more important issue, 
potentially leading to major social disruptions and pos-
sibly wars, and hence a much higher policy priority 
(Dalby 2015:83).  
The reality of geopolitical power at the international 
level has often meant that PICTs are inclined to adopt an 
agenda dominated by external powers that:  
• does not necessarily correspond to their main priorities 
and concerns;  
• continues to ignore the connections between environ-
mental security, human security and freedom from 
violence and war; and 
• remains with powers and centres outside of their direct 
control and authority.  
As an example, according to Schoeffel (2020), external 
powers utilise aid and development mechanisms to influence 
and prioritise gender equality in political and economic 
institutions within PICTs. The context-specific needs of 
women and sexual minorities in the region are often not taken 
into account by these external actors in either agenda-setting 
and implementation processes. As a result, interventions can 
reinforce gender inequalities, delegitimise policies and laws 
designed to support women and sexual minorities, and even 
produce additional violence and insecurity against these 
groups (Bull et al. 2020).  
However, successful management of and response to 
certain issues are beyond regional and local powers and lie 
more at the global level. If priorities are not aligned, the 
global impact and activities of major global players, espec-
ially in relation to climate change, can counter the efforts of 
the PICTs themselves, highlighting once more the import-
ance of cooperation. 
This does not minimise the impact and influence PICTs 
can have to influence the international and global agenda. 
PICTs’ success in mobilising against nuclear testing in the 
1980s testifies to their leadership and capacity. In fact, 
Dornan (2020) and Dvorak (2020) highlight that the scale 
and urgency of the security threat posed by climate change 
in the Pacific has created an important movement through 
regional bodies that underscores the need to challenge the 
status quo and re-think our model of economic development 
and economic security, our frameworks of responsibility 
and accountability, and to reconfigure power relations.  
Reconfiguring power relationships 
The focus on security and vulnerability has increased 
interest in resilience. Resilience can be understood as the 
capacity and means to cope with risks, shocks, and stress 
(Sirven 2007) or to ‘bounce back’ after a shock or crises 
(Boas and Rothe 2016).  
Resilience discourse stresses rationales and practices 
such as adaptation to risk, shared responsibility, and 
self-capacity to achieve human security. In line with 
such a discourse, empowerment of vulnerable com-
munities by funding adaptation projects in the global 
South became reconsidered as a part of a broader 
security strategy.  
This resilience discourse tends to produce a devolv-
ment from the state providing security to communities, 
individuals, the private sector and civil society (Chmutina, 
Lizarralde, Dainty and Bosher 2016) bearing this respons-
ibility. As Dinnen (2020) argues, while privatisation of 
security can produce and support innovation, entrepre-
neurship, and economic opportunity, it can simultaneously 
increase insecurities by entrenching existing power ine-
qualities and undermining the legitimacy of state actors. 
Most PICTs comprise jurisdictions spread across multi-
island territories with porous borders and limited capacities 
to protect against crime and other security threats. This 
necessitates coordination and collaboration among local, 
regional, and international stakeholders to minimise regional 
risks and to allow for applicable responses to immediate and 
perceived threats (Watson and Dinnen 2020). 
There is however, a parallel resilience and empower-
ment discourse oriented towards transforming the conditions 
that produced the insecurities in the first place (Tschakert 
2009). In this discourse, notions of responsibility and 
accountability are centred on those who have produced the 
insecurities. For example, Oels (2015:189–190) argues that 
the discourse that focuses on resilience and migration as a 
result of climate change, ‘depoliticizes the issue of climate 
change in a radical way’ and contributes to ‘legitimizing the 
displacement of millions of people’, taking away the res-
ponsibility of industrialised countries to reduce emissions. 
Refusing to disconnect the causes of climate change from the 
solutions proposed is an important act of discursive resistance 
that aligns with the position and reactions of PICT leaders as 
highlighted by Chand and Taupo (2020). Dvorak (2020) also 
argues this in relation to the Marshall Islands’ continued 
efforts for justice beyond simple monetary compensation 
from the ravaging effects of nuclear testing.  
Efforts to relocate responsibility can be seen in dif-
ferent types of activity throughout the Pacific. For example, 
in 2014, the Pacific Climate Warriors Campaign, involving 
30 Pacific Islanders and hundreds of Australians, used 
kayaks and traditionally built canoes to occupy the harbour 
and turn away 10 of the 11 coal ships set to collect their 
cargo from Newcastle, Australia. This very material and 
symbolic action was explicitly designed to make visible the 
‘connections between the actions of the Australian fossil 
fuel industry and the impacts that anthropogenic climate 
change is having on many Pacific Islands’ (Fair 2015:58). 
Another recent example is the Pacific Island Students 
Fighting Climate Change (PISFCC) who are currently 
pressing Pacific leaders to bring up the issue with the Inter-
national Court of Justice (ICJ) and ask for an ‘advisory 
opinion on the obligations of states under international law 
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to protect the rights of present and future generations 
against the adverse effects of climate change’ (Vanuatu 
Climate Action Network, 2019).  
In these examples, resilience and empowerment are 
located in radically different worldviews that people can 
bring to deal with global climate change and environmental 
security problems. Indigenous customs that emphasise 
connectivity, interrelatedness, and responsibility in relation 
to both people/communities and the environment are central 
to what PICTs and Pacific communities are asserting. These 
require going beyond extractive practices and technological 
solutions to reduce environmental insecurity and realising 
that cultivating the resilience to deal with change and 
insecurity will require re-ordering the current global politi-
cal and economic regime (Mar 2016; Hau’ofa 1994).  
Identifying ‘traditional’ systems as potential sites of 
resilience can also be found in discussions around food 
security. While there are many policy efforts at INGO, gov-
ernmental and media/civil society levels focusing on raising 
awareness of traditional food systems and practices, such 
efforts tend to fall back on individualising responsibility for 
the provision of food security. However, for traditional food 
security systems to be viable and sustainable, one cannot 
ignore the current causes of food insecurity in the PICTs 
brought about by colonisation, neoliberal globalisation,  
and environmental degradation linked to climate change. 
Again, resilience and empowerment located in tradition or 
community participation can only be sustainable and mean-
ingful in the context of re-configuration of power relations. 
The modernisation discourse, globalised and imposed 
through colonialism and as well as the implementation of 
multiple international development projects, centres the 
citizen-state relationship as the primary relationship to 
order behaviour.  All other relationships (religious, cultural, 
gender) are meant to be secondary and subordinated to the 
relationship to the state, to ensure the security of both the 
state and its subjects. However, this approach has produced 
many types of insecurities, including through violence used 
by states against specific populations to subordinate alter-
native identity and community groups (Castells 2011). In 
addition, neoliberal globalisation has not only left the state 
unable (or unwilling) to provide for the economic and 
health security of its population, it has also weakened the 
ties that could facilitate security outside of the state. (see 
Carnegie and King 2020). As Ratuva (2014) argues in 
relation to understanding social protection in the Pacific, the 
modernisation discourse has also created a deficit in 
thinking about security provision. By locating relationships 
beyond the state as both subordinate and often problematic, 
socio-cultural relationships and communities are ignored as 
a potential source of security enhancement. Yet, as Amin 
and Girard (2020), Watson and Dinnen (2020) and Forsyth 
(2020) show, these non-state relationships located in faith, 
wantokism, kastom and other cultural communities have 
been central in PICTs to ensure (public) security. 
Central to many key tenets of Pacific ideas of 
governance is the ability to take the individual not as an 
abstract citizen stripped of their identities and relationships, 
but instead embedded in relationships. In such a per-
spective, resilience will not be found in the individual or 
vulnerable community forced to come up with their own 
solutions and adaptations, but instead from resources and 
knowledge that can be mobilised because of the relation-
ships and interconnectedness between individuals, (local, 
regional and global) communities and the state. This 
suggests that instead of marginalising or excluding non-
state relationships and identities in efforts to reduce gender 
(or other) insecurities, it is necessary to take them into 
account both in recognising their role in producing 
insecurities and in their potential to rectify them. The key 
here is to draw on context-specific resources (leadership, 
relationships, ideas, and discourses) that challenge the 
reification of culture, tradition, and identity as mono-
lithically patriarchal and/or exclusive of certain ideas. 
(In)securities in the time of COVID 
The impact of the COVID pandemic has further com-
pounded regional insecurities. While most PICTs have 
successfully managed to control the spread of COVID-19 
in their communities, mitigating measures such as lock-
downs, are having serious impacts on their economies and 
the livelihoods of their peoples, particularly in countries 
dependent on tourism.  
One major challenge is that there are no swathes of 
tourists waiting for borders to re-open to visit these places 
en masse and that the pandemic in these countries may tame 
the demand and enthusiasm even further if the health 
situation appears risky or out of control. Even if PICTs were 
willing to accept the risks and trade-offs of re-opening to 
regular tourism (without extended quarantines or other 
requirements that may limit appeal or demand), there is no 
guarantee that this will bring the desired levels of tourists 
required to boost their economies in these difficult times. 
Hence, PICTs may end up trading relative security from 
COVID for greater health risks by exposing their popu-
lations and their health system for small potential economic 
gains from international tourism. 
While a handful of economically wealthy countries 
have already pre-ordered the majority of vaccines to be 
produced worldwide, many countries may end up having a 
very hard time getting them, particularly countries with less 
economic power and financial leverage. This is where the 
current geopolitical tensions over influence in the Pacific 
may play to the PICTs’ advantage, as Australia has com-
mitted (in principle) to securing vaccines for the PICTs – an 
action seen by some as an attempt to gain points in the 
ongoing war of influence between China and Australia 
within the region (Butler 2020). The relatively small 
populations of most PICTs also make this promise more 
achievable and affordable in practical terms. ‘Vaccine 
diplomacy’ may therefore play a key role in the overall 
‘COVID-19 diplomacy’ in PICTs, adding to other current 
strategic actions like budget support and the provision of 
medical supplies and equipment (Zhang 2020). 
Finally, the economic crisis produced by the global 
pandemic has made sites of resilience in Pacific com-
munities more visible. Ratuva (2014) argued the importance 
of recognising ‘culture-based indigenous social protection 
systems used by subaltern Pacific communities as a means 
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of building resilience and developing adaptation strategies’. 
As he states: ‘Far from being “failed”, Pacific communities 
have over the years developed culture-based mechanisms, 
not captured in Western-based classificatory schemas, 
which provide them with resilience and adaptability in the 
face of neoliberalism and globalisation’ (Ratuva 2014:42).  
In particular, in the current situation, many Pacific 
communities have been able to draw on such culture-based 
mechanisms of reciprocity, relationality, care and respons-
ibility to buffer the impact of loss of employment and wages 
(Kabutaulaka 2020). This speaks to the importance of 
looking beyond the state and formal institutions as a site of 
social protection. For many PICTs, this type of resilience 
also serves to buffer state responses. The pandemic-related 
strain placed on state-owned security service organisations 
across the region has revealed the disadvantages of relying 
on external support for day-to-day operations. It has also 
reinforced the resilience of organisations where strained 
financial resources, limited technical and logistic support, 
human resource shortfalls and limited physical resources 
affect but do not prevent service provision (Watson 2020). 
Moreover, transactional ideas embodied in the founding of 
the Barter for a Better Fiji, a Facebook-based bartering 
platform set up to respond to the loss of earnings and closure 
of services during the pandemic, and its replication across 
Oceania, points to the creativity with which communities 
have responded to the current crisis and the ways Pacific 
communities are modelling new ways of building security.  
Conclusion 
If security and resilience are to be sustainable and ongoing, 
there is an urgent need to align local and global security 
priorities, as well as reconfigure the political economy of 
relationships, identities and ‘traditions’ as potential sources 
of resilience in security provision. In the context of the 
PICTs, contemporary security crises, a revitalisation of 
indigenous worldviews and knowledge (Smith 2013), a 
push for Southern theorisation (Connell 2014), and tech-
nologies that facilitate collective action and solidarity 
(Titifanue et. al. (2017) have created an emerging oppor-
tunity to produce new ways of reconfiguring power 
relationships between different states, as well as, and 
perhaps more importantly, between communities and states 
within and beyond national borders. 
Note 
1  Parts of this chapter have been reproduced with the 
permission of Routledge from: 
 Amin, SN, C Girard and D Watson 2020, ‘Security, 
resilience and resistance in the PICs: Aligning priorities and 
relocating responsibility’, in SN Amin, D Watson and C 
Girard (eds), Mapping Security in the Pacific: A focus on 
context, gender and organisational culture, Routledge, 231–
243. 
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Australia and security in the Pacific Islands 
James Batley, The Australian National University 
The Pacific Islands have traditionally been seen as imping-
ing on Australia’s national security in two distinct but inter-
twined ways: first by serving (potentially or actually, 
willingly or unwillingly) as a platform or vector through 
which hostile external parties might threaten Australia; and 
second, by engaging Australian interests because of their 
own internal instability and vulnerability. Against this back-
ground, Australia faced a range of commonly-cited chal-
lenges in the region in 2020, including policy gaps that exist 
between Australia and many Pacific Island countries on 
issues such as climate change, and the role and influence of 
China in the region.   
The Australian government’s 2017 Foreign Policy 
White Paper set out a vision of ‘helping to integrate Pacific 
countries into the Australian and New Zealand economies 
and our security institutions’, something it described as 
‘essential to the long-term stability and economic prospects 
of the Pacific’. More recently, Australia’s 2020 Defence 
Strategic Update outlined Australia’s aim not only to work 
with its neighbours and partners, but to ‘shape our environ-
ment’ and to ‘deter actions against our interests’ against an 
array of threats and potential threats.1 While in no way 
suggesting that these statements represent the totality of 
Australia’s current approach in the region, it is nevertheless 
helpful to consider them as part of Australia’s broader 
approach for enhanced engagement with the Pacific Islands 
region, or its ‘Pacific Step-up’. 
Both sets of statements are consistent with long-standing 
Australian anxieties about the ways in which the Pacific 
Islands bear on Australia’s national security that are noted 
above. Even so, both also suggest a change of tone – at least 
– compared to the way the Pacific islands region has 
traditionally been considered in Australian policy statements. 
Both statements come against the background of a changing 
strategic environment in the region and in particular the rise 
of China: the Strategic Update is notably frank in describing 
the ‘deterioration’ in Australia’s strategic environment in 
recent years (The Pacific chapter of the Foreign Policy White 
Paper, drafted in less strident times, referred rather more 
coyly to ‘increasing competition for influence’ in the region). 
At the same time, it would be a misreading of Australian 
policy to see the language in either of these two key 
statements as driven solely by China’s rise in the region; both 
the Foreign Policy White Paper and the Strategic Update 
explicitly describe ways in which the internal stability and 
development trajectories of Pacific Island countries (at least 
those closest to Australia geographically, in particular) 
continue to have implications for Australia’s national 
security and to demand policy responses. 
Challenges 
It has become a commonplace observation that Australia’s 
relations with the Pacific have come under stress in recent 
years due to a range of factors. The issue of climate change 
is an obvious starting point; although there have been 
tensions between Australia and its Pacific neighbours on  
this issue for many years, it is clear that they have become 
much more acute of late. The Pacific Islands Forum’s 2018 
Boe Declaration, which describes climate change as ‘the 
greatest threat to the livelihoods, security and wellbeing of 
the peoples of the Pacific’, is often held out as emblematic of, 
and even in some senses as bringing to a head, the gap 
between Australian and Pacific island perceptions and policy 
in this area (see for instance Fry 2019). Differences over  
the issue of climate change at the 2019 Pacific Islands Forum 
leaders meeting were particularly acute, and received wide-
spread media coverage at the time.   
Equally, many Pacific island countries do not share 
Australia’s geostrategic outlook or anxieties, or at least 
aren’t prepared to say so publicly. For some, this is a matter 
of foreign policy doctrine as a number of Pacific island 
countries explicitly espouse ‘friends to all, enemies to none’ 
foreign policies. Three countries of key interest to Australia 
(Papua New Guinea, Vanuatu, and Fiji) are members of the 
Non-Aligned Movement, underlining their desire to be seen 
as independent actors internationally.  
Some leaders, such as Samoa’s Prime Minister 
Tuilaepa, have expressed scepticism over the relevance of 
concepts that are important to Australia, such as the Indo–
Pacific, arguing that such constructs simply miss the point 
in the Pacific, and do not reflect Pacific Island priorities. In 
a 2018 speech, Tuilaepa declared: 
under the flagship of our Blue Pacific identity, we are 
building a collective voice amidst the geopolitical din on 
the existential threat of climate change that looms for all 
of our Pacific family.… The renewed vigour with which 
a ‘Free and Open Indo–Pacific strategy’ is being 
advocated and pursued leaves us with much uncertainty. 
For the Pacific there is a real risk of privileging ‘Indo’ 
over the ‘Pacific’ (Tuilaepa 2018). 
Tuilaepa has also spoken on behalf of many Pacific 
Islanders in expressing concern that they were being asked 
to choose sides in the burgeoning strategic contest between 
the United States (and its allies) and China, and in doing so 
risked impairing their autonomy and agency as sovereign 
states. He was quoted in a 2019 interview as saying ‘Their 
[i.e. Australia and its allies] enemies are not our enemies.’ 
In a similar vein, Forum Secretary General Dame Meg 
Taylor stated in early 2019: 
I reject the terms of the dilemma which presents the 
Pacific with a choice between a China alternative and  
our traditional partners. Unfortunately, this framing 
remains the dominant narrative in the public debate  
about our region in the context of today’s geostrategic 
competition… In general, Forum members view China’s 
increased actions in the region as a positive development, 
one that offers greater options for financing and 
 
February 2021 29 
development opportunities – both directly in partnership 
with China, and indirectly through the increased com-
petition in our region (Taylor 2019 (I)). 
Taylor’s studied even-handedness in the face of rising 
geostrategic tension in the region has led her to be more than 
obliquely critical of aspects of Australia’s approach in the 
region, as in another 2019 speech where she declared: 
we continue to observe a multitude of security measures 
and initiatives introduced in the region, including the 
expansion of the naval bases at Lombrum on Manus 
Island and in northern Australia. Reportedly, there is 
also a proposal for a naval base at Stirling Island in 
Western Solomon Islands. Perhaps, an apt observation 
is that of Vanuatu’s Foreign Minister the Honourable 
Ralph Regenvanu who has questioned this ‘increasing 
militarisation of the (Pacific’ (Taylor 2019 (II)). 
This survey of Pacific views is cursory and selective at 
best but it nevertheless illustrates a gap that undoubtedly 
exists between Australia’s security perceptions and ambi-
tions and that of key Pacific Island countries and regional 
leaders. Indeed, some (e.g., Fry 2019) have even argued that 
Australia’s policies have been counterproductive, driving 
countries such as Papua New Guinea, Fiji, and Samoa into 
even closer engagement with China. So is this gap 
unbridgeable? To what extent does it diminish Australia’s 
ability to pursue its security interests in the Pacific Islands, 
and in particular, its objectives of integration, shaping and 
deterring? 
Challenges in context 
The first answer to this question should be to note that dis-
agreements and tensions between Australia and countries in 
the region are hardly a new phenomenon. Indeed, for those 
with long enough memories, this might almost be seen as 
situation normal as there never was a golden age of perfect 
comity between Australia and its Pacific Island neighbours 
to contrast to today’s state of affairs. Noisy headlines have 
long been a staple in the region’s relations with its large 
neighbour. Disagreements should not necessarily be seen as 
undermining key relationships or put forward as definitive 
indicators of declining influence. 
Second, while Pacific Island countries may be united at 
a regional level on the question of climate change, it is much 
less clear that this issue is a deal-breaker in Australia’s 
bilateral relationships with Pacific Island countries. Indeed, 
there would seem to be little evidence to support the case 
that climate change stands in the way of productive bilateral 
relationships. If much of the region’s talking is done at the 
regional level, much of its business is done at the bilateral 
level.2 
In addition, not all Pacific Island countries adopt a tone 
of moral equivalence on the question of China’s role in the 
region. As has been noted by more than one commentator, 
Palau’s former President Remengesau has explicitly emph-
asised that his country’s: 
steadfast reliability makes Palau and the other Freely 
Associated States natural allies in the Pentagon’s new 
Indo–Pacific strategy, a plan to counter Chinese 
expansionism and its militarisation of islands in the 
region’ (Quoted in Firth 2020).  
In September 2020, Remengesau was reported (PAC-
NEWS 2020) as calling for the United States to establish ‘a 
regular US military presence’ in his country (one wonders 
what the Forum Secretary General made of this). Former 
PNG Prime Minister Rabbie Namaliu was recently asked 
whether PNG might ultimately have to choose between 
Australia and China. His response, while emphasising his 
country’s traditional ‘friends to all’ foreign policy, was that 
in the end ‘he did not believe it would be difficult for [PNG] 
to make that choice’ (Nicholson 2020). 
Third, while it is true that Australia’s broader geo-
strategic interests in the Pacific are not explicitly addressed 
in the Boe Declaration, at the same time, they are not 
necessarily inconsistent with it. The Declaration acknow-
ledges ‘a dynamic geopolitical environment leading to an 
increasingly crowded and complex region’ but it does not 
take an overt position on that other than in carefully-worded 
language (e.g., respecting ‘the sovereign right of every 
Member to conduct its national affairs free of external 
interference and coercion’; reaffirming ‘the right of 
Members to individually and collectively address security 
issues and concerns’; and reaffirming ‘the importance of the 
rules-based international order founded on the UN Charter, 
adherence to relevant international law, and resolution of 
international disputes by peaceful means’). To acknow-
ledge that Australia has different security interests or 
priorities compared to those of Pacific Island countries 
(whether considered individually or expressed collectively 
in statements such as the Boe Declaration) is not to deny the 
legitimacy of either set of interests or priorities. So it would 
be an over-reading to see the Boe Declaration as antithetical 
to Australian interests in the region, or to the pursuit of 
those interests.   
In fact the evidence suggests that the Boe Declaration 
has helped to provide a common language and vocabulary 
that Australia is able to use in its already extensive dealings 
with Pacific Islands countries. Australia now routinely 
references the Boe Declaration in its official documentation. 
The delegate handbook for the first Joint Heads of Pacific 
Security meeting (hosted by Australia on 9–10 October 2019 
in Brisbane) carried the Boe Declaration in full. The Strategic 
Update cites the Boe Declaration, as does the PNG–Australia 
Comprehensive Strategic and Economic Partnership con-
cluded in August 2020. The recently-established Australia 
Pacific Security College (PSC) states that its ‘activities will 
be guided by the expanded concept of security under the Boe 
Declaration, and will seek to make a meaningful contribution 
to its implementation’. Australia does not deny climate 
change in the Pacific, that it is an issue of ‘greatest concern’ 
(DFAT 2020) to Pacific Island governments and people, or 
that climate change risks becoming increasingly a source and 
driver of instability in the region (Australian Government 
2016). Given Australia’s abiding anxiety about instability 
and vulnerability in the Pacific, it could hardly do otherwise. 
Critics object that Australia’s domestic policies on 
climate change mean that such references merely pay lip-
service to the Boe Declaration (see for example Kabutaulaka 
30 Development Bulletin 82 
and Teaiwa 2019), or that there is an irreconcilable 
incoherence between Australia’s positions domestically and 
externally. Even if that were true in the case of climate 
change, the Boe Declaration is about more than climate 
change. Its description of ‘an expanded concept of security’ 
includes reference to areas such as humanitarian assistance, 
health security, resource security (e.g., fisheries), trans-
national crime and cybersecurity. This range of security con-
cerns is, in turn, reflected in the national security strategies 
that have been issued by Pacific Island countries (Samoa and 
Vanuatu) in the past two years (and in Papua New Guinea’s 
earlier national security strategy, issued in 2013). These are 
all areas where Australia remains deeply engaged, at both the 
bilateral and regional levels, as the Pacific’s leading partner 
through security agencies such as the ADF or AFP or through 
the regular aid program. Indeed, COVID-19 has reminded 
Pacific Island countries of their stake in Australia’s role as a 
key partner in the areas of health security. Australia is also 
easily the region’s major partner in another critical area of 
human security – gender – even though the Boe Declaration 
is notoriously silent on this issue. 
Australian assets and initiatives 
Before noting recent initiatives, it is worth recalling the 
extent of Australia’s existing assets in the region. This is as 
much a matter of relationships and networks as it is of 
financial resources. Those assets include the most intense 
personal investment by an Australian Prime Minister in his 
regional counterparts at any time in the post-colonial period. 
They include by far the most extensive diplomatic network 
across the region, with resident Australian Embassies and 
High Commissions established in every Forum member; 
defence representation and cooperation programs in Papua 
New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Vanuatu, Fiji, Samoa, Tonga, 
Tuvalu, Kiribati, RMI, FSM, and Palau; and Australian 
Federal Police (AFP) representation and/or police develop-
ment programs throughout the region.3 Those assets also 
include Australian membership of key regional organisations 
and networks including the Forum itself, the Pacific Com-
munity, the Forum Fisheries Agency, the South Pacific 
Regional Environment Program, the South Pacific Defence 
Ministers Meeting, the Pacific Islands Chiefs of Police,  
the Pacific Transnational Crime Network, and the Pacific 
Immigration Development Community, to name the most 
prominent. To be sure, this catalogue does not tell us anything 
about the quality of Australian engagement with those 
institutions and individuals in Pacific Island countries that are 
relevant to Australia’s security concerns and objectives, nor 
indeed about the quality of coordination among the various 
Australian agencies involved. Even so, it does underline, at 
the very least, the extent of Australia’s engagement and reach 
in the region, something that is unmatched by any of the 
region’s other development partners, whether traditional or 
‘emerging’. 
That said, in considering Australia’s assets in the 
region, it is also worth recalling the significant roles played 
by its allies and friends including New Zealand, the United 
States, France, Japan, and the United Kingdom. Each 
country is working to increase its presence and activity  
in the region in ways that are mostly consistent with 
Australia’s interests. 
Australia’s Pacific Step-up has seen a range of new 
policy measures in the area of security that can be seen as 
answering the imperative of integrating and shaping the 
region. These include the Pacific Fusion Centre, announced 
in 2018 (Payne 2018) and aimed at providing a more robust 
and integrated flow of information to Pacific governments, 
particularly in supporting maritime domain awareness; the 
aforementioned Australia Pacific Security College which, 
apart from building capacity, aims to build and strengthen 
networks among officials responsible for security policy 
across the region; and the Joint Heads of Pacific Security 
meeting which met for the first time in October 2019  
and was hosted by Australia (Defence 2019). The latter init-
iative brought together police, border management, customs, 
immigration and defence organisations from Forum member 
countries (and Timor-Leste) for the first time to consider  
the range of security issues facing the region. 
There may be some concern at the regional level that 
these initiatives are not being undertaken under the direct 
aegis of the Forum, even if the Forum Secretariat has been 
engaged extensively on their design and work plans. There 
was also reportedly some concern at the bilateral level, over 
the course of 2019, that initiatives under the Step-up were 
being rolled out too quickly for Pacific administrations to 
absorb. If so, COVID-19 has served to slow down the pace 
at which initiatives such as these can be implemented and 
further developed. Even so, they are all tokens of 
Australia’s aim to show ongoing leadership in the region. 
They illustrate Australia’s convening power in the region, 
and its ability to resource initiatives both in financial and in 
personnel terms. None of them is focused explicitly on 
China or the broader geopolitical issues confronting the 
region: if there is a sub-text to these various initiatives, it is 
about fostering a regional community of policymakers, one 
in which Australia is deeply and naturally embedded. 
Building such a community is necessarily a long-term 
endeavour and will require strategic persistence and 
patience. In the short term, though, recent history provides 
numerous examples to suggest that Australia is successfully 
prosecuting its ‘traditional’ security interests in the region, 
as seen in Australia forestalling a proposal for Chinese-
owned company Huawei to build an undersea cable from 
Solomon Islands to Australia in 2017; heading off what may 
have been a Chinese attempt to establish a permanent base 
in Vanuatu in 2018,4 securing Fiji’s approval to redevelop 
Blackrock Camp into a regional training hub for police  
and peacekeepers, and (recent wobbles notwithstanding) 
Papua New Guinea’s agreement for Australia to lead the 
redevelopment of Lombrum Naval Base in Manus. The 
2019 diplomatic switch by Solomon Islands and Kiribati 
from Taiwan to China were more equivocal developments 
in terms of Australian interests in the region, though it 
should be acknowledged that Australia, unlike the US, did 
not set out to prevent Solomon Islands from making this 
switch. Kiribati’s switch seems to have come as a surprise 
to Australia but it is more the surprise than the switch itself 
that might be seen as a setback for Australia. 
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It is of course artificial to think about Australia’s ‘hard 
security’ agenda in the region in isolation from broader 
policy initiatives under the Pacific Step-up. The aid program 
as broadly conceived and the increasing number of Pacific 
Islanders taking opportunities to work in Australia both serve 
Australia’s longer term interests in the Pacific as well as 
promoting development and building capacity in the region. 
And beyond this, non-government and people-to-people 
linkages and relationships between Australia and many 
countries in the Pacific remain robust and growing (Batley 
2017). These too must count as assets in any accounting of 
Australia’s ability to pursue its long-term goals in the region. 
Conclusion 
In the contemporary cliché, the Pacific region is clearly more 
crowded and contested. It can’t be denied that significant 
gaps exist between Australian and Pacific Islands’ under-
standings of and approaches to security in the region. 
Differences on climate change in particular remain serious. 
But those gaps and differences should be kept in perspective 
when considering Australia’s place in the region. In recent 
times Australia has shown repeatedly that it is able to draw 
on its assets in the region to protect and to prosecute its 
security interests, and that those assets are being enhanced 
through new initiatives.   
From a longer-term point of view, the work of inte-
grating, of shaping and of deterring in the region remains a 
work in progress. It cannot be said, at this stage, that the 
region conceives of itself as a fully-fledged security 
community. In a dynamic region, Australian governments 
will need to continue to push the boundaries of existing 
policy settings. There is plenty of work to do. 
Notes 
1 The Strategic Update’s geographic scope extends beyond the 
Pacific Islands, of course. As the Update makes clear, the 
Pacific Islands are a critically important part of that scope. 
2  This appears to have been something of a concern to Forum 
Secretary General Dame Meg Taylor during the COVID-19 
pandemic. In August 2020 she was quoted as encouraging 
‘Forum members to looking beyond their national boundaries, 
and for development partners to think beyond bilateralism’ 
(Magick 2020). 
3  Specifically, these efforts include bilateral development pro-
grams in Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Vanuatu, Samoa, 
Tonga, and Nauru, and regional development programs in 
Kiribati, Niue, Tuvalu, the Republic of Marshall Islands, Palau, 
Cook Islands and the Federated States of Micronesia. 
4  While the details of this alleged arrangement remain obscure, 
it is surprising how ready many observers were to accept at 
face value denials issued at the time by both the Chinese and 
Vanuatu governments, as if that settled the matter. 
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Identity, national security and influence: The ‘Pacific Reset’ and shaping 
New Zealand’s relations with the Pacific islands 
Anna Powles, Massey University, New Zealand 
In 2018 the newly formed Labour-led coalition government 
launched the Pacific Reset. The Reset was New Zealand’s 
most notable foreign policy shift towards the Pacific islands 
region in decades and consequently steeped in expectation. 
The new government promised to lead change ‘rather than 
managing a modified status quo’ (Peters 2018a) and in Prime 
Minister Jacinda Ardern’s first foreign policy address, she 
forecasted the policy shift stating that, in the Pacific, ‘we can 
do better, and we will’ (Adern 2018). Labelled the govern-
ment’s ‘top foreign policy priority’, the strategy was 
extolled as representing a: 
refreshed New Zealand approach to the Pacific region 
… driven by our strong Pacific identity and inter-
connectedness with the region, coupled with the direct 
impact the Pacific’s stability and prosperity has on New 
Zealand’s national interests (MFAT 2019a). 
The Reset’s primary objective was to serve as a policy 
framework or guide to reshape New Zealand’s relations with 
its Pacific partners and the region as a whole. Accordingly, 
the Reset reflected efforts to recalibrate New Zealand’s strat-
egy towards the Pacific and signalled a potentially trans-
formative approach towards the region that would prioritise 
partnership and emphasise mutual respect. The Cabinet Paper 
(2018) outlining the rationale for the Reset cited three drivers 
for New Zealand’s engagement in the Pacific islands region: 
New Zealand’s Pacific identity; national security; and shared 
prosperity. Significantly, the Reset signalled an effort to 
address those domestic policy settings which have impli-
cations for the Pacific (MFAT 2020:6). 
Since the Reset’s inception, two inter-related questions 
have dominated. First, to what degree was the Reset 
inspired and influenced by geopolitical contestation and 
concerns about China’s rising influence in the Pacific? And 
second, to what extent does the Reset seek to address the 
persistent dilemma in both New Zealand domestic and 
foreign policy: what is New Zealand’s standing and place 
in the Pacific? Two years later, the Reset remains a core 
foreign policy objective for the second-term Ardern govern-
ment and is likely to become increasingly central to New 
Zealand’s response to intensified geopolitical competition 
in the region. Through a survey of key policy documents, 
this chapter considers the ways in which two of the drivers 
– identity and national security – have informed the Reset. 
The chapter will conclude that influence lies at the nexus 
between the two drivers and that New Zealand will be 
increasingly called upon to exercise influence in an 
environment of geopolitical competition.  
The Pacific Reset 
Growing dissatisfaction and concern with the highly trans-
actional nature of New Zealand’s relations with the Pacific 
led to calls in 2017 to review and reset New Zealand 
policies towards the Pacific (Powles and Powles 2017). 
Cabinet deliberations in early 2018 echoed the need for a 
‘refreshed approach’ to New Zealand’s relations with the 
Pacific and stipulated that the strategy would include the 
following five elements: building deeper, more mature 
political partnerships with Pacific island countries, includ-
ing by reinvesting in leadership diplomacy in the Pacific; 
ensuring New Zealand Government decision-making on 
domestic policies considered the implications for the 
Pacific islands region; and enhancing the effectiveness of 
Pacific regional organisations to better respond to shared 
challenges (Cabinet Paper 2018). The strategy also stated 
that New Zealand activities in the Pacific would be guided 
by five principles of engagement: understanding, friend-
ship, mutual benefit, collective impact and sustainability 
(ibid).  
From the outset, the official discourse consistently 
emphasised that the Reset reflected a sea change in New 
Zealand Government policy towards the Pacific. The Reset 
was described as a ‘reenergised approach’ and that New 
Zealand would move away ‘from a traditional donor-recip-
ient relationship to one based on partnership, friendship and 
mutual benefit’ (MFAT 2019b:22). It claimed to reflect:  
a fundamental change to how our government works that 
includes deeper collaboration with Pacific partner coun-
tries, greater coherence and connectivity between dom-
estic and Pacific policy, more ambition for our Pacific 
development programme, and increased resources to  
use our voice and connections internationally to raise 
awareness for Pacific issues (ibid). 
To achieve this the Reset initially had a strong domestic 
focus. Deepening Pacific policy across government required 
building the architecture within and across 32 government 
agencies to support ‘a cross-government commitment to 
Pacific issues’ (MFAT 2019a) and an ‘integrated approach to 
foreign policy’ (MFAT 2019c). This accompanied the 
expectation that the ‘heightened tempo of effort and invest-
ment across the State sector’ needed to ‘become the new 
normal for New Zealand’s Pacific engagement’  (MFAT 
2019b:22). With the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade 
(MFAT) as lead agency, this included integrating devel-
opment and diplomatic efforts into the purposefully created 
Pacific and Development Group in Wellington and the 
Pacific Connections office in Auckland.  
The Reset was also accompanied by a significant 
budgetary increase of NZ$714m (A$661m), a 30 per cent 
increase, over four years to support diplomatic and devel-
opment activities. Of New Zealand’s total aid budget, the 
increase of aid to the Pacific equates to approximately 60 
per cent (around NZ$1.331bn (A$1.234bn)) over the 2018–
21 period. Additional initiatives under the Reset included 
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the establishment of a NZ$10m (A$9.2m) Pacific Enabling 
Fund to support engagement with Pacific partners from 
cultural and sporting diplomacy, people to people links, to 
military cooperation activities and the launching of Pasifika 
TV at a cost of NZ$10 million over three years. Moreover, 
superannuation requirements were removed allowing res-
idents of the Cook Islands, Niue and Tokelau to receive 
their pensions without spending the required five years in 
New Zealand when over the age of fifty.  
The Reset also led to the expansion of New Zealand’s 
diplomatic footprint in the Pacific. Ten new diplomatic 
posts were created in the Pacific (in Samoa, Tonga, Fiji, 
Vanuatu, PNG, Solomon Islands, Kiribati and Honolulu) 
and four positions in Tokyo, Beijing, Brussels and New 
York to coordinate development policy and partnerships  
for the Pacific region. Leadership diplomacy initiatives 
resulted in two high-profile Pacific missions led by Ardern 
and Peters in 2018. In the first year there were 21 ministerial 
and parliamentary under-secretary level visits to Pacific 
countries and territories. This included the first ministerial-
level attendance at a Forum Fisheries Agency Ministers 
meeting since 2009, the first ministerial visit to Tokelau 
since 2004, and, in 2019, the first visit by a New Zealand 
prime minister to Tokelau in 15 years. New Zealand also 
saw an increased tempo of visits from Pacific leaders and 
ministers in 2018 from eight countries and territories. 
Cabinet also approved a new policy framework to underpin 
New Zealand’s engagement with the realm countries of the 
Cook Islands, Niue and Tokelau.  
New Zealand’s Pasifika/Pacific identity  
New Zealand’s Pacific identity narrative is contested, com-
plicated, and arguably has greater currency internationally 
than within the region itself (Powles 2017). It is, however, 
a common anchor within official foreign policy – and 
increasingly domestic – discourse as New Zealand seeks to 
reconcile with questions of national identity. It is cited as a 
key driver for New Zealand’s engagement with the Pacific 
that lays claim to New Zealand being a Polynesian country 
with greater interconnectedness between New Zealand, 
Cook Islands, Niue, Samoa, Tokelau and Tonga than any 
other countries in the world with the partial exception of 
Australia (Cabinet Paper 2018).  
The identity narrative is driven by three factors: 
geography, its constitutional obligations towards the Cook 
Islands, Niue and Tokelau, and its indigenous tangata 
whenua and its later migrant tagata Pasifika populations. 
New Zealand has a rapidly growing tagata Pasifika pop-
ulation with more than 40 different Pacific ethnic groups 
that together comprise the fourth largest major ethnic group, 
behind European, Māori and Asian ethnic groups (New 
Zealand Census 2013). By 2026, it is projected that New 
Zealand’s Pacific population will have grown to 10 per cent 
of the total population, compared to 7.4 per cent in 2013 
(Ministry for Pacific Peoples). Critically, tagata Pasifika 
are an increasingly powerful domestic constituency with the 
2020 election resulting in the largest number of Pasifika 
ministers in cabinet (five in total) with Aupito Sio, the 
Minister of Pacific Peoples and Associate Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, outside cabinet (Department of the Prime 
Minister and Cabinet 2020).  
New Zealand’s place in the Pacific and, by extension, its 
place in the world as a Pacific nation, has long been a source 
of debate. From the 1970s onwards, New Zealand became 
increasingly more aware of its Pacific connections, however, 
these connections were frequently framed in terms of influ-
ence and national interest – themes that not surprisingly 
remain present in contemporary discourse. The Kirk govern-
ment (1972–1974), for example, pursued a proactive policy 
of engagement with the Pacific and directly linked New 
Zealand’s international reputation with its regional influence 
(Ross 2016). The 1978 Defence Review pointed to the need 
to incorporate the fact that ‘New Zealand is a Pacific country’ 
into the formulation of defence policy.  
In 2002, then Minister for Foreign Affairs and Pacific 
Affairs, Phil Goff, conflated identity with a form of 
stewardship stating that: 
we no longer see ourselves as an isolated British outpost 
somehow misplaced at the bottom of the Pacific. We see 
ourselves as a Pacific nation with key responsibilities in 
the South Pacific (Goff 2002).  
Goff later expanded on this asserting that the presence 
of a strong Pasifika community has enabled a ‘unique 
interaction between New Zealand and the Pacific which 
gives us a sense of identity with and a greater ability to work 
alongside our Pacific neighbours’ (ibid). In 2009 then 
foreign minister Murray McCully drew a direct link bet-
ween identity and regional leadership stating that: 
New Zealand is truly a Pacific nation, not just in terms 
of geography, but also in terms of our increasing 
Pasifika population…This rich demography gives New 
Zealand both a responsibility and a unique capacity to 
play a leadership role...in this region (McCully 2009). 
Furthermore, successive reviews of New Zealand’s 
relations with the Pacific have linked identity with national 
interest and regional leadership. The 1990 policy review, 
Towards a Pacific Island Community, stated that New 
Zealand was coming to terms with its place as a Pacific 
island nation and even suggested that New Zealand was 
perceived by the Pacific island countries as in, and of, the 
region. However, the report also warned that New Zealand 
did not necessarily understand the Pacific and should not 
presume to take a proprietary or colonial approach to 
Pacific Island affairs (NZG 1990).  
The 2010 parliamentary review of New Zealand’s rela-
tionships with the Pacific islands suggested that the close 
personal and family connections with the region dis-
tinguishes New Zealand from other countries that seek 
engagement in the region and in turn lends itself to a ‘unique 
and intimate understanding of the region’ (Foreign Affairs, 
Defence and Trade Committee 2010:12). The review made 
further claims that ‘New Zealand is increasingly part of the 
regional fabric’ and that ‘key partners expect New Zealand 
to strongly support the maintenance of peace and stability 
in this region.’ The 2020 inquiry into New Zealand’s aid to 
the Pacific also reiterated the link between identity and 
national interest, stating that New Zealand’s engagement in 
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the Pacific is driven by ‘its strong Pacific identity and 
interconnectedness with the region’ and combined with the 
‘direct effect that the stability and prosperity of the Pacific 
has on New Zealand’s national interests’ (Foreign Affairs, 
Defence and Trade Committee 2020:9).  
The linking of identity with national interest has led to 
a sense of ‘New Zealand exceptionalism and cultural 
capital’ (Goldsmith 2017). Salesa (2017:6) challenges this 
by calling for greater recognition of:  
the ways in which the Pacific drives the configuration of 
New Zealand’s overseas priorities, its national defence, 
its view and understanding of the world, and indeed, 
how the Pacific inflates or amplifies New Zealand’s 
importance to others around the world. 
Furthermore, Salesa (ibid) argues that the Pacific is 
New Zealand’s gateway to the world and ‘why New 
Zealand matters in a way a small country of its size typically 
does not’. Moreover, McGhie argues that despite the 
rhetoric of ‘New Zealand’s Pacificness’, the country has yet 
to fully address the complex nature of the problems facing 
Pacific states, which requires a change in attitudes as to how 
issues are approached.  
New Zealand’s national security as a driver 
for engagement with the Pacific  
The ‘safeguarding of New Zealand’s interests’ is a primary 
driver of New Zealand’s engagement with the Pacific 
(MFAT 2020:35). New Zealand’s national security, it is 
argued, is ‘directly affected by the Pacific’s stability’ 
(MFAT 2018). This includes contemporary security chal-
lenges, such as transnational organised crime, and increas-
ingly, concerns about the rise of Chinese influence in the 
region and the destabilising impact of US–China strategic 
competition. As Dame Meg Taylor stated in mid-2017: 
the geopolitical and development context of the Pacific 
has shifted and the region faces a range of external and 
internal factors that are acting to reshape it, including 
increasing plurality of regional actors, shifts in global 
power, and unmet development challenges. 
That year then Prime Minister Bill English (2017) noted 
during an official visit to the region that: 
much of the discussion … was about the relative influ-
ence of a range of countries in the Pacific, whether it’s 
New Zealand, Australia, China, the US, or Russia to 
some extent. 
The role of national security as a core driver of the 
Reset is reinforced across a stable of government policy. 
For example, the protection and promotion of stability, 
security and resilience in the Pacific is listed as one of  
the government’s 16 national security and intelligence 
priorities (Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet 
2019). The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade Strategic 
Intentions 2019–2023 (MFAT 2019b) states that: 
New Zealand’s security is directly affected by the ability 
of the Pacific to increase resilience, grow sustainable 
economies, manage conflicts and combat crimes that 
transgress borders. 
Accordingly, the promotion of a ‘stable, prosperous 
and resilient Pacific in which New Zealand’s interests and 
influence are safeguarded’ is one of seven strategic goals 
(ibid). The document outlines the desired 10-year out- 
come of a ‘more stable, secure, resilient and well-governed 
Pacific’ with indicators to measure success including 
‘evidence of partnerships between New Zealand and Pacific 
bilateral partners strengthened’ (ibid:22).  
The Strategic Defence Policy Statement unequivocally 
states that New Zealand’s national security ‘remains 
directly tied to the stability of the Pacific’ (ibid:24). The 
statement is a significant document as it provides the most 
coherent statement on New Zealand’s strategic environ-
ment, serving as a proxy foreign policy white paper. It 
sought to identify the challenges to the international  
rules-based order and the implications for New Zealand. 
Critically, it also located the Pacific within this context of 
heightened strategic uncertainty. The statement argues that 
the Pacific is confronted with intensifying challenges 
including climate change, transnational crime and resource 
competition with a ‘growing gap in capacity to adequately 
address them’ (Ministry of Defence 2018a:22). 
The statement suggests that these complex disruptors 
could test local governance, exacerbate state fragility and 
likely require increased levels of assistance, including 
operations beyond humanitarian assistance and disaster 
relief (ibid). It announced a significant operational policy 
shift by elevating the ability of the New Zealand Defence 
Force to operate in the Pacific to the same level as New 
Zealand’s territories, the Southern Ocean and Antarctica. 
That same year the Ministry of Defence released its climate 
assessment that sought to highlight the intersection between 
climate change and potential conflict and instability in the 
Pacific, stating ‘the security implications of climate change 
are further magnified in areas dealing with weak govern-
ance or corruption’ (Ministry of Defence 2018b:6).  
In 2019, the Ministry of Defence released a second 
assessment that aimed to translate the high-level strategic 
policy of the Reset and the Strategic Defence Policy 
Statement into a regional approach. The Advancing Pacific 
Partnerships assessment is effectively how defence will 
align its strategic policy settings and capability plan with 
the Reset. This is demonstrated through the Vaka Tahi 
Pacific Partnership Model for defence engagement as a 
platform for building relationships across the region and 
grounding it in the five principles of the Reset. The New 
Zealand Defence Force Strategic Plan 2019–2025 (known 
as Plan25) further advances the link between the Pacific and 
New Zealand’s national security by stating:  
The recognition of operating in the Pacific as equal in 
priority for the NZDF to New Zealand’s own territory is 
reflective of the Government’s Pacific Reset, and the 
importance of the Pacific to New Zealand’s national 
security (New Zealand Defence Force 2019:8). 
There are several common but noteworthy threads 
across the policy documents. The first is that the Reset 
elevated the Pacific as a national security priority in a 
manner that had not been previously evident. Doing so 
aligns with New Zealand’s key ally and partner in the 
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Pacific – Australia who launched its own Pacific Step Up in 
2017 – and offsets criticisms of New Zealand by its Five 
Eyes intelligence network partners who have suggested 
New Zealand is taking a softer line on China. The second 
thread is the consistent linking of New Zealand policy with 
Pacific identified priorities. This seeks to reinforce New 
Zealand’s identity as part of the Pacific and garner regional 
buy-in for New Zealand policy. For instance the Advancing 
Pacific Partnerships assessment foregrounds the Boe 
Declaration on Regional Security (Pacific Islands Forum 
Secretariat 2018) notably the emphasis on an expanded 
concept of security, and the Blue Pacific (Malielegaoi 2017) 
as guiding frameworks for defence engagement with Pacific 
partners. The climate assessment, for example, locates 
defence’s response to climate security challenges within a 
wider policy context which includes both the Reset and  
the Boe Declaration. It also adopts the Boe Declaration 
language of an expanded concept of security. The third 
thread is the need for New Zealand to better understand  
and have improved capability and capacity to respond to  
the evolving strategic environment. This is reflected in  
stated policy deliverables such as a ‘refreshed New Zealand 
regional security approach by 2021’ (MFAT 2019b:22), 
which is perhaps evidenced by the defence assessments, 
particularly the Vaka Tahi partnership model, as well as New 
Zealand policing initiatives such as the three year NZ$11m 
(A$10.1m) Police Partnership program with the Fiji Police 
Force focused on combatting transnational crime, and sup-
port to defence policy development in Fiji and PNG.  
There is no doubt that the Reset was driven in part by 
concerns about China’s rising influence in the Pacific. 
Growing concerns within government were reflected in the 
Strategic Defence Policy Statement, which in stating that 
China ‘has not consistently adopted the governance and 
values championed by the order’s traditional leaders,’ 
(Ministry of Defence 2018a:17) was the strongest statement 
New Zealand had made about China at the time. The 
Climate Crisis assessment, released later that year, made the 
explicit link between climate change and strategic com-
petition in the region by suggesting that states could  
exploit climate assistance to increase influence and access 
(Ministry of Defence 2018b:7). Citing geopolitical shifts in 
the region, Peters, a leading proponent of a more hawkish 
stance on China, called on greater US engagement in the 
Pacific in two speeches in Washington (Peters 2018b, 
2019). The view that ‘we can no longer take for granted…a 
benign Pacific neighbourhood’ is likely to become further 
entrenched as the shift in relative power of the US and 
China is more acutely felt (MFAT 2020:33). Newly 
appointed foreign minister Nanaia Mahuta (Powles 2020) 
appears to have adopted similar policy settings although 
these will likely be tested even more so as increasing 
strategic competition creates additional demands for New 
Zealand as its security partners harden their expectations.  
Influence: At the nexus between identity and 
national security 
The Reset captures and seeks to advance New Zealand’s 
strategic ambitions in the Pacific. For that reason, there is  
 
heightened interest in New Zealand’s ability to influence its 
Pacific partners and considerable strategic anxiety that New 
Zealand’s influence has waned. Peters (2018c) acknowl-
edged that, ‘our eyes are wide open to New Zealand’s 
decreasing influence in the Pacific’. Accordingly, the policy 
documents attempt to project a greater ease and confidence 
in framing New Zealand’s engagement with the Pacific in 
terms of influence as well as identity. For instance, the 
Cabinet Paper (2018) stated that ‘in no other region does 
New Zealand matter more, wield more influence, and have 
more impact than the Pacific. But our ability to pursue our 
interests is challenged by the dizzying array of problems the 
region faces and an increasingly contested strategic envir-
onment which is eroding our influence. This is seen within 
a broader international context where it is recognised ‘it is 
getting harder for New Zealand’s voice to be heard…and 
our influence will diminish over time’ (MFAT 2020:22). 
New Zealand’s Pasifika/Pacific identity is regarded as a 
key soft power trait that has the potential to translate into 
influence (Powles 2017). This framing of New Zealand as 
uniquely and favourably positioned on cultural grounds to be 
a strategic diplomatic actor in the Pacific (Goldsmith 2017) 
is not new. Moreover, influence – and being seen to have 
influence – is a critical element of New Zealand’s relation-
ships with its key partners including ally, Australia, and 
strategic partner, the United States. Influence is a soft power 
instrument New Zealand brings to the table, with the country 
marketing itself to its security partners as a ‘trusted bridge 
builder between countries in the Pacific and the wider Asia–
Pacific region’ (MFAT 2014). However, increasing strategic 
competition in the region is likely to result in competing 
demands on New Zealand to exercise its influence to achieve 
broader Five Eyes security objectives. This poses risks for 
New Zealand, where its national security priorities and those 
of security partners diverge, or even cut across, the priorities 
of those sharing a Pacific identity. New Zealand’s challenge 
will therefore be how to balance the national identity project 
with its national security imperatives.  
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Pacific Islands in China’s security and future engagement  
Denghua Zhang, The Australian National University 
China’s military, known as the People’s Liberation Army 
(PLA), has increased its engagement with Pacific island 
countries (PICs) in recent years. For example, in November 
2019, General Li Zuocheng, Chief of PLA Joint Staff 
Department, visited Fiji and pledged to deepen military 
cooperation between the two countries and in December 
2018, China donated a hydrographic and surveillance vessel 
to the Fijian Navy. 
A closer China–PICs relationship has spurred tradi-
tional powers such as the US and Australia to strengthen 
ties with Pacific islands. The Trump administration was 
pushing Marshall Islands, Palau and the Federated States of 
Micronesia to renew the Compact of Free Association, a 
Series of treaties between these countries and the US that 
were partially established as compensation for the loss of 
life, health, and land resulting from nuclear testing con-
ducted by the US on the Marshall Islands and Bikini and 
Enewetak Atolls from 1946 until 1958. The Compacts 
allow citizens of Micronesia to live and legally work in the 
US without a visa. In return, the US has sole access and a 
substantial amount of military and veto power over these 
islands. With the escalation of US–China tensions in the 
Indo–Pacific region, the China factor will feature more 
prominently.   
Against the backdrop, this paper discusses two 
questions:  
1. In what ways are PICs relevant to China’s security? 
2. What are the prospects of China-Pacific security 
engagement?  
The term ‘security’ is used as a broad concept encom-
passing political, economic and military elements that are 
interconnected. Drawing upon public Chinese policy papers 
especially those of PLA, this paper provides a Chinese 
perspective of China-PICs security relations.  
It is important to note at the outset that PLA’s activities 
in the Pacific are just part of China’s bigger engagement 
package which consists of foreign aid (soft loan domin-
ated), diplomatic, trade, educational, cultural, tourism and 
other people-to-people engagements.   
PICs’ relevance to China’s security 
China’s security is tied to its national interests that have 
been clearly defined by Beijing in recent years. For the first 
time, in 2011, the Chinese government articulated that its 
core interests include: 
state sovereignty, national security, territorial integrity 
and national reunification, China’s political system 
established by the Constitution, overall social stability, 
and the basic safeguards for ensuring sustainable eco-
nomic and social development (China State Council 
2011).  
In 2015, the PLA issued its first white paper on military 
strategies, stating that: 
the security of overseas interests concerning energy  
and resources, strategic sea lines of communication 
(SLOCs), as well as institutions, personnel and assets 
abroad, has become an imminent issue (China MoD 
2015).  
In the same year, the Chinese National Congress passed 
a security law that according to Article 2, China focuses its 
national security on issues such as: 
the regime, sovereignty, unity, territorial integrity, 
welfare of the people, sustainable economic and social 
development, and other major interests of the state 
(China NPC 2015).  
Based on these three official definitions, PICs, though 
geographically distant from China, are relevant to its sec-
urity interests in the following aspects. First and foremost, 
the Taiwan issue in the Pacific is directly related to China’s 
sovereignty, territorial integrity and reunification. Since its 
founding in 1949, the communist regime in Beijing has 
listed the reunification of Taiwan with mainland China on 
the top of its agenda and spared no effort in reducing inter-
national recognition of Taiwan. This has led to the decades-
long diplomatic competition between China and Taiwan in 
the Pacific. The urgency to solve the Taiwan issue has 
increased in the Xi Jinping era. In October 2013, Xi told a 
senior Taiwanese delegation that the issue of political divi-
sion between China and Taiwan cannot be postponed 
forever which was interpreted as Xi’s growing impatience 
with the standoff. The tug-of-war has intensified since Tsai 
Ing-wen from the pro-independence Democratic Progres-
sive Party won the presidential election in Taiwan in 2016. 
In response, the Chinese government has taken a tougher 
stand on Taiwan. Xi Jinping highlighted in January 2019 
that China would not abandon the option of using force if 
necessary to solve the Taiwan issue. With China’s strong 
lobby efforts, Solomon Islands and Kiribati switched their 
recognition from Taiwan to China in September 2019, 
tipping the imbalance of power in China’s favour. This 
setback makes Taiwan’s remaining four allies in the  
Pacific (Marshall Islands, Nauru, Palau and Tuvalu) more 
important to Taiwan and China’s future relationship.  
In addition, China needs PICs’ voting support at inter-
national and regional institutions on other issues related to 
its sovereignty and territorial integrity such as in Tibet, 
Xinjiang, Hong Kong, and the South and East China Seas. 
For example, Papua New Guinea (PNG) supported China 
over the controversial Hong Kong Security Law at the UN 
in July 2020. PNG and Vanuatu expressed support for 
China’s position on the South China Sea issue in 2016. 
China’s economic stake in the Pacific is also increasing 
with a focus on mineral resources and fisheries. Since late 
2014, PNG has exported two million tons of liquified 
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natural gas to China annually, which accounted for three per 
cent of China’s total imports of 61.79 million tons in 2018. 
The Chinese state-owned enterprise CNFC Overseas 
Fisheries established its branch in Suva, Fiji in 1998. The 
tuna catches of the company’s 42 longliners has now 
reached 14,000 tons annually. Deep seabed mining in the 
Pacific is another area that has received growing attention 
from China. Although it is still an uncharted territory, the 
massive reserves of seabed mineral resources in the vast 
Pacific Ocean hold great potential in the future. The China 
Ocean Mineral Resources Research and Development 
Association, which is affiliated with the Ministry of Natural 
Resources, has increased its research on the Pacific and its 
engagement with Pacific governments.  
PICs also matter to China’s space programs and mili-
tary strategies. Chinese spacecraft tracking ships Yuan 
Wang, managed by the China Satellite Maritime Tracking 
and Control Department of PLA, have been conducting 
monitoring missions in the Pacific Ocean for China’s space 
programs including its first manned space flight, Chang’e 
lunar probe and the Beidou navigation satellite system 
(equivalent to the US global positioning system). Further-
more, PICs, along with some islands of Japan, form the 
second island chain, which is a part of the vague ‘three 
island chains’ theory coined by late US Secretary of State, 
John Foster Dulles, in 1951 to strategically surround China. 
To break these island chains has long been a goal of PLA 
senior leadership over time. The strategies of PLA Navy 
have evolved from ‘coastal defence’ to ‘offshore waters 
defence’, and more recently to ‘the combination of offshore 
waters defence and open seas protections’. PLA doctrines 
have also changed with a focus on maritime military capa-
bility. As the PLA 2015 white paper mentions explicitly:  
The traditional mentality that land outweighs sea must 
be abandoned, and great importance has to be attached 
to managing the seas and oceans and protecting mari-
time rights and interests. It is necessary for China to 
develop a modern maritime military force structure 
commensurate with its national security and develop-
ment interests, safeguard its national sovereignty and 
maritime rights and interests, protect the security of 
strategic SLOCs and overseas interests, and participate 
in international maritime cooperation, so as to provide 
strategic support for building itself into a maritime 
power (China MoD 2015).  
In line with this strategy, PLA has conducted reforms 
in recent years to streamline its line structure and devote 
more resources to the development of its Navy. All these 
shifts have contributed to the growing capability and con-
fidence of the PLA Navy. This makes PICs more relevant 
to China’s interest and security. 
As a result, PLA has increased its engagement with its 
counterparts in PNG, Fiji, Tonga and Vanuatu in recent 
years, in the form of personnel training, material assistance 
(such as military uniforms and vehicles), grants for facility 
construction and exchanges of mid and junior level officers 
(Zhang 2020:1). Table 1 lists PLA visits to the four PICs in 
the past two decades. As of August 2020, PLA has organ-
ised four forums for senior defence officials from the 
Caribbean and South Pacific islands. Chinese maritime 
research vessels such as Haiyang 6 and Xuelong 2 have also 
conducted scientific hydrographical activities in the Pacific, 
triggering concerns that the research results can be used for 
both civilian and military purposes. 
Table 1. PLA visits to the Pacific since 2000 
Fiji 1. Mar 2002, General Qian Shugen, Deputy Chief of 
PLA General Staff Department 
2. Jan 2013, Major General Qian Lihua, Chief of 
Foreign Affairs Office, Ministry of Defense 
3. Aug 2014, naval hospital ship Peace Ark 
4. Dec 2016, naval training ship Zhenghe 
5. Aug 2018, Peace Ark 
6. Nov 2019, naval training ship Qi Jiguang  
7. Nov 2019, General Li Zuocheng, Chief of Joint 
Staff Department, Central Military Commission 
PNG 1. Oct 2009, General Chen Bingde, Chief of PLA 
General Staff Department 
2. Aug 2010, Zhenghe and frigate Mian Yang 
3. Sept 2014, Peace Ark 
4. Jul 2018, Peace Ark 
5. Oct 2019, Qi Jiguang 
Tonga 1. Aug 2012, Zhenghe 
2. Aug 2013, General Wu Changde, Deputy Director 
of PLA Political Work Department 
3. Aug 2014, Peace Ark 
4. May 2015, Lieutenant General Xing Shucheng, 
Deputy Commander of Guangzhou Military 
Region 
5. Jul 2015, Major General Ci Guowei, Deputy Chief 
of Foreign Affairs Office, Ministry of Defense 
6. Apr 2016, Vice Admiral Tian Zhong, Deputy 
Commander of PLA Navy 
7. Aug 2018, Peace Ark 
Vanuatu 1. Sept 2010, Zhenghe and Mian Yang 
2. Jan 2014, General Wang Guanzhong, Deputy 
Chief of PLA General Staff Department 
3. Sept 2014, Peace Ark 
4. Jun 2017, PLA naval escort taskforce 
5. Jul 2018, Peace Ark 
Source: compiled by author based on public data 
Prospects of China–Pacific security 
engagement  
So far, the China–PICs security cooperation is limited in 
scope and depth compared with that between China and 
other regions, and between the US, Australia and Pacific 
islands. For example, PLA has established 130 military 
attaché offices overseas with none in the Pacific. However, 
it is expected that PLA will place more attention on the 
Pacific region in the future for two reasons. First, the 
military modernisation and building of more aircraft car-
riers have boosted PLA’s confidence to extend its influence 
beyond the first island chain. The Chinese government led 
by Xi Jinping has ambitions to rejuvenate China as a great 
power under the ‘China Dream’ banner. Xi has shifted his 
focus from the ‘taoguang yanghui’ strategy (buy one’s time 
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and hide one’s strength) held by his three predecessors, to 
‘you suo zuowei’ (make great achievements). PLA has 
conducted extensive reforms especially the sweeping org-
anisational reform in 2015–16 to increase the coordination 
of different units in modern warfare. The modernisation of 
PLA Navy has also accelerated under Xi Jinping. China’s 
first homemade aircraft carrier Shandong was commis-
sioned in April 2017. Another two are reported to be under 
construction. China’s defence budget has maintained a 
steady growth, exceeding US$178.6 billion for 2020 with a 
growth of 6.6 per cent from last year. With its growing 
capability, PLA navy fleets have frequently sailed through 
the Taiwan Strait and Miyako Strait which sit along the first 
island chain. Thus, in January 2017, China’s official news-
paper People’s Daily confidently predicted, ‘It is just a 
matter of time before China’s aircraft carrier crossed the 
second island chain and reaches the Eastern Pacific’ (Zhang 
2017: 40). In this circumstance, small wonder that PLA will 
make greater efforts to strengthen its military ties with PICs 
in the future.  
Second, the rapid escalation of the US–China rivalry is 
likely to stimulate PLA to develop more substantial security 
cooperation with Pacific islands. As some analysts argue, 
the US–China competition is a systematic one in nature 
between the existing hegemony and a rising superpower for 
leadership and status at global and regional arenas (Heather 
and Thompson 2018:115). PLA has expressed concerns 
over former President Obama’s policy of pivoting to the 
Asia–Pacific, criticising it for aggravating regional tensions 
(China MoD 2015). In recent years, the US–China relations 
have soured on all fronts with the military sector included. 
The Trump administration has targeted the communist gov-
ernment in China as a revisionist power and the primary 
competitor of the US, and took counter measures. For 
example, the US government put forward the ‘Free and 
Open Indo–Pacific’ Strategy in 2017. In July 2020, the US 
Secretary of State Mike Pompeo criticised the previous 
administrations for their ‘blind engagement’ with China and 
pledged to contain China’s expansionism (Pompeo 2020). 
In the face of mounting pressure from the US, Beijing has 
adopted dual strategies. Chinese top diplomats such as 
Yang Jiechi (Chinese communist party politburo member 
and former foreign minister), Wang Yi (incumbent foreign 
minister) and Cui Tiankai (ambassador to the US) have 
recently called for dialogues between the countries to solve 
the crisis. This goodwill gesture can be interpreted in part 
as Beijing’s effort to occupy the moral high ground if the 
bilateral relationship goes from bad to worse.  
On the other hand, the Xi Jinping administration has 
shown no signs of compromise on issues of its core interests. 
As a warning against a closer US–Taiwan relationship and 
the military drills of US aircraft carrier strike groups in the 
disputed South China Sea, PLA conducted counter-drills 
almost simultaneously in the Yellow Sea, Bohai Sea and the 
South and East China Seas in August 2020. PLA has also 
blamed the US for ‘strengthening its Asia–Pacific military 
alliances and reinforcing military deployment and inter-
vention, adding complexity to regional security’ (China MoD 
2019). 
If the current US–China tensions get out of control and 
spiral into a cold war or even military confrontations (with 
the Taiwan issue and the South and East China Seas dis-
putes as potential flashpoints), it could increase China’s 
urgency to build closer military ties with PICs. Then it may 
be possible that China will seek to establish military bases 
in the Pacific to directly compete for influence with the US. 
Discussions have already started in the academic circle in 
China. Some Chinese scholars call for Beijing to consider 
building ports for civilian and military uses in PICs such as 
Fiji, PNG and Vanuatu (Zhang 2020:2). Should PLA pro-
ceed, the challenges are apparent. These plans will meet 
with firm opposition from traditional powers such as the 
US, Australia, France and New Zealand. Compared with 
China, these countries enjoy closer historical and security 
ties with PICs and can exert influence on the latter’s 
security policymaking. To guard against China’s rise in the 
Pacific, traditional powers have stepped up their engage-
ment with PICs and strengthened internal coordination typ-
ified by the Australia–India–Japan–US quadrilateral sec-
urity dialogue and the outbidding of China by Australia and 
the US to jointly fund the upgrade of the Lombrum military 
base on PNG’s Manus island.  
The close relations and shared cultures between PICs 
and traditional powers on one hand, and the growing PICs–
China engagement since 2006 on the other, will make it 
extremely difficult for PICs to take sides in the US–China 
rivalry. Equally difficult, if not impossible, is that PICs will 
give the green light for China to establish military bases in 
their countries. Even if China succeeds in persuading a 
Pacific island country to accept China’s proposal, it is likely 
that the Chinese base will be presented as a logistical 
support facility similar to its military base in Djibouti in the 
Horn of Africa. Completed in August 2017, this is China’s 
first overseas military base and has been described by PLA 
as mainly providing logistical support to its escort missions 
in the Gulf of Adam (Cabestan 2019:736).  
If the US–China tensions ease under a Biden admin-
istration, the development of US–China relations globally 
and regionally is a new question that deserves attention. As 
the existing superpower, the US will continue to strengthen 
its security relations with PICs to advance its interests. 
From China’s perspective, as a rising superpower, if its 
economic and military power continue to rise, its security 
interest will undoubtedly expand. This could lead to a 
conflict of interest. In this case, can the US and China 
accommodate each other’s security interest in the Pacific? 
Can they manage differences and share power to live in 
peace? These are subject to debate. Different models such 
as ‘grand bargain’ and ‘a concert of powers’ have been 
proposed by scholars (Glaser 2015; White 2012). These do 
not seem feasible in the current climate of growing rivalry 
between the US and China. For example, since 2018, PLA 
has been excluded by the US from the annual Rim of the 
Pacific exercise.  
In addition to avoiding taking sides in the US–China 
rivalry, PICs will benefit if the two great powers can co-
operate and shoulder responsibilities on the issue of climate 
change. Climate change is the largest single security threat  
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to PICs who are constrained by resources and expertise to 
tackle the issue. Currently the US and China have provided 
their own climate aid to PICs, but much more needs to be 
done at the global level led by the two countries and other 
major emitters of greenhouse gas. 
Another scenario that deserves attention is whether PLA 
will be involved in future operations to evacuate Chinese 
diaspora stranded by social unrests in the Pacific. Guided by 
the ‘Go Out’ Strategy initiated by the Chinese government, 
millions of Chinese business people, either as staff of state-
owned enterprises or private businesses, have gone overseas 
to seek commercial opportunities in the past two decades. 
This creates a new task for PLA. As the 2019 PLA white 
paper articulates: 
overseas interests are a crucial part of China’s national 
interests. One of the missions of China’s armed forces is 
to effectively protect the security and legitimate rights 
and interests of overseas Chinese people, organisations 
and institutions (China MoD 2019).  
In practice, PLA has sent its air force and navy vessels 
to evacuate Chinese citizens from war-ravaged Libya 
(2011) and Yemen (2015).   
However, except for these two operations, the Chinese 
government has used non-PLA resources such as com-
mercial charter flights to evacuate its citizens during the 
riots/conflicts in Timor-Leste (2006), Lebanon (2006), 
Chad (2008), Haiti (2009), Kyrgyzstan (2010) and Egypt 
(2011). Similar operations were conducted in the Pacific. 
The growing number of Chinese businesses and their dom-
inance of the retail sector in the Pacific have given rise to 
local resentment. This sentiment contributed largely to the 
riots in Honiara and Nuku‘alofa in April and November 
2006 respectively with the Chinese businesses being the 
main target. Coordinated by the Chinese embassies in PNG 
(responsible for providing consular services to Chinese in 
Solomon Islands as the latter was Taiwan’s ally at the time) 
and Tonga, the Chinese government came to the rescue of 
its citizens affected in the riots by organising charter flights 
to pick them up. 
As the Xi Jinping administration is proactively rolling 
out its Belt and Road Initiative in the Pacific, China’s 
economic interest and the number of business people will 
continue to grow. The Chinese diaspora could be trapped in 
similar social unrests in some PICs in the future. When  
this happens, the Chinese government may take different 
approaches in response. If the US–China relations have not 
broken down to open conflicts, it is likely that China will not 
involve PLA in the evacuation operations to avoid fuelling 
the security concerns of the US and other traditional powers. 
However, if the US and China slip into conflicts, there is 
more chance that PLA will be directly involved in the pro-
tection of Chinese business and citizens in PICs. This will 
exacerbate the traditional powers’ existing mistrust of China.  
Conclusion 
To sum up, PICs are relevant to China’s core interests and 
security strategies. China’s military engagement with PICs 
has grown in the past two decades. With its confidence in 
breaking the first island chain, PLA will likely set its eyes 
on the Pacific. The escalation of China–US rivalry could be 
a catalyst for China to further increase its military engage-
ment with PICs. More competition between China, the US 
and other traditional powers in the security sector is 
expected. This will put PICs in a difficult position. At the 
extreme, PICs will need to take sides. 
PLA’s military ambition in the Pacific will also be 
affected by China’s available resources. China’s economic 
wealth accumulated in the past four decades has enabled the 
steady growth of PLA budgets in the past two decades. 
However, trade wars with the US, COVID-19 and massive 
flooding present grave challenges for China’s economy. 
How this will affect China’s military spending in the future 
remains to be seen. A reduced budget will inevitably 
constrain PLA’s activities in the Pacific.  
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666 COVID-19 and climate: Threat multipliers to 
Pacific food and nutrition security 
Steven Crimp, Robyn Alders, Mark Howden, Rachel Friedman, The 
Australian National University and Federico Davilo, University of 
Technology Sydney 
Pacific Island Countries (PICs) comprise more than 2000 islands and atolls in 28 
countries and territories. While the region covers one third of the Earth’s surface, 
the total land area is only approximately 550,000km2, representing 2 per cent of the 
entire 30,000,000km2 of the Pacific region (Barnett 2011). This land area is home 
to approximately 2.3 million people (excluding Papua New Guinea) of whom half 
live within 10km of the coast (Andrew et al. 2019). Population numbers are rapidly 
growing around major cities, and urbanisation in PICs is happening three times 
faster than the global average (UN Habitat 2015). By 2050, over half of the Pacific 
population is expected to live in urban areas (UNESCAP 2018). 
Subsistence food production forms a significant part of household income, well 
over 60 per cent in some countries, but also varies greatly across the region. Variable 
inflation rates, poor economic growth, negative trade balances, global food price 
rises, and increasing household dependence on commercial markets affect almost 
all PICs and have added to food and nutrition insecurity (SPC 2016). Agricultural 
production in large parts of the Pacific is well below its inherent potential, with 
recent analysis by Farrell et al. (2020) finding that between 1980 and 2016 crop 
production in the region (excluding Fiji and PNG) declined from 1200 to 800 
grams/per capita/per day. 
Pacific food systems are diverse and complex, spanning different geographies 
and agro-ecological environments. To understand the impacts of the COVID-19 
pandemic on Pacific food security, we selected seven PICs on the basis of a typology 
of island groupings (Table 1). This allowed the impacts of COVID-19 to be 
differentiated geographically and is consistent with other Pacific studies that have 
examined food systems shocks, and with regional development in food systems 
programing (Charlton et al. 2016, SPC 2020). The seven PICs selected include small 
islands (Kiribati and Tuvalu), medium islands (Samoa, Tonga) and larger islands 
(Solomon Islands, Vanuatu, Fiji). We conducted a separate parallel study in PNG, 
which is excluded from this list of countries, because of its size and geographical 
complexity (but covered in the following paper). 
Table 1. Typology of Pacific islands  






Group 1: Smaller 
islands  
Small reef and 
composite islands 
Kiribati  120  995  
Tuvalu  10  44  
Group 2: Medium 
islands  
Volcanic, limestone, 
and composite islands 
Samoa  199  3,046  
Tonga  100  847  
Group 3: Larger 
islands  





667  29,675  
Vanuatu  305  13,526  
Fiji  895  20,857  
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While the contributions that agriculture and fisheries 
make to livelihoods and the socio-economic profile vary 
between countries, primary food production remains core to 
the region’s economies: 
• The smaller Group 1 countries are more reliant on fish-
eries than agriculture. Both Tuvalu and Kiribati have 
approximately 40 per cent of the population living in rural 
areas. Agricultural land makes up 42 per cent of Kiribati 
and 60 per cent of Tuvalu, contributing approximately 24 
per cent of GDP in Kiribati and 17 per cent in Tuvalu. 
Agriculture and fisheries contribute between 9.2 and 35 
per cent of GDP depending on country. 
• The Group 2 countries have lower capacity for food pro-
duction, and much higher trade deficits given their 
reliance on imported food. In Tonga, over 77 per cent of 
the population lives in rural areas, and agriculture takes up 
46 per cent of the land area and contributes 15–20 per cent 
of GDP. In Samoa, 82 per cent of the population live in 
rural and peri-urban areas, agriculture takes up 12 per cent 
of the land area and contributes 10–20 per cent of GDP 
(Sialaoa 2019).  
• Group 3 countries have highly diverse food production 
systems and differentiated dependence on rural liveli-
hoods. In Solomon Islands and Vanuatu, 70–80 per cent 
of the population living in rural areas are involved in 
agriculture and/or fishing. In Fiji less than half of the 
population lives in rural areas. The contribution of agri-
culture to GDP also varies in Group 3 countries, from 
approximately 35–40 per cent in Solomon Islands to 15–
20 per cent in Vanuatu and less than 10 per cent in Fiji 
(FAO 2020a). 
Data collected include a range of media and public 
policy responses from different PICs, as well as selected 
examples from interviews carried out with 21 key inform-
ants working in agriculture, fisheries and policy in the 
Pacific. Data were collected in June-July 2020 and analysed 
in August 2020. It builds from parallel emerging studies that 
either document the immediate impacts of COVID-19 on 
food systems (Eriksson et al. 2020, Piturara 2020), or 
projects the potential impacts.  
Factors currently undermining Pacific 
food and nutrition security 
Climate and water risk, associated loss of arable 
land and the adaptation gap 
Climate change and associated increases in the frequency 
and intensity of extreme weather events have negatively 
impacted food and nutrition security in the Pacific region 
for over a decade (MacPherson 2017). In 2015, Cyclone 
Winston resulted in A$368 million in lost agricultural 
production (Sleet 2019). In the same year, Tropical Cyclone 
Pam resulted in the loss of 80 per cent of crop production in 
Vanuatu (Cvitanovic et al. 2016). In addition to the obvious 
impacts of extreme weather events on food production and 
food trading, climate change is also driving geographical 
spread of disease and pests, increasing food safety risks 
(Maggiore et al. 2020).  
Compounding impacts of climate threats, COVID-19 
control measures, and food insecurity were experienced in 
April 2020, during Tropical Cyclone Harold in Vanuatu. 
Measures to mitigate COVID-19 contagion in Vanuatu led 
to nation-wide lockdowns, limiting the normal movement 
of people. Category 5 Cyclone Harold severely impacted 
the northern provinces: 95 per cent of homes were des-
troyed in Pentecost, crop damage ranged from 50 per cent 
to 100 per cent, and an estimated 27 per cent of the popu-
lation was displaced (Refugees International 2020). FAO’s 
situational assessment in May 2020 estimated that 
17,500 ha of cropland was affected (FAO 2020b). Relief 
measures from Australia and New Zealand were hampered 
when humanitarian aid workers were required to quarantine 
for 14 days before being able to aid local communities.  
Freshwater availability and extreme climate events 
have and will continue to put pressure on agricultural pro-
duction. The combination of sea level rise and thinning 
freshwater lenses due to lower rainfall and increased 
extraction drives salt water intrusion, which will amplify 
food systems insecurity (Leal Filho et al. 2020). This in turn 
depresses agricultural production and presents a geo-
political security risk in the region.  
Persistent malnutrition  
While persistent malnutrition in the region has generally 
declined, it still remains higher than the global average. 
Kiribati, Solomon Islands, and Vanuatu have over 35 per cent 
of their respective populations suffering from nutritional 
deficiency (IHME 2018). Malnutrition impacts are unevenly 
felt, with vulnerable households (including the elderly, 
people living with a disability, the socio-economically poor 
and other marginalised groups), with children and women 
being overrepresented (FAO 2020a). The top two risk factors 
causing the greatest burden of disease in the Pacific are 
malnutrition, including nutritional deficiencies and dietary 
risks including diabetes, kidney disease, and cardiovascular 
diseases. For instance, diabetes and kidney disease in the 
seven Pacific Island countries in this assessment have a much 
higher prevalence than the global average (IHME 2018).  
One of the drivers of persistent malnutrition has been the 
changing international trade context of the region. Pacific 
trade liberalisation in the mid-1990s resulted in an increase 
in cheap imported processed foods such as noodles, rice, and 
wheat. The convenience, low price and ease of access of these 
products led to changed food consumption habits. Further 
trade and economic impacts of COVID-19, discussed later in 
this paper, may hamper a dietary transition, with people not 
being able to afford healthier foods or adequately feed 
children, thus lowering the consumption of nutrient rich 
foods. 
Limited employment opportunities and reliance 
on remittances  
Key informant responses indicate that the high pro-
portion of low-paid, informal labour in agriculture, and 
other services using migrant labour, remains a significant 
vulnerability in the Pacific region. Poorly remunerated  
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agricultural workers contribute to decreased food access, 
utilisation, and stability over time. The International Labour 
Organization stressed that ‘despite sustained job growth, 
decent work deficits and informality challenge prospects of 
further reduction in working poverty in Asia and the 
Pacific’ (ILO 2018). 
Tourism and associated services are major employers 
in the Pacific, notably in Vanuatu, Fiji, Tonga, and Samoa. 
Tourism makes a substantial contribution to the GDP of 
several of the Pacific countries (e.g., 30 per cent in Samoa, 
38.9 per cent in Fiji, and 45 per cent in Vanuatu). Tourist 
related services provide between 30 per cent (Solomon 
Islands) and 80.2 per cent (Samoa) of total employment in 
the Pacific. Tourism also creates much of the domestic 
demand for fresh produce and thus farm incomes for those 
delivering to restaurants and resorts. For example, in 2017, 
hotels and resorts in Fiji’s main tourism areas spent FJ$74.4 
million (A$50 million) on procurement of fresh produce. 
Remittances make significant contributions to social 
protection in the Pacific, although their aggregate flow 
varies widely across the region. In a recent analysis, the 
contributions of remittances to GDP in 2018 ranged from 
40.7 per cent in Tonga to about 16.4 per cent in Samoa. The 
World Bank estimates that remittance flows across the 
Pacific will drop, compared to 2019 estimates, by approx-
imately 20 per cent or US$100 billion dollars, by the end of 
2020 due to restricted international employment oppor-
tunities (IMF 2020). It predicts that due to reductions in 
national GDP and remittances up to 60 million people will 
be pushed into extreme poverty as a result of the impacts of 
the COVID-19 pandemic. This substantial poverty increase 
can lead to substantial reduction in economic access to food, 
creating both an immediate and an ongoing food security 
risk for the region.  
Significant dependence on food imports 
Since the 1980s, there has been a marked acceleration of the 
globalisation of Pacific food systems. Food imports increased 
in parallel to a decline of total agricultural output. The 
dependence on international systems exposes communities to 
the price fluctuations of commodities in global markets. At 
this stage, international food prices have remained relatively 
stable during COVID-19; however, the dependence of the 
region makes it particularly sensitive to global price fluc-
tuations if they occur during the northern hemisphere’s 
winter. Despite relative price stability, import prices remain 
elevated compared to 2019 (AMIS 2020), and more volatile 
than in previous decades. Both market price and price 
volatility are important determinants of access to food and 
thus important determinants of Pacific food security. 
Persistent gender inequality 
In 2018, it was reported that while Asia and the Pacific had 
made progress in some areas of gender equality, available 
data against the Sustainable Development Goals indicators 
highlighted significant inequality for women and girls (ADB 
and UN Women 2018). For one, gender-based violence is 
endemic in the Pacific region; often during conflicts and 
natural disasters, social structures are further destabilised, 
leaving many women and girls vulnerable to increased sexual 
violence, exploitative labour, and trafficking (UNFPA 2020). 
Women make important contributions to agriculture 
and rural livelihoods, and play a vital role in the care and 
reproduction of households and communities. However, 
persistent gender inequalities in the region, such as unequal 
access to productive resources (including land, services and 
inputs, finance, training and information), markets, and 
institutions, hamper the realisation of women’s human and 
productive potential and undermine community food 
security. The COVID-19 pandemic has exacerbated already 
limited access to resources. The closure of fresh food 
markets has had a disproportionate impact on women,  
as the main participants in fresh market sales. These 
closures served to reduce household incomes and in turn 
hamper ongoing food production. 
Rapid population growth, intergenerational 
inequity, and urbanisation  
The demographic youth bulge, accompanied by inter-
generational inequity that works against the young, and 
growing urbanisation are impacting agricultural and fish-
eries workforces and hence food security across the Pacific. 
Most public infrastructure and support are targeted at urban 
communities, exacerbating the urban-rural divide in much 
of the Pacific. Under-resourcing of rural development has 
left youth and rural communities more vulnerable to shocks 
and hence less resilient for food security.  
Poverty is known to exacerbate food insecurity; in 
urban areas with limited capacity to grow food, loss of 
employment can rapidly amplify food insecurity. Urban and 
informal workers in the economy are core to keeping food 
systems functioning, especially in larger island countries 
like Fiji, Vanuatu and the Solomon Islands. In both Port 
Vila and Honiara, farmers often commute from rural areas 
to central markets, often staying overnight until produce is 
sold. COVID-19 related lockdowns have meant many urban 
markets have closed, or operate at reduced volumes, cutting 
income for street food vendors and limiting the influx of 
food from rural areas. Because many urban dwellers rely  
on income from informal food-related businesses, the pan-
demic has resulted in negative economic impacts for much 
of the urban population, reduced purchasing capacity for 
food, and therefore elevated food stress. This is com-
pounded by less fresh produce entering urban areas, 
increasing food prices for staples.   
Youth are also disproportionately exposed and vulner-
able to socio-economic shocks associated with the COVID-
19 pandemic. The Pacific has a very young population – 
more than half of the population of the 22 countries and 
territories in the Pacific is under the age of 25. Un- and 
under-employment is a major concern, with average youth 
unemployment at 23 per cent compared with the global 
average of 12.6 per cent (ILO 2018). Youth living in 
informal urban settlements have been hardest hit by the 
economic downturn and are less likely to find gainful 
employment, than those over the age of 25 once economic 
recovery is underway.  
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Persistent under-resourcing of biosecurity, 
animal and plant health  
Pathogens and pests continue to threaten agricultural and 
aquatic production in the Pacific – the risk of pests and 
diseases increases as genetic diversity declines. Island envir-
onments have inherently limited biological resilience in the 
face of aggressive invasive species, due to limited natural 
predators, and relatively low genetic diversity. Multiple 
biosecurity breaches have resulted in substantial food insec-
urity and nutritional impacts, loss of farmer incomes, export 
earnings, and balance of payments (McGregor et al. 2011).  
Fragmented value chains and food governance 
systems 
In many countries across the Pacific, the governance of food 
security and food systems extends across multiple agencies 
managing agriculture and trade through to public health, 
including public, private and civil society actors. This 
fragmentation makes policies that work across sectors hard 
to facilitate. COVID-19 has placed extra stress on these 
governance arrangements and resulted in instances where 
the rollout of incentives has been slow, and ineffective. 
Contrastingly, knowledge and information sharing between 
agencies and between communities in the region has been 
collaborative during the COVID-19 pandemic. The diver-
sity of studies looking at food and nutrition security have 
enabled the World Food Programme Regional Food 
Security Cluster to meet and share progress on work, 
allowing for strong alignment of interventions to support 
recovery.  
Traditional farming practises and declines in 
agricultural productivity. 
The Pacific region has the smallest land holdings in the 
world, with an average holding of 1 hectare, and an average 
of 3.2 parcels per holding (FAO-RAP 2020). For most of 
the Pacific, the total land cultivated by smallholders 
comprises a sizeable portion of the total agricultural land. 
Agricultural production in large parts of the Pacific is well 
below its potential with recent analysis by Farrell et al. 
(2020) finding that between 1980-2016 crop production in 
the region (excluding Fiji and PNG) declined from 1,200 to 
800 grams/per capita/per day (includes foods relevant to 
food security, excluding cash crops and tuna). 
Growing input costs, more variable seasonal con-
ditions, incentives to grow specific cash or food crops, and 
the pressure to reduce the complexity of crop rotations have 
all resulted in much lower crop diversity than ever before, 
in turn predisposing the region to system wide shocks, 
notably for very subsistence-dependent countries like 
Solomon Islands. Cash crop production has continued in 
Fiji, and increased in Solomon Islands and Vanuatu. Copra, 
sugar cane and kava have seen increased focus as an engine 
of economic development in rural areas, across Group 2 and 
3 islands.  
Marine production plays a critical role in some Pacific 
economies. National fisheries in Vanuatu, Solomon Islands 
and Kiribati are highly lucrative foreign-owned enterprises 
(Barclay and Cartwright 2007). For example, in Kiribati 
which has one of the largest commercial tuna fisheries in 
the region (Gillett and Tuati 2018), up to 75 per cent of 
government revenue comes from oceanic fisheries access 
fees. Conversely, of the fish consumed in rural areas in the 
Pacific, 60–90 per cent comes from subsistence fishing 
activities (Bell et al. 2009). The contribution of coastal 
fisheries to communities is often understated, and the 
pressures on marine ecosystems creates economic and food 
security risks for these dependent communities.  
While important for both local and commercial eco-
nomic benefits, these marine systems are exposed to global 
economic and climate change pressures. Warming oceans 
will create further risk to the food security of communities 
reliant on fishing, for protein and micronutrients. COVID-
19 further exacerbates these threats through movement 
restrictions that have resulted in declines in subsistence 
fishing activities and income from temporary closure of 
commercial enterprises.  
Increasing logistical costs and the future impli-
cations of greenhouse gas targets for shipping 
food to and from Pacific nations 
In 2018, the International Maritime Organization (IMO) 
adopted mandatory measures under the pollution preven-
tion treaty (MARPOL) to reduce emissions of greenhouse 
gases from international shipping. The IMO has executed 
global technical cooperation projects to support the capacity 
of states, particularly developing states, to implement and 
support energy efficiency in the shipping sector (IMO 
2018). Despite these support plans, the emissions reduction 
strategy is impacting the Pacific in a number of ways. The 
first is a slowdown in the speed of existing vessels in order 
to reduce fuel usage. This is slowing the delivery of food 
products to Pacific islands and potentially disrupting 
existing transport schedules. A second, longer-term impact, 
will be an increase in logistics costs as fleets are required to 
replace older vessels with more energy efficient ships.  
Both added logistics costs and more volatile scheduling 
will have significant impacts on food availability and food 
prices across the Pacific. We currently see the potential 
impacts of added logistics costs and more volatile scheduling 
resulting from COVID-19 disruptions with localised food 
stress in Group 1 islands, as well as more volatile food prices 
in Group 2 and 3 islands (Table 1).  
Poorly adapted and underfunded education and 
risk communication 
Across the Pacific region, child and adult education is 
insufficiently adapted to local conditions, which contributes 
to a lack of practical understanding of sustainable agri-
culture, human nutrition, and sustainable food systems. 
Some recent examples focusing on education for environ-
mental sustainability and green growth provide guidance on 
how education needs to transform in order to encourage 
climate change adapted agricultural practices (UNESCO 
2016).  
School curricula are often poorly adapted to local 
settings, including local agroecological zones and market-
ing systems (Epstein and Yuthas 2012) and inadequate 
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resources devoted to teaching human nutrition and how to 
meet nutrient requirements with locally available, nutritious 
food. The limited investment in education further per-
petuates gender inequalities. These matters are vital to 
ensuring good outcomes for human wellbeing, food and 
nutrition security, and natural resource utilisation. 
Gaps in risk communication tools and practices across 
the region weaken the capacity of countries to effectively 
engage with populations at risk and the wider public in the 
event of health security or food security threats, particularly 
in the Pacific (CHS 2019). Limited formal education in 
relation to the origin and control of infectious disease 
complicates effective risk communication. 
Conclusions 
We have examined key threat multipliers and how they are 
contributing to factors that exacerbate food insecurity in the 
Pacific. The current COVID-19 pandemic has highlighted 
exposures in Pacific security, with this shock resulting in 
significant loss of employment and incomes, disrupted value 
chains due to both local and international restrictions on 
logistics, and resultant increases in food prices and growing 
food insecurity. In some Group 1 countries, food producers 
are concerned about the limited availability and/or access to 
agricultural supplies for the next growing seasons. These 
input constraints are likely to result in further reductions in 
food production, extending food insecurity in the region. 
Declining food access in urban areas and worsening 
gender-based discrimination were identified as concerning 
impacts, but not necessarily across the entire Pacific region. 
Despite no recorded cases in some countries, the impacts of 
the COVID-19 pandemic on economies, jobs, food pro-
duction, education, and health systems have been wide-
spread, with loss of livelihoods and increased levels of 
poverty. This is occurring against the backdrop of declining 
agricultural productivity over much of the Pacific region 
and in concert with a range of pre-existing regional and 
country-specific threat multipliers, highlighting the fragile 
state of food security in the Pacific. This convergence of 
threats highlights the importance of taking a compre-
hensive, all-hazards, multi-sectoral approach to achieving 
resilient food systems in the Pacific. 
Note 
The authors would like to thank the Australian Centre for 
International Agricultural Research for supporting this 
research. We would also like to extend our gratitude to the 
extensive array of esteemed contributors and key inform-
ants identified by author/s in their respective chapters for 
the Pacific regional country assessment and the Indo–
Pacific regional synopsis.  
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Food security in the Southwest Pacific 
R Michael Bourke, The Australian National University 
Improvements in food security 
Over the last 80–140 years food security has increased across 
the Southwest Pacific countries, in particular in Papua New 
Guinea, Vanuatu and the Solomon Islands where between 76 
and 87 per cent of the populations live in rural areas. Food 
security, as defined by the United Nations’ Committee on 
World Food Security, means that all people at all times have 
physical, social, and economic access to sufficient, safe, and 
nutritious food that meets their food preferences and dietary 
needs for an active and healthy life (IFPRI 2020). 
Food security has increased in the Southwest Pacific 
nations because of: 
• the adoption of more hardy and productive food crops 
including sweet potatoes, cassava, tannia (Xanthasoma 
taro), maize, African yam, peanuts, numerous vegetables 
including pumpkin, choko, amaranths and hardier cultivars 
of existing crops, particularly ABB triploid banana; 
• the use of cash to purchase food when subsistence food is 
insufficient; and 
• links between urban and rural relatives.  
Adoption of new food crops 
The adoption of new food crops has varied between locations 
and over time. For example, the anthropologist Malinowski 
(1935:180) noted that sweet potato was adopted on Kiriwina 
Island in the Trobriands around 1890 and was a moderately 
important crop by 1915 by which time its incorporation into 
gardens had helped reduce the impact of food shortages. 
When taro blight, a deadly disease caused by the fungus 
Phytopthora colocasiae, resulted in the destruction of taro 
crops in Solomon Islands, Bougainville and Buka in the 
1940s (Packard 1975), sweet potato rapidly replaced it as  
the staple food (Connell 1978). By the early to mid-2000s, 
sweet potato provided about 65 per cent of food energy in 
Kiriwina, PNG and Solomon Islands (Bourke et al. 2006:23). 
Production and consumption of sweet potato continues to 
expand in PNG and Vanuatu, as it does elsewhere in the 
Pacific islands (Iese et al. 2018). 
In recent decades, villagers in many locations in the SW 
Pacific have grown more cassava, although it has become the 
most important food in only a few locations. Over the past 30 
years, African yam has been incorporated into food pro-
duction systems in the region, along with triploid bananas, 
particularly hardy ABB types, that are high yielding and 
resistant to drought. 
These newly adopted food crops have increased food 
security in a number of ways. They generally produce more 
food per unit of land area than the older Asia-Pacific food 
crops such as taro, yam and diploid bananas. Importantly, 
they continue to produce reasonably well when land use is 
intensified and soil fertility declines. Newly adopted food 
crops can increase total food production because the 
cropping period can be extended and fallow periods can be 
reduced allowing more numerous plantings over a 15–20 
year period. Improvements in food security associated with 
changes in staple food crops have mostly occurred in the 
PNG lowlands, intermediate altitude zones, as well as in the 
islands of PNG, Solomon Islands and Vanuatu. There have 
been some gains in productivity with adoption of different 
foods crops in the PNG highlands, particularly cassava and 
triploid bananas in the lower valleys, and ‘English’ potato 
at higher altitudes (2000–2800m). However, there have 
been fewer gains from adoption of new species in the PNG 
highlands than in the lowlands and islands in the region. 
Table 1 gives an overview of the main food sources in PNG, 
Solomon Islands and Vanuatu. 
Table 1. National population and food sources in 
Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands and Vanuatu 






8,935,000 712,000 295,000 
Rural dwellers 
as proportion of 
total population 
(per cent) (2) 
87 80 76 
Proportion of 
food produced 
locally (per cent) 
(3) 
83 79 78 
Main sources of 
carbohydrate 



























1.  (Pacific Community 2020). The population of PNG is not known 
precisely as there has not been a reliable national census since 
2000. Bourke and Allen (forthcoming) estimate the mid-2020 
population was between 8.5 and 9.6 million. 
2. (Pacific Community 2020). This is the proportion of the total 
population who live in rural areas, that is, those who are not living 
in urban areas. Most rural dwellers are rural villagers, but some 
live in non-village situations, such as schools, small government 
stations, mission stations, plantations or mining camps. 
3.  (Bourke et al. 2009:131; Bourke et al. 2006:24; Bourke 1999) 
for PNG, Solomon Islands and Vanuatu respectively. 
4.  (Bourke et al. 2009:138-144; Bourke et al. 2006:22-23; Bourke 
1999) for PNG, Solomon Islands and Vanuatu respectively. 
Use of cash to purchase food  
The second important reason that food security has improved 
for rural villagers is improved access to cash to buy imported 
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or locally grown food when subsistence crops are inadequate. 
Sales of imported rice increase sharply after major natural 
disasters such as cyclones, drought and frost. Much of the 
imported rice, wheat-based foods, vegetable oil, canned fish 
and meat is consumed by those living in urban and rural non-
village areas. Some peri-urban families obtain much of their 
food energy from imported foods while villagers with limited 
links to markets rarely consume imported foods. Generally, 
rural villagers in the SW Pacific obtain up to 20 per cent of 
their food energy from imported foods.  
Malo Island in Vanuatu provides a fairly typical 
regional example of island-based villagers in the region. 
Allen (2015) documented that on average a resident of Malo 
derives around 20 per cent of their calories from food 
imports and that, in most years, this could be easily sub-
stituted with surplus subsistence production.  
Rural-urban links 
The third factor which has improved food security for rural 
villagers is links with urban relatives although this has less 
impact compared to access to cash and adoption of new 
food crops. Nevertheless, when subsistence food pro-
duction is inadequate, some urban dwellers transfer money 
to their rural-based relatives to enable them to purchase 
food. This is more common during cyclones, severe drought 
and frost when gardens are destroyed. 
Efficient supply chains for imported rice and wheat-
based foods would facilitate the availability of foods that 
can be readily stored and transported long distances. The 
same supply chains, however, also facilitate the widespread 
availability of items with low food value and those assoc-
iated with poor health outcomes, particularly carbonated 
drinks and food with a high sugar content. 
Changes in nutritional status 
In the 1960s and 1970s, dietary surveys of many groups in 
PNG whose nutrition had changed little from precolonial 
times found that diets in some areas were ‘grossly inad-
equate’ (Korte, 1976). In a review of human nutrition in 
PNG, Heywood and Nakikus (1982) reported that many 
low-protein diets and a limited amount of available food 
often resulted in slow physical growth of children, (Mueller, 
Vounatsou et al. 2001) and stunting, high infant death rates, 
girls not maturing until their late teens (Mueller and Smith 
1999), and stunting in adults. When people adopted cash 
crops and started buying imported food, including protein-
enriched rice, tinned fish and meat, diets improved 
significantly and people were able to get through periods of 
overall food shortage. 
Since about 1990, however, the rate of nutritional 
improvement has slowed and in some communities may 
have ceased. The limited number of trustworthy surveys 
with large samples means little recent reliable information 
is now available.1 Today, undernutrition in children under 
the age of five remains a significant problem in PNG, 
Solomon Islands and Vanuatu, as well as some other Pacific 
Islands nations (SPC 2011). In PNG, almost half of children 
under five years old and one-third of children in Solomon 
Islands and Vanuatu, are stunted – the result of inadequate 
food intake over a long period. In PNG, there is a reas- 
onably high level of wasting, which indicates short-term 
malnutrition. This is less widespread in Vanuatu and 
Solomon Islands (Table 2). 
Over a third of women of reproductive age in PNG and 
Solomon Islands and about a quarter of women in Vanuatu 
are anaemic (Table 2). As well as indications of under-
nutrition, a significant proportion of adults in all three nations 
are obese and suffer from diabetes (Table 2). The combin-
ation of increasing consumption of imported staples and 
increasingly sedentary lifestyles has resulted in Pacific pop-
ulations being not only among the most obese in the world, 
but have the highest prevalence of type 2 diabetes. Poor diet 
has also contributed to a number of other non-communicable 
diseases, such as increased hypertension and cardiovascular 
disease. These are overwhelmingly urban problems. 
Table 2: Prevalence of under- and over-nutrition in 
Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands and Vanuatu, 
by percentage 





49.5 31.6 28.5 
Overweight, children 
under-5 
13.7 4.5 4.6 
Wasting, children 
under-5 
14.1 8.5 4.4 
Anaemia, women of 
reproductive age 
36.6 38.9 24.0 
Obesity, adult women 25.8 27.1 30.1 
Obesity, adult men 16.6 17.9 20.2 
Diabetes, adult women 14.3 15.1 16.0 
Diabetes, adult men 15.4 12.6 15.7 
Source: Global Nutrition Report 2020 
Issues of under- and over-nutrition (obesity) have impli-
cations for economic development. At a national level, they 
may be associated with a shortened life expectancy; reduced 
productivity in both subsistence and formal sectors; reduced 
possibility for children attaining their physical and intel-
lectual potential; and high levels of stress on health systems. 
Threats to food security 
Rapid population growth: One of the most important 
long-term threats to food security in the SW Pacific is rapid 
population growth. Given the high proportion of the pop-
ulation who live in rural villages and grow most of their own 
food, there is growing pressure on agricultural land leading 
to reduced soil fertility in many locations. In the islands and 
PNG lowlands, this pressure has been absorbed by the 
adoption of new food crops, particularly sweet potato. The 
dependence on sweet potato in some locations means that 
past gains in productivity are now being overtaken by 
population growth and pressure on land. This is particularly 
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marked in the PNG highlands where there are few altern-
ative food crops that grow well at higher altitudes. 
In response, large areas of other food crops are being 
planted by villagers, particularly bananas in the highlands; 
cassava in the lower areas (up to 1500 m); and ‘English’ 
potato at high altitude locations (over 2000 m). Land use is 
being intensified through either addition of organic matter 
or a rotation of sweet potato with peanuts. Despite these 
changes, as the population continues to increase there is 
increasing pressure on land and food security in many parts 
of PNG’s central highlands. 
The high dependence on sweet potato is also becoming 
an issue in Bougainville and Buka Islands where excessive 
soil moisture on sweet potato tubers has led to food supply 
vulnerability. This is being exacerbated by climate change. 
Climate extremes: Subsistence food production is reduced 
by climatic extremes such as drought, cyclones and frost 
(Cobon et al. 2016). Recent examples include tropical 
cyclone Pam in Vanuatu in 2015, drought (and frost at very 
high altitudes) in PNG in 1997 and 2015 resulting in wide-
spread food shortages (Allen and Bourke 2001; Kanua et al. 
2016), and extended periods of very high rainfall. The 
impact of very high rainfall on tuber yield is generally 
underestimated but when rainfall is excessive, the above 
ground vegetation of the crop is particularly vigorous and 
the low yield not apparent until harvest time. The impact of 
very wet soils occurs in the first 6–8 weeks after planting, 
but the impact is not apparent until many months later 
during the tuber bulking phase.  
Other natural events: Floods, landslides, earthquakes and 
tsunami can also destroy crops; however, the impact on 
food supply is generally much less than that from drought, 
frost and very high rainfall. Increasingly, pest and disease 
issues are affecting food gardens in the region but there is 
only limited information on their impact on yield. 
Climate change: The climate in the region is changing 
rapidly with increasing temperatures, rising sea levels and 
changing rainfall patterns with further changes forecast 
(Lough et al. 2016). Rapid temperature increases in the New 
Guinea highlands have meant increases in the altitude at 
which crops can be grown. For example, coconuts bear at 
1600m in the PNG highlands whereas 40 years ago, the very 
highest location at which nuts could be harvested was 
1310m (Bourke 2010). Rising sea level is impacting on 
people on atolls and some other very small islands, with 
saline water now affecting production of the staple food 
swamp taro (Cyrtosperma chamissonis) on atolls east of 
Buka Island in PNG and the nearby Ontong Java atoll  
in Malaita Province, Solomon Islands. It is likely that 
increasing temperatures, rising sea levels and increasing 
rainfall will have a serious impact on the production of 
some food crops in coming decades (McGregor et al. 2016). 
Food security vulnerability: Populations most vulnerable 
to food shortages are those living in remote areas with poor 
market access, limited access to health and education 
services, low cash income and, sometimes, limited capacity 
to gain outside assistance. People living on small islands 
with a high to very high population density are particularly 
vulnerable, such as Tongoa, Paama and North Pentecost  
in Vanuatu or remote atolls and small islands in the 
Autonomous Region of Bougainville, Milne Bay Province 
and elsewhere in PNG. Other locations where people are 
particularly vulnerable in PNG include those at very high 
altitudes (over 2200m); those in locations between the 
central highlands and the lowlands; and the Strickland-
Bosavi sub-region in Western Province. 
Nutrition, hygiene and health education:  Providing 
information on basic human nutrition, hygiene and health is 
a critically important way of improving the lives of rural 
villagers. It is particularly important to provide training to 
schoolteachers and schoolchildren as most of the latter 
group will be parents within a decade of leaving school. 
Conclusions 
The majority of people in PNG, Solomon Islands and 
Vanuatu are rural villagers who produce most of their own 
food from gardens, tree crops, fishing and domestic 
animals. Sweet potato is the most important food crop in 
PNG and Solomon Islands. Other staples include banana, 
coconut, yam, cassava, sago, taro and tannia. These crops 
are also grown in Vanuatu, aside from sago, but no single 
crop is dominant. Over the past 80–140 years, food security 
has improved in these countries because of the adoption of 
more productive food crops, most of which were dom-
esticated in Central and South America, access to cash that 
can be used to purchase food when subsistence supplies are 
inadequate, and, to a much lesser degree, support from 
urban-based family members. 
Significant gains in human nutrition over the past 60 
years have been documented, at least in PNG, and this is 
associated with access to cash from cash cropping. Never-
theless, undernutrition of children remains a major impede-
ment to human development in all three nations, as does 
high levels of anaemia in women. A significant proportion 
of people in all three nations are obese and suffer from 
diabetes, particularly in urban areas. 
Food security is threatened by rapid population growth 
and consequently more intensive land use and reduced soil 
fertility in many locations. Extreme climate events par-
ticularly drought, frost and prolonged periods of very high 
rainfall also reduce food supply in many parts of this sub-
region. Global climate change is starting to impact food 
supply particularly on atolls and other very small islands, and 
this is likely to increase in coming decades. Villagers who 
have the greatest vulnerability to chronic and short-term food 
security generally live in more remote locations where access 
to markets, health facilities and cash income is limited. 
Food security issues can be addressed through three 
main mechanisms: 
• research and outreach to improve food production;  
• greater access to cash income for rural villagers, with 
sale of agricultural produce the best option for most rural 
villagers; and 
• education in basic human nutrition, hygiene and health 
for all those of school age. 
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Note 
1.  Important studies include a major 1956 study in Sinasina, 
Simbu Province (Venkatachalam 1962) and a restudy in the 
same location in 1981 (Harvey and P Heywood 1983); the very 
comprehensive 1982–83 National Nutrition Survey and 
extensive analysis of this (Heywood, Singleton and Ross 1988; 
Mueller and Smith 1999; Mueller et al. 2001); and the 2018 
IFPRI surveys in four lowland locations (Schmidt et al. 2019). 
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Food security and community development in the Pacific:  
Case studies from Fiji 
Suliasi Vunibola and Ilisoni Leweniqila, Massey University, New Zealand Introduction
This paper considers the role of bula vakavanua (the Fijian 
way of life) in two indigenous Fijian communities, Saroni1 
and Bucalevu,2 in helping rural villages achieve food 
security. Traditional mechanisms such as solesolevaki 
(cultural capital through collective work), together with 
monthly community work structures in place, can help 
households achieve food security. Revitalising these tra-
ditional mechanisms, encouraging wider use of them, and 
establishing legal frameworks for protecting traditional food 
security could have widespread benefits.  
Food security in the Pacific and Fiji 
In the past, inter-island exchange and regular cultivation 
and storing of famine foods underpinned food security in 
many parts of the Pacific (Campbell 2014). However, for 
some time this inter-dependency has, to an extent, been 
replaced by dependence on food imported from outside the 
Pacific (Campbell 2006). The increased price of imported 
food is also creating new concerns about food security and 
the vulnerability of Pacific island countries (McGregor et 
al. 2009). The situation is exacerbated by the decline in 
availability of famine foods and other traditional forms of 
disaster resilience (Campbell 2014). Together with a reduc-
tion in community-based food production and political, 
social, cultural, and economic changes, there has been a 
marked decline of food security in the Pacific island 
countries (Gaillard and Mercer 2013).  
Traditional food security 
Traditional foods are integral to the culture, history, and 
lifestyle of Pacific Island peoples and offer an insight into 
nutritional patterns and how they formed over time. As most 
PICs are ecologically vulnerable, food security was a 
cornerstone of most traditional Pacific Island societies. 
Through practising agroecological biodiversity, traditional 
food systems have been an essential element of ecosystem 
stability (Thaman et al. 2002). For example, tree crops like 
banana, plantain and breadfruit will survive flooding 
whereas yams, cassava and kumala (sweet potato) are 
resilient during cyclones. The abundance of production 
encouraged traditional food preservation and storage 
(Campbell 2006), including the use of davuke (underground 
storage) to preserve breadfruit, kumala and other root crops. 
These traditional food banks provided and allowed intra- 
and inter-community cooperation where mutual support, 
reciprocity, and indigenous exchange of food and food 
products were particularly important during times of 
hardship or extreme natural events within households, tribe, 
and vanua (Campbell 2015). For example, after Cyclone 
Winston in 2016 many districts in Fiji used resilient  
crops and famine food for survival. Famine foods in Fiji  
include dalo ni tana (Xanthosoma sagittifolium), via kau 
(Cyrtosperma merkusii), via kaile (Alocasia macrorrhiza), 
(Dioscorea bulbifera), bulou (Dioscorea bulbifera), and ota 
(fern) (Athyrium esculentum) and (Manihot esculenta) 
cassava. 
Research methods 
Our research in Saroni and Bucalevu villages was on-going 
throughout 2018 and continued to 2020. We used the Vanua 
Research Framework (VRF) (Nabobo-Baba 2008) – a widely 
accepted cultural research framework used by Pacific 
researchers. The framework, derived from the Kaupapa 
Maori Research Framework (Smith 2013), includes indige-
nous worldviews by developing and encouraging approaches 
that value cultural ways of being (Nabobo-Baba 2008). The 
VRF recognises the concept of vanua (tribe and the integ-
rated nature of land, people and culture) as central to 
indigenous Fijian identity. Adhering to the VRF principles 
helps build a web of trust, respect and lifelong relationships 
with research participants. 
Our findings in Saroni village 
The Saroni community-driven development initiative 
adopted its work structure from the Nayarabale Youth Farm 
work structure (Vunibola and Scheyvens 2019), which 
focuses on sustainable development for the community and 
improving general wellbeing. Four critical elements guide 
the weekly activities (see Table 1, next page).  
The main focus in Saroni was the village commercial 
kava and taro farm. Driven by the youths, it involves the 
germination of planting materials in planter bags and trans-
planting to the fields. The villagers adopted the work plan 
structure which resulted in some immediate benefits. For 
instance, the plan gave the villagers a routine of work and 
better management of time. The work structure (Table 1, 
next page) was analysed by an elder of Saroni village who 
explained: 
Eitou samai muria na I tuvatuva mai Nayarabale sa bau 
yaga ni eimami sa mai bula vaaivaarau. Sa rairai totoa 
na yalovata ni caa na solesolevai. Sa raici na duavata 
ka sa raici viro ga na toso ni teitei ka dau maka i mada 
dina ni maka tu na sede. We followed the work structure 
from Nayarabale, and we saw immediate benefits as it 
allowed us to work in a monthly routine, which is always 
difficult for village life. People now work collectively at 
the farm and we can see rapid increase in farming 
activities and farm expansion. This is impossible when 
people work alone without any capital to pay for labour 
(Joti Tasere, January 10, 2020).  
However, the Saroni commercial farming intervention 
faced a hurdle three months after establishment. People 
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Table 1: Work structure of Saroni village 
 
were having problems attending solesolevaki (collective work) 
and as a result, they were not able to follow their monthly 
routine. The people had a village meeting to identify the reasons 
for members not attending the work programs. They carried out 
talanoa (discussions) to work out their issues. The youth leader 
stated: 
Eitou sa vaataroga taucoo na veivuvale sa kai unei ni 
vuna levu dudua e yaco na leka iya ni maka na magiti. 
E ra dau lai vaakeketi magiti rawa me ana ina na vuvale 
nib era na solesolevai, sa dodonu me eitou ca’ava ina e 
dua na a kai muri na loga ni yakona. We carried out 
discussions with all families in the village and we 
realised that the main contributing factor for the 
difficulties of following the routine is the inability of 
families to have access to enough food. People need to 
look for food first before they can attend solesolevaki. 
We need to look at ways to rectify the issue of food 
security first before the commercial kava farm venture 
(Netani Naivalu, January 10,2020).  
To maximise attendance in solesolevaki programs the 
village reformed the work structure to boost the food security 
program which meant that time was allocated every week to 
food security both for individual families and for socio-
cultural gatherings. For instance, the food security program 
in the third week is at the community garden which aims to 
provide food for socio-cultural gatherings and income. Two 
days a week (a total of ten days in a month) are dedicated to 
solesolevaki (collective work) on individual household 
vegetable gardens and staple crop farms. Arieta Vulakome, a 
mother and the women’s group leader, commented: 
Eimami sa mai yalokisi ni sa lewe levu e ra maka ni kai 
dau lao I solesolevai baleta ma sa une na ena asia. Ia 
na leka dina eimami dau sotava na yalewa ei na yakiti 
ni dau maka na magiti e tu I vale. Na ena sa ca’a vaalevu 
na loga ni magiti sa eimami taleitaina na marama. We  
were disheartened by the disruption of the monthly 
program as we saw the benefits but in reality, the women 
and children suffered as the food at home was insecure. 
Developing our food gardens will alleviate many chal-
lenges we face (Arieta Vulakome, January 9, 2020).  
The reformed work structure, with a focus on food 
security for communal and family purposes, was followed 
for the next five months. This not only allowed enough food 
for the families but resulted in easier access to the food 
gardens for women and children when the men were away 
doing solesolevaki (see Table 2). 
Table 2: Reformed work structure of Saroni village 
 
Evaluation after five months saw an improved village 
in terms of economic and community development and the 
general wellbeing of the community. By placing more 
emphasis on food security activities, sufficient food was 
produced for families, to’ato’a (extended family) and 
matakali (sub-clan).   
Saroni village crop records include a measurement of 
the food security status of every household showing their 
access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food that meets the 
food preferences and diet necessary for an active and 
healthy life. The crop record also shows the planting density 
Week Solesolevaki 
activities 
Group involved Venues 
1 Youth farm All youth members Youth farm 
camp 
2 Individual farms Small youth groups 
who farm on the 
same location do 
their small 
solesolevaki, helping 






3 Tribal food 
security 







any visitors from 
outside the 
village) 
All tribe members but 
the necessities for 
hospitality and 
cultural protocols 
(e.g,. money, food, 
artefacts and 
transport) are 
provided by the youth 
farm. Members 
undertake activities 






Group and days 
involved 
Food security 
1 Youth farm All youth members 
work on the 
commercial farm on 







Small youth groups 
who farm at the same 
location do their small 
solesolevaki, helping 
on other individual’s 
farms. Members do 






3 Tribal food 
security 
All tribe (village) 
members. Members 


















or any visitors 
from outside 
the village) 
All tribe members but 
the necessities for 
hospitality and cultural 
protocols (e.g. money, 
food, artefacts and 
transport) are 
provided by the youth 
farm. Members do 
activities like cooking 
and attending 
meetings and 
ceremonies. This is 
done from Thursday 
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of each crop cultivated in the village. Planting density 
records provide a guide for farmers on total crops planted 
and the total land area developed allowing farmers to make 
informed decisions on what best to produce on the site. 
Planting density in Figure 2 was reached using the 
following formula: 
Plant Density = Total number of plants on  
the ground in crop 
Required total number of plants per  
hectare in a crop 
 
Figure 2: Total number of root crops and assorted 
vegetables at Saroni village  
 
 
Research in Bucalevu village 
In the past, the farming work structure of Bucalevu village 
was the combination of the indigenous Fijian calendar (Vula 
Vaka-Viti), which is based on planting and fishing seasons, 
and a monthly agriculture work program. To be successful, 
local NGO food production development projects needed 
people to be actively involved in the solesolevaki 
program. However, there was little individual commitment 
to the project although village leaders identified food 
security as a problem for every household. This led in 2017 
to the rearrangement of the work structure. With traditional 
knowledge, the researchers, the Ministry of Primary 
Industries, and the Ra Provincial Office, designed a work 
structure that the village people were happy with (see  
Table 3).  
Three months after restructuring to revive food security 
for each of the 42 households in Bucalevu, wellbeing (bula 
sautu) was achieved, as explained by one of the elders: 
Ena rawati ga na bulasautu ena bula i vakavakarau kei 
na solesolevaki oqo nai yavu ni bula dina e Bucalevu. 
Wellbeing could be attained by managing our time 
following a structured work plan and, most importantly, 
through solesolevaki (collective work or cultural capital/ 
currency) a resilient mechanism handed down from our 
ancestors (Waisake, July 2 2019). 
Bucalevu managed to achieve food security, which 
allows them to practice ‘veivoli vaka itei’ (exchanging food  
products within the community and other communities). 
This program has promoted the self-sufficiency of food to 
Bucalevu village, enabling them to accommodate socio-
cultural obligations. 





Focus Hours Comments 






8am to  
12pm 
2 days dedicated 
to this work; the 









8am to  
12pm 
2 days dedicated 
to this work; the 
other days given 
to individual 




3 Solesolevaki 8am to  
4pm 
Working 
collectively on the 
farms 
12pm to  
1.30pm 
Lunch 4 Matanitu 
(government 
visit) 
8am to  
4pm 
3 days dedicated 
to this work; the 







Family time is essential to every household for 
sharing some traditional knowledge purposes for 
every young generation. 






Record keeping is also essential for Bucalevu farmers and 
a successful farm manager keeps accurate records and has 
established a sound recordkeeping system. A crop record 
includes the date of planting, crop or assorted vegetable name, 
the number of plants planted, and expected harvested time. 
Planting density on Figure 3 was attained using this formula: 
 
Plant Density = Total number of plants on  
the ground in crop 
Required total number of plants per  
hectare in a crop 
 
Figure 3: Total number of root crops and assorted 
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Maintaining these records enable the farmers to 
make informed decisions for the future and better organise 
their land-management practices, including crop rotation 
and pest control. 
Food as a cultural component 
Food is a critical component of Pacific culture and other 
indigenous groups globally, and this is visible in any 
function or gathering. Having enough food for the family 
and socio-cultural obligations therefore are the ultimate 
aims for indigenous Fijians in rural Fiji. A way to achieve 
this demand is to include food security programs in the 
work structure followed by village members. In both case 
studies, following the daily routines is found to contribute 
to bula vakaivakarau (disciplined village life); yalomatua 
ni vakayagataki gauna (wise use of time) and solesolevaki 
(social and cultural capital) where people pool resources 
and labour for the common good. Once there is an 
abundance of food to cater for household needs and socio-
cultural obligations, villagers are able to use crops as a 
commodity to sell at the market for family income.  
Discussion 
Community-based development in the Pacific has been the 
focus of local and international development agencies for 
many years with the aim ofs improving the wellbeing  
of Pacific people. However, there remains the serious  
question – how should community-development structures 
be planned and executed to achieve the aspired goals? We 
have found that community development interventions do 
not always recognise the interrelated and interconnected 
components or reality of specific geographical locations. 
Development plans, feasibility structures and frameworks 
are prepared in advance of workers being recruited to 
implement the intervention. Due to the interwoven systems 
of bula vakavanua (way of life signified by the culture, 
tradition, and customary land), community development 
initiatives can be challenging and such challenges occur 
when community development initiatives focus specifically 
on the project itself rather than having a holistic view of the 
highly connected, interwoven community components 
which can include social, physical, environmental and 
spiritual factors (Holland 2006; Morse et al. 2013).  
One of the major components of rural subsistence com-
munities in the Pacific is the capacity of matavuvale (family) 
to attain food security. Food security in the communities 
studied not only refers to families’ access to enough food but 
also access to nutritious foods that suit their dietary needs 
and socio-cultural obligations (Campbell 2015). A critical 
element of indigenous economic development on customary 
land in Fiji is being able to provide financial support for 
socio–cultural responsibilities, which also contribute to 
business sustainability and improve community partnership 
(Vunibola and Scheyvens 2019). Similarly, families need to 
have access to enough food for subsistence consumptionsand 
also for socio-cultural gatherings like weddings, catering for 
church gatherings, and other social occasions and obli-
gations. The new food security program enables the estab-
lishment of separate farms catering for gatherings, which 
ensures that families have enough food and there is sufficient 
for social-cultural obligations.  
Food security for families in the community provides a 
stable platform for sustainable community development 
projects. Governments or non-government organisations 
fund community projects which could also be community 
driven (for instance, Saroni case study). The findings of this 
research suggest that food security not only improves the 
participation of village people but is also linked to the 
longevity and sustainability of any community develop-
ment initiative.  
Notes 
1. Saroni village is in Dogotuki district, Macuata. 
2  Bucalevu village is in Nakorotubu district in west Viti Levu. 
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Securing coastal fisheries in the Pacific: Critical resources for food, 
livelihood and community security 
Joeli Veitayaki, University of the South Pacific  
The deteriorating health of Pacific coastal fisheries rep-
resents insurmountable security challenges. Years of 
increasing use and production with little concern for the 
ecological wellbeing of fisheries resources have resulted in 
altered and polluted habitats and resource depletion. In 
addition, Pacific nations have to secure their maritime zones 
and their resources from better organised, equipped and 
often unscrupulous operators. They also need to give 
serious attention to their coastal fisheries. 
Coastal areas in the Pacific host important habitats, such 
as sand and mudflats, seagrass beds, mangroves and coral 
reefs, all of which must be effectively managed to support the 
diverse ecological, economic, cultural and social interests of 
the people. These coastal fisheries provide food security  
and nutrition, community resilience, economic growth and 
employment, poverty alleviation and the empowerment of 
local communities. They are under threat. They consist of 
subsistence, artisanal and commercial fisheries, as well as 
aquaculture and recreational fishing – activities that are 
important but poorly understood despite their economic 
importance. Coastal fisheries include a diverse range of 
traditional and contemporary fishing methods and gear that 
reflect the multiple species fished and are also home to 
unique marine biodiversity and commercial activities that are 
vulnerable to intensive resource use. Unfortunately, Pacific 
islanders have not effectively managed these critical 
resources and sources of livelihood, causing their decline and 
eventual collapse. These fisheries are not expected to cope 
with the combined devastating impact of climate change, 
over exploitation and worsening pollution.  
In addition to these challenges, Pacific small island 
developing states (SIDS) are scattered across the world’s 
largest ocean where tropical cyclones, storms, floods and 
droughts represent security threats that Pacific citizens  
must address to effectively manage their coastal fisheries. 
Additional security threats such as environmental degrada-
tion, globalisation, organised crime, demographic changes, 
deficient state capacity, poor governance, eroding social 
cohesion and political crises must also be addressed to 
ensure the security and continuity of coastal fisheries. 
Activities required to secure coastal fisheries include con-
trolling overfishing and the degradation of coastal habitats, 
and empowering all involved stakeholders to be responsible 
for the health of the coastal environment. In addition, 
COVID-19 has redefined security in an interdependent world 
and has reminded humanity that environmental resources 
have limits that cannot be crossed. COVID-19 has also 
heightened the need to reconsider our development strategies 
and the need to focus on the sustainable use of natural 
resources to support economic development and the well-
being of our communities. This paper considers the way 
forward to ensure the long-term security of access to fisheries 
stocks that are vital to Pacific livelihoods and economies.  
Importance of coastal fisheries 
Coastal fisheries provide the majority of the local protein 
supply in the SIDS (Gillett 2011), which makes their 
security and sustainability critical for nations that have the 
responsibility to manage these resources and provide for 
those that rely on their fish catches. These states are work-
ing individually and collaboratively to assure the security 
and sustainability of these resources, requiring innovation 
and commitment from all stakeholders within the Pacific as 
well as those from outside. 
Coastal fisheries contributed an estimated US$300m 
(A$390m) annually to the GDP of Pacific SIDS and 
territories in 2014 (Gillett 2016) and employed around 
100,000 people, with subsistence fisheries engaging 10–20 
times more people than commercial fisheries (Hanich et al. 
2018:279). Women constitute approximately 25 per cent of 
small-scale fishers and account for 56 per cent of the 
landings (Harper et al. 2013) that include invertebrates, 
such as shellfish and holothurians. Fisheries are the main 
source of protein for Pacific islanders of whom, 89 per cent 
consume fish weekly (Household Income and Expenditure 
Survey (HIES) data from 10 PICTs 2012–16). Per capita 
fish consumption rate is 37 kg per person per annum 
ranging between 20 kg to 110 kg (HIES data 15 PICTs 
mainly 2001–06). While human population densities 
throughout the region have been relatively low until recent 
times allowing fishing areas to remain productive, devel-
opment and population growth over the last three decades 
have resulted in the overexploitation of coastal fisheries, 
which will soon not meet the requirements in 16 of the 22 
Pacific island countries (SPC 2008; Bell et al. 2009). 
Security challenges 
The management of coastal fisheries is complicated by lack 
of data, altered ecosystems, high demand, heavy exploitat-
ion, uncertain scientific information, unpredictable resource 
management outcomes, heightened economic development 
demands and ineffective implementation of management 
measures (Holland 2010). These factors influence the 
security of coastal fisheries that are related to the safety of 
the people involved, food security, ecological security, 
territorial security and the security of offshore fish stocks. 
Pacific states must effectively address these threats because 
their viability ‘as independent nation states hinges on the 
capacity of their lagoon and coastal fisheries to ensure food 
security and livelihoods’ (Hanich 2018:281). 
Security of people  
Traditionally, Pacific islanders enjoyed food security result-
ing from the range of food sources available including 
subsistence farming, barter, selling, fishing and hunting. 
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This arrangement has been eroded and replaced by com-
mercialisation, urbanisation and the reliance on cheap and 
poor quality imported foods (Connell and Lowitt 2019). 
The importance of coastal fisheries and the health of ocean 
ecosystems are critical to the cultural, social and economic 
wellbeing of Pacific peoples, especially during times of 
crisis.  
Growing human populations, along with changes in 
lifestyle associated with modernisation and global trade, 
have put enormous pressure on coastal fisheries (Beyerl et 
al. 2018). In addition, increasing demand for food and 
higher living standards require higher and regular income 
to pay for water, power and sewerage facilities, modern 
houses, roads and a wide range of consumer goods. Land 
clearing and urbanisation are associated with declines in 
water quality and the health of coral reefs and associated 
habitats (Dutra et al. in press). 
Safety is a concern because people are venturing further 
into the ocean in the hope of making a better catch. In one 
such case, two Kiribati fishermen survived almost four weeks 
drifting in the Pacific Ocean in 2013 (Australian News 
Network 2013). The men, aged 20 and 40, were on a fishing 
trip off Banaba Island in the Gilbert Islands when strong 
winds pushed their 14-foot boat towards the Solomon 
Islands. They were rescued by a US ship passing through the 
area after surviving on raw fish and rainwater, before they 
were found, more than 675 kilometres away from home. 
Food security  
Food security is a glaring challenge because increasing 
population, commercialisation and the need for increased 
income has forced people to sell their best food sources for 
cash. In addition, the desire to take up paid employment has 
taken people out of their villages and into areas where they 
are unlikely to afford the healthy and nutritious food they 
used to source from their gardens and the sea. Moreover, 
the promotion of fisheries development projects is increas-
ing the demand for reef fish thus worsening coastal fishing 
pressure in the region (Cinner and McClanahan 2006).  
With more than two thirds of the animal protein 
consumed in coastal villages coming from fish (Zeller et al. 
2015), one can understand why reef overfishing is common 
throughout the Pacific (Bell et al. 2017). Overfishing 
reduces the abundance and size of reef fish and also presents 
negative consequences for reproduction. In locations where 
herbivorous fish species are targeted, overfishing can 
accelerate reef bio-erosion and reduce fish biodiversity and 
productivity (Doropoulos et al. 2013). 
Ecological security  
Climate change affects the interactions between the ocean, 
land and the atmosphere, which influences the health and 
productivity of the biosphere, society and economy. 
Increasing ocean acidity and rising sea levels are damaging 
marine ecosystems including coral reefs, seagrass beds and 
mangroves that sustain healthy marine environments and 
coastal fisheries (Dutra et al. in press).  
Increased and unregulated use of pesticides and chem-
ical fertilisers, land clearing, changes in land use and 
infrastructure development, which can lead to increased 
sediment and nutrient runoffs into coastal waters have 
degraded coral reefs and affected the fisheries. Forest 
conversion, logging and mining threaten biodiversity and 
worsen climate change impacts, which affect unique 
habitats such as mangroves and coastal systems critical for 
healthy fisheries. Imagine the ongoing devastation caused 
by the sediment load from the Rewa River floods that brings 
approximately 107 tonnes per year to its estuaries and 
beyond (Hasan 1986). Serious sewage contamination has 
been reported for many years in the main urban and devel-
opment centers such as Pohnpei, Federated States of 
Micronesia (Morrison 1999), Fanga’uta Lagoon, Tonga 
(Zann 1994), Coral Coast and Suva Lagoon, Fiji (Naidu et 
al. 1991; Naidu et al. 2018). 
Collapsed fisheries across the Pacific highlight the 
need to align fisheries development to the capacities of the 
fish stocks. Although deteriorating coastal fisheries have 
been reported for at least 30 years (Kailola 1995; Pita 1996), 
lack of data and the multiple types of species being fished 
have made management complicated as fishers quickly 
move to a new commodity after noticing depletion in the 
stocks they are harvesting. Resource management and the 
rehabilitation of fisheries resources must engage local 
stakeholders to be effective. 
The sustainability of fisheries is also threatened by the 
pursuit of conflicting government development objectives, 
poor planning, inaccessible markets, lack of attention to 
environment management, lack of understanding of the 
complex social and cultural conditions, insufficient human 
resources and a lack of evaluation. Fish production has 
increased considerably in recent decades, threatening the 
health of the fisheries stock. Improved post-harvest pro-
cessing and collection of products from rural areas for sale 
in urban and overseas markets has greatly enhanced the 
commercial use of fisheries in areas far from the main 
centres, making fisheries management difficult. The correct 
balance between resource use and management needs to be 
strictly adhered to. 
Territorial security  
Pacific states have declared extensive maritime zones that 
need to be effectively managed and controlled. While 
Pacific SIDS were transformed by the 1982 United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea into large ocean island 
states with new wealth and potential resources, they were 
required to fulfill their obligations under the convention. 
Pacific countries have formed regional institutions such as 
the Pacific Islands Forum, Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA), 
and the Secretariat of the Pacific Community (SPC) to 
support their members in the pursuit of their rights and the 
delivery of their responsibilities.  
Illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing is the 
biggest security threat to the sustainable management of 
coastal fisheries. IUU is rampant at local and international 
levels. Recently, Vietnamese fishermen moved into the  
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western Pacific islands in search of reef resources such  
as sea cucumber, giant clams, trochus, lobster and fish 
(Marango 2017). The ‘blue boats’ are undetectable at sea 
but have been caught in several Pacific island countries 
including Palau, the Federated States of Micronesia, PNG, 
Solomon Islands, Vanuatu and New Caledonia (Radio NZ 
2017). In Solomon Islands, 40 blue boats crews were each 
fined US$99 (A$128) while the boat owners were fined 
US$1.59m (A$2.06m) (Loopsamoa 2017) for illegally 
entering the country.  
Fisheries development is often undertaken haphazardly 
without proper stock assessment, feasibility studies or 
impact assessments. In addition, there is limited apprecia-
tion of the relationships between offshore resources, coral 
reefs and mangrove forests, resulting in poor decision-
making that threatens the sustainability of these resources. 
Links between islands and continental slopes and food webs 
for tuna occur via the planktonic/larval phase of coral reef 
fish and via micronekton, while post-larvae from pop-
ulations of coral reef fish and invertebrates have been found 
in the stomach of tuna (Le Borgne et al. 2011:212).  
Transhipment involves the quick transfer of fish from 
the fishing ground to the market. It is a vital part of the 
commercial fishing industry, involving hundreds of refrig-
erated carrier ships roaming the oceans taking in catch from 
thousands of fishing vessels and transporting it for pro-
cessing on shore (Pew Trust 2019). Transhipments can take 
place at sea or in specified ports where ‘unscrupulous 
fishing vessel operators can obscure, manipulate, or other-
wise falsify data on their fishing practices, the species or 
amounts caught or transferred, and catch locations’ (ibid.). 
Proper control of transhipment is critical to improving the 
‘health of diminishing fish stocks’ and safeguarding the 
proceeds to host nations. In the western and central Pacific 
Ocean, over US$142m (A$184m) worth of IUU product is 
transhipped each year and is misreported or unreported  
by licensed fishing vessels. These activities harm the live- 
lihoods of those who fish legally, undermine fisheries 
conservation and management and contribute to global 
overfishing and the trafficking of people, drugs and 
weapons. 
Security of offshore fish stocks 
Pacific nations are obligated to sustainably manage fish-
eries resources in their maritime areas, even though they do 
not have the capacity or the resources to exert effective 
control over their maritime areas, which are undetermined 
in some cases. Pacific SIDS must meet their international 
obligations as sovereign governments committed to playing 
their role to minimize IUU activities. 
IUU activities undermine the capacity of the Pacific 
SIDS to manage and conserve their tuna resources (World 
Bank 1996). Although Pacific SIDS have formulated inno-
vative regional and subregional fisheries management 
institutions to protect their resources, these must be 
effectively implemented and enforced. The FFA advises its  
 
 
members on tuna fisheries management and development 
issues and has successfully negotiated their regional fish-
eries management organisation, the Western and Central 
Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC), to collaborate 
with their distant water fishing nation partners in the 
sustainable use of the region’s fisheries resources.  
The lack of capacity in Pacific SIDS to enforce com-
pliance or exemptions, as well as the incompatibility of 
national, subregional and regional objectives weakens 
regional management arrangements and compromises the 
equitable sharing of benefits from the use of fisheries 
resources. These factors threaten the sustainable manage-
ment and development of fisheries resources in the Pacific 
islands, which puts at risk those dependent on them. 
Deep seabed mining is also a major concern given the 
negative impact on the ocean of any disturbance of the 
ocean floor. Unfortunately, Pacific SIDS regard the mining 
of deep seabed minerals as a welcomed opportunity for 
economic diversification and growth and have based their 
marine space claims over it (Giron 2016). PNG has been 
working with Nautilus Minerals for the development of 
hydrothermal sulphides in its economic exclusion zone. It 
is essential that Pacific SIDS implement a carefully planned 
strategy of maritime power, ‘which assumes a strong 
assertion of maritime sovereignty’ (Giron 2016:95). 
Some Pacific SIDS may be disregarding the sustain-
ability of their resources to ensure the attainment of short-
term development goals. Hau’ofa (2008:48) reminded us of 
the risk as our countries and people scramble to carve a future 
in: 
an age when our societies are preoccupied with the pursuit 
of material wealth, when the rampant market economy 
brings out unquenchable greed and amorality in us.  
This is illustrated by fisheries developments that are 
pursued without proper consideration of the fish stocks, 
increasing numbers of highly efficient fishers, reactionary 
rather than properly planned resource management, inef-
fective management measures and coastal states paying lip 
service to sustainable fisheries development.  
The way forward 
Secure access to productive fish stocks is fundamental to 
sustaining Pacific livelihoods, economies and wellbeing. 
Sustaining our coastal fisheries resources is our ultimate 
goal and challenge given the multiple species that must  
be managed in a healthy environment, the dependence of 
people on coastal resources for food, the growing demand 
associated with higher populations, and the increasing 
commercial use of the resources and the enormous areas 
that have to be managed. Although sustainable fisheries are 
included in the region’s strategic frameworks, these frame-
works have to be effectively aligned and implemented. 
Pacific SIDS must formulate, implement and enforce 
appropriate fisheries development policies, strategies and 
activities.   
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The management of known endangered keystone 
species such as sharks, turtles (Sabinot and Bernard 2016), 
Maori wrasse, rock cod, coral trout, giant clams and beche 
de mer should be a part of an integrated development and 
management plan for coastal fisheries. Finding a solution 
for such overexploited resources will not be easy but must 
start with the education and empowerment of all our people 
on the changes that need to be undertaken (Aqorau 2014). 
As we have witnessed with the community-based manage-
ment of marine resources, major accomplishments are made 
when all of our people are empowered and supported to play 
active roles in the management of resources many of them 
own. 
Palau is leading the fight to have vibrant and healthy 
coral reefs as the basis of sustainable development that 
supports strong and robust economies. Working under the 
Micronesia Challenge with the Commonwealth of Northern 
Mariana Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, Guam 
and the Marshall Islands, Palau pledged to protect 30 per 
cent of its coral reefs and 20 per cent of its forest resources 
by 2020, as well as contribute to the global coral reef 
conservation targets (Micronesian Challenge 2020). These 
countries have heightened marine resource management, 
and solicited much needed funds and technological assist-
ance from international partners to support local initiatives 
and advocate the importance of taking appropriate action at 
all levels of governance.  
Regional cooperation is the logical approach to address 
shared issues such as minimising IUU fishing and resource 
depletion and promoting environmental management, com-
munity-based fisheries management and the use of inno-
vative new methods such as aerial surveillance and digital 
data collection and analysis in support of evidence based 
decision-making and formulating appropriate management 
responses. However, effective regional management arrange-
ments will only be accomplished through enhanced regional 
integration, which will be compromised if: 
individual states pursue different objectives based on 
their own interest, because the success of regional 
resource management arrang ements depends on the 
resemblance of objectives of member states and the 
compatibility of regional and national policies and 
strategies (Aqorau 2014). 
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Resource security in Papua New Guinea: Linking resources,  
development and security 
Glenn Banks, Massey University, New Zealand 
Introduction 
The effects of Papua New Guinea’s 40 years of natural 
resource dependence are ambiguous, contested and run 
deep. The minerals and petroleum sector has been the 
‘backbone’ of the formal economy since Independence and 
dominates international trade and investment within the 
country, links numerous sectors such as finance, manufac-
turing and construction, makes up a significant proportion 
of GDP, has contributed significantly to government 
taxation, and is an important component of the skills 
development and skilled employment of the workforce. The 
extractives sector in Papua New Guinea has also created 
challenges that are consistent with many of the features of 
the so-called ‘resource curse’ or the belief that resource 
extraction often does not contribute to sustainable social 
and economic improvements in mineral resource dependent 
countries. Hence, there has been limited diversification 
away from mineral dependence since independence, and the 
high dependence on the extractive sector has produced a 
form of resource insecurity marked by reduced government 
capacity, rising corruption, and increased conflict, ine-
quality and structural poverty. 
In this context, a discussion of Papua New Guinea’s 
extractive industries and the concept of ‘resource security’ 
is instructive, and provides a useful lens to more broadly 
examine the ways in which ‘development’ itself is repre-
sented in the country. In this context, resource security can 
most broadly be defined as ensuring that natural resources 
are abundant and available enough to prevent a lack or 
scarcity of water, food, energy or other basic elements of 
life. Without this resource security, a state of resource 
insecurity is produced, marked by shortages of water, food, 
or land, any of which can trigger drought, hunger, conflict, 
and poverty. Translating this notion of resource security to 
the Papua New Guinea extractives industry produces a two-
fold distinction between resource security at the national 
level and a more local view of what resource security might 
mean. It is also apparent that the notion of security itself 
depends very much on the perspective adopted; resource 
security for a project developer means something different 
to that of a government official. At the local level, notions 
of security and insecurity also intersect with other critical 
development discourses such as rights, capabilities, vul-
nerability and resilience. 
The term ‘resource security’ only makes sense in PNG, 
and is only useful as an explanatory concept, if we adopt it 
through the eye of the beholden. Overarching external 
analyses of PNG as a ‘resource insecure state’ (a parallel, 
cause or consequence of it being regarded as a ‘weak state’) 
need a sharper and at the same time more nuanced under-
standing of the ways in which communities (and the state) 
operate in terms of access to and the utility of natural 
resources in Papua New Guinea. In particular, acknow-
ledging the importance of the relational worldview that 
dominates Melanesian lifeworlds becomes central to both 
understanding local concepts of resource security, and for 
developing policy and pathways forward.  
Indications and representations of 
development in PNG  
The UNDP National Human Development Report (NHDR) 
(UNDP 2014) provides both a snapshot of development 
indicators across a range of key sectors and a narrative that 
connects the extractive sector to these indicators. In basic 
terms, Papua New Guinea is now ranked 155th out of 189 
countries in terms of its Human Development Index (HDI), 
with a score of 0.543, putting it at the top of the list of Low 
Human Development countries in the UNDP HDR 
(UNHDR) ‘league table’. This is up two places from 2014 
and the Index score itself has risen from 0.491 (2013). The 
World Bank though, continues to place Papua New Guinea 
in its Lower Middle Income category.  
The disconnect between the Middle Income status and 
the Low Human Development rank points to the sub- 
stantial value of resource exports (over K200bn since 
Independence) and significant economic flows through the 
government and the economy from the sector that have not 
translated into improvements in other broader-based 
aspects of development. Health and education indicators 
that contribute to the HDI alongside the economic measures 
have not been tracking upwards systematically. Some 
standard health measures have tracked positively – life 
expectancy at the national level in Papua New Guinea for 
example has officially increased from below 40 years in 
1960, to over 64 years in 2017 (World Bank database). 
Other aspects and indicators of health have moved slower 
such as Maternal Mortality Rates (MMR) or even in some 
cases reversed, such as with tuberculosis numbers. 
Likewise, education indicators point to some improvements 
such as increased access to primary education over the past 
20 years, but many remain very poor such as retention rates 
through the system, and an average level of formal 
education for adults in Papua New Guinea of just 3.9 years 
in 2012 (UNDP 2014:50). While the connections (and 
disconnections) are complex, this failure to turn resource 
wealth into broadly conceived social improvements sits 
behind much of the criticism of PNG’s resource-dependent 
development to date.  
The NHDR (UNDP 2014) also noted that: 
Poverty levels do not appear to have changed si-
gnificantly since 1996, despite an economy that has 
grown at almost 6.5 per cent per annum over the past 
decade (p.3).  
 
62 Development Bulletin 82 
While measures of poverty in PNG have been conten-
tious (see Gibson 2005; UNDP 2014, 28–31), there is no 
evidence that any form of poverty (basic-needs or food 
poverty, for example) has significantly reduced. And 
although there is no reliable measure of inequality (the most 
recent Gini coefficient calculations were done in 2009) the 
fact that there has been rising GNP/capita and national 
wealth without a linked drop in poverty rates indicates 
growing inequality, something that is also widely evidenced 
anecdotally.  
There are two axes of inequality, in particular, that cut 
across any discussions of broad-based development in 
Papua New Guinea. First, there are stark differences 
between male and female indicators of development. The 
NHDR (2014:3) states: 
the very poor indicators relating to gender disparity and 
inequality, with women in Papua New Guinea having 
consistently lower education and heath indicators, and 
being subject to high levels of gender-based violence. 
There are also significant differences in development 
and inequality by geographic location. There is a strong 
urban/rural divide across most indicators of development 
and provincial level indicators show:  
after the National Capital District (NCD), the five 
provinces that make up the Island region of Papua New 
Guinea (the provinces of Manus, New Ireland, East and 
West New Britain, and Bougainville) have higher levels 
of achievement of the MDGs (Millennium Development 
Goals) (and hence higher human development) than the 
rest of the country (along with Milne Bay) (p.57).  
These various dimensions of inequality – none of 
which appear to be reducing – are in part a consequence 
of differing geographies, access, histories, and resources. 
Location of and access to different natural resources (land, 
forests, minerals, water etc) varies significantly for com-
munities across the country. At the sub-national level this 
variation produces differing levels of resource security and 
insecurity.  
In sum, natural resources and particularly the extractive 
industries in Papua New Guinea are a central element of 
PNG’s development narrative. The NHDR illustrates how 
the effects of mining, oil and gas dominate the formal 
economy, and the lack of translation of mineral revenues 
into broad-based forms of development is regarded as one 
of the major failures in the country’s development history.  
Resource security at the national level  
Many of the issues in PNG’s extractives sector certainly 
speak to rising insecurities at national and local levels, but 
they tend to be framed as impacts, ‘curses’ and corporate 
responsibilities. 
Resource security at the national level is discussed in 
two related but distinct ways, each of which is driven by 
different actors. The dominant ‘resource security’ discourse 
arises in relation to state regulation and security of access 
to mineral resources for multinational corporate investors.  
 
The NHDR noted that in ‘Bohre Dolbear’s 2013 version of 
its ‘Ranking of Countries for Mining Investment, “Where 
Not to Invest”, Papua New Guinea was ranked 22nd out of 
25 countries on “managing social issues”, “permitting 
delays” and corruption’ (p.10). Multinational corporate 
investors rate ‘resource security’ in PNG poorly as they 
have concerns about securing continuing access to the 
mineral resource they are mining, along with contractual 
adherence by the State. While this has been a long-standing 
concern, recent events in relation to the Porgera gold mine 
have brought the issue to the fore again.  
The refusal of the State to renew the Special Mining 
Lease (SML) for the corporate (Canadian and Chinese) 
owners of the Porgera mine has led to charges of exprop-
riation and internationally-mediated legal action. The 
rationale provided for this action by the State was an 
inability to agree to terms for the renewal which would have 
delivered appropriate benefits to the State and local com-
munities, a charge that the company disputed (Burton and 
Banks 2020). Although it does appear that a settlement may 
at least partially restore access of the investors to the 
operation, this reduced ‘security’ has occurred in the con-
text of broader resource nationalism which itself seeks to 
‘secure’ these mineral resources for the nation (NHDR 
2014). Papua New Guinea’s ‘insecurity’ is a result of 
political shifts and continuing access is the defining issue 
for both the investor and the state. 
A second perspective on resource security would argue 
that while the security of the resources themselves is not 
threatened (except through exhaustion of the resource 
which at present seems distant), access to revenues from 
these resources is insecure. For example, the forestry sector 
has provided very low returns to the nation for decades due 
to transfer pricing and corruption. Neither the national 
government nor the majority of those in communities 
affected by the industry have secured significant sustainable 
returns from the sector as a result of poorly framed and 
enforced agreements.  
The volatility of mineral revenue which is a result of a 
complex interaction between global commodity prices, 
corporate profitability and Mining and Petroleum fiscal 
regimes and agreement, also produces insecurity for the 
state. Recently, commodity price fluctuations, fiscal terms 
and revenue distribution agreements meant the returns to 
the national government from mining and petroleum during 
2014–17 were at their lowest levels in 25 years despite 
export values being at record highs thanks to the initiation 
of the PNGLNG project (Banks and Namorong 2018). In 
most instances, the risks associated with this insecurity are 
borne heavily by the State.  
‘Abundance’ and ‘access’ then play into under-
standings of security at the national level. This ‘resource 
revenue insecurity’ has very real developmental effects as 
it creates a lack of certainty that in turn constrains the ability 
of the State to plan for and commit to long-term national 
development programs and budget trajectories. This then 
makes the link between mineral resources and development 
planning insecure at the national level.  
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Insecurities at the local level  
Mining and the extractive sector have a particularly poor 
record in terms of local impacts in Papua New Guinea, and 
these impacts are all closely associated with growing levels 
of insecurity.  
The most obvious signs of extraction compromising 
security are the environmental and social effects experienced 
in the vicinity of the operations (and often some distance 
away). Mining in particular transforms landscapes and 
environments. Forests are removed, mountains razed and 
valleys filled through the construction and waste materials 
from mines. Waterways are typically polluted, often at levels 
that persist for hundreds of kilometres downstream. The Ok 
Tedi mine in Western province became emblematic of the 
effects of waste materials on river systems (see Banks and 
Ballard 1997), but similar destruction has been apparent in 
relation to Bougainville, Porgera and Wafi. Forests, agri-
cultural land and fresh water supplies are all reduced in  
extent and quality. Access to such resources is likewise 
compromised – often severely – for local communities, and 
water, food and land security all come under increasing 
pressure. The NHDR (UNDP 2014:61-62) uses the Porgera 
mine to illustrate the relationship between poor social and 
environmental conditions and resource insecurity in sur-
rounding communities which make deadly conflict highly 
likely. A recent study from Bougainville (Human Rights Law 
Centre 2020) showed that environmental legacies from these 
large-scale mines can impact resource access for com-
munities for decades after the mine closes. 
It is also clear that at the operational level, these threats 
to environmental security are entwined with social and eco-
nomic processes that threaten human security. Increasing 
migration (Bainton and Banks 2018), growing inequalities, 
and the ‘social pathologies’ associated with mining 
(alcohol, gambling, prostitution, and other illegal activities) 
produce situations in these communities where human 
rights violations are common, where human capability 
development is reduced, and the threats to human security 
are numerous and sustained. 
Growing insecurities in the community pose a threat to 
the security of the mine operation. Attacks on staff, 
equipment, vehicles and camps obviously affect continuing 
operations of the mines and oilfields. The response is the 
development of corporate security and the increasing 
presence of police and para-military state forces. Not sur-
prisingly, this securitisation of the resource operations often 
feeds growing insecurities in the communities, with many 
of the recorded human rights violations at Porgera being 
committed by these private and state security forces 
(Human Rights Watch 2010). The responses to violence and 
insecurity often produce the conditions that generate more 
violence and insecurity around resource extraction sites. 
It is also worth considering a more locally-focused com-
munity lens in these contexts. Every aspect of Melanesian life 
was defined by the relationships individuals constructed with 
other peoples and the environments they lived in including 
their connections to land, their place within societies, and 
even the very foundations of their own individual identity 
(Strathern 1988). Tightly bound relationships based on 
reciprocity, of dependency and of protection formed a central 
element of security for individuals and communities. 
Relationships then form a critical and often understated 
axis for a locally-conceived notion of ‘resource security’, one 
that takes in elements of human security, human rights  
and human capability approaches within the Melanesian 
relationally-oriented worldview. To give one example, 
human rights abuses committed by an external party (recent 
migrants or a mining company security officer) may spark a 
collective response that can destabilise other relationships i.e. 
‘tribal fighting’ at Porgera, regularly sparked by tensions 
over mine compensation and exacerbated by migrants, 
frequently become deadly and complex conflicts that com-
promised security for many within the community (Burton 
2014, Jacka 2019).  
At the local level, as with the national level, resource 
security can then take a number of forms, coming from 
differing but often intersecting perspectives on security, 
each of which necessitates us asking what is being secured, 
by whom, and from who? The paradoxical movement that 
sees some stakeholders seeking to securitise resources in 
ways that actually increase the likelihood that others will 
face growing security threats is an outcome of these con-
flicting understandings of the origins and motivations that 
generate security and insecurity. 
Conclusions  
Natural resources and their exploitation and/or conservation 
are central to most of the development narratives narrated 
in, by, and about Papua New Guinea. Analysing resource 
security can provide additional insights into these repre-
sentations of development, and highlight some of the gaps 
and exclusions within these existing representations and 
narratives. 
At the national scale, there are tensions between a 
global sector that places a premium on stability and security 
(or continuity of access to resources and leases), and a 
nation-state concerned with securing consistent flows of 
revenue from extractive industries to be able to consistently 
and predictably fund broad-based development. These 
narratives meet at the negotiating table, when mining 
agreements and fiscal terms are settled. Recent history in 
Papua New Guinea suggests that neither multinational 
corporations nor the nation-state are satisfied with existing 
arrangements as leases continue to be contested, and 
fluctuations in resource revenues continue to be a constraint 
on more effective service delivery and development.  
At local levels, resource security is compromised by 
growing inequalities, environmental destruction, and conflict 
within communities and between communities, the State, and 
resource developers. Resource insecurity drives multi-
dimensional forms of poverty, where people and com-
munities are subjected to growing social and economic 
insecurity. And paradoxically, it appears that the more 
corporations invest in securitising their operations, the 
greater the security risks to those operations as community 
insecurity increases and conflicts intensify. Critically, for 
Melanesian communities, relational values are central to how 
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security and development is understood, meaning that 
discussions of resource security at local levels should account 
for the ways in which Melanesian peoples frame their 
livelihoods and communities around kinship, reciprocity, 
dependency and relational constructions of identity. 
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A cultural basis for land and livelihood security: The Guadalcanal Plains 
Palm Oil Limited, Landowners Association & Company, Solomon Islands 
Gordon Leua Nanau, University of the South Pacific and Lincy Pendeverana,  
Solomon Islands National University 
Guadalcanal Plains Palm Oil Plantations Limited (GPPOL) 
took over from the Solomon Islands Plantations Limited 
(SIPL) in 2005. It was a national project touted as a way  
to bring back peace, security and economic recovery 
following five years of ‘tensions’ from 1998 to 2003. New 
Britain Palm Oil Limited (NBPOL) signed a Memorandum 
of Understanding (MOU) with the landowner’s association, 
the Guadalcanal Plains Resource Development Association 
(GPRDA) that led to the incorporation of an association 
called the Guadalcanal Plains Resource Development Com-
pany Limited (GPRDCL). NBPOL also signed two separate 
MOUs with the national government and Guadalcanal 
Province to reopen the oil palm plantation on Guadalcanal 
in 2005. The establishment of GPRDA and GPRDCL not 
only provided safeguards and security for landowners but 
also allowed them to benefit more from their land. GPPOL 
encouraged the smallholder outgrower scheme (SOGS) on 
customary land as a way of engaging with farmers planting 
oil palm on customary land. The establishment of the land-
owner association and company plus the SOGS provides  
an ‘alternative development’ that sees the local Lengo 
(Guadalcanal Plains) social and cultural relations as pillars 
and drivers of oil palm development on Guadalcanal. Such 
a development approach guarantees security for land, safe-
guards livelihoods, and encourages business growth and 
wellbeing. 
Overview of Guadalcanal land tenure and 
social structure 
To understand the oil palm industry and the relationships 
among landowners, the state, and the investor, it is important 
to have an appreciation of the socio-cultural underpinnings of 
the Lengo area of Guadalcanal where the oil palm plantation 
is located. The Lengo area, also known as the Guadalcanal 
Plains, covers the national constituencies of North and North 
East Guadalcanal, East Central Guadalcanal and parts of 
Central Guadalcanal. It is home to five tribal groups, or kema: 
Ghaobata, Lathi, Nekama, Thimbo and Thongo within which 
there are various landowning mamata (clans) which are the 
custodians of customary land in Lengo. It ensures that people 
in the community are safe from external threats to engage in 
livelihood activities on land as long as the activities do not 
disturb the peace, security and livelihood of others.  
Rights over family food gardening areas (ghatuba) are 
highly regarded rights in the Lengo culture as they are 
sources of security and livelihoods for specific groups of 
people and families (Nanau, 2017). A ghatuba is the gard-
ening place that was first cultivated by people who moved 
to a new piece of land (Lasaqa, 1972). In the past, when 
population densities were low, there were vast areas of  
 
unoccupied land and new arrivals were welcomed and 
allowed to build houses and their sacrificial altars and to 
communicate with their gods. As they settled in, the hosts 
normally identified certain areas on their land for the new 
arrivals to plant their food, fruit trees, and sometimes their 
homes over which they had rights.  
Security of livelihoods: These rights are safeguarded by 
the two ethical requirements of respect (kukini) and 
reverence (kikinima). The gardening areas are overseen by 
those who work on them. As such, fruit trees or wild root 
crops, building materials, vines, and other materials within 
and around those areas are out of bounds unless permission 
is sought from the garden owners (Nanau 2017). Even 
members of the landowning mamata must get permission 
from those who own gardens to collect anything from there 
or its surroundings. In order to maintain community and 
social norms, it is therefore imperative for a developer of 
land to get the consent of both the mamata and those in 
control of the ghatuba. The entire community shares in the 
good fortunes of the harvest in the gardens or the fruit trees. 
For instance, with corn, sweet potato, yam or breadfruit 
harvest, all living in the same community, whether relatives 
or not, will share the harvest. In the same vein, events and 
problems that befall a family in the village become every-
one’s problems and require collective effort and contribu-
tion. Security of the individual members of the community 
and security of lifestyle and food supply are ensured 
through the spirit of respect and reverence.  
An important aspect of daily work in Lengo and much 
of Guadacanal is that people do not usually concentrate on 
a single activity for the entire day but allocate time to food 
gardening, fishing, church work, school or other meetings. 
Development activities would do well to take this into 
consideration. 
Solomon Islanders feel safe when their land, resources 
and livelihood are undertaken within the parameters of their 
social norms and worldviews. Their interaction with the 
global economic system through early explorers, labour 
recruiters, traders, planters, missionaries and colonial admin-
istrators left a negative impression on many locals. As a 
result, Solomon Islanders often view with scepticism any 
development that involves their customary land. 
One way to address this skepticism is to establish devel-
opment projects that understand and accommodate local 
customs. Under the NBPOL/GPPOL MOUs, the smallholder 
out growers scheme operates on customary land. Since the 
introduction of SOGS, about 2000 hectares of oil palm 
plantations have been planted on customary land and is likely 
to increase in the future. The SOGS suit the casual lifestyle 
of Solomon Islanders who have many other livelihood  
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activities to attend to in a day. SOGS farmers also benefit 
more from their own plantations as GPPOL pays them the 
farm gate price after withholding tax. 
The security of social networks: Research on the social 
dimensions of economic activity has demonstrated the 
importance of social networks in building trust for business 
success at local, national and international levels (see Amin 
and Thrift 1995; Yeung 2009; Sidaway 2007). Gibson-
Graham (1996), for instance, emphasises that diverse 
economies bring to attention the non-capitalist practices and 
relations that are often ignored in mainstream discourses 
dominated by capitalist market logic. Such non-capitalist 
practices include relational traditions and reciprocity such 
as gifting and exchanges (McKay 2009). Those concerned 
with market logic will consider social embeddedness of 
economies purely from their capacity to generate income 
and profit. However, it is also important to recognise that 
social embeddedness of economies also generates non-
economic benefits; those that are less tangible but provide 
emotional wellbeing and life satisfaction for communities 
and households. These include scholarships, assistance with 
church commitments and school activities, construction of 
water supplies and similar activities.  
The insecurity of past palm oil projects: Palm oil 
development on Guadalcanal was part of the colonial 
government’s efforts to develop a plantation economy for 
the needs of the British Solomon Islands Protectorate. As 
the colonial government prepared the islands for political 
independence, the government signed agreements with a 
number of multinational companies to plant oil palm, grow 
rice, cut timber, and prospect for minerals to reduce 
dependence on British aid (Larmour 1984:90). Following 
oil palm trial plantings in 1965, the colonial government 
successfully reached an agreement with the Commonwealth 
Development Corporation (CDC) in 1970 to establish 8000 
acres of land between the Ngalibiu and Mbaraande rivers. 
The CDC was also to provide SI$6 million1 and recruit 800 
initial workers to work in the plantation (Moore, 2017). The 
Solomon Islands Plantations Limited (SIPL) was estab-
lished in 1971 on an initial 1478 hectares of land between 
Ngalibiu and Metapono rivers (ibid). It was originally 
modelled on a nucleus estate linked to smallholder out-
growers. However, the smallholder component was never 
realised and SIPL operated entirely as an estate until its 
closure in July 1999 during the Guadalcanal conflict 
(Fraenkel, Allen & Brock 2010). 
The oil palm estate was a shareholder arrangement with 
CDC/SIPL owning 68 per cent of shares, the government 
30 per cent, and landowners two per cent (Thompson, Wan 
et al. 2004: 4). It is very likely that members of landowning 
mamata were new to such negotiations and had very limited 
information on the worth of such ventures. These agree-
ments benefitted the foreign investors, buyers, and the gov-
ernment with little consideration for landowning mamata. 
The shareholding arrangements were considered by 
members of landowning mamata as ‘unfair’, but such 
agreements dictated the operations of SIPL until its closure 
at the height of the tensions (Nanau 2008: 162). 
By 1990, SIPL had acquired a total land area of 6,300 
hectares for its oil palm operation. The acquisition of land 
was conducted under a ‘lease and leaseback’ arrangement 
where formerly alienated lands were granted back to 
original landowning mamata with 99-year leases issued to 
government and 75-year subleases to SIPL/CDC.2 Rent was 
paid to landowning mamata through their trustees as per 
provisions of the Land and Titles Act. Furthermore, a total 
of 58 parcels of customary land were leased to government 
for 99 years and then subleased to SIPL. Some customary 
lands were compulsorily acquired by the government for the 
oil palm development during the early years (Allen 2012a; 
Fraenkel et al., 2010). Some however, were registered and 
then sub-leased to the company.3  
Since the establishment of SIPL in 1971, palm oil has 
been the country’s most valuable agricultural export com-
modity, employing about 1800 workers with an additional 
estimated 8–10,000 dependents. Past studies about labour 
composition in SIPL revealed that 65 per cent of labour- 
ers including dependents were from Malaita Province 
(Fraenkel et al., 2010). During SIPL days, fewer indigenous 
people from Lengo were engaged in the oil palm industry 
as manual labourers – an occupation regarded as a low-level 
job. Frustrations by local residents had stemmed from their 
inability to control what people, and the island from which 
they came, were employed on the plantation that was on 
their land. 
Adding to local frustration was the growing conflict 
that began in 1998 when a group of militant youths from 
Guadalcanal attacked settlements in Malaita over the gov-
ernment’s failure to address important issues such as non-
payment of compensation for indigenous people killed by 
settlers, and restrictions on land ownership in Guadalcanal. 
Between 1998 and 2000, Lengo, where SIPL (now GPPOL) 
is located, became the epicentre of the conflict and an 
estimated 25,000 people were displaced from areas of north 
Guadalcanal causing the oil palm company to halt opera-
tions and subsequently close down in 1999 (Allen 2012b; 
Fraenkel et al., 2010). 
Security for the future  
The closure of SIPL paved the way for increased engage- 
ment with landowners and led to a much more favourable 
shareholding arrangement of 20 per cent equity share com-
pared to only two per cent previously. Priority of employ-
ment is now given to landowners of Lengo followed by 
people from other parts of Guadalcanal. People from other 
provinces in Solomon Islands are recruited when landowners 
and others from Guadalcanal can no longer fill remaining 
positions in the company (Fraenkel et al., 2010) or when the 
jobs require specialised expertise. 
In 1999, leaders of the landowning mamata, SIPL, the 
Solomon Islands Government and Guadalcanal Provincial 
Government all signed a Memorandum of Understanding 
providing the framework for engaging nearby communities 
in contract/manual work, renegotiating the increase in land 
premiums and rentals leased to SIPL, and dictating that 50 
per cent of all revenues generated by government and paid  
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to Guadalcanal Province be transferred to the trust account 
of the landowner’s association.4 The MOU also decreed  
that alienated lands with oil palm trees would be transferred 
to landowners as compensation for biological diversity loss. 
Following international intervention by the Regional 
Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI) in 2003 
to restore peace in the country, intensive negotiations  
to resume oil palm production commenced. Discussions 
occurred between the New Britain Palm Oil Limited 
(NBPOL), owned by the Malaysian company Kulim, the 
Solomon Islands Government, the Guadalcanal Provincial 
Government, and the landowning mamata of the five tribal 
groups of Lengo. Consequently, in 2005, NBPOL com-
menced operations and started exporting palm oil by mid-
2006 (Allen 2012a; Fraenkel et al., 2010). The landowners 
saw this as an opportunity to improve their livelihoods and 
negotiated much better terms with the new oil palm 
company such as signing the NBPOL/GPRDA MOU (Sol-
Law 2004a) that allowed them to lease their mamata  
land and enjoy royalties and higher land rentals than 
previously earned under SIPL. In addition, members of the 
landowning mamata benefit from the SOGS that are now a 
major feature of the GPPOL. 
Examining the GPPOL development model 
National security, land security for landowning mamata and 
kema, and investor security were paramount considerations 
in the discussions that gave way to the establishment of 
GPPOL. But what made the GPPOL development model 
attractive to landowners? How does the model encourage 
community relationships, security and goodwill among 
stakeholders? Does it respect the rights of ghatuba owners 
who may have lost their livelihood rights because of palm 
oil development? The answer may lie in the reciprocal 
nature of relationships that exist between various stake-
holders or parties in this development project. To start with, 
the landowning mamata formed an association under  
the Charitable Trusts Act, called the Guadalcanal Plains 
Resource Development Association (GPRDA) which then 
formed the Guadalcanal Plains Resource Development 
Company Limited (GPRDCL) under the Companies Act. 
Three separate MOUs were signed: the first MOU was 
signed between NBPOL and the Solomon Islands Govern-
ment; the second was between NBPOL and the Guadalcanal 
Provincial Government (Sol-Law, 2004b); and the third bet-
ween NBPOL and GPRDA. As indicated earlier, GPPOL 
offered better terms of incorporation for landowners. 
According to the MOU, the GPPOL owns 80 per cent of 
shares while the landowning mamata now own 20 per  
cent equity share in the company. The Solomon Islands 
Government does not own shares in GPPOL. The company 
use arrangements under CDC/SIPL and NBPOL/GPPOL 
are compared in Table 1. 
Before commencing operation, NBPOL/GPPOL ensured 
that all land leases were standardised with lease expiry dates 
renewed and extended for 50 years until 2076. Under the 
NBPO/GPPOL agreement, rents increased from $65 per 
hectare to $100 per hectare per year. This was paid 
quarterly, with $40 paid in the first quarter and $20 each in 
the latter three quarters of each year (ibid). Land rentals for 
leases are paid to individual lessors who are members of 
GPRDA. 
Table 1. Comparison between the company use 
arrangement under Commonwealth Development 
Corporation/Solomon Islands Plantations Ltd and 
New Britain Palm Oil Ltd/Guadalcanal Plains Palm 
Oil Plantations Ltd 
Criteria CDC/SIPL NBPOL/GPPOL 
Landowner 
equity 


















0 per cent 10 per cent of farm 
gate price 
Employment Manual labourers 
mostly from other 
provinces (65 per 
cent from Malaita)  













Source: Adapted from Sol-Law, 2004a; Nanau, 2008; Allen 2012a. 
There is provision to revalue the land under oil palm 
after the first seven years of operation and after that every 
five years (Sol-Law, 2004a). This standardisation process 
was made possible by the cooperation of the Solomon 
Islands Government, the Solomon Islands Plantations Ltd, 
Commissioner of Lands, the Guadalcanal Provincial Gov-
ernment, and the landowning mamata. Royalties are cal-
culated on the basis of the farm gate price and are paid into 
two parts: 50 per cent is payable to landowners monthly and 
the other 50 per cent is paid in an investment fund. There 
are also dividends paid annually depending on GPPOL’s 
level of profitability, 20 per cent of which is invested in the 
landowners’ business arm, the GPRDCL, for community 
projects including construction of water supplies and class-
rooms, road improvement, provision of scholarships, and 
related activities. 
The GPRDCL currently invests in a refuelling station 
at Point Cruz in the Honiara CBD, a shop in Ranadi in the 
Eastern end of Honiara and the Royal Plains Motel at 
Kola’a Ridge in Honiara, and provides employment for 
mostly young women and men. In a presentation during the 
Guadalcanal Land Summit held at the Honiara Hotel on 20 
March 2018, the then Chair of GPRDA John Rose and his 
team told the gathering that annual land rental plus royalty 
for 2018 was SBD$7.247 million (Rose 2018). Evidence 
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indicates that this has been a profitable venture with con-
siderable levels of cash going into the local economy since 
2013 as a result of the development model used at GPPOL. 
Discussion 
GPPOL contributes around 24 per cent to the GDP. While  
the benefits under the GPPOL development model are 
notable, there are concerns, especially on the need for more 
transparency. This is particularly true in terms of land 
records, agreements and communication channels between 
GPPOL, GPRDA, mamata trustees, and ordinary members 
of mamata. It is evident that the nature of the trusteeship 
arrangement under the Land and Titles Act is very elitist. In 
most instances, only mamata trustees have access to 
important information, especially those that relate to land 
records and transactions. Even some very senior trustees of 
certain mamata do not have access to lease records of their 
leased lands. For instance, in an interview with a trustee of 
na mamata a Pga (not a real name), he stated:  
I have no copy of the Lease Agreements we signed with 
GPPOL. When we ask [for] them, they did not want to 
give us copies of these document[s] and claimed that 
copies are with their lawyers. So till now, I do not have 
a copy of the lease agreement that we signed (Personal 
interview, June 6, 2016).  
Likewise, a member of na mamata a Lka (not a real 
name), expressed similar sentiments stating,  
I have no idea how we as members of Lka Mamata are 
incorporated into GPRDA. That is because there was no 
wide consultation amongst us. Only our trustees and the 
elderly people discussed this. We were still small and 
young when discussions regarding the inclusion of our 
tribe into GPRDA were convened. We are now adults 
but still some of us members never see the lease 
agreements and even agreements that made us part of 
GPRDA (Personal interview, June 20, 2016). 
Lack of information and partial information or misin-
formation are concerns in the current scheme of things and 
have future implications for peace and security. In the 
interest of sustaining cordial relationships, more effort 
should be made to ensure that communication of inform-
ation and records between GPPOL, GPRDA, trustees and 
ordinary members of kema and mamata are addressed. 
Closely related to this but even more serious is the need 
to closely monitor the process of replacing land trustees 
who have passed on. It is evident in the list of trustees of 
different mamata parcels listed at the back of the GPRDA 
and NBPOL MOU (Sol-Law 2004a: 28–42) that many of 
the land trustees listed there are deceased. Many have not 
been replaced while others may have been replaced through 
non-transparent processes contrary to the requirements of 
replacing trustees under the Land and Titles Act. This has 
wider security implications as far as the mamata members 
are concerned. With the non-transparent and often times, 
secretive way deceased land trustees were replaced, the 
security of mamata land and the benefits that come with it 
may end up in the wrong hands. In the interest of long-term 
security and peace the landowning mamata, GPRDA, 
GPPOL, Commissioner of Lands, and the state should 
initiate a process whereby the replacement of deceased 
trustees on the current leased lands to GPPOL are done 
transparently and updated. This could be a model for future 
development efforts on customary land in the country. 
Finally, the potential for the expansion of oil palm 
plantations into frontier communities is relatively high. 
Nevertheless, there must also be due consideration for food 
security when considering expansion. With the high popular-
tion growth rate and population density in Lengo, consid-
eration must be given to food security. The Guadalcanal 
Plains are the main source of vegetables and other food 
supplies for the Honiara markets. The potential to expand into 
more customary land may have dire consequences on food 
security and livelihood activities in the future. It is important 
that GPRDA and the Solomon Islands Government carry out 
assessments and feasibility studies before allowing further 
expansion of palm oil into frontier communities as gardening 
areas for subsistence and other livelihood activities may 
dwindle giving rise to unforeseen security challenges. 
Conclusion 
For development projects like oil palm plantations to 
succeed in customary land settings and to receive local 
support, they must be socially embedded in the cultural 
contexts and worldviews of host communities. Moreover, 
development projects must realise that relationships are 
important and must be strengthened through properly dis-
cussed agreements. The needs of the wider community 
ought to be accommodated rather than focussing narrowly 
on the needs of landowning mamata.  
In order to ensure future security, peace and sustainable 
development, enabling land and resource owners to be 
shareholders in important national projects would benefit the 
nation. In GPPOL’s case, the Solomon Islands Government 
and Guadalcanal Province allowed the GPRDA and land-
owning mamata to be shareholders in the company rather 
than mere rent recipients. Dividends and royalty payments 
received enabled the landowners’ business arm, GPRDCL, to 
invest in livelihood as well as capital projects and businesses. 
This is a development model that can be replicated in other 
parts of the Solomon Islands and the wider Pacific if 
governments are genuinely interested in empowering their 
citizens and promoting sustainable development.  
Notes 
1  Aus$1 = SI$6. 
2  Since independence in 1978, all land leases were auto-
matically reduced to a maximum of 75 years. 
3  For a comprehensive discussion on how customary land is 
acquired, registered, leased and sub-leased in Solomon 
Islands, see Larmour (1984: 68-96). 
4  Even at this stage, one could already see that the willingness 
of the Solomon Islands Government to give up some of its 
shares to the landowning mamata and provincial government 
in the interest of national peace and long term security. 
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Climate resilience through sociocultural mobility: Reframing the Pacific’s 
urban informal settlements as critical adaptation pathways 
Alexei Trundle1, The University of Melbourne 
The Boe Declaration on Regional Security puts climate 
change front and centre in the vision of Pacific regionalism 
set out by Pacific Island Forum leaders, with explicit con-
sideration of and focus on the threat that climate-related 
shocks and stresses pose to the livelihoods, security, and 
wellbeing of its inhabitants. Unstated, however, is the risk 
posed by climate change to the Pacific’s cultural and  
societal fabric – attributes that underpin community-level 
climate resilience. Also not addressed are the ways in which 
these sociocultural attributes are intertwined with an estab-
lished history of movement and migration within, across, 
and beyond Pacific Island Countries. These omissions have 
occurred despite being issues of acute geopolitical concern 
as they sit at the nexus of humanitarian responses to 
disaster-driven displacement, widespread exertions of state-
based control and border securitisation of wealthier nation 
states, as well as the resurgence of nationalistic political 
agendas globally. Despite limited efforts to support, engage 
with, or understand these forms of resilience by develop-
ment actors and government agencies, these informal attri-
butes are shown to be critical sources of both cultural and 
community resilience. 
This paper draws upon research into community resil-
ience in six migrant communities in two Melanesian capital 
cities: Port Vila, Vanuatu and Honiara, Solomon Islands.  
Emerging evidence of climate-induced migration 
within Melanesia suggests that the translocation of rurally 
derived community resilience into Pacific cities can play  
a critical role in supporting climate adaptation pathways 
within Pacific Island Countries. This concept funda-
mentally challenges norms applied in international develop-
ment, requiring a multifaceted decolonisation of urban 
systems, processes and regulations. As the impacts of 
climate change continue to worsen, these social and cultural 
sources of community resilience need urgent consideration 
by international development programs and regional plan-
ning policy frameworks if stability is to be maintained 
within and across the Pacific. 
An emergent security concern: climate-
induced migration 
Climate-induced migration suffers from misaligned scales 
of analytical and geopolitical interest. The broader narrative 
of the ‘climate refugee’ attracts both popular and political 
attention through speculative concerns associated with 
mass migration and displacement as prospective threats to 
security and the control of the state. Analysis and research, 
however, draw upon empirical evidence relating to the 
incremental movement and mobility of localised groups 
who seek proactive or responsive actions to enhance or 
preserve the security of households and their livelihoods. 
Contemporary evidence of the latter is masked by  
the complexity of attributing both overarching migratory 
rationales and the climate shocks and stressors embedded 
within them. Where mass displacement has occurred, 
climate signals are often obscured by or intertwined with 
other drivers or pull factors, in addition to specific climate-
related shocks stresses. Climate-induced migration can also 
be exhibited as a response to speculative climate futures, 
complicating assessments derived solely from recently 
observed climatological events. 
This discursive contestation and complexity parallels 
critical considerations of the nature of migration itself. 
Human mobility is a phenomenon that is at its core a 
‘normal practice interwoven with the everyday’ (Barnett 
and McMichael 2018). It is also at odds with transnational 
concerns of state-based security and geopolitical stability, 
leading to a ‘territorial trap’ that is ‘constantly reproduced 
by populist politics and the media’ (ibid). In the case of the 
Pacific’s larger archipelagos these nationalistic narratives 
can also be observed sub-nationally, with urbanisation and 
urban identities themselves facing active sociocultural and 
political resistance (Keen and Connell 2019). The former is 
evident in recurrent narratives of incentivising the return of 
young people to depopulated rural areas, while the latter is 
reflective in the more passive persistence of ‘home-island’ 
identities in third and fourth generation urban-born residents 
of Melanesia (McEvoy, Mitchell and Trundle 2020). 
The consideration of climate-induced migration foc-
uses on the attributes of community resilience that can be 
transferred from rural to urban citizens by migrating indi-
viduals and households. These considerations are framed 
through localised notions of human security, as well as  
their implications for maintaining national and regional 
resilience, as reflected in the Boe Declaration and other 
regional architecture such as the Framework for Resilient 
Development in the Pacific.  
Urban resilience and the Pacific migrant 
dialectic 
Mobility and movement have long been central to the 
resilience of Pacific Islanders. Bertram and Watters, in their 
initial proposition of the South Pacific ‘migration, remit-
tances, aid and bureaucracy’ (MIRAB) economic model, 
argued that within Oceania the: 
movement of individuals takes place without severing 
the links binding them in their kin group of origin … 
allowing [them] to colonize and exploit economic 
opportunities across a wide range of economic 
environments’ (1985:499). 
This fluctuating and interconnecting flexibility resonates 
strongly with theorisations of socioecological resilience. In  
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Holling’s early writings on resilience, it was notable that he 
identified it to be the determinant ‘persistence of relation-
ships within a system’ [author’s emphasis] despite recurrent 
disturbances or fundamental instability within the ecological 
system in question (1973:17).  
Paradoxically, although urban centres facilitate much 
of the migratory and fiscal movement referenced by 
Bertram and Watters, the systems that govern and service 
the Pacific’s cities and towns starkly contrast with this 
flexibility and resilience. This is despite urbanisation and 
mobility across most Pacific Island Countries having 
increased substantially during the intervening three-and-a-
half decades during which investments in and development 
of urban infrastructure and governance has broadly failed to 
match population growth (Jones 2016). Many colonial-era, 
municipal boundaries remain unchanged despite peri-urban 
‘overflow’ in cities such as Port Vila and Honiara now 
comprising between 40–50 per cent of their populations and 
surrounding local governments lacking the regulatory juris-
diction or bureaucratic infrastructure to provide urban 
services (Trundle 2020a). Basic infrastructure and services 
such as potable water, sanitation, solid waste collection, and 
electricity are also falling well short of demand or even into 
disrepair (Gero, Kohlitz and Willetts 2017). Equally prob-
lematic is the ‘orderly’ release of urban land for occupation, 
given the share of urban inhabitants across the region living 
informally has been estimated at 24.1 per cent in official 
UN figures without recalculation since 1990 (see, for 
example, UN-Habitat 2016:86 ). 
With limited formal urban governance and a focus of 
international development efforts in rural areas (Kiddle et al. 
2017), the Pacific’s urban resilience in the face of recurrent 
climate-related and other shocks and stresses points to a local, 
endogenous influence (Trundle, Barth and McEvoy 2019). 
These hybrid, dialectic forms of urban inhabitance provide 
alternative capacities to cope with climate-related shocks  
and stressors beyond those usually evident within urban 
systems and disaster risk governance. Additionally, they 
enable adaptation pathways for future climate-induced rural 
migrants, while at the same time securing key social and 
cultural assets through their urban translocation.  
Translocating community resilience through 
informality  
The primary data collected as part of this research consisted 
of semi-structured interviews with informal migrant house-
holds across the six settlements shown in Figure 1 (n=57) 
cross-referenced with interviews with representatives of 
institutions engaged in climate resilient development 
activities in each city (n=26). Follow-up workshops were 
also conducted with each community to explore interview 
data, with secondary socio-demographic and policy anal-
ysis also integrated with these primary research findings. In 
each context, research was conducted after a major climate-
related shock event (the April 2014 Floods in Honiara, and 
the impact of Tropical Cyclone Pam on Port Vila in March 
2015), which provided a point of reference for both com-
munity and institutional engagement. 
Figure 1: Case study communities in the cities of Port 
Vila, Vanuatu and Honiara, Solomon Islands 
 
Source: Author. 
When asked about sources of security support received 
in response to a climate-related shock or stress, respondents 
across all six communities demonstrated that formal gov-
ernment support played only a secondary role at a community 
level. Two-thirds of all households responded negatively, 
noting that ‘place here, hemi olsem the government no look’ 
(BSHH5), or that ‘if you votem for him lo lose, [the politician 
who lost], em winner him no help you [the winning MP won’t 
help you]’ (WVHH7). Of those responses that viewed gov-
ernment engagement in the community positively, awareness 
raising activities or ad hoc infrastructure interventions that 
had limited effects on household-level security or long-term 
development pathways were viewed as most beneficial. As 
one respondent noted: 
after Cyclone Pam, [we] received tanks, ropes, food, 
tarpaulin, water. But the things we really want [from] the 
government … is a good road for when it is rainy, water 
supply and light (ETHH7). 
In contrast, resilience within these areas was recognised by 
community-members and institutional representatives alike 
as being drawn from informal community structures and 
hybridised, translocated traditional knowledge and kastom. 
As one institutional representative in Vanuatu noted: 
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the chief works very closely with the council [and] 
island associations. So those island associations pro-
vided security … I think we [need to] start praising those 
local systems and see how we can integrate or … put 
them together (VUE7).  
Another reflected that when Tropical Cyclone Pam hit Port 
Vila there were: 
all those impacts on some modern infrastructure, 
housing [but] some more traditional housing was very 
much intact … we need to relook at how we package 
some of those initiatives or deliverables that we label in 
terms of resilience (VUE2).  
When discussing the urban features, functions and actors 
that supported resilience at a household level, community 
respondents referenced informal, community attributes such 
as chiefs, customary practices, and the wantok system twice 
as often (n=849) as those associated with the state (n=323) 
and civil society (n=98) combined. Critically, these attributes 
reflected translocated traditional, rural practice, often com-
bined with urban resources, economies and the interplay 
between differing cultural backgrounds. As one institutional 
respondent reflected, ‘people that migrate to the urban … 
they come with all this traditional know-how, all these rich 
techniques and information on how to survive through a 
natural disaster, be it flooding, a cyclone, whatever. But … 
access to that material, or the equivalent of that material in 
the modern [context] is their big dilemma’ (VUE12).  
Food security was also found to hinge on a vast net-
work of predominantly informal food production systems, 
driven similarly by informal land tenure, markets and 
labour. ‘Gardens’ accounted for 17.3 per cent (n=155) of all 
references to informal community-level activities across the 
57 household interviews. Despite encompassing a variety of 
tenure types and garden typologies (ranging from backyard 
sup sup gardens to small scale agriculture in peri-urban 
‘bush garden’ areas), these sources of food production and 
informal income operated almost exclusively outside of the 
recognised functional purposes of both of the two cities 
irrespective of their municipal or peri-urban classification. 
Of the households interviewed, 68.4 per cent had a garden, 
however access to arable land varied depending upon the 
proximity of settlement areas to the town boundary and 
relationships with customary land owner groups, consistent 
with findings in other studies (Komugabe-Dixson et al., 
2019; Savage, Bambrick and Gallegos 2020). 
Land tenure was found to have a more complex 
relationship with community resilience and household 
security, reflective of the diversity of occupation arrange-
ments evident within even the six settlements in question, 
with informality noted to persist elsewhere in each city 
(McEvoy, Mitchell and Trundle 2020). Nonetheless, the 
capacity to establish either informal extended family clus-
ters within formal allotments or to expand upon existing 
informal housing footprints in unleased areas was found to 
generate both critical forms of local resilience, and to enable 
a greater level of mobility to and from each city in support 
of responses to external and localised shock and stress 
effects. The sharing of informal urban services (such as 
potable water sources, sanitation and washing facilities) 
across households showed potential for scaling up and 
extending government and development led interventions 
to enhance security. However, this would require informal 
governance structures to be better integrated with these 
formal institutions. 
The lack of understanding of these endogenous sources 
of climate resilience presented a critical security risk. The 
continuing pressure of urban expansion on peri-urban areas 
was observed to be a major ‘non-climate’ pressure that was 
impacting the food security and household income and 
productivity of many informal inhabitants, with some 
households noting that they had to walk hours to either 
access arable land or collect water. The lack of formal 
frameworks for engagement between peri-urban expansion 
of informal settlements, the government, and customary 
landowners is also widely recognised as being a critical 
contributing factor to the Ethnic Tension in Solomon 
Islands, providing a cautionary historical demonstration of 
the potential impact of a lack of engagement with these 
informal structures (Foukona 2015).  
There is no ‘Pacific B’: Climate security 
without urban adaptation pathways? 
Barnett and McMichael set out two key considerations of 
climate induced migration: the process of cumulative 
causation; and the diversity of spatial and temporal scales 
that differentiate mobility from migration (2018). In the 
case of migration to Pacific cities, informal settlements play 
a critical integration role that would otherwise be inhibited 
by the formal constructs of cities. Through analysis of these 
characteristics and functional arrangements, lessons can be 
learnt to enable future adaptation pathways as the impacts 
of climate change accelerate across the region.  
The capacity for informal settlements to respond to 
cumulative pressures is enhanced by wantok networks, 
which enable ongoing rural–urban linkages. As one res-
pondent explained of one of the earliest such settlements in 
Honiara: 
The first person to settle here is a fisherman … in the 
beginning there were only men who came to settle here. 
As time goes on, the fisherman go back home, they get 
married, then they bring their spouse here to live. [More] 
people migrate into Honiara …to farm, some came to 
school, some to live with those who already live here. 
So the village has grown from there, and expanded 
(OJHH1).  
Equally, maintaining island ties enables movement 
back to home islands in response to crises within the urban 
domain – a process that is intertwined with circular patterns 
of movement that maintain and facilitate these inter-island 
kinship systems.  
More complicated, however, are questions relating to 
the scale and irreversible nature of population shifts neces-
sitated by the impacts of climate change. This is particularly 
the case as related to slow-onset stresses such as sea-level 
rise, ocean acidification, saline ingress and shifts to growing 
seasons for crops and livelihood products. While the Pacific 
is often cited in reference to its vulnerability to climate 
 
February 2021 73 
change impacts, its diversity of geographies, livelihood 
arrangements, and even localised climatological and geo-
logical impacts means that the climate ‘signal’ is often  
unclear.  
Although many interviewed households identified 
searching for employment as the primary reason for mig-
rating to the city a more detailed interrogation uncovered 
critical secondary pull factors instigated by state policies. 
More than half of the households (33 of 57), identified 
needing to pay school fees as the underlying rationale for 
their shift into the city in search of employment. Respon-
dents also noted that once school payments were no longer 
required they intended to return to the islands. As one 
representative from the community of Blacksands, Port Vila 
explained: 
Bai mi stap here, Twofela boy blo me secondary 
[school], so mi stap lo completem school. Suppose mi go 
back to Tanna, mi work where? So mi must stap here so 
many years, until they completem school, then mi go 
back’ (BSHH6).  
A further five households had migrated to the city for study 
directly. 
Climate-related drivers of urban in-migration were  
less uniformly evident across the case study communities. 
However, in Honiara’s, Ontong Java Settlement, there was 
a clear demonstration of climate-induced migration with the 
community’s home island Ontong Java Atoll experiencing 
severe coastal erosion, incremental sea level rise, and saline 
ingress into water supplies. Even in this instance, climate-
induced migration was noted to be intertwined with other 
factors. As one community leader explained during work-
shop consultations: 
with migration … people are experiencing problems 
with food security, because the gardens are being 
affected by sea water encroaching into the freshwater 
lens. [So] people come over seeking medical attention 
amongst other things and don’t go back (Ontong Java 
Settlement Workshop Respondent, November 2019). 
Limits to these endogenous, community-based forms 
of resilience highlighted a need for government, donor 
and/or civil society partnership and support. While circular 
patterns of migration enable urban adaptation pathways, 
this heightened mobility can also obscure adaptation plan-
ning which needs to be led by government and other actors. 
In the case of Ontong Java atoll, this was already happening, 
with one interview respondent noting that ‘land where we 
can resettle lo Malaita [island], government and the church 
are looking for, working for mifala relocatem (OJHH2). 
Conclusion 
The sociocultural resilience of Pacific Island communities, 
often classified as one of the world’s most climate and 
natural disaster exposed regions, has long been lauded as 
one of its greatest strengths. Limits to mobility across and 
within the Sea of Islands are increasingly becoming evident 
as the onset of climate-related shocks and stresses forces 
communities and ecosystems to relocate and adapt. By 
focusing on the community attributes that underpin this 
resilience rather than simply individuals or households, 
policymakers can better understand how to support the 
‘positive’ translocation of these sociocultural attributes into 
new settings.  
Informal settlements in the Pacific have been both 
understudied and broadly left to emerge without formal 
government or civil intervention, and as such have endog-
enously adapted traditional governance structures and cus-
toms with relatively high levels of tenure security in many 
Pacific Island Countries. These Pacific ‘urban villages’, 
while lacking in government services and infrastructure, 
contain attributes that would benefit from support from 
within urban systems, and from being more widely encour-
aged within the formal domain. In doing so, a greater 
breadth of urban adaptation pathways can be both identified 
and established, enhancing the security of both the com-
munity and the state in the face of the impacts of climate 
change.  
Notes 
1  Melbourne Sustainable Society Institute/Connected Cities 
Lab. 
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666 Reconfiguring human security relations between 
the state and society: The Papua New Guinea 
experience 
Henry Ivarature, The Australian National University 
The novel coronavirus (COVID-19) has profoundly reconfigured human security 
relations between state and society in Papua New Guinea (PNG). In implementing 
its COVID-19 response, PNG opted for an authoritarian structure with an emphasis 
on law enforcement where transparency, accountability, and democracy were 
legally qualified to protect human health in the interest of national security.  
In taking this approach, the perceived human security threat posed by COVID-
19 led to a significant change in relations between state and society. The state has 
requested that citizens momentarily forgo democratic rights, liberties, and freedoms 
in the interest of national security, but sustaining society’s long-term participation, 
cooperation and compliance has been a challenge on a number of fronts.   
PNG society in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic is considered strong in 
the sense that most citizens do not comply or readily cooperate with the COVID-19 
measures and regulations issued by the state. This non-cooperative behavior 
exposes the weaknesses in the capability of state agencies to enforce COVID-19 
measures and regulations. Inadequate funding of COVID-19 initiatives as well as 
an under-resourced public health infrastructure considered inadequate in handling 
the pandemic also played on relations between the state and society.  
COVID-19: Reconfiguration of state and society relations 
On March 11, when the World Health Organization (WHO) declared COVID-19 a 
health pandemic PNG’s response to protect its society comprised five key measures 
rolled out over four months from March to June 2020.  
1. The first was the declaration on 14 March of COVID-19 as a quarantinable epidemic and 
infectious disease. The action taken was to restrict international flights to Port Moresby, 
and restrict international arrival of ships to three ports in the country; Port Moresby, 
Kokopo and Madang. A total ban was placed on travelers arriving or transiting through 
virus infected countries. 
2. The second measure was the declaration by the National Security Council on 16 March of 
COVID-19 as a national security threat. A ban on international all travel was imposed on 
20 March. PNG closed its borders, except for health workers, persons assisting with 
COVID-19 response, diplomats, military personnel, and flight crew and crews of inter-
national ships. Throughout the country, social clubs, sporting events and gatherings of over 
100 persons were also banned. 
3. The third measure was the declaration of a nation-wide state of emergency (SoE) on 23 
March by the National Executive Council under section 239 of the Constitution. The SoE 
lasted for 14 days. At this point, PNG had one case of COVID-19. Initially, an inter-agency 
National Operations Centre1 was established to oversee and coordinate the SoE. 
Subsequently, a National COVID-19 Control Centre (NCCC) assumed daily operational 
and implementation matters. A Ministerial Committee headed by the Minister for Health 
had political oversight. Its members included the Ministers for Foreign Affairs,  
Communications and Technology, Civil Aviation, Citizenship and Border Security, State 
Enterprises, and Transport.  
Under the SoE, the military was called-out to protect the liquified natural gas project 
sites; maintain law and order in Hela, Southern Highlands, Morobe, Central provinces 
and the National Capital District. They also patrolled the main corridors of the 
Highlands Highway and the border provinces of West Sepik and the Western provinces, 
aside from helping civilian authorities in humanitarian relief exercises (PNG National 
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Overseeing their operations and implementing COVID-
19 measures was the new police commissioner, David 
Manning. He was appointed on 26 March. Manning had been 
on the post for five months when he was entrusted with con-
taining the spread of COVID-19. As Emergency Controller 
he had control over police, army and correctional services 
who were assigned to support his operations. He also had 
responsibility over a budget of PGK45 million plus addi-
tional funding that was allocated to dealing with COVID-19. 
In the 22 provinces of PNG, the Emergency Controller was 
supported by his provincial police commanders, provincial 
administrators and chief executives of provincial health 
authorities. With this coordinating structure, power was 
entrusted in an individual with authority and control over 
human behavior, movement, and freedoms of the people in 
PNG. 
4. The fourth measure was to extend the nation-wide SOE for two 
months from 2 April to 2 June. It came into effect after the 14-
day nation-wide SoE ended on 2 April. In obtaining parlia-
ment’s unanimous approval to extend the SoE, Prime Minister 
James Marape said this measure was necessary ‘to protect all 
citizens’ (Marape 2000). Four extraordinary emergency laws 
were also unanimously passed to support the implementation 
of SoE. These laws were: 
• the Quarantine (Amendment) Act 2020;  
• the Emergency (Defence Force) (COVID-19) Act 2020;  
• the Public Health (Amendment) Act 2020; and, 
•  the Emergency (General Provisions) (COVID-19) Act 
2020.  
In passing these laws, society, through its representatives 
in parliament, agreed to temporarily forfeit a number of 
democratic rights, freedoms and liberties in the interest of 
national security. COVID-19 more or less had reconfigured 
state and society relations. The public became aware of these 
limitations as security personnel enforced regulations and 
restricted movement of people.  
5. The final and fifth measure was the enactment of the Public 
Health Emergency Act 2020 also known as the pandemic law 
in June 2020. When the 2-months nation-wide SoE ended on 
2 June, parliament purposely extended the SoE for an 
additional 14-days for this law to be prepared and tabled in 
parliament. This law provides the legal framework for ‘a 
practical and effective legislative mechanism for the imple-
mentation of all necessary measures to detect, prevent the entry 
of, and eradicate[the]… pandemic, outbreak or serious public 
health threats’ (Ivarature, 2020a). It covers COVID-19 as well 
as other future pandemics. Other changes include the establish-
ment of the National Control Centre (NCC) which replaced the 
COVID-19 NCCC. An operational blue print forms the 
framework of the NCC, aligning it with the pandemic law and 
Niupela Pasin or the new normal. The changes are expected to 
streamline coordination between provincial coordination 
centres and relevant agencies to implement the COVID-19 
response. At this point in time, there were eight COVID-19 
cases in five provinces, including the capital. 
The absence of a vaccine to deal with COVID-19 
dramatically reshaped global economics and challenged the 
medical capabilities of many countries. In PNG, the 
staggering surge in global cases and its spread around the 
world was used to reinforce and justify anxiety and fear in 
view of the country’s inadequate health infrastructure. The 
underlying measures taken between March and June 2020 
were, and continue to be, underpinned by a defensive 
strategy of contact tracing, communication and awareness, 
and infection containment, until vaccines are rolled out. 
PNG’s poor financial and economic outlook posed a 
serious challenge for government in protecting its people 
(Ling-Stucky 2020a). In April 2020 when the two-month 
nation-wide SoE was agreed to by parliament, the country 
had a budget deficit of PGK4.6 billion which was forecast 
to grow to PGK6.6 billion (Ling-Stucky 2020a). The cause 
of the debt was attributed to a PGK2 billion decline in 
external and domestic revenues, forcing the government to 
closely manage its implementation of COVID-19 programs 
and other public expenditures. PNG’s GDP was also 
projected to fall in 2020 ‘by 3.7 per cent, a drop from a 
positive 2 per cent to a negative 1.7 per cent’ (Ling-Stucky 
2020b).  
Despite the poor financial position, the Prime Minister 
promised to release PGK45 million for the COVID-19 
response allocated in the 2020 national budget. He also 
promised an additional PGK150 million; an economic 
stimulus plan of PGK5.6 billion which was later increased 
to PGK5.7 billion to minimise the economic impact of 
COVID-19; and a supplementary budget that reflected the 
evolving economic environment.  
Altogether, a total of PGK715 million in different lots 
was committed to COVID-19, excluding other international 
assistance. This amount comprised the PGK45 million 
committed in the 2020 national budget, PGK70 million 
from the World Bank and PGK600 million by the govern-
ment under the stimulus package.  
The allocation of PGK600 million was split between 
health and security (PGK280 million) and economic 
stimulation programs (PGK320 million). Of the PGK280 
million for the health and security sector, 45 per cent was 
allocated to health, 48 per cent went to security, and five per 
cent went to fund a citizen repatriation exercise. The 
remainder went to churches for an urban food assistance 
program. Under health, funding went to preventative 
actions, pay frontline provincial health workers, and pur-
chase personal protection equipment. This budget com-
mitment excludes the substantial financial and resource 
assistance from international organisations and donors. 
Security sector funding was for surveillance and monitoring 
borders and the construction of ten border posts along the 
PNG-Indonesia border where the threat from the virus is 
considered a high risk (Ivarature 2020b). 
Society checks on state COVID-19 response  
The danger of investing extraordinary emergency powers in 
a single individual is the potential for abuse of those powers. 
Fortunately, the Emergency Controller has acted responsibly.  
Oversight on behalf of society requires strong parlia-
mentary opposition to keep government in check; truly 
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bipartisan parliamentary activities; and a fearlessly inquis-
itive media to ensure transparency and accountability on the 
expenditure of public funds, use of state resources, and 
quality of implementation of regulations. Through social 
media, the public sought and obtained public accountability 
of the COVID-19 budget allocation. The government also 
responded positively to these demands. It was kept account-
able by the small vocal opposition which at that time 
numbered only five parliamentarians.  
Resource limitations shape State efforts to 
protect society  
Private sector businesses and employees have been the most 
affected by COVID-19. Many businesses have scaled-down 
operations and laid off employees. On the other hand, state 
agency employees had guaranteed security in income and 
employment – a point of contention for the PNG Trade 
Union Congress (PNGTUC) that accused the government 
of unfair treatment and discrimination.  
The PNGTUC claimed that some 10,000 private sector 
employees have had to fend for themselves after being laid 
off. In April, the Prime Minister assured the public that 
business super funds agreed to provide relief by allowing 
withdrawals of between 30–50 per cent of their con-
tributions. In the May economic stimulus plan of PGK5.6 
billion, a total of PGK500 million was allocated to help 
people who had lost their jobs as a direct result of COVID-
19. But withdrawal of contributions could not proceed 
without amending the General Superannuation Fund Act. 
As the Act only allows withdrawals after a waiting period 
of three months, section 90 needed to be amended for 
immediate withdrawals. Government did not keep its 
promise to amend the Act in June. The Act was amended in 
September and certified in November. By then, most people 
who were made redundant because of COVID-19 satisfied 
the minimum 3 months.  
Employees affected by COVID-19 were assured that 
commercial banks would provide relief on loan repayments, 
such as a three-month grace period. Small and medium 
enterprises were forced to wait for the economic stimulus 
plan. The initial amount promised in April was PGK250 
million but in September, only PGK200 million was released 
for SMEs.  
Testing trust between state and society over 
COVID-19 
Appealing to society to cooperate and comply with COVID-
19 preventative measures in the national interest neces-
sitates reciprocal behaviour from the state and its agents. 
Trust is central in this relationship, but a number of actions 
by the state undermine society’s trust.  
The first is corruption. Society expected the state to 
financially account for the use of public funds and 
demanded an audit of the PGK45 million when allegations 
of misuse surfaced in the media. With the history of cor-
ruption in the health sector over procurement of medicine 
and medical supplies still fresh in the public’s mind, society 
led by civil society and the media held government 
accountable. Although legal exemption of COVID-19 funds 
from the public finance management and procurement laws 
raised suspicion and distrust, the government is committed 
to accountability. Even the requirement for the Emergency 
Controller to only provide an expenditure report to the 
Cabinet added to society’s distrust. 
The second is the dissemination of concise, accurate 
information to keep society informed. Convening daily 
media conferences to update on the progress of COVID-19 
management became a standard operating practice for the 
Emergency Controller and the Prime Minister. However, the 
majority of the rural population was kept in the dark as the 
updates were received by a small section of society with 
access to modern media platforms. Locals also distrusted the 
integrity of tests in light of the high incidence of cases being 
reported positive and subsequently found to be negative.  
The third is the occasional strong-handed tactics of law 
enforcement by some security personnel when regulating 
public behaviour. Citizens were unhappy as mistreatment 
and abuses escalated, and food, including betel-nut, was 
seized and destroyed. As society’s complaints intensified, 
the Opposition began to question government’s approach in 
managing COVID-19. In its view, COVID-19 was a public 
health issue, and not a law and order problem. The appoint-
ment of a policeman as Emergency Controller and the 
hurriedly enacted pandemic law reinforced the belief that 
the pandemic had been securitised. By enacting this law, 
rights and liberties, including democracy, have been 
debased. It is not surprising that the constitutionality of this 
law which was rushed through without wide public con-
sultation is now before the courts to determine. An approp-
riate framework would be public health-based, led by 
medical professionals where political leadership is directly 
accountable and responsible. 
Finally, society expects equal treatment and application 
in laws, rules and regulations. Everyone, regardless of office, 
is expected to comply with COVID-19 laws and regulation. 
No one should be exempted given the serious public health 
risk COVID-19 poses to society. The government’s decision 
to allow a private jet carrying a wealthy Chinese businessman 
to enter and depart PNG in June against pandemic law and 
COVID-19 protocols, greatly disappointed society. That 
disappointment was expressed in a letter published in the 
Post-Courier on 18 August 2020. 
Our only hope through this challenging time is that our 
leaders should set the example for our people to follow 
… If we are being asked to stay at home, why would our 
Prime Minister and other Ministers choose to travel out 
of the COVID-19 hotspot in PNG that is supposed to be 
in lockdown and drive the length of the country taking 
selfies and posting on Facebook … If people need to 
wear masks, and they do, then why are Ministers openly 
interacting without masks. The Mining Minister walking 
into shopping centres without a mask despite being 
asked to wear one … Our people will follow the lead set 
by our leaders. 
Conclusion 
The key lesson for PNG is to undertake a long-term invest-
ment in a sustainable public health infrastructure if it is to 
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guarantee adequate protection against health security threats. 
Such an approach would complement the defensive strategies 
taken to prevent the outbreak and spread of highly contagious 
and infectious disease.  
PNG must develop and invest in a pragmatic pandemic 
management strategy that addresses all health needs, not 
just those of the pandemic. This strategy must be based on 
public health management practices and be led by qualified 
medical professionals. Law enforcement, while important 
in maintaining public order, should not handle a public 
health problem.  
Society does not necessarily need to give up their 
rights, freedoms and liberties. The risks for abuse of powers 
are high. Society may be more willing to cooperate in 
preventing the spread of the COVID-19 virus if their rights, 
freedoms and liberties are not abused. People may be more 
compliant with COVID-19 regulations if public funds are 
subjected to public finance and public procurement laws. 
Society may participate if agents of state also practice and 
apply the same rules and regulations they make. In this 
difficult economic climate, investments in human security, 
particularly in health and economic recovery, are two 
priority areas for building relations between state and 
society. 
Notes 
1  It comprised of the Departments of Health, Treasury, Finance, 
Citizen and Immigration Authority, Transport and Infra-
structure, Information and Technology, National Airport 
Corporation, Air Niugini, PNG Ports, National Agriculture and 
Quarantine Authority, PNG Customs Services, PNG Tourism 
Promotion Authority, PNG Defence Force, Royal Papua New 
Guinea Constabulary and the Institute of Medical Research. 
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Human security in the Pacific: A personal reflection 
Vijay Naidu, University of the South Pacific 
Human security is defined as a holistic approach in dealing 
with the whole range of threats that affect individuals and 
communities. In this sense it means achieving freedom from 
want and freedom from fear. Freedom from want is mainly 
achieved through employment and meaningful livelihoods 
and can exist when people are able to meet all their basic 
needs including food and shelter as well as access edu-
cation, health and social security services provisioned by 
the state. Freedom from fear means that they are protected 
from crime and violence, intrusive and predatory actions of 
the state, and are able to participate in decision-making 
bodies and freely choose representatives to those bodies. 
Human security therefore encapsulates the elimination of 
poverty and the empowerment of people to demand and 
take pro-active measures to keep their communities safe. 
Pacific island communities have survived and sus-
tained themselves over several millennia by giving due 
regard to the multiple dimensions of what is being concept-
ualised as ‘human security’. With the integration into the 
world economy brought about by colonialism and more 
recently, globalisation, the challenges to human security 
have significantly increased and become more complex. 
There are many internal and external threats to human 
security and external factors can generate internal changes 
that may have significant consequences for a Pacific Island 
country (PIC).  
Security threats in PICs 
Conflicts in a number of  island states has arisen over the 
use of local resources for ‘national development’ in a less 
than transparent and equitable manner; the presence of 
strangers in territories claimed by resident indigenous 
groups; competition over land and jobs; the destruction of 
natural habitats for subsistence livelihoods; the lack of 
participation by local communities in making decisions 
about the use of their resources; and the use of repressive 
measures by state power holders against those who pro-
tested their legitimate concerns. Most PICs are variously 
subject to a full range of natural hazards such as cyclones, 
droughts, flooding and tidal surges, earthquakes, and 
tsunamis as well as volcanic activity. Three different 
vulnerability indexes show that PICs and other small island 
states are amongst the top 30 of the most vulnerable of 111 
countries. ‘Vanuatu is ranked the most vulnerable of any of 
the 111 states; Tonga is third, Fiji eighth, the Solomon 
Islands eleventh, Samoa twentieth, Papua New Guinea 
thirtieth, and Kiribati fifty ninth….’ (Brindley 2004:23). 
Economic insecurity: As very small and non-competitive 
producers of raw materials, PICs are extremely vulnerable 
to fluctuations in commodity prices. Most are heavily 
dependent on one or two commodities. They are price takers 
rather than price makers and producers of much that they do 
not consume and consumers of much that they do not 
produce. Human capital loss is a major concern for some 
countries.  
For much of the last two decades PICs have exper-
ienced stagnating and even periodically declining rates of 
economic growth, although on per capita terms, a number 
of countries and the region as a whole have received very 
large amounts of development assistance.  
Despite the size of these aid flows, real per capita growth 
rates over the period have been disappointing. The 
average for the Pacific over the 20 year period to 2001 
was 0.8 per cent per annum, compared to 1.1 per cent for 
the rest of the world. The last decade has been even 
worse, with the Pacific averaging a contraction of 0.1 
per year, compared to the world average of 1.4 per cent 
growth (Brindley, 2004:4).1 
Agriculture, most especially subsistence agriculture, is 
regarded as posing a considerable impediment to economic 
growth. In virtually all PICs, customary forms of land 
tenure are intimately bound up with small-holder pro-
duction. Customary land tenure is perceived as a major 
block to increased productivity as group ownership does not 
allow land to be used as collateral in securing bank loans 
for investment in equipment, fertiliser and pesticides. 
Moreover, investments in other areas such as tourism, 
housing, renewable energy, and waste disposal are seen as 
being unnecessarily stalled by land not being a factor of pro-
duction that can be bought and sold in the market. However, 
it is also widely recognised that without the access that most 
islanders have to plots of cultivable land guaranteed by their 
membership of land-owning groups, poverty levels would 
be much higher.2  
Natural and man-made insecurities: In addition to 
economic vulnerability and natural hazards, ‘man made’ 
disasters abound. These include lack of accountability by 
state power holders, serious shortcomings in the rule of law, 
public finance mismanagement, outright corruption and 
military intervention in democratic processes. In a number 
of the largest countries, security forces have become the 
primary sources of insecurity.3 Poor leadership and lack of 
vision and appropriate public policies together with the 
processes of peripheral capitalism have led to growing 
social inequality and poverty. In the larger PICs, significant 
numbers of children do not attend schools due to a lack of 
affordability and accessibility. The lack of opportunities for 
gainful employment and amenities for recreational activ-
ities have spawned counter cultures of delinquency, crime 
and drug abuse amongst unemployed young men and 
women. Sexually transmitted diseases and HIV/AIDS have 
become widespread. In addition to the existing pandemic of 
non-communicable diseases (NCDs) in PICs, COVID-19 is 
now affecting people in numerous ways. Tourism and 
remittance dependent PICs have been seriously impacted by 
near complete curtailment of international flights, the 
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abrupt end to tourism and the loss of employment for 
thousands of workers engaged in tourism and related 
sectors. Fortunately, PICs’ governments acted quickly to 
close their borders, limiting the spread of the virus. 
Human insecurity: Another extremely negative social 
phenomenon has arisen as the result of the COVID-19 
lockdowns and loss of employment and livelihoods: dom-
estic violence and violence against women and children, 
already widespread in the region, has increased signifi-
cantly. Numerous cases of battered women and the violent 
deaths of women at the hands of intimate partners have been 
reported in Fiji and PNG. Violence has also been prevalent 
historically, and lurks below the surface in disputes over 
land, inter-tribal competition, family disputes, and even in 
sports. These can be fuelled by alcohol and other drugs. In 
PNG, Bougainville and the Solomon Islands, weapons, 
including guns, have aggravated injuries and mortalities in 
conflicts between groups and idle young men have provided 
the foot soldiers for unscrupulous leaders in their bid for 
political ascendancy in Fiji, PNG, Vanuatu and the 
Solomon Islands. 
Environmental insecurity: Global warming continues to 
have a disproportionate effect on atoll states such as 
Kiribati, the Marshall Islands and Tuvalu where saltwater 
intrusion is increasing – the partial consequences of activ-
ities in the industrialised world. Climate change has had 
consequences for all island countries further reducing the 
ability of their populations to literally keep their heads 
above water. Extreme weather events such as Cyclone 
Winston, Cyclone Pam, Cyclone Gita, and Cyclone Harold 
have devastated a number of PICs. Fiji experienced an 
economic downturn of 20 per cent of GDP after Cyclone 
Winston in 2016. The estimated damage caused by Cyclone 
Pam in Vanuatu a year earlier was equivalent to 64 per cent 
of its GDP. Nearly 38 per cent of Tonga’s GDP was lost as 
a result of Cyclone Gita in 2018. In the midst of the 
emerging threats posed by COVID-19, in April 2020, 
Tropical Cyclone Harold destroyed agricultural livelihoods, 
homes and infrastructure estimated at 65 per cent of 
Vanuatu’s GDP. Cyclone Harold also caused serious des-
truction in Solomon Islands, Tonga, and Fiji. Development 
advances and improved living standards are destroyed by 
these extreme weather events, and affected PICs have to 
start from scratch, again and again. 
These natural, socio-cultural, economic and political 
problems and hazards comprise the security threats that can, 
and do, affect human development and human security in 
PICs. To combat these threats the ‘human security frame-
work’, which is an integrated approach based on partnerships 
between civil society organisations, states, and regional/ 
international institutions, is intended to provide a compre-
hensive safeguard that seeks to empower local peoples. 
From State security to human security 
This new partnership approach to human security is a 
significant paradigm shift from the state-centric model of 
security that has emerged over the last few decades. In this 
approach, security was defined narrowly as threats to the 
survival of the state. These threats were perceived as being 
mainly external and included cross-border issues, possible 
military invasion, fish poaching in territorial waters, drugs 
and human trafficking. Since 9/11 there has been a pre-
occupation with terrorism, heightened securitisation of the 
state, and international aid donors refocusing aid towards 
military and police assistance.  
Political instability was considered a significant internal 
threat to the state, leading to harsh crackdowns on advocates 
of human rights and social justice. The human security 
paradigm sees security much more broadly as the survival 
and safety of people and their communities.  
Human security is concerned with safeguarding and 
expanding people’s vital freedoms. It requires both shielding 
people from acute threats and empowering them to make 
changes of their own lives. Needed are integrated policies 
that focus on people’s survival, livelihood and dignity, during 
downturns as well as prosperity (UN Commission on Human 
Security, 2003:iv). 
The Pacific Plan (2005) accepted this broader notion of 
security as ‘the stable and safe social (or human) and political 
conditions necessary for, and reflective of, good governance 
and sustainable development…’ The Pacific Islands Forum 
Secretariat (PIFS) compiled two security frameworks within 
its regional integration program to address Pacific leaders’ 
vision of ‘a region of peace, harmony, security, social 
inclusion and prosperity to allow our people to lead free, 
healthy and productive lives’ (Pacific Islands Forum 2016). 
While the Security Sector Governance Framework 
focused primarily on state institutions, all security insti-
tutions have the responsibility to support human rights. In 
the global context this is recognised through the Inter-
national Code of Conduct for Private Security Providers, 
the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, 
and the Montreux Document. The Secretariat developed  
the UN Human Security Framework (2016) to provide a 
clear common foundation and strategic guidance to Forum 
Island Countries and stakeholders for improving the under-
standing, planning and implementation of human security 
approaches in stand-alone and broader peace, security and 
development initiatives for the region. 
The Human Security Framework provides a common 
language and sound basis for discussions, planning and 
implementation of human security initiatives. It is also a 
tool for communicating to partners and governments inside 
and outside the region as to what the common under-
standing of human security is by Forum member countries 
(Deputy Secretary General, PIFS Andie Fong Toy, 2016).4 
The Human Security Framework 
Civil society organisations: The human security frame-
work recognises that human security requires an integrated 
approach that brings together civil society and the state. 
CSOs comprise the more traditional community and faith-
based entities, NGOs, business groups, trade unions, ethnic 
and cultural associations. Their role in social, economic, 
political, and environmental spheres cannot be over-
estimated. CSOs are involved in food security and 
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livelihood related activities, they provide education, health 
and social services as well as seek sustainable development. 
They settle disputes, mediate and resolve conflict and 
contribute positively to peace building. The work of civil 
society groups enhances social capital. 
When men, women and children are more informed 
about all aspects of human security, their rights and res-
ponsibilities and their entitlements as citizens, they are 
likely as individuals and as members of CSOs to take 
initiatives to protect themselves from threats and make 
informed choices regarding their human security. They are 
better able to hold leaders at all levels to account on their 
security. CSOs are well placed to mobilise people and 
resources to enhance safety and security. This has been 
evident in PICs as individuals, youth groups, women’s 
movements, community, and faith-based organisations 
together with international NGOs and partners have mobil-
ised to support people affected by COVID-19. 
In summary therefore, CSOs can play vital roles in 
generating, promoting, maintaining and taking action on 
information and action programs to enhance human security 
by themselves and as a valued partner of state institutions 
and development agencies. It is imperative that Forum 
island governments individually and collectively recognise 
the role that CSOs have played in protecting and promoting 
Pacific communities from security threats. This recognition 
should be accompanied by a willingness to engage in 
dialogue with CSO representatives in an equitable and open 
manner. CSOs must be accepted as partners in the work of 
governments and at the regional level CSO representatives 
should be effectively represented when decisions are made 
about human security matters. They need to be involved in 
the implementation, assessment, and monitoring of projects 
and programs relating to improving the security of people 
and communities. 
Governance: The Biketawa Declaration committed Forum 
Islands governments to good governance defined as being 
open and transparent, protecting the rights of citizens as 
well as upholding democratic processes and institutions. 
These guiding principles provide the bases for the formul-
ation and implementation of public policies that are res-
ponsive to the needs of citizens and are equitable. 
Institutions that effectively provide public goods, promote 
rule of law and expand physical infrastructure in an open, 
accountable and inclusive way promote the environment for 
human development, respect for human rights and increase 
the capacity of all to actively pursue human security goals.  
Reconciliation and peacebuilding: To some extent 
tension and conflicts are part of human existence and there 
are routine and established modes of channeling and 
resolving these stresses in societies. In recent times 
however, there have been overt and violent conflicts that 
have unraveled the social fabric of communities. Post-
conflict peacebuilding can easily be jeopardised without 
attendance to the root causes of the conflict, and building 
confidence and trust within and between individuals and 
groups involved. The process of reconciliation requires 
active participation of CSOs, especially recognising and 
supporting the role of women as peace-makers. There are 
several steps in the reconciliation process: first, the pre-
paredness of the parties involved in the conflict to accept 
their part in generating and aggravating the antagonism. 
Second, there must be a willingness to make reparations for 
the harm done to others. Third, being prepared to dialogue 
honestly on how to deal with the root causes of the conflict. 
Fourth, being prepared to participate in peace building 
activities that bring together the former conflicting groups. 
Law and justice systems: Legal and justice systems in the 
PICs involve both indigenous institutions and the colonially 
inherited ‘western system’. Many rural and remote com-
munities as well as urban informal settlements continue to 
use values and norms that reflect customary systems. There 
is an emphasis on ‘restorative justice’ and rebuilding 
relationships between the aggrieved person’s family/ 
community and those of the offenders. The arrangements 
are better understood, more easily accessible and are 
generally not overly expensive. The exception to this 
observation is the huge inflation in compensation payments 
required in the Southern Highlands Province of PNG. 
Additionally, the resolution of certain types of crime such 
as rape in the customary system may not be adequate as a 
satisfactory remedy for victims. However, the growing 
number of crimes, increasing numbers in prison and the 
heightened sense of insecurity in urban areas provide 
evidence that the existing ‘western’ system is not working. 
There are issues of whether the punishment fits the crime, 
especially for first offenders, the treatment of juvenile 
delinquents, the rehabilitation of prisoners, support for their 
families, support for the victims of crime, and recidivism.  
Society and cultures: In recent decades there have been 
significant social transformation of kinship in small 
communities, but traditional values and institutions have 
continued to exist. In several instances, significantly valued 
cultural institutions are recognised in PICs’ constitutions. 
Customary ownership of land and its inalienability are 
entrenched in a number of constitutions as is the role of 
chiefs and persons of rank. The Biketawa Declaration 
recognises ‘the importance of respecting and protecting 
indigenous rights and cultural values, traditions and 
customs.’ Additionally, there is a need to ensure that 
languages of communities are taught to its younger mem-
bers as this is most likely path to maintaining the integrity 
of Pacific island cultures. There is a danger, however, that 
the wholesale acceptance of traditional rights, values, 
traditions and customs will have negative impacts on 
women, youth and children. The later tend not to have much 
say in traditional decision-making fora. Besides, there  
are likely to be serious violations of human rights if 
‘customary’ sanctions against non-conforming members of 
society are enforced. 
Livelihoods and poverty: A fundamental challenge for 
PICs will be to ensure meaningful livelihoods and employ-
ment for their people. Increasing social inequality has been 
accompanied by a growing number of people, especially 
young persons, without jobs or access to other livelihoods. 
Rural–urban disparities have grown, and ever larger 
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numbers are eking a living below the poverty line. An Asian 
Development Bank study on poverty and hardship in the 
region confirmed what CSO representatives had been 
saying about the extent of poverty in PICs. Cook Islands 
had 12 per cent of its people living below the poverty line; 
all the Melanesian countries had poverty level ranging from 
30 to 40 per cent; and in Kiribati half the population  
were found to live in poverty. Gross social inequality and 
poverty often lead to social exclusion, unrest and political 
instability. The youngest and oldest segments of society are 
most vulnerable to economic exclusion. 
There is a need to expand economic activities, increase 
food security, generate employment, and ensure greater 
access to resources and opportunities. Cultural norms of 
reciprocity and sharing with the wider kinship group are 
being replaced by values that are linked to urban living and 
the monetary economy. Civil society organisations can 
work with local communities to identify and generate  
new economic opportunities. They can establish self-help 
groups and secure micro-finance for cash earning activities. 
They can work with families, young mothers, women and 
youth to build their capacity by the provision of information 
and training. CSOs can also play a significant advocacy role 
to influence pro-poor growth policies.  
Land, resources, and the environment: Natural resource 
use, conservation and management is at the heart of human 
security. Land is often utilised inefficiently and under 
increasing pressure from population growth, leading to it 
becoming a major source of competition, tension and 
conflict. Extractive industries such as logging, mining and 
fishing have seriously depleted forest cover, degraded 
natural environments, and affected people’s livelihoods. 
CSOs have a critical role to give voice to the concerns of 
local communities about the degradation of their environ-
ment, loss of biodiversity and the loss of livelihoods. In the 
long-term this will reduce conflict and support sustainable 
development. 
Education and awareness for reducing violence: In 
multi-ethnic and multi-lingual PICs, nation building 
remains a challenge. In addition to the issue of violence, 
suicides are also uncommonly high in some countries of the 
region. Education can play an important role in combatting 
this. School curriculums need to focus on local content that 
deals with history, origins of different groups, their cultures, 
language studies, multiculturalism, explanations about 
migration and resource competition in order to help increase 
understanding and tolerance. This can also be supported by 
greater cooperation with CSOs as well as zero-tolerance for 
violence in schools, respect for the sanctity of the person, 
and gender equality, all of which can begin the process of 
changing attitudes and behaviour in wider society.  
Tackling misuse of arms: Fortunately for the region,  
the civilian population and police forces remain largely 
unarmed. Small arms including combat weapons such as 
assault rifles, machine guns and automatic pistols are limited 
to areas that have experienced open violent conflict. 
Bougainville, Guadalcanal, and the PNG Southern Highlands 
have suffered significant casualties from the use of small  
 
arms. Recent participatory studies have illustrated increases 
in violence linked to these weapons. Livelihoods and lives 
have been lost and communities are keen to see an end to 
gun violence. CSOs can help educate people about the 
negative consequences of gun use, identify the factors that 
contribute to gun violence and work towards the phasing 
out of guns from communities. 
HIV/AIDS and homophobia: HIV/Aids has been increas-
ing in PICs. The common risk factors are a large number of 
young people in the population, high levels of STDs, teenage 
pregnancies, and the tendency to have unprotected sex with 
multiple partners. There are many challenges to individuals 
and communities that range from tackling ignorance about 
STDs and HIV/AIDS, monitoring infections, treatment and 
the attitude of the wider community members to HIV/AIDS 
positive persons. Homophobia, moral judgement, and fear 
affect how infected persons are treated by communities. 
CSOs are already playing a significant role in partnership 
with governments and multilateral agencies to advocate and 
educate for greater health services and security.  
Conclusion 
While there has been continued preoccupation with the 
securitisation of the state, human security has emerged as a 
transformative concept and framework. Through this con-
cept, a more partner-centred approach between security 
actors is continuing to evolve. CSOs are already engaged in 
creating awareness of risks relating to health for instance, 
and tackling many of the threats to human security. Groups 
of youth, women, environmental and human rights activists 
have been educating and advocating about a range of issues 
that impinge on people and communities in the region. With 
the shift towards an integrated holistic approach to human 
security, they can be a portent partner to the state, regional 
and international development agencies in ensuring safer 
and secure communities. Their potential will be enhanced 
by the recognition of the work that they are currently doing, 
treating them as equal partners, making resources available 
to them and helping them to build their capacity. 
Notes 
* This paper is an updated version of an earlier presentation to 
the Workshop on Civil Society and Human Security, UNDP 
Pacific Centre and Citizens Constitutional Forum, at the 
Tokatoka Resort, Nadi. 25-26 April, 2007 
1  The heavily remittance dependent economies of Samoa and 
Tonga have experienced growth. Samoa has engaged in the 
reform process most consistently and has shown annual 
growth rates over the last five years.  
2 Some Pacific experts continue to subscribe to the notion of 
‘subsistence affluence’ which in my view was not equally 
present in all PICs and in any case raises the issue of what is 
defined as affluence. 
3  The ethnically exclusive Fijian military has engaged in four 
military coups undermining democratic electoral outcomes; 
the Solomon Island police were involved in the 2000 coup 
which overthrew Prime Minister Bart Ulufa’alu’s 
government; the Papua New Guinea and Vanuatu security 
forces have mutinied periodically. 
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Surviving the pandemic: COVID-19 in the Pacific and health security 
Hugh McClure, The Australian National University 
Pacific Island Countries and territories account for eight of 
the world’s ten remaining nations with no recorded cases of 
COVID-19. Drawing on the Australia Pacific Security 
College’s weekly Trendlines – COVID-19: The Pacific 
Response series, this paper investigates the policy responses 
employed by Pacific governments to this global pandemic.  
The decisive responses taken by Pacific governments 
in the early days of the pandemic, including the response to 
snap close borders to international travel, has proven crucial 
in avoiding widespread catastrophe in many countries. 
While keeping the virus out of the region has been vin-
dicated from a health perspective, border closures have had 
striking economic, social and political impacts, highlighting 
the nature of policymaking in a crisis. Management of the 
economic and social fallout continues as the cost of border 
closures continues to compound. The hurdle ahead is how 
Pacific governments can safely reopen their economies.  
Splendid isolation  
If one were to design a geographical region to succeed in 
controlling a global pandemic, it might look something like 
the widely dispersed Pacific Islands Countries (PICs). 
Recognising the inherent geographic benefits of their Blue 
Pacific continent, governments capitalised upon their nat-
ural isolation, sealing their borders to international arrivals, 
including returning citizens, to safeguard against the intro-
duction of COVID-19 into vulnerable communities.  
With the memory not only of the deadly 2019 Samoan 
measles outbreak, as well as the 1918 Spanish Flu that 
claimed the lives of almost one-third of Samoa’s population, 
policymakers conceded that the region’s public health 
infrastructure was too underdeveloped to respond to an 
outbreak of a communicable respiratory illness. With health 
infrastructure painfully lacking, the decision was made 
that prevention was better than cure, and leaders made the 
most of the vast moat that is the Pacific Ocean.  
The first country to seal their border was the Marshall 
Islands. Tonga, Kiribati, Palau, the Federated States of 
Micronesia, Tuvalu and Nauru all followed suit. While the 
rest of the world has been ravaged by COVID-19, these 
island nations have remained largely virus free throughout 
2020, something that, by October, Nauru’s President said 
was a ‘commendable’ achievement (RNZ 2020a).  
It must be noted that closed borders did not keep cases 
out of all countries. Owing to its role as a regional trans-
portation hub, Fiji recorded a number of cases but the 
country’s tracking, isolating, and testing mechanisms man-
aged to keep the virus from spreading extensively within 
communities, helped by state of emergency restrictions. Most 
cases were confined to border quarantine centres. Similarly, 
the only cases in the Solomon Islands and Vanuatu have been 
in border quarantine. Border closures kept these countries 
virus-free for the majority of 2020, providing time to 
develop border management systems, which have proven 
effective at keeping the virus out of the community at large.  
In a Pacific Wayfinder podcast (2020), Dr Pauala 
Vivili, Director of the Public Health Division of the Pacific 
Community has said that the public health response has 
been strong across the region, protecting the clinical 
services response, where there are greater challenges. 
The uncomfortable truth 
Throughout the pandemic, the most infected Pacific com-
munities have consistently been the territories ruled by 
metropolitan powers, including the US territories of Guam 
and the Northern Mariana Islands and the French territories 
of New Caledonia and French Polynesia.  
In the early stages of the pandemic, high case numbers 
in Guam, French Polynesia and New Caledonia were 
attributed to the rotation of officials from metropolitan 
countries. Through the early months, protests at airports in 
New Caledonia were frequent as French officials continued 
to arrive in Noumea and bypass customs and health check-
points, despite mandatory 21-day quarantine arrangements. 
Pro-independence party president Daniel Goa responded, 
stating that France had failed to respect the Noumea Accord 
due to the continued rotation of officials and ordered the 
French High Commissioner to leave the country. 
In the second half of the year, the exponential increase 
in cases witnessed in Guam and French Polynesia high-
lighted uncomfortable truths about policy autonomy for 
local administrations.  
Despite strong opposition from indigenous Tahitians, 
French Polynesia’s borders were re-opened to tourism in the 
second half of the year. Around 7500 tourists arrived in Tahiti 
from mid-July to mid-August, with 90 per cent travelling 
from the US and France. Despite mounting case numbers, 
French authorities dug their heels in to rule out any return  
to lockdown or the declaration of a second state of 
emergency. This decision came despite multiple French 
Polynesian unions threatening to strike unless COVID-19 
measures were strengthened. While authorities did reintro-
duce the requirement to wear masks while travelling on 
public transport, many of the calls for other restrictions and 
protections were unanswered. As a result of the border 
reopening in July, the number of cases rose to 56 by the end 
of 2020. 
It is not clear where these tensions will end. Despite being 
ultimately unsuccessful, New Caledonia’s second independ-
ence referendum in as many years saw both an increased 
turnout and an increased pro-independence vote (Sartre and 
Doherty 2020).  
In counterpoint, Guam’s government responded swiftly 
to its second wave with lockdowns, presumably with the 
agreement of the US Government which manages the 
territories’ border policies (RNZ 2020b).  
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Coming home 
Pacific Islanders are travellers by nature, and the COVID-
19 pandemic highlighted how many Pasifika people are 
overseas at any given point in time – for study, seasonal 
worker programs or family commitments. As months have 
passed, governments across the region have been reluctant 
to reopen their borders to international arrivals, including 
citizens stranded abroad. 
The repatriation of seasonal workers who were on 
contract in Australia and New Zealand at the outbreak of 
the pandemic has been undeniably slow and has left 
families separated for an extended period. Samoan and ni-
Vanuatu seasonal workers in New Zealand have been 
subjected to a stop–start approach to repatriation, largely 
due to the sheer size of the repatriation task, owing to the 
magnitude of their Seasonal Worker Program (SWP).  
Many of the hurdles of repatriation are at the Pacific 
end. Governments are clearly anxious about the capacity of 
scarce quarantine, isolation and testing facilities to manage 
the large number of repatriates effectively, and have been 
cautious about the risk of introducing the virus into the com-
munity (Bedford 2020). Vanuatu Prime Minister Loughman 
halted repatriation in June due to fears that the queue of 
2300 repatriates could overwhelm his country’s quarantine 
facilities. Meanwhile, in Kiribati, President Maamau called 
for patience, refusing to allow citizens to return home until 
the government had built an isolation facility. Six months 
on, his citizens remain locked out (RNZ 2020c). While New 
Zealand has provided some assistance, repatriation of 
seasonal workers has placed a substantial financial burden 
on both Pacific countries and individuals, particularly those 
travelling from Australia.  
Border quarantine processes have so far detected recent 
known positive cases entering Fiji. Despite the success of 
managing a consistent stream of arrivals to Fiji, there is 
concern that the country’s acceptance of ‘all stations’ flights 
from India, stopping off in Jakarta and Port Moresby, is 
unduly increasing the risk level. Similarly, Prime Minister 
Sogavare in Solomon Islands heralded that his nation’s 
quarantine systems had proven successful when that 
country’s first and second cases were detected in border 
quarantine and were sucessfully isolated. Sogavare indi-
cated that the decision to delay repatriation until facilities 
were ready has proven prudent. Despite this, widespread 
opposition was voiced over plans for a repatriation flight 
from China, which carried just over 80 government 
appointed Chinese architects to assist in works for the 2023 
Pacific Games.  
Inside the bubble  
In addition to border closures, Pacific governments moved 
quickly to declare states of emergency. Initially expected to 
run for 14 days, they were eventually declared for much 
longer periods. In Vanuatu, a state of emergency was 
declared until the end of 2020, despite the country having 
not recorded a single case of the virus. The pandemic 
marked the first time that state of emergency declarations  
were issued as a preventative measure, rather than as a 
reaction to crisis (Ride and Kekea 2020).  
To enforce social distancing, churches, schools, markets 
and kava bars were forced to close their doors, changing the 
fabric and pulse of social Pacific lifestyles. With tightly 
policed curfews enacted, the vibrant streets that characterise 
the region quickly became deserted. 
As weeks have turned into months, state of emergency 
enforcement has evolved into a vexed political issue. In 
Samoa, critics of the Prime Minister have said that his state 
of emergency restrictions are but a thinly-veiled excuse for 
him to implement his traditionalist beliefs on the country, 
such as that businesses should not trade on Sundays. In 
many parts of the region, the increased visibility of police, 
and the central role they have played in managing a public 
health crisis, has raised eyebrows (Thomson 2020). While 
state of emergency and lockdown restrictions curtailed the 
spread of the virus, the constitutionality of extended state of 
emergencies has been questioned in numerous parts of the 
region, including Vanuatu and French Polynesia (Mayron 
2020). 
The debate surrounding the state of emergency has 
perhaps been fiercest in PNG. Despite recommendations 
from the Parliament’s Permanent Emergency Committee for 
the state of emergency to continue for two additional months, 
it was lifted in June 2020 after no new cases were recorded 
for 60 days. The state of emergency was replaced by the 
National Health Emergency Act 2020, a piece of legislation 
that has become the subject of criticism by anti-corruption 
agency Transparency International PNG (2020), for imping-
ing on citizens’ rights for an indefinite period with no 
parliamentary oversight. Debate has continued to be fierce, 
with former Prime Minister Peter O’Neill outlining that he 
did not support a state of emergency extension beyond 14 
days, and he was backed up by the Governors of Madang, 
Eastern Highlands and East Sepik provinces.  
Just as PNG’s second wave took hold in August 2020, 
Prime Minister Marape declared his country must ‘learn to 
live with the virus’, allowing the 14 day second-wave lock-
down period to lapse without any extension (Whiting 2020). 
Despite a 10:00pm–5:00am curfew remaining in place at 
the time, schools were re-opened and restrictions on inter-
provincial travel were similarly lifted as case numbers 
skyrocketed.  
The management of PNG’s health resources is a 
fraught topic. Under strain, the PNG Nurses Association 
threatened industrial action over personal protective 
equipment shortages, while pressure built in August 2020 
after the Rita Flynn Sports Complex, which had been the 
country’s isolation facility, reached capacity amidst the 
country’s second wave.  
A month later, as case numbers continued to mount, 
Opposition Leader Belden Namah called on the government 
to remove all remaining COVID-19 restrictions, claiming 
the restrictions were crippling the nation’s economy for 
little practical benefit. He stated that most deaths were 
attributable to pre-existing comorbidities.  
Economic fallout  
In August 2020, the Asian Development Bank released its 
2020 Pacific Economic Monitor (PEM) that showed a region-
86 Development Bulletin 82 
wide economic contraction of 4.3 per cent. The PEM pre-
dicted that tourism-dependent economies, including Palau, 
the Cook Islands and Fiji would record the greatest con-
tractions, with GDP in Fiji expected to shrink by 15 per cent. 
Looking to the future, the PEM forecast growth of 1.6 per 
cent in 2021 contingent upon the resumption of international 
travel.  
If border closures were the chosen protection from failing 
health systems, then expansive stimulus payments were the 
buffer to the pandemic’s economic fallout with governments 
across the region moving quickly to increase welfare payments 
to support a growing list of unemployed workers. While 
payments are helpful, they are far from enough.  
The Fijian Government predicted the single largest 
economic contraction in Fijian history of 21.7 per cent, with 
remittances falling by 15 per cent and foreign direct invest-
ment reducing by 40 per cent. Faced with this grim 
economic outlook, the government presented a US$390m 
(A$554.8m) stimulus package early in the pandemic. The 
sizeable budget deficit pushed the debt to GDP ratio to 83.4 
per cent, in part due to tax reductions of US$232m 
(A$330.6m), legislated to support businesses and stimulate 
consumer spending. With one third of the workforce having 
lost either their jobs or faced reduced hours, the Minister for 
the Economy outlined that 86,000 Fijians accessed relief 
payments from their pension fund in phase one, with 26,000 
accessing support during phase two. If figures like these are 
replicated across the region, such unprecedented demand has 
the potential to overwhelm countries’ embryonic welfare 
systems.  
In response to Fiji’s package, the University of the 
South Pacific economist Dr Naleesh Gounder said the 
government should have done more to diversify the 
country’s economy (RNZ 2020d). Dr Gounder outlined that 
the COVID-19 pandemic has highlighted the risks inherent 
to Fiji’s narrow economic base, arguing now is an  
opportune time to develop alternate industries. Similarly, 
non-government organisations including the Foundation for 
Rural Integrated Enterprises Development (FRIEND) and 
the Fiji Council of Social Services (FCOSS) made clear their 
disappointment with the Budget (Rex 2020). FRIEND said 
that those engaged in the informal economy were largely 
ignored by the government’s stimulus package. The FCOSS 
argued that the government focused disproportionately on 
supporting businesses, failing to appropriately assist fam-
ilies to make ends meet. Often, individuals must have 
superannuation accounts to register for welfare, dispropor-
tionately neglecting the many informal workers who are 
most vulnerable to economic hardship. Clan and kastom 
continue to be the safety net for the majority.  
In PNG, the COVID-19 Economic Stimulus Package 
was developed. Several months after it was announced, 
Treasurer Ling-Stuckey outlined its content: 
• US$79m (A$112.3m) investment in health and security; 
• water sanitation and hygiene received US$17m (A$24.1m); 
• frontline provincial health received US$10m (A$14.2m); 
• US$8.5m (A$12.9m) for personal protective equipment; 
• US$1.4m (A$1.99m) to churches for food provision; 
• US$21m (A$29.87m) for constructing new border posts 
with Papua; and 
• the government approved a US$56m (A$79.6m) relief 
package to boost small and medium enterprises in res-
ponse to appeals from business for tax relief. In theory, 
the money will be allocated to commercial banks and the 
National Development Bank for low interest loans.  
Delays in the release of funds have been reported. The 
PNG Micro-Small and Medium Enterprise Council has 
reported that US$60.27m (A$81.1m) in funding promised 
for Small and Medium Enterprises has not been received. 
Similarly, Prime Minister Marape apologised to church-run 
health facilities that were forced to close their doors due to 
a four-month delay in payments of salaries and operational 
funds. Such debates have had substantial implications on 
the political economy and day-to-day politics. 
Elsewhere in the region, the French Polynesian 
Assembly approved an updated Budget to account for the 
territory’s revenue shortfall of US$150m (A$213.4m). In 
Tonga, the 2020–21 Budget passed the parliament unan-
imously, in what marked the Kingdom’s largest Budget 
deficit on record, totalling US$26.4m (A$37.6m). With 
remittances down, national revenue was reduced and the 
need for social support was greater. Niue, a country that 
has traditionally returned a balanced budget forecast a 
substantial deficit as a result of the altered economic climate 
during the COVID-19 pandemic. 
Rising debts are inevitable. At risk of economic insta-
bility, Pacific leaders are continuing to engage with diverse 
development partners for donor assistance and debt relief.  
Social affairs  
As border closures have lingered, and much of the region 
has remained out of work, the impact on households has 
compounded throughout 2020.  
Reflective of the higher unemployment rate exhibited, 
incidences of domestic and family violence have sharply 
increased. Fiji’s Minister for Women has repeatedly out-
lined that the country’s domestic violence hotline has 
received increased calls during the pandemic. Eighty-seven 
calls were placed with the nation’s hotline in February 
2020, a figure that rose to 527 by April of that year.  
Further, just as the COVID-19 pandemic has been 
labelled the ‘pink recession’ in Western countries, women-
led businesses in the Pacific are in heightened need of 
support. According to the head of the Pacific Trade and 
Investment Commission, Caleb Jarvis, women’s reliance on 
the services and tourism industries has led to dispro-
portionate impact. A survey revealed that 92 per cent of 
women entrepreneurs have suffered a drop in revenue. 
More pain is likely to come.  
Regional rescue 
When Tropical Cyclone Harold made landfall in April 
2020, the category five system drastically altered the nature 
of the COVID-19 response. In parts of the region, including 
Vanuatu’s Sanma province, where 90 per cent of homes 
 
February 2021 87 
were impacted, COVID-19 concerns took a backseat to the 
pressing humanitarian response as leaders had the melan-
choly duty of responding to the twin-emergencies of cyc-
lone and pandemic and declared dual states of emergency.  
With the usual humanitarian assistance support work-
ers not able to access the region due to border closures, 
financial aid absorption capacity was limited. With both 
COVID-19 and Cyclone Harold aid flows entering the 
region simultaneously, and without the traditional rush of 
external humanitarian assistance, coordination was vital. 
The need for regional cooperation became clear. For the 
third time in its history, the Biketawa Declaration was 
invoked in April, as Pacific Island Forum foreign ministers 
met virtually and agreed to establish a Pacific Humanitarian 
Pathway on COVID-19 (PHP-C) to coordinate and prior-
itise assistance flows, as well as manage the increasingly 
complex political relationships with the ever-increasing list 
of donor partners. In the months since, PHP-C has been 
widely viewed as a win for the region – serving as a corridor 
to accelerate and coordinate humanitarian assistance in the 
aftermath of Cyclone Harold and also for the distribution of 
medical supplies such as testing kits and personal protective 
equipment for the COVID-19 response.  
In August, the Pacific Island Forum Secretariat with the 
UN World Food Programme (2020) welcomed the launch 
of the Humanitarian Air Service that would assist with the 
aftermath of Cyclone Harold and also the distribution of 
medical supplies. The service made its maiden flight from 
Nadi to Port Moresby to deliver 44 cubic metres of essential 
medical supplies. The Air Service forms part of the PHP-C. 
Meanwhile, regional collaboration for border processes was 
discussed at a virtual roundtable convened by the United 
Nations and the Asian Development Bank. Representatives 
from Solomon Islands, Kiribati, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu 
and Fiji attended and discussed border security quarantine 
processes hoping to streamline approaches, and accelerate 
the return of tourists. 
Playing the long game? 
As leaders turn one eye to the future, the Pacific is a region 
in two parts. About 80 per cent of Pacific Islanders live 
rurally, many of whom have limited access to health 
services, and even sanitation. It is these communities that 
are most vulnerable to infectious diseases, and have the 
most to risk and the least to gain through the resumption of 
international travel and tourism. Frequently tested by 
natural disasters, Pacific Islanders have long returned to 
their gardens as the ultimate safety net, learning to live in 
subsistence affluence and relying on the social safety net 
provided by the kastom economy. In this pandemic, many 
have returned to villages to harvest their gardens and 
engage in subsistence agriculture and fishing. In some parts 
of the region, a return to traditional ways has also included 
the resumption of bartering and traditional money systems 
(Fainu 2020).  
On the other side of the equation is the urbanised parts 
of the region, which are reliant on access to global markets. 
Many would like to revive the tourism industry, but the 
hopes for a region-wide travel bubble are looking dim, Fiji 
Prime Minister Frank Bainimarama floated the idea of a 
‘Bula Bubble’ to see tourists return to his country from 
Australia, New Zealand and other Pacific countries. 
Vanuatu’s Prime Minister announced a similar ‘Tam Tam 
Bubble’. Both proposals were dashed after their announce-
ment. A ‘Realm Bubble’ between New Zealand, the Cook 
Islands and Niue has been raised periodically, but it too 
seems a way off.  
In a novel approach, Fiji welcomed its first arrivals 
through the ‘Blue Lane’ strategy, which saw two visitors 
from New Zealand arrive on a boat after spending a fortnight 
quarantining at sea. While some have taken advantage of the 
pathway, it is a niche and expensive solution. It will take 
some time before tourism earnings will return to pre-COVID 
times. 
Other industries have also been affected by the pandemic. 
Export-focused, resource-based economies including PNG 
and Solomon Islands have suffered reduced employment and 
reduced government revenue streams due to a drop in demand 
for natural resources, including timber and commodities. 
Conclusion 
The COVID-19 pandemic has impacted almost every aspect 
of policymaking in the Pacific. Pacific governments’ decisive 
response to close borders has protected much of the region 
from a significant outbreak of the virus. For a region that 
continues to battle a non-communicable diseases epidemic 
and serious co-morbidities, the risk COVID-19 presents is 
significant. 
The effective shutdown of much of the economic life 
of the region has highlighted many of the underlying policy 
challenges of the Pacific region. In 2021, the challenges of 
the region’s vulnerability to natural disasters, tensions of 
external governance in the region’s territories, persistent 
social issues including gender inequality, matters of polit-
ical and economic management and the exposure of the 
region’s narrow economic base are each in sharp focus.  
Leaders now face a range of policy challenges, as they 
seek to restimulate the economy in a way which boosts 
prosperity while continues to safeguard the health of the 
region. Despite the Australian Government making over-
tures to procure and provide vaccines to the region, leaders 
will struggle to find ways to balance the diverse security 
challenges facing the Pacific that the pandemic, and its 
response, have brought to the surface. 
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Reflections on a short history of epidemics in Samoa  
Pamela Thomas, The Australian National University 
This paper considers 150 years of epidemics in Samoa and 
their impact on society and traditional beliefs. Although 
information on pre-contact health and health practices is 
limited to a few Eurocentric mission sources, it is clear that 
ill health was dealt with in ways that were socially effective, 
if not always effective in curing disease. Prognosis and 
healing supported traditional beliefs, promoted mutual 
support within the family, reinforced the relative rank of 
both the living and the dead, and provided a therapeutic 
interlude for the entire extended family in which trans-
gressions could be confessed and grievances aired. Not only 
were illness and death the impetus for large social 
gatherings attended by family from all over the country they 
were also an effective way of rapidly spreading infection. 
1830–1930 The age of epidemics1 
Following contact, the experience throughout the Pacific 
was much the same as in Samoa, and in some societies, 
notably Fiji and Tonga, it was worse. Epidemic after 
epidemic of previously unknown diseases killed not only 
new generations of children but young and older adults 
(Table 1). In Western Samoa, following the arrival of the 
ship ‘Messenger of Peace’ which carried the European 
missionaries, Williams and Barff and six Tahitian teachers, 
the first epidemic of influenza broke out. 
As Turner (1861:222) reports:  
The natives at once traced the disease to the foreigners 
and the new religion … ever since there have been 
returns of the disease almost annually … in some cases 
it is fatal to old people and those who have been prev-
iously weakened by pulmonary disease. There was an 
attack in May 1837, another in November 1846, both of 
which were unusually severe and fatal … In 1849 
hooping cough [sic] made its appearance and a good 
many children died ... In 1851 another new disease 
arrived – mumps. It was traced to a vessel from 
California and soon spread all over the group. Scarcely 
a native escaped … the universal opinion of the Samoan 
people is that the mortality is now greater among the 
young and middle-aged people than formerly”.  
Mills (1839) writes that those who did not immediately 
succumb to these diseases were left with pulmonary com-
plications and ‘vast numbers (were) taken off after the 
disease itself was removed’.  
In 1893, Samoa ‘was in the throes of an epidemic of 
measles which prostrated the whole group … the mortality 
was excessive’ (Collier 1893). Bleazard (1896:1) of the 
Methodist Mission reports that ‘This is the first experience 
of measles … and it is exceedingly bitter. All are being, or 
have been, attacked and many have been carried off’ while 
Collier (1893:2) wrote ‘The death-rate is very high 
notwithstanding the precautions which have been taken to 
keep it down’. No sooner had the measles epidemic abated 
than an epidemic of diarrhoea and dysentery followed 
resulting in the death of a great number of children 
(Bleazard 1896:1). 
Not surprisingly, by the turn of the century population 
estimates show a marked decline and it was believed that 
Pacific Island people were doomed to extinction. In 1875, 
measles alone killed 40,000 Fijians.2 In Fiji, ‘Whole com-
munities were struck at one time … there was nobody left 
to gather food or carry water’ (Thomson 1896 in McArthur 
1967:76). Not only were populations thought to be 
declining, the general standard of health was considered by 
Europeans to be deteriorating. Worse was to come. The age 
of epidemics reached its peak in Western Samoa in 1918 
with the influenza pandemic. 
Table 1: Major epidemics in Western Samoa 1830–
1930  
Date Disease Source 
1830 Influenza  Turner 1861 
1837 Influenza Mills 1839 
1839 Influenza Pratt 1849 
1846 Influenza Pratt 1849 
1849 Whooping Cough Erskine 1853 
1851 Mumps Turner 1861 
1891 Influenza Collier 1893 
1893 Measles Carne 1793 
1907  Dysentery/Whooping Cough McArthur 1967 
1911 Measles/Dysentery McArthur 1967 
1915 Measles McArthur 1967 
1918 Influenza Pandemic AJHR A-4 1923 
1923–24 Dysentery AJHR A-4 1926 
1926 Whooping Cough McArthur 1967 
Note: This information was compiled by the author. 
The Influenza Pandemic 
In 1918, the SS Talune arrived and a passenger carrying 
influenza was allowed off the ship. In a highly social and 
mobile society the disease spread quickly and six weeks 
later nearly one third of the population (7542 persons), had 
died (New Zealand Parliamentary Papers H31c3). Mortality 
was selective, affecting more men than women, and both 
ran higher risks of dying than children. Those with a 
tendency to obesity were particularly prone (Pirie 1963:78). 
Thirty per cent of all adult men and 25 per cent of adult 
women died. Within the male population, 45 per cent of 
Samoan matai (chiefs) and nearly 50 per cent of Samoan 
church leaders died. Goodall (1954:36) reports that ‘of 220 
Samoan pastors in active service 103 died … twenty-nine 
out of 30 members of the Council of Elders (Au Toieaina) 
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were among the casualties’. In addition 65 per cent of all 
Samoan Roman Catholic catechists died (Pirie 1963:78). 
Whole villages were wiped out, houses fell into dis-
repair, plantations were overgrown and the death of nearly 
half the sacred and secular leaders threw surviving villagers 
into confusion. Neither belief in traditional religion nor 
Christianity were effective protection.  
For Samoans it was this epidemic, not the Great War, 
which marked the watershed between two eras. The 
survivors were bereft not only of relatives, friends and 
leaders; they were bereft of confidence, and in many 
instances, of a faith equal to such a strain (Goodall 
1954:362). 
Health responses to introduced diseases  
Samoan perceptions of this sudden and continued influx of 
unknown and deadly diseases and the ineffectiveness of 
traditional healers to deal with it seems to have gone 
unrecorded, except for brief European comments of social 
disruption and demoralisation. I could find no mention of 
these events in Samoan myths or stories and family gen-
ealogies appear to have ignored the havoc this disruption 
must have caused in title succession. However, there was a 
dramatic increase in belief in Christianity and adherence to 
the London Missionary Society (LMS) and the Catholic 
Church. In addition, there was an upsurge in Samoan off-
shoots of different religious denominations and an increase 
in Samoan ‘visionaries’ and faith healers – a situation which 
continues today.  
The New Zealand response 
Following the pandemic, for which the New Zealand Admin-
istration felt responsible, the New Zealand Government put 
considerable funding and effort into improving health with a 
particular focus on the health of women and children. In 
1923, a system of community-based primary health care 
was established, based on New Zealand’s health policy of 
equality of access and community participation in health 
care. In Samoa, the NZ Administrator, the highest ranking 
New Zealander in the country, adhering to Samoan 
etiquette, went on a ceremonial Samoan journey (malaga) 
to all villages in Samoa where he met the village fono 
(Council) to enquire about the health situation in the village 
and what the chiefs thought might be done about it. When 
some suggested that women be given information on how 
to care for children’s health, he enquired if the fono would 
support the establishment of a women’s health group or 
committee in their village. High ranking women could be 
trained in basic health matters and first aid and take 
responsibility for the health of the village women and 
children. This was accepted by all villages and young 
women from highly ranked families were trained in basic 
health care for women and children and travelled the 
country together with an American, and later a New 
Zealand, woman doctor3 to establish the women’s health 
committees.  By 1925, all villages in Samoa had a Women’s 
Health Committee presided over by the wife of the high 
chief and/or the wife of the pastor. For nearly 100 years the 
committees were visited regularly by a trained health 
worker and later were responsible for ensuring children 
were fully immunised against diphtheria, pertussis, tetanus, 
polio, TB and measles.  
2019–20 The measles epidemic 
To a large extent the committees still function but for some 
time now have been known as Women’s Committees to 
allow inclusion of other ‘economic development’ activities 
which often take precedence over health. This weakening 
of the committees and the decline in children receiving the 
security of full immunisation, together with the periodic 
emergence of ‘faith healing’ movements which discourage 
immunisation and other forms of modern medicine, are 
perhaps in part responsible for the 2019–20 measles 
epidemic that led to the death of 97 children. In an effort to 
halt the measles epidemic and aware of the strength of faith 
healing groups opposed to immunisation, the Samoan 
Parliament moved quickly and in late December 2019 
passed the Infants Amendment Bill 2019 making it com-
pulsory for every child in Samoa to be vaccinated against 
measles when they reached the eligible age of six months. 
It also required that each child being enrolled for school 
produce their vaccination and immunisation records with 
heavy fines for school principals who were lax in applying 
the regulation.  
Faith-inspired healing movements 
Shortly after passing the Infants Amendment Bill, the 
government closed down Kangan Water, a group selling 
bottled water that was widely believed to have ‘divine’ 
healing properties. Radio New Zealand reported that 
Kangan Water was considered to be ‘one of the most 
common home remedies…in Apia it was not uncommon to 
see queues of cars waiting to buy it’ (RNZ 2020:2–6).  
Belief in Kangan Water would seem to exemplify a 
continued need for healing beliefs outside the formal health 
system. The largest, best known, and perhaps the most 
disruptive, of these quasi-religious groups was Emanuelu. 
Based to some extent on American television faith healing 
programs, group healing was exemplified by chants, hymns, 
laying on of hands, sprinkling with blessed water, special 
incantations, prayers and speaking in tongues. Followers 
were encouraged to throw away their medication as Jesus 
would heal – to use medication or allow vaccination indi-
cated lack of faith. Emanuelu became so popular it had 
groups operating in 27 villages, creating considerable dis-
ruptions and difficulties for the Department of Health and 
in particular for the immunisation programmes conducted 
by the Women’s Committees. Emanuelu was eventually 
formally “discouraged” but as in the past, small religiously-
inspired healers continued to emerge and gain followers.  
COVID-19 
In the case of COVID-19, Samoa, with its large numbers of 
family members in New Zealand, Australia and the United 
States, many of whom return to Samoa for important family 
functions, could be considered at very high risk of another 
pandemic but to date there have been few cases. Perhaps it 
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is worth considering the security action of American Samoa 
in the great influenza pandemic when they isolated their 
islands by closing all maritime borders. They remained 
secure from the disease while Western Samoa lost nearly 
one-third of its population. As we now see with COVID-19 
in Australia and New Zealand there is security in isolation.  
Notes 
1  Much of the historical information in this paper is based on 
work I undertook for my unpublished PhD thesis, ANU, 1986.  
2  Almost one-third of the population, 
https://devastatingdisasters.com 
2  To find a woman doctor anywhere at the time was unusual, 
but to find two women doctors in Samoa at this time was 
almost unbelievable. They were Dr Mabel Christie, a very 
early NZ medical graduate, and Dr Regina Flood Keyes, wife 
of the American consul and former US Army doctor.  
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Advancing opportunities at the intersection of Pacific security and health  
Nicholas Thomson, The Australian National University 
In 2019, The Lancet released a special issue exploring the 
potential of harnessing synergies between the security and 
health sectors where doing so would improve individual and 
public health outcomes without undermining human rights 
(Thomson et al. 2019). Citing recent examples of the use of 
militaries in support of public health responses to infectious 
disease outbreaks, the series noted that if partnerships bet-
ween public health and public security were more critically 
examined for potential synergies, responses to incidents 
affecting health and disease outbreaks could be immensely 
improved. However, there are a number of practical con-
siderations. Understanding how security and health actors 
exist across operational cultures and power dynamics, as well 
as relevant interests and capacity requires long term vision, 
investment in developing sectoral and partnership capa-
bilities, and sophisticated political and policy frameworks.  
Partnerships between health and security are not un-
common across a whole range of important areas, from res-
ponding to road trauma and countering domestic violence 
through to disaster response and containing biological 
threats. But these partnerships are often undocumented and 
unrecognised and therefore underexplored and under-
appreciated. While The Lancet series shed new light on the 
relationships between health and security, it didn’t explore 
the potential scope and application of partnerships between 
security and health in responding to an expanded suite of 
threats. It didn’t unpack, expand, or challenge current dis-
courses around concepts of health-security.  
Concepts of health and security 
For many governments around the world, recent infectious 
disease outbreaks such as Ebola and COVID-19 have 
heightened awareness of ‘health-security’ interactions that 
involve both incident management, politics and actions 
designed to prepare for, and respond to, biological threats – 
a process that can be narrowly defined and contested with 
respect to roles and responsibilities. At various times and 
through different lenses and institutions, ‘health-security’ 
has had a range of different meanings, from the threat of 
antimicrobial resistance on global human health to the 
morbidity and mortality implications of non-communicable 
diseases for fragile health systems (Stoeva 2020). But the 
idea of health as a security issue takes on much broader 
dimensions and implications as elaborated by the original 
United Nations construct of health as the key pillar of 
human security (Chiu et al. 2009).  
Human security itself is explicitly linked to the funda-
mental ‘right to health’ first articulated in the 1946 
Constitution of the World Health Organisation. It ensures 
that health-security directly interfaces and grapples with  
the often daily challenges of sustaining access to adequate 
food, water and shelter against a backdrop of climate 
degradation, conflict and issues of agency, empowerment 
and governance. In many cases, health issues can result in 
acute population health crises which, when under a com-
bined ‘health-security’ rubric can translate into and gain 
traction. The notion of ‘health’ as a construct of national 
security often sits very uncomfortably within the security 
sphere (Bernard 2013). There are many public health actors 
who believe that using health as a construct of security 
legitimises authoritarian restrictions to such fundamental 
aspects of human life as the right to freedom of movement, 
as occurred with protests about prolonged Pacific States of 
Emergency in countries such as PNG and Vanuatu. This 
wariness plays into the often fundamental distrust that exists 
between a government and the people in the context of how 
‘security’ is enacted.  
So while there are potentially multiple definitions and 
conceptualisations of health-security, this paper explores 
the two-way interactions that view health as a construct of 
security, and security as a construct of health. This more 
systemic understanding is critical to understanding the 
interactions between the two, and how to respond to an ever 
widening range of threats that have both health and security 
implications. There is perhaps no better current opportunity 
for this inter-sectoral work than the Pacific’s Boe Declara-
tion’s expanded security concept that encompasses both 
human and traditional security. The advantage of taking 
into account climate, human, environmental and resource 
security alongside the traditional security threats of trans-
national crimes, cybercrime and cyber-enabled crimes is 
that health and national security truly become a whole-of-
society construct and the responsibility of all to own and 
implement.  
These different security challenges are truly inter-
connected. For example, despite being responsible for only 
.03 per cent of the world greenhouse gas emissions, Pacific 
island communities are amongst the most vulnerable 
societies to the health and security impacts of climate 
change. Increased exposure to acute weather events has 
widespread implications for health and security such as the 
physical impacts of climate change on the safety and 
security of water and food, and the increased risk from 
vector borne and non-communicable diseases (NCDs), the 
latter from impacts on fresh food production (McIver et al. 
2016) and comorbidity. Local food production is entirely 
dependent on both water availability and management just 
as the sustainability of what you catch and farm in the ocean 
is determined by the health and security of the marine 
environment. Extreme climatic events exacerbate clean 
water access in some areas of the Pacific region where many 
rural communities face water insecurity (Chan et al. 2020). 
Actors at the intersection of security and 
health 
Efforts are already underway in many countries in the 
region to articulate whole of government and whole of 
society approaches to the health and security threats 
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relevant to the Boe Declaration. For example, by recog-
nising that environmental and human health are directly 
linked to climate change, many Pacific island countries are 
at the forefront of a new global response to climate through 
promotion of renewable energy targets and highlighting the 
importance of the ocean-climate nexus, particularly on 
fisheries (Government of Fiji 2018). But policies and 
frameworks are only half the battle. Identifying a full range 
of actors that have a stake in, and capacity to act across a 
complex array of intersecting issues is complex, as is 
clarifying what their roles and responsibilities are.  
For example, in recognising that NCDs pose a sig-
nificant threat to health and sustainable development in  
the Pacific, Pacific ministers endorsed the Pacific NCD 
Roadmap at the Joint Forum Economic and Health 
Ministers Meeting in 2014. The NCD Roadmap lays out 
policies, legislation and actions to be taken by a number of 
diverse stakeholders including health, education, trade and 
law enforcement. The NCD Roadmap is also meant to be 
supported by a National Multi-Sector Task Force to oversee 
the implementation of the National Multi-Sector NCD 
Action Plan. A recent review of the programme however 
has highlighted that these leadership and governance 
structures have been either missing or functioning at a 
suboptimal level (Win Tin et al. 2020). 
So herein lies a challenge. How do you identify and 
empower a full range of actors who may see the world 
differently and have different interests to come together and 
support a whole-of-society approach to engagement and 
respond to diverse challenges at the intersection of security 
and health? How do you create a concept of health and 
security where a police commander in the Highlands of 
PNG understands that the high incidence of NCDs in the 
police force and society can create power, security and 
capacity shortfall, if not better addressed? How do you 
design a training package for maritime customs officials 
that improves their biosecurity awareness when they board 
an illegal fishing boat? And, how can you support small 
farm holders and local market managers to maintain food 
production and the supply chains when situations such as 
COVID-19 prevent access to key agriculture production 
materials or risk community transition of the disease? And 
given how interconnected the security and health challenges 
are, how do we ensure our national security strategies and 
their policy and operational responses affecting health and 
security are well integrated? 
Integrating policy responses across a multi-issue 
national security framework and ensuring it draws on  
and accounts for local customary practices, science and 
technology, and public-private partnerships is critical, 
but challenging. In meeting the objectives of the Boe 
Declaration, national security strategy development and 
implementation will require widespread consultation and 
agency collaboration across the cross-cutting threats. It will 
also require bringing stakeholders together who may not 
have seen themselves as part of national security before nor 
would ordinarily work together; this can include health, 
agriculture and infrastructure officials. Developing the 
human resource capacities and core competencies of these 
people is needed to work across the issues that span health 
and security areas. This requires carefully crafted institu-
tional arrangements, and well-resourced efforts. This was 
evident in the establishment of the Pacific Humanitarian 
Pathway that addressed needs for biosecurity, health 
supplies and cyclone relief following Cyclone Harold and 
COVID-19 impacts, last year.  
Building momentum at the intersection of 
security and health 
Advancing whole of government and community approaches 
to health and security in the Pacific region can be facilitated 
by the development of national security strategies that are 
backed by multiple actors. Individual agencies will also 
need to invest in their own capabilities and their under-
standing of how their areas of interests are affected by the 
actions and interests of other agencies. For example, more 
investment is needed to build the baseline capabilities of 
security actors to understand their role in preparing and 
responding to biological threats, and development of 
training materials that cover subject matter not traditionally 
covered in the police recruit training. Building a level of 
recognition across the security sectors of their critical role 
as partners in supporting health (broadly defined) should 
translate to better health and security outcomes and support 
better relationships across the security–civilian nexus. At 
the same time, bringing in subject matter stakeholders from 
diverse government agencies to consider threats to national 
security will grow understanding, respect, and a sense of 
shared responsibility for the national security strategies that 
are owned by a collective rather than being the purview of 
a select few. 
Building these capacities across the various systems will 
take time but it will be a worthy exercise over the coming 
years. There are already some efforts underway to meet the 
professional and academic capacities required to enhance a 
multidisciplinary approach to intersecting issues that cut 
across both health and security challenges. The Fiji National 
University and the Australia Pacific Security College at 
ANU, guided by a regional industry advisory committee of 
health and security sector officials from the region is 
developing a Security and Health course for students and 
professionals working across core areas of health and 
security. The course will combine academic interrogation 
and operational perspectives from the field and is being 
designed to explore the intersection of health and security in 
the Pacific region. The course also seeks to advance subject 
matter knowledge with opportunities to grow multi-
disciplinary and multi-agency partnerships, collaborations 
and networks that support both health and security outcomes. 
Conclusion 
Health is placed at the forefront of security and ushers in 
multiple opportunities to respond to the critical issues 
facing the region and indeed the globe. It also demands 
a re-envisioning of how we develop national security 
strategies which need to address mounting health 
security issues, and critically consider who needs to be 
involved beyond the traditional security sector. Investing 
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in the development of people and the range of sectors 
from which they come is required now to ensure the Boe 
Declaration is enabled through multi-stakeholder col-
laborations to develop action and institutions that can 
deliver positive and shared outcomes at the intersection 
of health and security for the Pacific.  
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Security issues for women and children  
in Papua New Guinea 
Philip Gibbs and Lorelle Yakam, Divine Word University, Papua New Guinea 
Recently a woman at a protest caused a stir by carrying a 
placard reading ‘PNG is not safe to live as a female’. She 
was drawing attention to the fact that in Papua New Guinea, 
women and children endure shockingly high levels of 
family and sexual violence, with rates of abuse estimated to 
be among the highest in the world outside of a conflict zone. 
Between 2007 and 2016, Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) 
treated 27,993 survivors of family and sexual violence in 
the country (Médecins Sans Frontières, 2016) and findings 
from the 2016–18 Papua New Guinea Demographic Health 
Survey (PNG DHS) reported that 63 per cent of married and 
divorced women interviewed have experienced physical, 
sexual, or emotional spousal violence, most commonly 
physical violence (54 per cent), followed by emotional 
violence (51 per cent). An estimated 66 per cent of women 
in PNG are survivors of domestic violence (Human Rights 
Watch, 2019), and at least 200 women die each year from 
violent assaults prompted by witchcraft accusations. 
The vicious assault of athlete Debbie Kaore and the 
violent death of Jenelyn Kennedy, a 19-year-old mother of 
three in Port Moresby in June 2020, saw mass protests 
across the country calling for change. Factors leading to 
Jenelyn’s death included a system that allows underage 
marriage, gender norms that legitimise violence, and the 
failure of the country’s law, justice, and health sectors. 
According to the National Demographic Health Survey, 70 
per cent of women and 72 per cent of men believe that a 
husband is justified in beating his wife if she neglects the 
children or goes out without telling him (50 per cent and 49 
per cent). A cause for concern is the finding that women’s 
experience of spousal violence increases with improved 
education and household wealth. Fifty-five per cent of 
women with an elementary education reported experiencing 
spousal violence, compared with 76 per cent of women with 
a higher education.  
Dulciana Somare-Brash, daughter of former Prime 
Minister Sir Michael Somare, says that for many reasons 
she feels unsafe in her own country.  
No man (or woman) should tell me I’m safe here in PNG 
when I have so little control over everything that 
happens around me and to me, in my world that simply 
means I’m unsafe as a female in PNG (Dulciana 
Somare-Brash 2020).   
Children are also at risk. MSF has found that more than 
half of all MSF consultations for survivors of sexual violence 
were with children, with around one in six with children 
younger than five years. Children also made up one in three 
of all family violence consultations in Port Moresby. One in 
ten adult women reported that the latest incident of sexual 
violence was part of a repeated or ongoing pattern. For 
children, this risk was heightened, with almost two in five 
children experiencing repeated or ongoing sexual violence. 
According to the 2015 Lukautim Pikinini Child Welfare 
Policy, around 75 per cent of children experience physical 
abuse at home. The Office of Public Prosecutor estimates that 
55 per cent of all sexual violence cases dealt with the abuse 
of children under 16 years old.  
Although the country passed a law in 2015 to streng-
then child protection efforts in compliance with the UN 
Convention on the Rights of the Child, implementing 
regulations were incomplete. Customary and traditional 
practices allow marriage of children as young as 12, and 
early marriage is common in many traditional, isolated, 
rural communities. Child brides are taken as additional 
wives or given as brides to pay family debts and used as 
domestic servants. Child brides are particularly vulnerable 
to domestic abuse. 
Security and victims’ services support 
There are family and sexual violence units in police stations 
across the country, designed to provide victims with pro-
tection, assistance through the judicial process, and medical 
care. Police intervention has led to improved services for 
victims of gender-based violence in some provinces, but 
comprehensive services for victims of domestic and sexual 
violence are lacking in much of the country. This lack of 
services, along with societal and family pressure, has often 
forced women back into violent and abusive homes. 
Independent observers have noted that approximately 90 
per cent of women in prison were convicted for attacking or 
killing their husband or another woman. 
For many women, the only safe place to go is to their 
own family, particularly if their parents are still alive or if 
they have a sympathetic sibling. That is not always possible, 
so another possibility in larger towns is a ‘safe house’. 
Human Rights Watch reports that there are five shelters for 
abused women in Port Moresby, which are often so full they 
cannot always accept women in need of counselling and 
shelter. The City Mission administers Haus Ruth in Port 
Moresby and Haus Clare in Lae. City Mission has teamed 
up with World Vision, Childfund, and the PNG government 
to open the first government-certified Children’s Crisis 
Centre in the country so that Haus Ruth serves as the 
combined GBV Women’s Centre and Children’s Crisis 
Centre providing shelter, medical attention, counselling, 
and social services for women and their children. The Crisis 
Centre in Port Moresby also provides short-term residential 
care for orphans, abused children, and those whose parents 
have been impacted by HIV/AIDS.  
NGOs and faith based organisations (FBOs) provide 
safe house facilities in other parts of the country. Oxfam in 
Goroka has taken the lead in providing support for those 
suffering from sorcery accusations, and an Oxfam supported 
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Case Management Centre in Lae provides women affected 
by sexual and family violence with the counselling, support 
and intervention they need to obtain protection and justice. 
Femili PNG runs Case Management Centres in Port Moresby 
and Lae to assist survivors of family and sexual violence. 
Other support centres include: Links of Hope in Port 
Moresby and Mount Hagen which provide support for 
children affected by HIV and AIDS; Human Rights 
Defenders in Simbu Province; Voice for Change assists 
with education and help for victims in Jiwaka Province; and 
Mercy Works provide support services in Mount Hagen, 
Goroka, Simbu, Kiunga, Wewak, and Port Moresby. Allied 
organisations include Cheshire disability services, the 
WeCare Foundation, and the Hohola Youth Development 
Centre in Port Moresby. The Catholic Church has a network 
of small agencies that have been providing temporary 
shelter for battered women, children and victims of  
family and sexual violence in Wewak, Kokopo, Madang, 
Bougainville and Port Moresby.   
Maternal and child mortality rates 
Childbearing in Papua New Guinea is a risky business. The 
Maternal Mortality Rate (MMR) in PNG is considered the 
highest in the Pacific region, with between 215 to over 900 
deaths per 100,000 live births. These figures indicate a 
serious safety situation for mothers in PNG and an urgent 
need to improve maternal health outcomes. Only 56 per cent 
of women in PNG give birth in a health facility, but that 
does not mean the birth is supervised by a skilled birth 
attendant, or that the facility has the necessary skills to 
support a safe birth. Papua New Guinea has the lowest rates 
of skilled birth attendants in the Western Pacific, with an 
estimated 6000 more skilled birth attendants needed to meet 
the global safety standard (WHO 2019). 
The health of some mothers has already been com-
promised by infections such as HIV or syphilis. Among the 
concerns of pregnant women infected with HIV is whether 
they will survive to carry their pregnancy to term and if their 
child will be born with HIV. In the Papua New Guinea 
Highlands, health services have sought ways to ensure that 
infected mothers remain healthy, have a supervised delivery, 
and that their child will not be infected with HIV or syphilis.  
In many cases, facilities lack basics such as running 
water and electricity needed to ensure a safe and sanitary 
environment for giving birth. Many facilities do not have 
refrigerators for vaccines or adequate stock of essential 
drugs or supplies to treat common conditions. In PNG, one 
in every 50 children dies within the first month of life and 
one of every 20 children dies before reaching their fifth 
birthday (PNG DHS 2016–18, 8.1). A survey found that 
only 18 per cent of children aged 6–23 months that live with 
their mothers were fed a minimum acceptable diet in the 24 
hours preceding the interview while 32 per cent of children 
had an adequately diverse diet in which they had been given 
foods from at least five food groups. Only 44 per cent had 
been fed the minimum number of times a day appropriate 
for their age (PNG DHS 2016–18, 11.1.5). 
The survival of infants and children depends in part on 
the demographic and biological characteristics of their 
mothers. The probability of dying in infancy is much greater 
among children born to mothers who are under age 18 or 
over age 34, children born after a short birth interval (less 
than 24 months after the preceding birth), and children born 
to mothers of high parity (more than three children). The 
risk is elevated when a child is born to a mother who has a 
combination of these risk characteristics, which is too often 
the case in Papua New Guinea.  
Safety on public transport 
Women are majority users of public transport and depend 
heavily on these systems for mobility as they often do not 
own or have access to private vehicles. However, there is a 
growing body of evidence that many women simply do  
not feel safe or secure while using public transport. For 
women and girls, sexual harassment and other gender-related 
security issues are important concerns. Harassment covers a 
wide range of behaviours of a threatening or offensive nature, 
from unwanted attention to physical or sexual assault.   
A scoping study conducted by UN Women in 2014 in 
Port Moresby found that more than 90 per cent of women and 
girls experienced some form of violence when accessing 
public transport, including on buses, waiting at bus stops, 
walking to and from bus stops, or in taxis. This includes 
verbal sexual remarks, inappropriate touching, and indecent 
exposure in terms of sexual violence. They are also victims 
of extortion, robbery, threats, or intimidation (UN Women 
2014). In response, special buses have been started in Port 
Moresby and recently in Lae, as part of the Safe Cities 
Initiative. The women-only transportation program began 
exclusively as a free-to-ride service called Meri Seif (Safe 
Woman). A young, female university student comments:  
I feel so safe when I get on the Meri Seif bus, I can easily 
pull out my phone and listen to music and actually make 
a phone call. On the public motor vehicles (PMVs), the 
thieves just walk on, and when they see ladies holding 
their bags, they just grab them or threaten [the women] 
(Women’s UN Report Network 2019). 
From 2014 to mid-2019, the number of Meri Seif buses 
rose from one to 11, the number of routes from one to six, 
and the number of riders from 21,000 to more than 600,000. 
The pilot was so successful that the Ginigoada Foundation 
has started the M-Bus, a pay-to-ride program, to move the 
model toward financial sustainability. 
The program faces hostility from some men, who have 
thrown marbles through bus windows, threatened women 
drivers at knifepoint, and tried to force themselves aboard 
the buses. While no serious injuries have occurred – each 
bus has two male security guards – safe travel around Port 
Moresby remains elusive. In 2018 UN Women trained more 
than 100 PMV drivers, crew members, and operators in the 
importance of safe transport for women. The overall 
message to the drivers was clear: If you had kept women 
safe on your buses in the first place, the city would not need 
women-only transportation. 
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Market place security 
Urban markets are not secure for female traders especially 
in larger towns such as Port Moresby or Mount Hagen. 
Eighty per cent of market vendors are women and over half 
of women market vendors in PNG have to bring their 
children to the market as many of the younger children do 
not attend school. Women and girls are bullied by market 
security, intimidated by police and sexually harassed 
throughout the day. People try to rob vendors on their way 
to the bus stop and they have to contend with unreliable 
public transport as they try to get home. Women even 
refrain from using toilets or other spaces in the markets, 
because they fear being attacked by ‘rascals’or intoxicated 
men and boys who roam the markets.   
Female market vendors suffer from extortion on a 
regular basis. In the absence of police or security guards that 
will protect women and girls, and with high levels of unruly 
and provocative behaviour, women are under pressure to 
pay public nuisances and potential perpetrators of violence 
with their produce or cash for ‘protection’ to avoid 
confrontation or violent incidents. Women vendors who 
have not been able to find space inside the market premises 
or feel safer sitting in the periphery of the markets are 
sometimes forced to pay double fees otherwise they face 
constant harassment and incur other safety and health issues 
by sitting on the side of the road.  
A UN study of markets in Port Moresby, found that 55 
per cent of the women and girls who participated, reported 
that they have experienced some form of violence in the 
markets surveyed (UN Women 2012). Twenty-two per cent 
of female respondents report having experienced more than 
one incidence of sexual violence while in the markets in the 
last 12 months, and 64 per cent of both male and female 
respondents reported witnessing some form of sexual 
violence against women and girls in the markets and 
vicinity. At least 78 per cent of the perpetrators of all forms 
of violence are men, and the large majority are adolescent 
boys or young men. Other common perpetrators of violence 
identified included the police and other market vendors who 
fight for spaces in the market. 
The UN Women Safe City project in Port Moresby,1 
has led to the redesign of the main markets and market stalls 
to make them more open and safer; increased access to 
clean drinking water, and improved sanitation and safety of 
toilet blocks. Such improvements in the capital city remain 
only a dream for vendors in provincial towns such as 
Goroka, Kundiawa, Wabag and Mendi. Despite markets 
becoming safer and the widespread campaign against 
violence, the lack of safety of women and girls outside 
markets is still a major issue. 
Safety when trekking to school 
Security issues also affect many children as they head to 
school. Some children travel by boat or canoe which can be 
treacherous in bad weather. Others need to cross fast-
flowing rivers each day. Bridges in the area are made of 
narrow tree logs, and rainfall makes them slippery. At 
times, the log bridges are completely washed away, or the 
road is badly damaged, making it difficult for children to 
attend school safely. 
When children at Ambullua in the Jiwaka Province 
were asked for ideas to make the bridge they had to cross 
safer, they suggested the construction of an iron foot bridge, 
but recognised that the limited road network servicing 
Ambullua would make it impossible to transport iron into 
the community. As an alternative, they suggested strength-
ening the bridges with additional logs, ropes, and bamboo, 
and to ensure that bridges are replaced as they start to 
deteriorate or when safety issues are reported (McKenna et 
al, 2020). 
The long trek to school is illustrated well in a film by 
Raphael Lauer, ‘Most Dangerous Ways to School’ (Lauer 
2015). The children in the film walk seven days across the 
Papuan Plateau from Mount Busavi to attend school in 
Moro in the Southern Highlands Province. 
Safety issues also surround children living in urban 
areas, who walk to school every day in some very dang-
erous suburbs. For instance a four year old girl living in East 
Taraka, one of the most dangerous suburbs in Lae, Morobe 
Province, walks for 45 minutes to school every day 
(Gabana, n.d.). Some children walk long distances to catch 
one or more buses or public motor vehicles (PMVs) every 
day (World Vision Australia, n.d.). Concerns around 
children’s safety on the road and catching PMVs have 
increased in the urban centres especially since road deaths, 
accidents, and crime rates have increased (World Bank 
2014; Road Traffic Authority 2019).  
Women’s security, land and logging   
Land gives local people a sense of security, identity and 
belonging. Spiritually they identify with the land as part of 
their history; their ancestors who are buried on their land 
provided villagers with their songs, masks, dances, magical 
spells, clans, and certain species of taro, bananas, and pigs. 
Matthias Lopa from Pomio summarises: 
if we give our land away, or if someone has taken it 
through commercial means, then we come to realise that 
our life is taken away and our sense of connectedness is 
disturbed because land is our life. The graves of our 
ancestors give us a sense of belonging. If that land is 
taken away for 99 years, then we become nobody (Gibbs 
and Lopa 2019). 
While it is often thought that 97 per cent of PNG’s total 
land area remains under the customary ownership of the 
local indigenous people. This is no longer true. The PNG 
Land Act (1996) contains provisions that enable the state to 
lease land from customary landowners and then lease it 
back to other persons or organisations. In the eight years 
from 2003 to 2010, almost ten per cent of PNG’s total land 
area was alienated from its customary owners and trans-
ferred to private companies through this lease-leaseback 
scheme. The leases came to be known as Special 
Agricultural Business Leases (SABL) and more than five 
million hectares of customary land have been alienated in 
over 70 leases to landowner companies associated with 
some rather dubious ‘development partners’, most of whom 
appear to be logging or oil palm companies. 
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This alienation of customary land is having a very 
negative impact on women, most particularly in the New 
Guinea Islands region. Women report increasing domestic 
violence, teenage pregnancy and drug abuse in their com-
munities as logging and oil palm plantations have moved in 
(Cannon 2020). Traditionally, women, particularly in matri-
lineal societies, have been the stewards of the land and passed 
it down to their children, but are now sidelined in discussions 
about land ‘development’. In their Country Gender assess-
ment of agriculture in the rural sector of PNG, the Food and 
Agriculture Organization (FAO), reported:  
While women typically have user rights to cultivate 
land, gather forest products and fish or collect marine 
resources, they rarely hold ownership rights or have 
associated control over productive resources. This tends 
to be the case regardless of whether an inheritance 
system is patrilineal or matrilineal (FAO 2019:17).  
Security and elections 
Papua New Guinea is one of four countries in the world 
without any elected female representatives currently in 
Parliament. In the last election no women were elected to 
the 111-seat Parliament, and only five per cent of candidates 
were female (167 of 3332). This is indicative of the barriers 
and security issues women face in participating fully in the 
political process. There are threats of violence throughout 
the country with regional variation but most often through-
out the Highlands region, where elections are notably more 
violent and entrenched cultural norms are reinforced by the 
highly patriarchal society. In the last election 40 people 
were killed, including four police officers. Election related 
violence occurs in both the public and private spheres with 
female voters facing direct threats of violence not only at 
the polls, but also threats of divorce and abandonment at 
home. When women have access to the polls the men in 
their families instruct them on who to vote for (Haley, N 
and K Zubrinich 2018). 
Women, reportedly ranging in age from 13 to 29, in 
some places called ‘coffee ladies’ will moonlight as sex 
workers in political campaign houses (sometimes referred 
to as ‘animal houses’) during the electoral period in 
exchange for money or food and in some cases, families 
will encourage young girls to provide sexual services in 
exchange for votes (Gibbs 2009). The use of voting as a 
marker for family loyalty is prevalent and can cause conflict 
in a woman’s life if a member of her and her husband’s 
family is contesting. If she votes against her relative, she 
may be disowned by her own family. Interviewees also 
report that those who vote against their family face gossip 
and shaming on social media from other members of the 
community. Voice for Change, an NGO focusing on 
combating violence against women in the Highlands, has 
reported that supporters of female candidates face threats, 
physical violence, and property damage from supporters of 
rival candidates. To increase the security of female voters, 
there have been recommendations that the Papua New 
Guinea Electoral Commission (PNGEC) ensure that there 
are separate polling compartments as well as lines for men 
and women with some distance between them to ensure that 
women have secrecy of the ballot and are not influenced at 
the polling stations.  
Conclusion 
Women and children in Papua New Guinea face a range of 
institutional and domestic security issues. Government 
departments such as the Department of Justice and Attorney 
General, non-government organisations and faith-based 
bodies seek to aid those affected and to bring about change. 
However, throughout the nation, security concerns such as 
domestic violence, sorcery accusations, maternal and child 
mortality, intimidation in elections and disempowerment of 
women at logging sites remain major issues. Perpetrators 
continue with few repercussions. Papua New Guinea 
remains a very dangerous place for women and children.  
Notes 
1  Develops, implements, and evaluates tools, policies and 
comprehensive approaches on the prevention of and response 
to sexual harassment and other forms of sexual violence 
against women and girls across different settings. 
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Improving the security of women and children: A personal reflection 
Lilly Be’Soer Kolts, Voice for Change, Papua New Guinea 
Almost fifteen years ago, my family was internally displaced due to ongoing tribal fights spanning decades that destroyed both 
property and life in my husband’s home in the Western Highlands Province. As a professsional couple with children and a 
successful small business, we refused to contribute cash towards the purchase of guns to arm my husband’s tribesmen so they 
could take revenge. Our stand against violence put us in harm’s way. We were forced to leave my husband’s village and resettle 
our family on my own tribe’s land, in what is now Jiwaka province.  
During my marriage, my husband and his community pressured me to give birth to a son, especially after I had given birth to five 
daughters. My sixth and last child was, finally, a son. Thirteen years ago, my husband deserted me and our six children, who I 
then raised as a single mother, working as an agricultural officer and teacher. Through my work I came to know there are too 
many women like me, who need information and guidance to ensure access to justice, to empower themselves to achieve financial 
independence and provide for their children. To begin to address women’s needs and create a better society for them in 1996 I 
started a local women’s rights NGO called Voice4Change (VfC).  
I am the proud mother of five beautiful daughters who I have raised to be safe, strong and secure – to be who they want to be and 
to become financially independent. They have played an integral part of VfC’s journey – its development and growth, challenges 
and achievements. My daughters have always helped since they were small, and are now part of our team and, with their peers, 
will shape the future of Jiwaka’s women and girls’. 
Lilly Be’Soer, personal account 
Protecting women’s rights  
It has taken the government of PNG almost four decades to 
translate the basic rights of citizens into policies, laws and 
strategies. It was not until the 2000s that PNG pushed  
law reform efforts that promote gender equality through 
parliament. PNG has now updated and expanded the defin-
ition of rape; criminalised marital rape through amendments 
to the Criminal Code (2003); established the Family Pro-
tection Act of 2013 which improves access to justice and the 
protection and support for victims of domestic and family 
violence; and more recently, criminalised the act of alleging 
a person is practicing sorcery thereby exposing the ‘accused’ 
to extrajudicial judgement and cruel and inhuman treatment. 
Effective implementation of these laws is not yet guaranteed.  
Family Support Centres in hospitals and Family and 
Sexual Violence Units in police stations that were initiated 
by NGOs in Morobe, Simbu and the National Capital 
District in the early 2000s, are now mandatory across PNG. 
The refinement of policies, protocols and procedures has 
been supported by multilateral and bilateral development 
partners, mainly the United Nations and the Government of 
Australia, but the quality of policies remains uneven across 
PNG’s 22 provinces.  
Accountability for women’s and children’s 
safety 
PNG’s ten year National Strategy to prevent and respond to 
Gender Based Violence (GBV) (2016–25) forces account-
ability on provincial governments to prioritise, plan and 
adequately budget for better coordinated multisector action 
towards ending violence against women. Halfway into the 
strategy’s implementation timeframe, only the National 
Capital District has developed and funded its own strategy. 
The Governor of National Capital District, together with  
the UN in PNG, has launched a campaign to convince the  
 
 
governors of all provinces that ending violence against 
women and girls must be a priority in provincial devel-
opment planning and budgeting.  
International NGOs have supported some local NGOs 
working to promote gender equality, but too often these 
partnerships are confined to channeling funds to a selective 
few partner agencies rather than working to grow a provincial 
or national movement. The few resources that trickle down 
to local GBV organisations and services are extremely 
limited.  
In a number of PNG’s provinces, the contribution of 
local civil society has been very important – particularly in 
adopting a rights-based and just gender approach to local 
level GBV prevention and response. NGOs in the Eastern 
Highlands, East New Britain and East Sepik provinces, for 
example, established initiatives and services to end violence 
against women well before PNG reformed its laws to address 
Violence Against Women (VAW). With very minimal 
resources, they have designed and delivered campaigns to 
shift community norms and have also trained traditional and 
elected community leaders as well as the police, village court 
personnel and key staff of the responsible government 
agencies. 
The challenge to end violence in the 
Highlands region 
PNG’s limited, available data suggests that GBV is more 
common and severe across the Highlands region and worse 
where there is enduring tribal conflict. PNG’s Highlands 
region was only opened up to colonial administration and 
the establishment of health and education services in the 
1950s, just 25 years before PNG gained independence in 
1975. Initially, PNG’s slow shift towards norms and laws to 
promote gender equality and an end to violence against 
women and girls had less impact on the enduring patriarchal 
traditions of the Highlands region.  
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By the mid-1990s, Simbu and the Eastern Highlands 
provinces had established strong local women’s rights 
organisations and links with Pacific regional and global 
feminist movements and networks. In the ‘new’ province of 
Jiwaka, the local NGO, VfC, has helped the local population 
catch up with rights-based iniatives to end VAW similar to 
Simbu and Eastern Highlands provinces. Together these 
three provinces have established a Highlands regional net-
work of women human rights defenders – a groundbreaking 
and unique inter-provincial movement to protect women’s 
rights. The network’s impact on improving the security of 
women and girls is largely limited to three of a total seven 
provinces in the Highlands region that despite their wealth 
from extractive industries lag far behind in protecting 
women and girls from violence. Resource wealth has not 
translated into a better deal for women (Cox 2019). 
The status and security of women in Jiwaka 
In Jiwaka, as in all other Highlands provinces, women are 
expected to allocate their labour and earnings to the needs 
of their family and tribe. Most women feel compelled to 
work hard continuously contributing their time, food and 
money to meet the many cultural and social obligations in 
the expectation that this will guarantee their safety and 
security.  
A woman perceived to be obedient and ready to support 
her male relatives in fulfilling their social and customary 
obligations is allocated land to cultivate crops. She can use 
this land freely while her biological father is still living. But 
if her father dies, in most cases she can lose the right to use 
the land as the land technically belongs to the men in her 
family. 
Independent incomes and control over their own 
earnings are vital to women’s choices, empowerment and 
security. Jiwakan women’s incomes are earned mainly 
through the production and sale of fresh produce at the local 
markets. Fresh food trading at local markets makes up the 
bulk of the Highlands region’s informal economic activity 
and income and most households depend heavily on 
incomes women earn through informal trade. Women who 
are denied access to land have to earn cash by buying from 
other women farmers/producers to resell in local markets. 
During the recent COVID-19 lockdown and the closure of 
markets, all women traders were severely impacted with 
resellers the hardest hit. Their livelihood was stopped and 
their children went hungry.  
The most serious security issue faced by women and 
girls in Jiwaka is the violence that results from patriarchal 
norms that undervalue their labour and productivity and 
deny them full citizenship and fundamental human rights. 
Entrenched beliefs regarding women’s inferiority normalise 
many different forms of violence against them. Women and 
girls’ fear of violence is a pervasive, ongoing problem that 
undermines their daily security and wellbeing. 
The most terrifying experience for women in Jiwaka is 
the violence that results from being labelled a practicing 
sorcerer. Sorcery Accusation Related Violence (SARV) 
frequently occurs in Jiwaka and other provinces of the 
Highlands region. Sorcery allegations are most often inten-
tionally fabricated by the accusers motivated by revenge or 
wanting to deflect blame from themselves or coveting a 
vulnerable woman’s land or property. The consequences, in 
their mildest forms, of alleging that a woman, and less 
frequently a man, is practicing sorcery are stigma, exclusion 
and banishment. But these days, SARV more frequently 
leads to abduction, public mob trials, and torture that is 
barbaric, sexualised and often fatal. Conducted mostly with 
impunity, these violent actions send a chilling message to 
all women and girls about their ongoing vulnerability. PNG 
law now criminalises persons who accuse others of prac-
ticing sorcery, but law enforcement and justice are too often 
far away, under-resourced and ambivalent about any inter-
vention to rescue innocent women and girls.  
PNG has yet to develop accurate, updated national and 
provincial data and trends on VAW. In Jiwaka, leading 
advocates and practitioners believe that women are 
increasingly dying at the hands of their partner or the extra-
judicial, mob actions of their communities.  
When a woman is the victim of violence or threats, the 
solidarity and support of male members of her family can 
make a difference. If she has the strong and committed 
support of men in her immediate family, she is more likely 
to seek justice and successfully navigate each long and 
difficult step towards achieving a positive outcome. But the 
support of kin is not always guaranteed.  
Jiwaka’s home-grown organisation for 
change 
VfC was established in 1996 to focus on Women’s 
Economic Empowerment and to strengthen women’s food 
crop production and ‘own account’ management. By 2004, 
the organisation’s leaders realised that programs to end  
violence against women and address violent conflict 
between tribes must be implemented parallel to Women’s 
Economic Empowerment programs.   
In 2013, VfC applied and won a highly competitive, 
three-year UN Trust Fund grant to end VAW. VfC was one 
of just 11 successful organisations out of total of more than 
2000 applications. The grant enabled community outreach 
to inform and educate people on the importance of working 
towards the achievement of equality and peace as integral 
parts of building a prosperous new province. In 2020, VfC 
has worked mainly across the North and the South Waghi 
Districts of Jiwaka Province, engaging with communities in 
32 council ward areas through their respective elected 
councillors (ward members). VfC’s Livelihoods Program 
has been directly working with women farmers to boost 
their agricultural production, to find markets and to gain 
control over their own incomes.  
VfC has also developed a program for young women, 
so that they know their rights and can develop their social, 
economic and political potential. In 2016, VfC surveyed 
more than 1000 girls in Jiwaka who were not attending 
school. Eighty per cent of the 1300 girls surveyed lacked 
the financial support needed to pay their school fees as well 
as emotional support. When they don’t make it to grade 11 
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they are labelled as failures, stigmatised and obliged to 
work hard to support their self-supporting mothers.  
Some young women are forced to get married. Families 
assume that the young woman will ultimately ‘belong to 
another man’ through marriage and will move to the 
husband’s place and work on his land. She will be told 
‘yu blo narepela man’ (you belong to another man); as if to 
affirm that she has no long-term status or belonging in her 
birthplace.  
Access to markets is an ongoing challenge for Jiwakan 
women – most of whom are farmers in rural communities. 
A lack of proper market infrastructure and reliable roads to 
remote, rural areas severely undermines women’s oppor-
tunities to earn sufficient income to support their families. 
VfC’s livelihoods program includes an informal savings 
and loans scheme that husbands and brothers cannot 
appropriate. With independent financial resources, women 
are more able to access justice including paying village 
court officials to hear their complaints about spousal 
violence, and – as is often demanded – for the woman to 
repay her ‘brideprice’ paid by the groom at their wedding 
in order to secure a divorce.  
Gender-based violence response desks  
VfC initially focused on the prevention of VAW, but when 
women and their families became aware of their human rights 
and the existence of state laws to protect them from violence, 
there was an overwhelming demand for hospital and police-
based services for survivors, as well as complementary para-
legal, crisis counselling and safehouse services.  
VfC has established three GBV Response Desks, two 
in South Waghi District and one in North Waghi, to provide 
GBV survivors with paralegal services, referrals to the 
police and courts, emergency and long-term crisis-coun-
selling and local safe house emergency accommodation. 
VfC has also piloted a safe house project in one community 
where women and girls seeking safety and security during 
periods of family or community conflict find solace and 
comfort, have access to an on-site counsellor, and health 
care is available through a partnership with a large and well-
run mission hospital. 
Women and girls who present at the GBV Response 
Desks are rapidly assessed to ensure their safety but the 
safety of survivors and staff navigating what can be a slow-
moving referral pathway is an ongoing challenge that 
requires courage and resilience on behalf of clients and staff 
alike. Many women lack the familial support needed to see 
justice through to fruition and are often forced by their 
family to withdraw complaints against their perpetrators. 
VfC staff accompany survivors to the court, where they are 
often exposed to verbal abuse and threats from perpetrators 
and their supporters.  
Community action 
Leaders in three communities have translated national 
commitments to end GBV into community action. The 
Warawau, Jima and Dambex communities have adopted 
bylaws that have proved effective in local VAW prevention 
and response and that align well with the relevant con-
stitutional principles and state VAW laws of PNG. 
Independent reviews and evaluations of VfC’s pro-
grams have confirmed that people feel ownership of, and 
commitment to, their community VAW bylaws, which they 
have developed over a long period of inclusive community 
education and consultation with members. While many 
challenges remain, there is definitely great improvement in 
the attitudes and behaviour of many men and boys towards 
women and girls in their communities.  
VfC has used its links with Pacific NGO networks to 
sponsor intensive training for Jiwaka’s police and health 
workers to help them better understand gender equality and 
deepen their commitment in making safety nets effective for 
Jiwaka’s for women and girls.  
VfC draws most of its support from the local com-
munity, regional networks of women’s rights organisations 
and a few international development organisations that have 
enabled institutional strengthening. The group has bene-
fitted from being part of a Pacific network of organisations 
working to end violence against women, coordinated by the 
Fiji Women’s Crisis Centre.  
VfC has also enjoyed many years of financial and 
technical support from international development agencies, 
including the International Women’s Development Agency 
where we enjoyed a beneficial, six-year partnership. From 
its original small, thatched roundhouse office, VfC has 
grown into a campus for residential training on women’s 
rights and ending VAW.  
Conclusion 
Many PNG women still lack information and support across 
all key sectors affecting their lives. They need more inform-
ation on health, markets and business development. Too 
many women still lack access to justice. PNG laws to 
prevent violence against women and girls exist but ensur-
ing police protection and access to justice are still 
extremely challenging for all and especially for remote, 
rural women.  
PNG’s National GBV strategy obligates the provincial 
government to develop its provincial plan and budget but in 
reality, VfC is the de facto lead implementer. VfC programs 
and services are doing much to prevent conflict and vio-
lence in contemporary Jiwaka province. They make a 
significant difference to gender equality, development and 
peace and also have much to give to other Highlands 
provinces such as Hela, where large scale oil and gas 
industries have exacerbated conflict and violence and 
neglected to support the formation of a home grown 
women’s rights organisation (Cox 2019).  
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Land and social security in Samoa 
Penelope Schoeffel, Tiffany Arthur and Malama Meleisea, National University of Samoa 
Introduction 
Remittance behaviour among overseas Samoans and cere-
monial contributions by most Samoans to major family 
occasions, can, to a large extent, be understood as a security 
measure. We argue that Samoans perceive their customary 
land as a social safety net, rather than an economic asset. 
Remittances secure their rights in family land and in the 
village to which the land belongs and, we suggest, the value 
of customary land to customary owners has less to do with 
its importance for economic development as proposed by 
the government of Samoa and its development partners – 
and more to do with the way in which customary lands, and 
the villages and chiefly titles those lands belong to, uphold 
personal and family identities and a sense of social security 
for Samoans at home and abroad. Thus a significant motiva-
tion among overseas Samoans who remit money to help 
support their village families and traditional obligations is 
that those families are their ‘place-holders’ in villages 
throughout Samoa. Remittances are the primary means to 
affirm and secure the rights of Samoan migrants to their 
social identities and to a place of belonging (fa’asinomaga).  
Samoa comprises eight islands totalling a land area of 
2830 square kilometres (1093 square miles), with a local 
population almost exclusively concentrated on the two 
bigger islands of Upolu and Savai’i. Samoa’s population is 
approximately 200,000, mainly indigenous Polynesians. 
Samoa’s diaspora greatly exceeds its resident population – 
with 182,721 people identifying themselves as Samoan in 
New Zealand in 2018 and in 2011 55,849 people in 
Australia identifying themselves as being of Samoan 
ancestry. In 2012, there were 180,000 people of Samoan 
descent in the USA, including people from the territory of 
American Samoa. In total it is estimated there are 417,849 
overseas Samoans, at least 300,000 of whom originate from 
independent Samoa. All persons of Samoan ancestry are 
eligible to become citizens of Samoa. 
Before the impact of COVID-19 the nominal GDP was 
$US844 million – and expected to grow by three per cent in 
2020. Tourism was an expanding sector accounting for 25 
per cent of GDP in 2019 (ADB 2019). Like other Pacific  
island countries, Samoa is highly vulnerable to natural 
disasters and other economic shocks. The latest Human 
Development Index ranked Samoa at the low end of ‘high 
human development’ with an overall ranking of 111 out of 
164 countries (UNDP 2019). In 2017, Samoa had an annual 
remittance inflow of $US 40 million and in 2018 remittances 
contributed to 16.4 per cent of the GDP (Connell 2015).  
Land tenure 
Around 80 per cent of land in Samoa is under customary 
tenure although most of the first class agricultural lowlands 
were alienated 150 years ago, leaving the rockiest land, 
hinterland forests and steep mountains as village land for 
use of constituent ‘aiga (extended family) and matai 
(extended family chief). Throughout the 19th century, 
political conflicts in Samoa were magnified by the arrival 
of relatively large numbers of foreigners who become 
entangled in the historic rivalries between the traditional 
political factions for supremacy over leadership (see Gilson 
1970 for a detailed history of this period). By the 1850s 
foreign settlers had begun to acquire land, and during the 
intermittent civil wars over the next 40 years warring 
factions sold parcels of land in exchange for guns, cash  
and other goods. By the 1880s land claims by foreigners 
amounted to about twice the area of the whole country, as 
Samoan leaders had sold the same areas of land to many 
foreign buyers (Meleisea 1987). The dubious nature of 
many land transactions and the massive extent of land 
claimed by foreigners led to the establishment of a Land 
Commission under the General Act signed at Berlin in 
1889, comprising members nominated by each of the three  
powers with claims in Samoa – Germany, United States of 
American and Great Britain. The Commission dismissed 
most of the land claims, but validated others – notably the 
extensive claims by the German Planation Company.  
After independence in 1961, Samoa’s constitution 
established that Samoan land cannot be sold or mortgaged 
in accordance to Article 101 (2), but it has been possible to 
lease customary land under the Alienation of Customary 
Land Act 1965. About 80 per cent of the total land area of 
Samoa including most village land remains under custo-
mary tenure. Only 14 per cent of land is classified as ‘first 
class agricultural’ land (Ward and Ashcroft 1998:22–25) 
most of which is government or privately owned. Custo-
mary land usually includes steep forested mountains and 
gullies, lava fields, and hilly, stony, but cultivable land. 
Land boundaries are mostly unregistered and matai, 
families and villages decide on who has authority over, and 
the rights to use, land.  
Disputes regarding customary land or land boundaries, 
as well as appointment of matai or succession to matai 
titles, are extremely common and dealt with by the Land 
and Titles Court which remains much as it was since first 
established by the German colonial administration in 1903 
(Meleisea and Schoeffel 2016). Research by O’Meara 
(1995) demonstrates clearly that customary land tenure no 
longer conforms to the principles that prevailed in the 19th 
century. Under prevailing customs in the precolonial period 
until the late 19th century, the highest ranking chiefs of 
large lineages allocated and re-allocated user rights to land 
and retained authority over the land regardless of who was 
actually using it. This flexible system both upheld the 
importance of the high chiefs and made sure everyone had 
access to resources according to their needs – well suited  
to a subsistence economy. O’Meara’s (1995) detailed 
research and our own observations show that although most 
Samoans, including overseas Samoans, believe this system 
still prevails, but people’s actual beliefs and behaviour often 
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do not match those principles. Most people believe the 
customary land they occupy is the property of their 
immediate family – often a nuclear family – and consider 
only children of present landholders will inherit user  
rights to the land. Claims to land by individuals and their 
immediate family is visibly demonstrated by the trend in 
villages for people to fence off not only agricultural land but 
also residential areas of land with chain wire fences and 
gates. Another device for the assertion of individual 
property rights is the location of graves. It is not unusual to 
see a grave or two located right in the middle of an area of 
unoccupied land, signaling that the land is thought to belong 
exclusively to the immediate descendants of the person or 
persons buried there (Meleisea and Schoeffel 2016). This 
can create uncertainty about land security and raise social 
tensions. 
Socioeconomic trends in villages  
A recent study suggests there has been little increase in agri-
cultural production or population growth in rural villages 
since the 1960s despite substantial population growth 
nationally and among Samoa’s diaspora. In 2018–19, 
Arthur (2020) collected data on four villages in Samoa – 
Poutasi, Uafato, Taga and Utuali’i – to make a detailed 
comparison of the same villages in the 1960s (Lockwood 
1971). Arthur found that the increasing integration with the 
market economy over time expected by Lockwood had not 
occurred and agriculture has actually declined, with very 
few families producing for the market. The 2015 Agri-
cultural Survey found that of approximately 28,000 house-
holds in Samoa only 1045 engaged in agricultural pro-
duction largely for sale, but most grew some subsistence 
crops (Samoan Agricultural Survey 2015), providing a 
degree of social resilience in the face of disasters and 
economic downturns.  
Village agriculture has problems with disease and 
damage from pigs, but also from on-going cycles of over-
production, particularly of taro when the market is flooded, 
and shortage when farmers, who have not achieved the 
profits expected, stop planting. Prices then rise, there is 
replanting, then over production once again and prices fall. 
Even crops for which there is a steady demand and good 
prices, such as premium variety cocoa, are affected by the 
desire among village people for a steady, predictable 
income comparable to wages rather than comparatively 
large seasonal payouts. Meleisea‐Ainuu and Schoeffel 
(2016) cite examples of cocoa growing smallholders who 
could easily sell their whole harvest to an exporter for a 
good price in a lump-sum, but refuse to do so, processing 
cocoa beans and hoarding them to sell weekly in small 
amounts for making kokosamoa – cocoa paste used to make 
a popular beverage. This earns much more than selling the 
whole harvest. Some cocoa growers, who don’t rely on 
cocoa income, hoard their processed beans until just before 
the new harvesting season when the shortage of cocoa at 
that time means they can ask twice the usual price. 
As shown in the 2016 census (Samoa Bureau of 
Statistics, 2017) there has been only minor growth in the 
rural population of rural Upolu and the island of Savai’i 
over the past 50 years except in the villages in northwest 
Upolu which are closest to the urban area of Apia where the 
population has increased. Internal migration is facilitated by 
the flexible kinship system that allows people to relocate to 
other villages if they have relatives there and are willing to 
contribute labour or wages. In the absence of social pro-
tections, this provides a social safety net. 
Contemporary debates on the security of 
customary land 
Since the 1990s the Government of Samoa – encouraged by 
the Asian Development Bank and neoliberal reformists – 
has characterised customary land tenure as an obstacle to 
rural development. Less than half of Samoans in Samoa live 
in villages or depend on customary land for their livelihood, 
however, most identify with one or more ancestral villages 
and their extended family wherever they are living. They 
believe they have rights to land if they return to live with 
their kinsfolk in one of their ancestral villages. This is one 
of the underlying reasons for matai title splitting – bestow-
ing the same matai title on two or more or many, in some 
cases hundreds, of holders. By constitutional guarantee, 
customary land cannot be sold and therefore cannot be 
mortgaged, but the Alienation of Customary Land Act 1965 
made it possible to lease land. Non-citizens may not own 
freehold land or hold leases on customary land without 
special permission. The most recent legislation providing 
for leasing of customary land are the Land Titles Re-
registration Act 2008 and the Customary Land Advisory 
Commission Act 2013 which have been met by fierce 
opposition from NGOs and Samoan scholars at home and 
aboard (see for example Iati 2016). The Asian Development 
Bank (ADB) supported a technical assistance project for 
‘Promoting Economic Use of Customary Land’ (ADB 
2017). Under this project measures have been taken to 
improve means to alter the customary land-leasing frame-
work and to set up a database of leased and leasable land, 
with the aim of developing a registry of all customary land. 
These measures allow for the possibility of leasing land to 
non-citizens as well as to citizens. This has triggered 
concerns aired in local newspapers about defending the 
customary land tenure system, and anxieties that foreigners 
are somehow being empowered to take it away from 
Samoans. A group of concerned matai protested to the ADB 
about the project, particularly about insufficient consul-
tations on proposed changes to land laws. Journalist and 
newspaper editor Mata’fa Keni Lesa quotes from the 
concerns the matai raised: 
Land in Samoan culture is regarded as an inheritance 
from God and connected intimately to the matai system. 
… The fear is that if land is lost so will the matai system, 
hence also the culture of Samoa (PIDP 2015).  
Inclusive Development International (IDI), a California-
based NGO, backed these concerns and assisted the matai 
to direct complaints to the Asian Development Bank’s 
office for accountability and legal matters. The issue is also 
being raised again by politicians standing against the 
governing party in the forthcoming 2021 national elections.  
106 Development Bulletin 82 
One of the problems in enabling easier leasing of 
customary land is the question of who has the authority to 
sign leases of customary land for commercial purposes. In 
July 2012, the Samoa Law Reform Commission (SLRC) 
circulated a discussion paper ‘Pule a le Matai Sa’o’ 
(authority of the principal chief) for public consultations. 
The paper was based on research on Samoan custom and 
usage and records of the Land and Titles Court (Meleisea 
2017). A matai sa’o is the head of a family possessing 
authority over members including other holders of titles 
belonging to that family. The matai sa’o is also the principal 
custodian of the customary land appurtenant to his or her 
title. A matai sa’o may accordingly authorise a lease on a 
portion of customary land appurtenant to his title on behalf 
of his ‘aiga and the heirs of his or her title. The discussion 
paper presented nine questions about the authority of the 
matai sa’o, regarding his or her duties and authority; the 
criteria for appointment of a matai sa’o; the issue of 
authority when there are multiple holders of the matai title; 
the authority of the village fono in relation to the authority 
of a matai sa’o; the kind of disputes that arise between a 
matai sa’o and the heirs to the title her or she holds, and the 
service due to a matai sa’o by his ‘aiga. The discussion 
paper also sets out the legislative and practice background 
of the Samoa Land and Titles Court. After public consul-
tation in October and November 2016, the SLRC produced 
a final report (Samoa Law Reform Commission February, 
2017). The report made ten tentative recommendations on 
minimum qualifications for a person to be recognised as 
matai sa’o – suggesting these might be set out in law – or 
at least influence policy and practices of government 
agencies in dealings with Samoan customary matters. Of 
particular relevance is the proposal for a legal residential 
requirement in appointing a matai sa’o – that he or she 
should have resided in Samoa for a least a year prior to 
appointment, and thereafter reside in Samoa for at least one 
third of each year. Of the 700 people who participated in the 
consultations, the majority agreed that residence in Samoa 
was an important responsibility of a matai sa’o. 
Constitutional amendments and Samoan 
custom  
The matter appears to have now been rolled into three 
interconnected bills currently before parliament – the Land 
and Titles Bill 2020, the Constitution Amendment Bill 2020 
and Judicature Bill 2020. These were passed into law by 
Samoa’s current one-party government in December 2020 
after much controversy, including the resignation of the 
Deputy Prime Minister, Fiame Naomi Mata’afa, who 
opposed the legislation. The first will replace the current 
Land and Titles Act 1981, and the second and third remove 
the Land and Titles Court from under its present consti-
tutional umbrella. The new Land and Titles Court thus 
created will have added powers for adjudicating on village 
laws passed by village councils – as well as on customary 
land and matai titles. The court will have its own appeal 
structure, separate from the Supreme Court. These struc-
tures promise Samoa that – 58 years after independence – a 
new Court will give Samoan customs a rightful place in law. 
The Explanatory Memorandum to the Constitution Amend-
ment Bill 2020 poses this question: 
Why is the Samoan Constitution more protective of the 
introduced modern principles such as individual rights, 
as compared to the Samoan custom and usages, the way 
of life of the Samoan people? In a courtroom, why are 
individual rights more powerful than Village Fono 
decisions? The answer is, because the Constitution says 
so.  
This presents an emotional appeal from the government 
that by changing the Constitution they are upholding 
Samoan customs which might be denied by the Consti-
tution, which Prime Minister Tuilaepa has said on many 
occasions, was written by foreigners and addresses Samoan 
custom in only four Articles (100–104). The two Samoan 
institutions addressed in the Constitution are customary 
land and matai titles – specified because of the assumption 
that these institutions, like foundation stones, would be 
long-lasting, whereas customs were not specified because 
they may change over time, as they do in all societies. 
Samoan custom has never been codified. The architects of 
Samoa’s Constitution undoubtedly believed that customs 
would evolve, the Samoans would muddle through, and 
eventually a new consensus would emerge about what is 
customary.  
In founding the Land and Titles Commission (later 
Court) in 1903, German colonial officials wanted to prevent 
the endemic feuds and civil wars of the past by weakening 
the customary authority of adversarial high chiefs and their 
supporters. Over the 51 years since independence there  
has been no attempt to establish a set of principles for 
making decisions regarding disputes over customary land 
that could enhance land and social security. Assuming all 
Samoans know their customs and culture, the Land and 
Titles Court makes decisions on the basis of undefined, 
possibly arbitrary, and often contrary, principles, depending 
on the opinions of those on the Bench. However, as a Court 
of Records, the judges usually uphold previous court 
decisions in relation to a particular title, area of land, or land 
boundary. Other than this, the Land and Titles Court has no 
formal principles to fall back on when making decisions on 
the relative rights of those living on and utilising land and 
others who assert rights to it through a split title, or a 
common ancestor, or relative rights to land between 
members of a land owning family living in Samoa and those 
living overseas.  
The Constitution contained ten provisions for the 
protection of ‘fundamental rights’ (Articles 5–15): the right 
to life; right to personal liberty; freedom from inhuman 
treatment; freedom from forced labour; right to a fair trial; 
rights concerning criminal law; freedom of religion, rights 
concerning religious instruction; rights regarding freedom 
of speech, assembly, association, movement and residence; 
rights regarding property; and freedom from discriminatory 
legislation.  
The new laws have raised many questions in public 
discourse on Facebook and in local media. What Samoan 
customs will the proposed constitutional amendments 
preserve or protect? What will the establishment of a new 
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Land and Titles Court separated from the current judicial 
system achieve? There has been considerable pushback 
against the proposed legislation by the Samoa Law Society 
(see Ey 2020, Meleisea and Schoeffel 2020). Legal opinion 
criticising the Bills argues that if a separate parallel legal 
system for customary law is established, it may remove 
constitutional protections and open the way for village 
councils of chiefs (fono) to act despotically. We should add, 
however, that in Samoa’s current one party parliament these 
Bills will soon become law. 
Conclusion 
Since the 19th century there has been an idea that Samoa is 
economically underdeveloped because of its customary 
land tenure. The most recent manifestation of this idea has 
been the aforementioned ADB project ‘Promoting Eco-
nomic Use of Customary Land’, which, with resulting legis-
lation, provides easier pathways to leasing such land, which 
seem to be the government’s unspoken agenda in passing 
the three new laws. We believe that the evidence of the past 
50 years shows small scale commercial agriculture on cus-
tomary land has not been favoured as an economic option 
by most Samoans on the basis of economic calculations 
rather than obstacles of custom. This is demonstrated by the 
four villages briefly described in this paper. Samoans do not 
treasure their land because of its economic potential, 
although their land does present subsistence and minor 
income earning options for those who need it.  
Land tenure is not an obstacle to rural development in 
Samoa. The obstacles are poor, rocky soil, pests and plant 
disease, climate disasters and low returns. Young men queue 
up for chances to pick fruit in New Zealand and Australia as 
seasonal workers, but have little interest in Samoan village 
agriculture because of these disincentives. There has, how-
ever, been rural development in Samoa. Despite low product-
ivity, every village in Samoa has access to sealed roads, 
reasonably effective transportation services, telecommun-
ications services, radio and television, and nearby education, 
health and police services – a situation resulting from an 
electoral system which favours village electorates and thus 
can strengthen some forms of social security.  
As we have shown, less than half of the population of 
Samoa lives under customary authority, and village popu-
lation and economic growth have stagnated over the past 50 
years. Yet Samoans retain a deep attachment to their ancestral 
villages as part of their identity and security and to the idea 
that village based branches of their families have land they 
could live on if they wished. This is demonstrated by the flow 
of remittances and the strength of public debate at home and 
abroad on leasing customary land; proposed changes to 
chiefly title-holding rules; or changes to the Constitution and 
the Land and Titles Court. Another indicator of the depth of 
attachment to village, land and custom is the extent of 
traditional ceremonial activities, particularly funeral and title 
bestowals, which are conducted on a far more munificent 
scale today than in the past due to money from overseas. 
Many hundreds of Samoans dig deep into their pockets to 
contribute to such ceremonies, and those abroad who can 
afford to, fly home for them. There are thousands overseas  
 
who finance and build village houses and churches they will 
probably never live in or use. Because a person is counted as 
family by giving and serving, recognition of their rights as 
family and as people belonging to a village is maintained. 
This is why thousands of overseas Samoans hold matai titles, 
even though they play no role in village government. The 
reason is security – the thought that whatever happens in 
town or abroad, a Samoan person who has served and con-
tributed to their family and village has a place of belonging, 
a place to return to.  
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666 COVID-19, human security and the plight  
of informal settlements 
Paul Jones, The University of Sydney  
COVID-19 has emerged in the Pacific region not only as a health issue but as a 
potential security crisis for the most vulnerable. Residents living in informal 
settlements face innumerable security challenges in meeting and sustaining their 
basic needs, including securing access to land and housing, clean water, and 
adequate sanitation. In addition, many must mitigate health problems that arise from 
living on flood prone/marginal lands and dealing with natural disasters and climate 
change impacts. The pandemic has elevated residents’ insecurities related to the 
quality of housing, land tenure, social protection systems, and maintaining 
livelihoods. In the short-term, this also includes the inability of residents to meet 
basic COVID-19 social distancing principles and access to clean running water.  
Consequently, the COVID-19 pandemic will have a far-reaching impact on the 
lives and livelihoods of those most vulnerable in Pacific informal settlements, 
further delaying access to basic human rights. Key messages emerge; firstly, for 
communities living in dense informal settlements with limited access to clean water 
and formal healthcare, it is impossible to apply the World Health Organization 
(WHO) ‘middle-class’ preventive measures around hand washing, social distancing 
and other measures. Secondly, a surge in COVID-19 cases in the Pacific and 
globally will have its greatest impacts on those urban residents who are already 
disadvantaged given their already unequal access to health facilities, their existing 
tenuous health, lack of affordable and adequate housing, uncertain land tenure, lack 
of access to basic services, and reduced livelihoods. Thirdly, when considering the 
security of shelters for those in informal settlements, COVID-19 highlights the need 
for refocusing and supporting ‘bottom-up’ models of urban development and urban 
growth in the Pacific.  
By the beginning of February 2021, 11 Pacific Island Countries (PICs), 
namely, the Commonwealth of the Northern Marianas, Fiji, French Polynesia, 
Guam, New Caledonia, Papua New Guinea (PNG), the Republic of the Marshall 
Islands, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Vanuatu and Wallis and Futuna recorded 23,014 
positive cases of COVID-19 and 203 deaths (SPC 2020). While COVID-19 is of 
concern in all PICs, community transmission is a major risk in French Polynesia 
and Guam where cases continue to increase. As of early February 2021, reported 
cases in PNG continued to increase gradually with the virus having been reported 
in half of PNG’s provinces. There remains a major fear of a significant outbreak in 
a country that is resource rich but has limited institutional, management and system 
capacity (McClure 2020). While in comparison to their Pacific neighbors, New 
Zealand and Australia, the number of recorded PIC COVID-19 cases are small, 
PICs have still implemented travel and tourism restrictions by closing borders, thus 
severely constraining international flights, cargo and tourist shipping. Solomon 
Islands is typical of many PICs, having shut down shops, bars and local markets, 
while youth impacted by school closures have migrated back to their home islands 
to ensure the security of their family networks and to access subsistence resources 
(Ride and Kekea 2020).  
With limited testing capacity combined with poor infrastructure and management 
capacity, all PICs have enacted public health emergencies that have resulted in 
lockdowns, school closures, market closures, curfews, and social distancing to contain 
and limit COVID-19 transmission (Bruce 2020). Identified health risks include the 
lack of necessary laboratory equipment to undertake in-country testing. This presents 
a major challenge of access to care if the number of COVID cases spikes. At a broader 
level, the dramatic reduction in tourist arrivals plus impacts from reduced shipping, 
fishing and general trade disruption is having a major impact on the local economy 
and livelihoods (SPC 2020). There has been little attention given to those residents hit 
hardest by COVID-19 and its PIC towns and cities, a trend observed elsewhere in 
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Figure 1: Attempts to close local markets such as those in Port Moresby and Suva have been problematic as 
they are fundamental to sustaining livelihoods and maintaining household cohesion.  
 
Source: Paul Jones
With its high dependency on tourism, the Pacific has 
greatly suffered from border closures and lockdowns, with 
consequences spreading into the overall economy and 
impacting supply chains and job security (International 
Monetary Fund 2020). The contraction of local economies 
means many of the urban poor who are self-employed or 
running small-scale enterprises are struggling to main- 
tain their livelihoods. Globally, declining employment is 
expected to reduce remittances by approximately 20 per 
cent. Excluding PNG, remittance flows in the PICs average 
approximately 10 per cent of GDP with major impacts 
likely to be felt in Tonga where remittances exceed 40 per 
cent of GDP compared to approximately 15 per cent in the 
Marshall Islands and Samoa (International Monetary Fund 
2020). Seasonal workers from PICs unable to work in 
Australia and New Zealand due to border closures further 
impacts on workers and their remittance flows to families. 
Collectively, a reduction in remittances and country-to-
country migration flows will contribute to weakening 
family cohesion and social networks, especially where 
existing ties are already fragile and under stress.  
In addition, reduced economic activity and spending 
will have serious consequences on maintaining and improv-
ing PIC developmental outcomes including their ability to 
achieve the relevant UN Sustainable Development Goals 
(SDGs), particularly SDG 1 that calls for an end to poverty 
in all its manifestations by 2030, and SDG 11 which seeks 
the development of safe and sustainable cities. Given the 
nature of the global economy, it is becoming increasingly 
clear that PICs will continue to see increased economic and 
social disruptions generated from the decline in the trade 
and tourism industries. 
In this setting, the COVID-19 pandemic will have a far-
reaching impact on the urban poor living in dense and 
overcrowded informal settlements. For example, the World 
Health Organization (WHO) recommends that people: 
• clean their hands with water and soap or use an alcohol-
based hand sanitiser; 
• maintain at least a one meter physical distance from other 
persons; and  
• avoid contact with eyes, nose and mouths to prevent the 
spread of COVID-19 (WHO 2020). 
It is impossible for residents of informal settlements to 
apply these ‘middle-class’ preventive measures given that 
they have limited access to clean water and are constrained 
in physical living conditions in terms of both their dwelling 
size and surrounding open space. Population density com-
bined with shared water standpipes and toilets loom as 
major sites of transmission. Many residents also have 
limited financial resources to consistently fund hand sanit-
isers and masks, assuming they are available. In this setting, 
access to soap-based products and good hygiene practices 
are equally important in fighting COVID-19 (Lal, Lucas 
and Slatyer, 2020).  
The Impact of COVID-19 on the security of 
informal settlements  
With over 95 per cent of the total global cases of COVID-19 
concentrated in urban areas, the pandemic will have its 
greatest impact in poor, underserviced and densely populated 
urban areas, namely, informal settlements and slums which 
are estimated to account for approximately one billion 
residents (UN-Habitat 2020a). The residents living in these 
areas include rural-urban migrants, refugees, and the dis-
placed. A 2016 Asian Development Bank (ADB) assessment 
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indicated several key features relevant to the status of 
informal settlements and the current COVID-19 pandemic. 
Firstly, the report indicated that in 2012, some 800,000–
1,000,000 Pacific urban residents lived in informal and 
squatter settlements, as well as native and traditional villages, 
and that by the end of 2015, this number would increase to 
more than one million residents. In the absence of formal 
baseline data on slums and squatter settlements compiled at 
PIC national and regional levels, and noting the continued 
upward trajectory of urban growth and informal settlements 
in the Melanesian capitals of Port Moresby, Honiara, Port 
Vila, and Suva as examples, an estimate of two million 
residents living in some form of urban village is not an 
unreasonable benchmark.  
Secondly, all PIC towns and cities contain to varying 
degrees a mix of urban villages plus formal development, 
with the largest number of informal settlements located  
in Port Moresby where over 50 per cent of the population 
lives in some type of informal urban village (Jones, 
2016).  
Thirdly, the report discussed opportunities to address 
the growing scale and proportion of informal and squatter 
settlements (urban villages) given their increasing number, 
size and density in PICs. The assessment makes clear that it 
is urban residents who experience the greatest insecurities, 
being least able to access adequate land, housing, services 
and infrastructure in PIC towns and cities. 
Finally, the report questions who constitutes the urban 
poor and disadvantaged, including who is increasingly 
moving into informal settlements to seek affordable land 
and housing and challenging both the typology and concept 
of what is an informal settlement and slum in the Pacific.
Figure 2: COVID-19 reporting in the Pacific will bring to the fore the neglected but critical data challenge of what 












Source: Paul Jones 
 
Unfortunately, little urban analytics and baseline data exists 
to understand the process of transformation and change to 
the Pacific urban fabric.  
Whilst the impact of COVID-19 may differ across 
PICs, the underlying characteristics of PICs pose a major 
structural hurdle in dealing with COVID-19. These include 
the small size and proximity/remoteness of PICs; gaps  
in infrastructure provision, and institutional and system 
capacity, especially health systems and land administration 
systems; provision of basic services; existing health and 
workplace safety compliance; high economic vulnerability 
due to limited export base and a high dependence on 
imports; migration and flow of remittances; existing hard-
ship and poverty with low formal social security safety nets; 
and high environmental vulnerability including climate 
change impacts. Whether large or small Pacific islands, 
these challenges are exacerbated by COVID-19 impacts and 
the lack of security will be most visible for those living in 
informal settlements.  
Despite these growing challenges, urban planning and 
management of PIC urbanisation remains weak and largely 
misunderstood and an absence of political will to act 
(Barbara and Keen 2015; Jones 2012). Planning approaches 
remain an inheritance of colonial times and Euro–American 
systems, with little appetite to develop coherent Pacific 
urban planning. Regional policy approaches are dis-
connected from national and city initiatives, resulting in 
good practice knowledge and contextual approaches of 
‘what works’ not being shared. The misalignment of policy 
is exacerbated by planning approaches that fail to support 
the growing number of informal settlements (Jones, 2017). 
In this setting, the impact of COVID-19 on the social, 
economic and cultural dimensions of (1) water supply and 
sanitation, (2) housing and land, and (3) livelihoods, social 
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cohesion and community resilience, highlight the challenges 
residents and households face in accessing and sustaining 
basic goods, services and support and most importantly, their 
overall security.  
1. Water supply and sanitation: The provision of potable 
water and clean sanitation facilities are important given that 
washing hands with a soap, sanitiser and clean water are the 
key tenets of the public health response. Confronting the 
needs of underserviced populations in informal settlements, 
especially those who may share toilets and do not have their 
own water supply, becomes paramount in improving overall 
health security and seeking local solutions for COVID-19. 
Shared water stands, for example, presents risks for social 
distancing such as queuing for water and maintaining 
physical distance. Water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH) 
interventions are often considered purely physical inter-
ventions, often independent of their deeper public health 
role and implications. WASH services are critical elements 
in stopping COVID-19 transmission and maintaining public 
health in underserviced informal settlements.  
Most PICs do not have sufficient handwashing services 
and WASH interventions to improve public health out-
comes have been limited to Suva, Fiji (Lal, Lucas and 
Slatyer, 2020). WASH services may be suspended or 
reduced in operational capacity, put on hold or deferred, or 
affected by a states of emergencies, school lockdowns, and 
border closures impacting those with existing insecurities 
the most. This impact will be further dependent on gender, 
social and kin dynamics, as well as general institutional 
capacity at state and local levels.  
2. Housing and land: Residents living in informal settle-
ments and slums where population densities are high are 
acutely vulnerable to contracting COVID-19 as they live in 
crowded conditions, lack direct household access to water 
and sanitation, and suffer from poor drainage and ven-
tilation. Unlike housing in middle class urban environments 
where mono-functional rooms and spaces are often delin-
eated by physical partitions, housing in informal settlements 
serves many functions including sleeping, cooking, eating, 
washing laundry and a place for general sociality, increase-
ing the likelihood that they will be used by residents suf-
fering from health issues as well as others in the residence.  
The complexity of the spectrum of land tenure arrange-
ments in PICs make it difficult to generalise about land 
tenure security as much of the response will be locally 
nuanced (see, for example, McEvoy, Mitchell and Trundle, 
2019). Where cash or in-kind services are required to pay 
rent to secure ongoing land tenure arrangements or make 
mortgage payments, deferral of payments or renegotiation 
may be requested if residents are unable to meet timelines. 
From a COVID-19 perspective, securing rooms or housing 
for those required to isolate or facing eviction arises as a 
major challenge. It may be unachievable in the urban setting 
requiring a move back to their rural village and home 
islands. In this context, land emerges as a strong form of 
financial and social security for landowners, but as an 
insecurity for the lessee who may have no socio-cultural ties 
or connections to the traditional or communal lands on 
which they live.  
Figure 3: Pre-existing land and financial issues will 
be compounded by COVID-19 if residents are unable 
to meet rent and mortgage payments.  
 
 
Source: Paul Jones 
Where population and housing density of settlements is 
high, the notion of what constitutes a household in informal 
settlements will be fluid as a single dwelling can contain 
more than one household as related residents move between 
houses and share food and sleeping spaces. Households 
may comprise the extended family including grandparents 
or the nuclear family. Thus, understanding the physical 
condition of the dwelling, the size of the house and com-
position of the household are also important in under-
standing household security and the potential implications 
from COVID-19. What these scenarios make clear is the 
tenuous trade-offs residents in informal settlements make 
on a day-to-day basis. In other words, residents are tasked 
with making a home that enables them to access urban jobs 
and educational opportunities, whilst accepting the under-
lying insecurity that may come with informal land and 
housing agreements that are not recognised by the formal 
system (Kiddle 2018).  
3. Livelihoods, social cohesion and community 
resilience: While a small proportion of those living in 
informal settlements may work in government institutions or 
the private sector, the majority work in mini-stalls, operate 
small scale home based entities such as laundries, pre-school 
care or motor repairs, act as suppliers to markets (from 
household gardens), work as market vendors, or simply look 
after the household. COVID-19 in its most basic form attacks 
socio–cultural protocols by enforcing social and physical 
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distancing which impacts on the proximity amongst people 
who live and work in a particular social group and 
community. When mobility restrictions are fragmented or 
stopped, livelihoods and income streams will be hardest hit, 
challenging family and household stability and social 
cohesion. With limited or no access to formal social pro-
tection systems and networks, women who do the bulk of 
unpaid household work whilst engaging in small scale 
economic activities will take the brunt of the burden. In this 
context, COVID-19 will attack the four basic elements 
central to maintaining social cohesion in PICs. These are:  
1. place attachment and development tied to ethnicity and 
kinship;  
2. kin-based social organisation;  
3. land tenure based on customary practices; and  
4. the persistence of subsistence-based household activities, 
such as home gardening, necessary for food security and 
maintaining market orientated trade (Jones 2016).  
With households and social settings in informal settle-
ments at the forefront of experiencing the socio-economic 
impacts of COVID-19, traditional governance, community 
decision-making, and support from informal social protec-
tion systems – as already seen in urban settings – will come 
strongly into play in the absence of limited impact from 
government formal systems. If these norms are not 
effective, the implications will include an upward trajectory 
in domestic violence, most notably in PNG which already 
displays some of the highest rates of sexual and family 
violence in the world (Bruce 2020). 
Despite the weakening of the social organisation of 
informal settlements through urbanisation, informal social 
protection systems such as making space available for 
visiting relatives, minding school children from outer 
islands, sharing food derived from subsistence, and pro-
viding remittances and cash to support family members 
continues to underpin and bind family, household and clan 
solidarity helping constrain poverty levels, maintain access 
to basic goods and services, and keep health, income and 
socioeconomic inequalities at lower levels than what they 
would be without such systems.  
Conclusion  
Security in the Pacific encompasses social protection  
and safety systems, gender discrimination and domestic 
violence, human rights, security of fishing rights and 
economic zones, and cyber and food security among many 
other issues.1 At a national level, for example, in 2017, 
Solomon Islands became one of the first in the Pacific 
region to launch a Women, Peace and Security National 
Action Plan, 2017–2021, addressing women's rights and 
participation in maintaining security and advancing peace, 
and emphasising the States' responsibility for ending sexual 
and gender based conflict and discrimination.  
At the local level, the COVID-19 crisis has revealed the 
depth of gaps in basic services and associated insecurities 
cutting across land, housing, and social protection systems 
facing the most vulnerable communities in informal 
settlements. In PICs, the COVID-19 pandemic is having a 
disproportionate impact on households and communities 
that cannot secure access to potable water, hand cleansers, 
masks, and knowledge of personal hygiene, and cannot 
maintain physical distancing principles. These and other 
socio-economic inequalities are most prevalent in informal 
settlements, thus increasing the risk of disease transmission 
to the wider population.  
While the exact levels of COVID-19 transmission in 
PICs are capped by low testing capacity, unreported cases, 
poor state of national ‘disaster’ response infrastructure and 
borders that are isolated due to distance, it is the impacts of 
COVID-19 on the socio-economic aspects of Pacific life 
that are deepening existing inequalities and insecurities in 
informal settlements. Despite the dearth of published base-
line data on Pacific informal settlements, ongoing land and 
housing insecurities, the tenuous state of livelihoods, and 
low levels of access to basic services and social systems 
pervade urban areas. In this context, the spread of COVID-
19 further constrains the ‘informal’ lifelines necessary to 
support livelihoods and maintain socio-cultural structures 
especially for those in informal settlements. This magnifies 
the inequalities and vulnerabilities in basic human rights, 
highlighting marginalisation, exclusion and gender ine-
quality as well as exposing how reliant PICs have become 
on larger countries outside of the region for their economic 
survival.  
More than ever, notions of security become an all-
embracing concept, with COVID-19 highlighting again the 
need for revisiting models of urban development and urban 
growth in the Pacific. At the household level, security as 
expressed through the condition of physical shelter, land, 
basic services and social support systems, becomes all 
important in sustaining livelihoods, while at the neighbour-
hood level, it is reflected in the physical condition of homes 
and the social mix of communities that influences public 
perceptions of safety, law and order. How do we address the 
insecurities and fundamental issues of urban equity and 
inclusion when many PIC leaders will not address the harder 
issues of imbalanced resource allocation and transparency of 
governance? What do these mean in individual PIC contexts 
where accurate social data on the most vulnerable is missing, 
and lower education levels of residents often only increases 
the spread of misinformation? Collectively, these are all 
threats to human security in the Pacific region.  
In conclusion, the COVID-19 crisis should be used as 
an opportunity to do things differently, focusing on improv-
ing living conditions, particularly housing, services and 
land tenure, whilst at the same time providing an oppor-
tunity to reflect on what has been achieved since the 
introduction of the SDGs and the New Urban Agenda 
(NUA). Central tenets of the potentially transformative 
2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the Sus-
tainable Development Goals (SDGs) as adopted by the 193 
United Nations member states in 2015 was to ensure ‘no 
one will be left behind’ and ‘to reach the furthest behind 
first’ In 2016, the NUA as adopted in Quito, Ecuador, 
confirmed ‘no one will be left behind’ as the leading 
principle in supporting implementation of the SDGs  
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and taking centre stage in renewed efforts to manage 
urbanisation. However, COVID-19 across PICS has 
exposed the problematic nature of implementing these 
‘global to local’ principles in a period when the gap between 
the ‘haves and have nots’ is increasing.  
In respect of the important role of WASH, only the 
Republic of the Marshall Islands, Vanuatu, Solomon Islands, 
and Federated States of Micronesia (FSM), have data on 
hygiene facilities and household handwashing. To achieve 
the objectives of the SDGs and other top down development 
imperatives, COVID-19 has exposed that ‘business as 
normal’ is not good enough. Inevitably, policies and pro-
grams will have more success if driven from the ‘bottom-up’ 
having relevance to community notions of security and their 
priority needs (land, housing, services, livelihoods) rather 
than imposed notions of what is best. Asking the key 
questions of ‘security for whom?’ as well as ‘security of 
what?’ will expose the deeper political and human dimen-
sions of policies, including who is included and excluded in 
urban development processes (Jones 2016, 2017). 
Notes 
1  See, for example, Development Bulletin No. 78 on ‘Urban 
Development in the Pacific,’ and section on Urban Security, 
63–78. 
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Unsettled: Informal settlement living in the Pacific 
Luke Kiddle, Victoria University, New Zealand  
Informal settlements of the Global South are among the 
least prepared for the seismic impact of the COVID-19 
pandemic (Corburn et al. 2020). Secure and adequate 
housing, safe water, toilets, sewers, drainage and waste 
collection are scarce or non-existent; space constraints and 
overcrowding make physical distancing and self-quarantine 
impractical and the rapid spread of infection more likely. 
Violence is often prevalent. Further, informal settlement 
residents, often reliant on precarious wage labour or the 
informal sector, are economically extremely vulnerable 
(Fèvre and Tacoli 2020). The tipping point into extreme 
poverty is easily reached (Ezeh et al. 2017).  
Settings 
In the 1994 Human Development Report the United 
Nations Development Programme (UNDP) broadened the 
notion of security from the protection of the state and its 
border by the military to the protection of individuals from 
a range of threats to wellbeing including chronic hunger, 
disease, repression, and other significant and hurtful 
disruptions (UNDP 1994). The 2012 adoption of General 
Assembly Resolution 66/290 was also a significant 
milestone in the global application of human security. In 
Resolution 66/290 the United Nations (UN) agreed that 
human security is an approach to identifying and addres-
sing ‘widespread and cross-cutting challenges to the 
survival, livelihoods, and dignity of people’. Seven key 
types of insecurity were identified: economic, food, 
health, environment, personal, community, and political. 
The United Nations Human Security Framework also 
promoted three key ‘freedoms’: 
• freedom from fear; 
• freedom from want; and 
• freedom to live in dignity (United Nations Trust Fund 
for Human Security 2016).  
In our region, Pacific leaders have also welcomed a wider 
understanding of security, notably recognising climate 
change in the 2018 Boe Declaration on Regional Security 
as ‘the single greatest threat to the livelihoods, security 
and wellbeing of the peoples of the Pacific’ (Pacific 
Islands Forum Secretariat 2018).  
Pacific populations are increasingly concentrated in 
urban areas. For example, 2018 data show Micronesia was 
69 per cent urban, Polynesia, 44 per cent and Melanesia, 
19 per cent urban with Melanesian urban areas growing 
particularly quickly (UNESCAP 2019a) accompanied by 
a rapid growth of informal settlements. An estimated 20–
45 per cent of those living in Melanesian capitals reside in 
informal settlements (PRIF 2015). Often located in coastal 
areas or on other environmentally marginal land such as 
steep hills and thus very vulnerable to storm events, 
informal settlements are at the forefront of numerous coal-
escing stresses on human security and wellbeing in the 
Pacific. 
Informal settlement health 
A globally-focused literature review of the health of slum 
residents published in The Lancet in 2017 showed that, 
overall, people living in slums have much worse health than 
those living in non-slum urban areas, specifically:  
• inadequate water supply, sanitation, drainage and waste 
collection in crowded environments predisposes res-
idents to diarrhoea and diseases such as typhoid, cholera, 
and hookworm.  
• children are especially vulnerable to diarrhoea, stunting, 
and impaired cognitive development given under-
nutrition, low breastfeeding rates, and poor sanitation.  
• reservoirs and vectors for infectious diseases flourish in 
slum environments.  
• the typically cramped physical and social environment 
of slums exposes residents to harm from fire, extreme 
weather, and crime.  
Overall, slum health has been neglected in the literature 
and warranted separate attention from urban health to assist 
in implementing particular slum related priorities in the 
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and NUA (Ezeh et 
al. 2017).  
Water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) 
In 2015, the World Bank, via the Pacific Region Infra-
structure Facility (PRIF), published ‘Unsettled: Water and 
Sanitation in Urban Settlement Communities of the 
Pacific’, a synthesis of WASH in urban settlement com-
munities of the Pacific, with a focus on Melanesia (World 
Bank 2015). While consolidated data is scarce, Melanesian 
informal settlements are poorly served with water, sanita-
tion, electricity, waste management, drainage, and roads 
(PRIF 2015). Table 1 (next page), for example, shows urban 
water and sanitation access across the Melanesian capitals. 
Utilities in Melanesia are often constrained by tech-
nical, financial, and legal barriers to serve informal settle-
ments, largely because they do not have a clear obligation 
from central government to do so (PRIF 2015). In addition, 
where authorisation to deliver services does exist, utilities 
tend not to prioritise extending services, often due to greater 
technical, legal, and commercial challenges than serving 
formal communities (ibid). Furthermore, even when 
services are provided, settlement households may not have 
access to them due to unmet land tenure requirements, such 
as the need to show some evidence of occupation, financial 
constraints, or cultural norms. For example, rural migrants  
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Table 1: Urban water and sanitation access in urban Melanesia 
 PNG Solomon 
Islands 
Vanuatu Fiji 
Urban water access estimates (%)     
Piped onto premises 55 61 51 96 
Other improved source (public taps, standpipes, wells, boreholes, 
springs or collected rainwater) 
33 32 47 4 
Unimproved (unprotected well or spring, carted tank or drum, raw 
surface water, bottled water) 
12 7 2 0 
     
Uran sanitation access estimates (%)     
Improved facilities (sewers, septic, composting) 56 81 65 92 
Shared facilities (2 or more households sharing a single facility) 9 n/a 33 4 
Other improved (bucket or hanging latrines, no sanitary platform, no 
effective waste containment) 
31 10 2 4 
Open defecation 4 9 0 0 
Source: Adapted from PRIF 2015 (2012 data) 
 
may be accustomed to receiving water and possibly 
sanitation services without payment (ibid; Gooden 2017). 
Often a pragmatic approach to delivery of services is needed. 
As a state owned enterprise, Solomon Water, for example, is 
mandated to provide water to gazetted urban areas only. 
However, the utility has been providing some reticulated 
water to informal settlements in urban Honiara and peri-
urban areas in Guadalcanal Province using a variety of 
approaches. These include reduced connection costs; 
community standpipes (with community water tariffs); 
prepaid ‘cash water’ trials; and campaigns to increase will-
ingness to pay and reduce illegal connections and water theft 
that is common in informal settlements (ibid).  
Women in informal settlements 
In Melanesia, it is women who bear primary responsibility 
for collecting water, cleaning, washing, cooking, and caring 
for children and the sick (PRIF 2015). Amnesty Inter-
national profiled the burden and risks faced by women in 
Solomon Islands informal settlements, noting two major 
concerns: firstly, a lack of clean water and proper sanitation 
near homes, and secondly, a high prevalence of violence, 
particularly sexual violence, against women. Women face 
high rates of physical and sexual violence when they are 
crossing poorly lit settlements to collect water in the early 
morning and evening, bathing, or toileting at night. 
Amnesty International argued that informal settlement 
communities in Solomon Islands, and notably their women, 
were deprived of their fundamental rights to water and 
sanitation and subjected to a ‘myriad of indignities’.  
‘Overall, it is very clear that women and girls are dis-
proportionately impacted by poor water and sanitation 
services—an experience applicable across the Pacific 
region’ (Amnesty International 2011; Munro and Carpenter 
2016; PRIF 2015).   
Personal security 
Data on personal security and crime rates in Pacific 
informal settlements are limited. World Bank research on 
trends in crime and violence in Papua New Guinea has 
shown how crime tends to be concentrated in urban areas, 
particularly Port Moresby and Lae. Data also show that 
significant proportions of crime involve violence, including 
the use of firearms. The World Bank research highlighted 
that certain parts of urban areas are ‘hotspots’ for crime and 
violence, yet evidence that crime and violence is concen-
trated in urban informal settlements is mixed. For example, 
the research noted that crime was also high in some affluent 
areas of Port Moresby (Lakhani and Willman 2014).  
My research has shown that personal security was 
identified as a key concern for many informal settlers but it 
was notable that many respondents associated, and perhaps 
conflated, security of tenure with personal security. This 
conflation was particularly common for Indo–Fijian resid-
ents of informal settlements where personal security was 
frequently an overriding concern and housing investment 
often included making informal settlement ‘plots’ and 
dwellings more physically secure (Kiddle 2011).  
[I feel insecure as] sometimes good, but sometimes 
drunken people cause the problem. And the thiefs [sic], 
three times they broke my house and steal the things. 
(Indo–Fijian resident of Tomuka in Lautoka). 
If we have developed land we can fence our area and put 
the burglar bar. The way we stay here anyone can be a 
mataqali1 and threaten [us] to leave this place. As far as 
we are concerned if we have proper title we are secured. 
(Indo–Fijian resident of Caubati Topline in Nasinu, 
greater Suva) (ibid:224,230).   
Khan (2010) has also documented that personal 
security is a major concern for female residents of Jittu 
Estate in central Suva, one of the oldest and most congested 
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informal settlements in Fiji. Indeed, language of insecurity, 
particularly for Indo-Fijians, is omnipresent in describing 
socio-political and everyday realities in Fiji (Pangerl 2007).  
The view that informal settlements are ‘crime riddled’ 
is, however, problematic. Negative stereotypes of informal 
settlements and settlers persist across the Pacific. Goddard 
(2001:3), for example, writes that informal settlements in 
Papua New Guinea are often stereotyped through linked 
themes of ‘uncontrolled migration, unemployment, extreme 
poverty, and crime, characterising settlement populations as 
maladjusted and undesirable in urban society’. The imagery 
that Goddard and others argue does not reflect the true 
diversity of urban informal settlements (Barber 2003). In 
Papua New Guinea especially, these stereotypes,  usually 
legitimised as part of a ‘war on crime’,  have influenced, 
and been used for justification for, forced evictions from 
informal settlements (Koczberski et al. 2001).  Construction 
ahead of big events in Papua New Guinea, such as the 2018 
Asia–Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit, has 
also seen the eviction of informal settlement communities, 
including approximately 3,000 settlers at Paga Hill to make 
way for hotels and the APEC meeting venue (CIVICUS 
2018, Woods 2018). In other Pacific Nations there has been 
a history of informal settlement evictions. Fijian authorities, 
for example, frequently evicted informal settler commun-
ities prior to a change in government approach around the 
late 2000’s (Kiddle 2011).  
Climate change 
Approximately 50 per cent of the Pacific’s population (7.5 
million people), live in coastal settlements (UNESCAP 
2019b). Climate change is bringing increased frequency and 
intensity of storm events. Pacific cities, where populations 
are increasingly concentrated, are at a growing risk as 
informal settlements in particular are often located upon 
marginal lands such as riverbanks, floodplains, accretion 
areas, and other coastal areas. The vulnerability of Pacific 
urban areas to climate related impacts, especially informal 
settlements, is intensified by non-durable housing, deficits 
in WASH and other critical infrastructure, and institutional 
capacity challenges influenced by weaknesses in govern-
ance and land use planning (Kiddle et al. 2017). Finally, in 
some Pacific nations a persistent rural bias remains, where 
the particular challenges of land management and planning 
in urban areas are ignored (ibid).  
Urban vulnerability has been illustrated through a 
number of devastating storm events in recent years in the 
Pacific region. In Honiara, for example, where it is esti-
mated that one in three households is within 500 metres of 
a river or coastline (Wilson 2018). All 24 fatalities in the 
2014 floods were from informal settlements located on the 
banks of the Mataniko River in central Honiara. Thousands 
of people were displaced to evacuation centres across the 
city, and just weeks after the flood, informal settlements and 
evacuation centres experienced a spike in diarrhoea cases 
linked to the contagious rotavirus. Studies later showed that 
over 4000 people, and in some informal settlements, more 
than 50 per cent of children were affected. The outbreak  
 
then spread to other areas of the country, with 27 fatalities 
recorded, most of whom were children under five years of 
age.2 (ibid).  
Conclusion 
Despite relatively scarce data, it is obvious that informal 
settlement living in the Pacific brings significant risk for 
residents. Climate vulnerability of informal settlements is 
acute. Informal settlement living also clearly brings health 
and personal safety risks, particularly for children and 
women. There is much to be done to meet the central tenet 
of the New Urban Agenda of ‘cities for all’ that are ‘just, 
safe, healthy, accessible, affordable, resilient, and sus-
tainable’ and the three freedoms of the United Nations 
Human Security Framework, particularly ‘freedom from  
fear’ and ‘freedom to live in dignity’. 
The 2015 Pacific Urban Forum endorsed a Pacific 
Urban Agenda that notably aimed to comprehensively 
respond to the impacts of climate change in urban areas and 
enhance social equity (Kiddle et al. 2017). The subsequent 
Pacific Urban Forum in 2019 aimed to galvanise action and 
partnerships for implementation of the Pacific Urban 
Agenda, although much more than rhetoric is needed for 
pathways that drive real change (Keen and Kiddle 2019). 
Informal settlements are at the forefront of the challenge. 
More work is required to improve the climate resilience of 
informal settlements. Further, across the region, investment 
in WASH in informal settlements should be prioritised.  
Economies of scale and increasing returns on investment in 
often dense informal settlements are on offer (Lilford et al. 
2017).  
Some Pacific nations,  particularly Papua New Guinea 
in recent years, are still forcibly evicting informal settlers 
from long established communities. However, global 
agencies such as UN-Habitat recommend pursuing altern-
atives such as less disruptive in situ settlement upgrading 
(Kiddle 2010). Upgrading involves a variety of responses 
including the provision of infrastructure, WASH improve-
ments, and a range of mechanisms to increase security of 
tenure and thus promote housing investment (ibid). All 
upgrading responses are likely to increase resilience to 
climate change and other shocks such as COVID-19.   
For many, living in an informal settlement does not 
bring the safety or dignity that the New Urban Agenda or 
the United Nations Human Security Framework envisage. 
Despite some focus on informal settlements from Pacific 
governments and development partners, much more needs 
to be done. In the Pacific, where the absolute numbers of 
informal settlers are not overwhelming, quick gains could 
be available through concerted, partnered efforts. 
Notes 
1  Land owning tribal group/unit. Sometimes used to refer to an 
individual.  
2  Diarrhoeal diseases have become the fifth leading cause of 
death in Solomon Islands (Wilson 2018).  
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Ol Man Kam: Community Associations as part of inclusive urban 
governance in the urban South Pacific 
Jennifer Day, The University of Melbourne 
Emerging governance structures of small, Pacific island 
capital cities are important because indigenous knowledge 
and practice present an alternative to dominant, Eurocentric 
ideas around which most of the world is now organised. 
Mobilising culture and indigeneity to challenge hegemonic 
ideas has become important all over the world (Escobar 
2007; Freire 2005) and over-reliance on colonially-
influenced social structures as instruments of governance 
discounts the possibility of allowing new ones to be 
integrated into governance processes.   
Two institutions in Vanuatu seek recognition and 
legitimacy from both the State and the public: the first is a 
state creation, the area council; and the second is the 
community, which has a distinct identity from a village or 
an urban settlement and is currently seeking its own status 
as a unit of governance. Community associations like the 
Elang Etas Community Association (EECA) offer models 
that could be added to existing State-led additions to help 
make urban governance more inclusive. The EECA 
organises communities of around 2800 people as a way of 
seeking to avoid eviction from land disputes. At the end of 
2019, there were more than 70 evictions planned in metro-
politan Port Vila, with another 30 in the remainder of the 
country (Personal communication with the Sheriff’s Office, 
December 2019). Some of these have been delayed because 
of COVID-19, but these delays have not resolved the 
underlying land disputes. If Vanuatu wishes to avoid urban 
conflict like that experienced in Honiara in Solomon Islands 
(Foukona 2015), it must find ways to resolve land 
disputes, accommodate urbanisation, and foster a sense of 
belonging (Day and Bamforth 2020) in new, urban migrants. 
New governance structures such as EECA could be con-
sidered along with state-driven structures such as area 
councils, as a possible model. This paper is the result of 
sustained engagement with EECA and the Elang Etas 
community since EECA’s founding in 2018.   
Background: Informality and city identity 
Vanuatu is a democratic republic, founded in 1980 after a 
colonial period (1906–80) where it was jointly governed by 
France and Britain under the name, New Hebrides. The post-
colonial environment of the capital, Port Vila, has blurred the 
distinctions between city and village confusing outsiders and 
locals alike that seek to understand where settlements sit on 
a continuum of formality. Port Vila continues to be 
characterised as a city of villages, or a ‘village city’ (Jones 
2011); an urban fabric characterised by groups of people 
reproducing ethnic enclaves of village life in an urban area. 
The distinction between formal and informal is another 
problem that appears in a distinct way in this setting where 
kastom, or traditional culture, is enshrined in the identity 
and founding constitution of the state.   
In Port Vila, the persistent link between the city and the 
village is underscored by the encirclement of the city by 
villages, and the functional and administrative inclusion of 
some villages into the metropolitan area. Around Port Vila, 
the established peri-urban villages were originally composed 
of the kin groups that were present in the area that become 
Port Vila: Pango; Eratap; Erakor; Ifira, and Mele (Rawlings 
1999). Attempts to create typologies of Pacific settlement 
types consistently miss or misunderstand some types of com-
munities that are outside these villages. One Asian Develop-
ment Bank report (Jones 2016), for instance, lays out a 
typology that includes traditional villages, squatter settle-
ments, informal settlements, and planned settlements – 
missing the non-village, non-squatter, communities that are 
growing rapidly and outside the planning structures that 
govern the area within the Port Vila municipal boundary. 
Including these communities in planning is important, given 
the proportion of people that live on customary lands in Port 
Vila (around 27,000,1) the proportion of the peri-urban 
population in communities (at least 25 per cent), and the rapid 
growth of these settlements (up to 12 per cent annually (Jones 
and Sanderson 2017)).   
In contemporary Vanuatu, the authority of chiefs is still 
highly relevant to social life. Chiefly authority was central to 
the construction of the independent state (Bolton 1999; 
Martin 2019), and chiefs are called upon to manage all 
matters of land and custom in Vanuatu. They are often 
declared the representatives of communities in determin-
ations of rightful land ownership in customary and intro-
duced legal proceedings, (e.g., Smith 2017). Importantly, 
chiefs continue to be called upon by the current government 
and social structures to provide leadership in new state 
structures, such as area councils. 
The current governance structure: Area 
councils 
One local structure of governance that has recently begun to 
assert more authority in matters of local regulation is area 
councils. Area councils are structures of the State that 
leverage Pacific respect for chiefly authority (Wairiu 2006). 
Established by an act of Parliament in 2003 (Government of 
Vanuatu 2003), area councils have been slowly mobilised as 
a form of local government. In 2015, at the official opening 
of the Eratap Area Council office, Shefa Province President 
Edward George noted that the:  
Eratap Area Council Office represents a ‘small govern-
ment’ for the people of Number Two Lagoon, Eratap, 
Teouma and Teouma Bush (Garae 2015).  
One example of the growing power of area councils is 
their ability to place restrictions on regional activities. 
Every year in July, people in Vanuatu plan a weeklong 
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celebration of independence, culminating on 30 July, 
Independence Day. In one community, the leadership 
decided to leverage the event to draw revellers to the Elang 
Etas community so that they could experience its vibrancy 
and organisation, and so that the community would be 
acknowledged by urban citizens as a viable part of the urban 
fabric. A convenient, secondary aim was to use the event to 
generate funds to support the operations of EECA.  
Starting in the first week of July 2019, youth members 
of the community cleared grass and brush from the com-
munity’s common space and erected 54 stalls with bamboo 
frames that would host food and drink vendors, kava sellers, 
and handicraft makers. Soccer and volleyball competitions 
were organised, and teams were invited from other com-
munities to participate. A Miss Etas competition was 
planned. Youth volunteers publicised the event in town, 
selling raffle tickets and seeking sponsorships from govern-
ment departments. A gender-inclusive security committee 
was established that would police the event and provide 
escorts to women and girls. Numerous similar festival 
grounds were set up in various communities in and around 
Port Vila during the month of July. Until 2019, these events 
appear to have occurred entirely outside of state regulation, 
with no permits required and no state involvement necessary.  
Then, in late-July 2019, the Elang Etas community was 
served with an unexpected notice that its festival would be 
shut down because it had not received a permit from the 
area council. This was a new regulation implemented by the 
provincial government that had not been effectively com-
municated with communities. Several days of information-
gathering ensued, wherein organisers feared that they would 
have to shut down the Independence Day festivities. There 
was relief when days before the start of the celebration on 
24 July, the area council officially permitted the event.  
It turns out that the State-directed organisation of the 
area council is deeply embedded in outdated notions of who 
belongs in the urban area. Centred around the five urban 
villages, area council leadership is drawn from the ranks of 
chiefs and customary landowners from these villages – to 
the exclusion of tenants living on that land. This structure 
further solidifies a significant power imbalance that favours 
customary landowners over their tenants. This is a problem 
because the vast majority of urban growth in Port Vila and 
other Pacific cities is happening on lands that are owned by 
customary landowners.   
An alternative governance entity: 
Communities 
In contrast to villages, communities are settlements without 
the history of customary land ownership in the area. They 
are often composed of migrants from outer islands or other 
parts of Efate. The distinction between villages and com-
munities is a matter of degrees rather than any distinct 
feature or rule. To some extent, all villages and com-
munities in Port Vila are mixed and non-homogeneous, at 
least compared to their historical compositions. A gener-
ation ago, one could generally expect that people living in a 
village were members of the extended kin network of the 
customary landowners. Nowadays, villages are no longer 
home only to homogenous kin groups; Ni Vanuatu migrants 
and foreign expatriates live in villages and have leased land 
from customary landowners that have subdivided and 
leased to long-term tenants. 
Communities can be homogenous, composed of people 
from a common island or group, living under the guidance 
and organisation of community committees and an elected 
or self-appointed chief. Increasingly, communities have ol 
man kam configurations, or people living in diverse com-
munities composed of populations from multiple islands; a 
place where people from all around Vanuatu establish 
residence in a location that gives them access to the city. 
Port Vila is a variation of mankam, a sometimes-derogatory 
term used to refer to migrants from other islands (Smith 
2017). In Port Vila, the term appears to have been 
repurposed by some community leaders to describe their 
urban fabric and other similar places in the city. At Elang 
Etas, where there are at least 22 islands represented, the 
community has sorted itself into 12 zones that are largely 
but not exclusively correlated with island of origin, 
according to the 2018 census.  
Even though both villages and communities are growing 
in population diversity, there is an important distinction in 
that land tenure security is much stronger in villages. 
Although there are evictions of some people from urban 
villages, there has never been a case of wholesale eviction of 
an entire urban village, or of customary landowners being 
evicted from their lands. Customary land ownership is far too 
strong and foundational in Vanuatu, enshrined in the 
country’s 1980 Constitution. It is this strength of cus-
tomary landownership, however, that has produced the 
wholesale evictions of communities or large parts of com-
munities. Since 2014, there are well-publicised evictions that 
have affected thousands of people, including Destination in 
2014; 580 people (estimate based on interviews with com-
munity members and leaders) in Prima and Mele Waisisi 
(Napwatt 2018), and at least 1000 people and probably closer 
to 3000 in Bladinieres in 2018 (according to Cullwick 2018). 
The language used to talk about these populations in 
government documentation, by international advisors, and in 
popular discourse is very important as the label ‘squatter’ is 
applied to people who do have some form of permission to 
live on the land where they reside.   
Determining how many people in Port Vila live in 
communities, as opposed to villages is difficult because there 
is no publicly available data source that answers this question 
due to the reliance on area councils as the administrative 
boundaries for Census data reporting. Elang Etas is certainly 
not Port Vila’s original ol man kam community, but the 
community does have roots dating at least to the 1990s but 
today many people are not interested in life in a community. 
Port Vila offers alternatives. Inside the municipal boundaries 
of the city, people make the additional distinction between 
community living and urban living, distinguished by the 
presence of a chief and collaborative lifestyles in 
communities. At Elang Etas, the EECA has organised the 
community for all kinds of civic projects – from mothers’ and 
youths’ committees to human-rights training to fundraising 
for Independence Day celebrations.  
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The EECA: A functioning governance entity 
The reason that the EECA was established was to plan for 
tenure security in Elang Etas. Its logo (Figure 1) illustrates 
its mission of unity and inclusion, with interlocked hands of 
different colours arranged around a golden star. The star 
represents the Republic of Vanuatu, and its inclusion in the 
logo represents the community’s recognition of the State in 
the identity of the community. The phrase, ‘united we 
stand’, signals community solidarity against the threats to 
the community namely, dispossession and eviction. 
Figure 1. Elang Etas Community Association 
logo  
 
With the endorsement of the Elang Etas Council of Chiefs, 
the Association decided to find out how much money 
people living in Elang Etas have paid under the customary 
and quasi-customary arrangements under which they reside. 
Elang Etas residents have also made significant financial 
and social investment in their community, and many believe 
that they have satisfied the terms of their agreement to live 
on this land. In the 2018 EECA Census, a total of 237 of the 
enumerated householders responded to a question about 
whether they had made land payments to the now-deceased 
former leaseholder. Of these, 232 reported that they had 
made some payments, and only five reported that they had 
made no payments. Of the 232 respondents that reported 
making a payment, 175 provided the amount of their 
payments. In 2019, these 175 households have paid a total 
of 57,512,862 Vatu (A$732,648 in 2019 dollars) toward 
their usufructuary rights to this land, since they began 
making payments in the 1990s. Despite this, an ongoing 
land dispute means that people’s tenure remains insecure. 
Area councils and communities have chiefs in 
common. At Elang Etas, a council of 12 chiefs works in 
collaboration with the EECA Executive, but has voluntarily 
become integrated into the EECA as a component of the 
Association’s structure. Figure 2 is a somewhat simplified 
reproduction of an EECA-produced figure showing the 
organisational structure of the Association. 
Figure 2. EECA Organisational Structure 
 
This is an unusual positioning of a new kind of social 
structure (the Association) over an established institution 
(chiefs). I have witnessed the EECA leadership structure 
survive two internal challenges, with community members 
and chiefs convinced of the need for this new structure of 
community organising. The first challenge occurred in 2018 
during a closed session with the Council of Chiefs and the 
EECA Executive. The second challenge occurred at the first 
annual general meeting, held upon the closing of EECA’s 
Year 1 activities in November 2019. One chief testified that 
a chief’s responsibilities in a mixed, urban community are 
far too complex for the Council of Chiefs to also assume  
the role of advocating for the community with the State  
and outside entities. His responsibilities in maintaining  
the kastom and managing conflict within his own zone 
occupied all of his time. Other chiefs from Tanna, Ambae, 
Tongoa, and Epi agreed, arguing that the Executive should 
retain this role. A vote solidified the Executive’s role as the 
spokespeople for the community and the interface with 
outside agencies. 
In this ol man kam community, gathering data on land 
payments, for instance, is outside the scope of chiefly duty 
and expertise. It is, however, extremely important for future 
challenges to the community’s legitimacy, and for future 
advocacy between the community and the State. In the 2018 
census, 150 householders responded to assess whether they 
had completed the obligations they made with the lessee 
when moving to Elang Etas. Of these 150 respondents, 31 
per cent reported that they had finished their payment 
obligations, either to the lessor or customary owner; 54 per 
cent reported that they had not yet completed their 
obligations; and 15 per cent did not know if they had 
completed payments. Fifty-eight per cent of households 
have made more than half of their required payments. In 
summary, the EECA found that most people living at Elang 
Etas believe that they have fulfilled their financial obli-
gation or a significant part of it.   
Conclusion: Communities in governance 
Current urban governance in Vanuatu has uncritically 
reproduced social structures such as area councils to the 
exclusion of other kinds of governance possibilities, has 
enabled the trope of the village to persist as the presumed 
building block of the city, and has allowed the inaccurate 
labelling of many places as ‘informal’. Communities, offer 
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a possible alternative to the dogma of the existing city-
village-informal distinction. Urban policy is currently under 
active construction in Port Vila, and there are competing 
narratives and logic that could affect this planning. One is 
top-down and State-led, one is bottom-up and community-
generated, and one is longstanding and changing with the 
times – area councils, community associations, and chiefs, 
respectively. All are important to governance, as they 
represent the various social locations where people look for 
guidance, seek belonging, and secure their place in the city. 
Cities will continue to expand onto customary land and the 
tenure arrangements that residents make with landowners 
should be recognised even if they are oral or customary. 
What is to be made of state engagement with customary 
processes when reliance on them excludes the majority of 
city dwellers? This is an important question that those who 
govern Port Vila should be asking. Recognising customary 
title and the role of chiefs in everyday society was a critical 
component of the independence movement in Vanuatu – a 
movement that still exists in the living memory of Vanuatu’s 
lawmakers and bureaucrats. Incorporating chiefly authority 
into state institutions like area councils is an important step 
to successfully administering this diverse society – but it is 
no longer enough. Communities have introduced com-
plexities to the urban landscape and governance systems like 
area councils must now be expanded to accommodate them.   
Notes 
1  The 2016 Mini-Census Vanuatu National Statistics Office 
2017, ‘2016 Post-TC Pam Mini-Census Report Vol. 1 Basic 
Tables,’ Report, Port Vila: Ministry of Finance and 
Economic Management,.conducted after Tropical Cyclone 
Pam (derived from Chart 3.7, p. 166) suggests that about 75 
per cent of households in the peri-urban area councils (Mele, 
Ifira, Erakor, Eratap, and Pango) reported some other 
housing tenure than ownership. The same report (Table 
1.14b) suggests that the 2016 metropolitan population living 
outside the municipal boundary was 27,304 people with 
around 50,000 living inside the municipal boundary. If 25 per 
cent of this population are living in non-ownership tenures 
like those at Elang Etas, this implies that about 6,800 people, 
or 9 per cent, in Port Vila are living in communities com-
prising about 2.5 per cent of the national population – and 
growing 
References 
Bolton, L 1999, ‘Chief Willie Bongmatur Maldo and the 
incorporation of Chiefs into the Vanuatu state’. 
Cullwick, J 2018, ‘Mass eviction’, Vanuatu Daily Post, 27 April. 
Day, J 2020; forthcoming, ‘Sister communities: Rejecting labels 
of informality and peripherality in Vanuatu’, International 
Journal of Urban and Regional Research. 
Day, J and T Bamforth 2020, ‘“This is our garden now”: 
Disasters and belonging in an urban Pacific’, In: Sanderson D 
and Bruce L (eds), Urban Disaster Resilience in the Asia–
Pacific. New York: Routledge, pp.Chapter 7. 
Day, J and M Wewerinke-Singh 2019, ‘Learning from survivors 
of development-induced displacement: Operationalising 
Vanuatu’s new displacement policy toward an inclusive 
Capital City’, Report, Geneva: Internal Displacement 
Monitoring Centre. 
Escobar, A 2007, ‘Worlds and knowledges otherwise: The Latin 
American modernity/coloniality research program’, Cultural 
studies 21(2–3), 179–210. 
Foukona, J 2015, ‘Urban land in Honiara: Strategies and rights to 
the city’, The Journal of Pacific History 50(4), 504–518. 
Freire, P 2005, Pedagogy of the Oppressed, 30th Anniversary 
Edition. New York, London: Continuum. 
Garae, L 2015, ‘Chief’s vision may trigger new town’, Vanuatu 
Daily Post, 11 February. 
Government of Vanuatu 2003, ‘Local Government (Area Council 
Divisions)’, Order 41 of 2003. Vanuatu: The Pacific Legal 
Information Institute (PacLII), Laws of the Government of 
Vanuatu. 
Jones, P 2011, ‘The rise of the “rural village in the city” and 
“village cities” in the Pacific Region’, Asia Pacific Network 
for Housing Research Conference on ‘Neoliberalism and 
Urbanization in the Asia Pacific’. University of Hong Kong. 
Jones, P 2016, ‘The emergence of Pacific urban villages: 
Urbanization trends in the Pacific islands’. 
Jones, P and D Sanderson 2017, ‘Urban development in the 
Pacific ’, The Development Bulletin, 78, 11–15. 
Martin, K 2019 ‘Big men, ceremonial exchange and life-cycle 
events’, The Melanesian World. Routledge, 375–388. 
Napwatt, F 2018 ‘Over 600 to be evicted’, Vanuatu Daily Post, 
09 June. 
Rawlings, GE 1999, ‘Foundations of urbanisation: Port Vila 
town and Pango village, Vanuatu’, Oceania 70(1), 72–86. 
Smith, RE 2017, ‘From colonial intrusions to “intimate 
exclusions”: Contesting legal title and “chiefly title” to land in 
Epi, Vanuatu’, Kastom, Property and Ideology, 327. 
Vanuatu National Statistics Office 2017, ‘2016 Post-TC Pam 
Mini-Census Report Vol. 1 Basic Tables’, Report, Port Vila: 
Ministry of Finance and Economic Management. 
Wairiu, M,2006 ‘23. Governance and livelihood realities in 




February 2021 123 
666 Large ocean media: Reporting security in an age 
of new Pacific diplomacy 
Steve Sharp, TME Media and Education Services  
Introduction1 
There is an increasingly urgent need in the Pacific for recognisable, independent 
and credible media discourses on national security that are disaggregated from the 
noise of self-appointed influencers on social media. National media institutions 
must bear this mantle because they are best placed to do so, for three reasons: 
1. Security literacy: Journalists bound by professional codes of ethics are best placed to 
drive ‘security literacy’ from a low base. From global ‘human security’ agendas down 
to grassroots conceptions of material survival, reporters are required to make sense of 
the nuances and explain why they matter. Journalists are infinitely better placed than 
the shadowy voices that emerge from, and slide back into, the digital social media 
cracks, who are not accountable. 
2. The media as early warners: The Pacific diplomatic playground is re-organising itself 
in ways that make us more connected, but in unpredictable ways. A professional class 
of journalists who are ‘security literate’ will be well placed to tell the story of regional 
integration in ways that protect the region against the disintegrative forces during this 
and any major period of geo-political upheaval.  
3. Transborder collaborations: The task of tracking and keeping pace with regional 
developments and translating the detail into relevant national news is becoming 
increasingly complex, but no less urgent. The transborder nature of business and politics 
is ripe for cross-border collaborations between national media to explain the business–
politics nexus to national and regional audiences.  
This conception of rising intellectual demands on our professional reporters is 
problematic not least because it is riven by an ideological divide about the media’s 
true and proper place in national development. On the one side, there are those who 
believe media should partner government in promoting agreed national goals 
(developmentalist thinking); on the other side, there is the view that national progress 
emerges from institutional competition where media record events but in doing so, 
also scrutinise power (watchdog role). 
As Sheila Coronel notes (2010:111): ‘The press as watchdogs of power is 
embedded in the self‐definition of journalists and in varying degrees, also in public 
expectations of the media’. 
Since the 1990s, the international donor community has also accepted that 
‘corrupt and inept governments were a major impediment to development efforts’ 
(Coronel 2010:112). But governments have resisted media scrutiny, often in ways 
that degrade media institutions and threaten the physical safety of journalists. 
Expect the trend towards online harassment of reporters under political direction to 
continue (IFJ-SEAJU 2018). 
The Pacific’s shifting and competing security narratives are complicated. And 
this is where the Pacific media as regional storytellers are more challenged. What to 
make of all the speeches, communiques and bickering around the Pacific family 
dinner table? To simply report the words of leaders is insufficient. Journalists need to 
not only report the significant but to explain why it is significant. This means 
connecting the polished words of official declarations with the daily struggles of town 
and village – the folks in whose name security narratives are being spun. It also means 
pointing out the disconnections. Because therein lies the story. 
Undermining media scrutiny: A regional issue 
Officials and leaders from across the region work within accountability structures and 
make political calculations about the risks of non-disclosure or ‘no comment’. They 
must consider the chance of hidden information becoming public knowledge at some 
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The energy, persistence and skills required to pursue 
these kinds of stories should not be underestimated in any 
jurisdiction. They are especially exacting within the insti-
tutional structures of media-government relations in PNG 
and the wider Pacific. The youthfulness, inexperience and 
lack of confidence of the Pacific journalistic corps are well 
known. Add to that the regular hostility of leaders. The Fiji 
Prime Minister in the Fiji Times newspaper stated: 
the Fiji Times is controlled by a cabal that manipulates 
the news agenda and uses inflammatory language to 
create disunity, division and instability and to advance 
its own political interests (Radio New Zealand 2015 in 
Singh 2017:4). 
Or in September 2020, the Samoa Prime Minister 
referred to the leading daily Samoa Observer as ‘the 
Opposition’ and of trying to topple the government. The 
newspaper had earlier complained of being denied ‘the 
right to ask questions of the Prime Minister at weekly 
press conferences and even copies of bills before 
Parliament’ (Samoa Observer 2020).  
What is the media’s role? 
There is also the tangible question as to whether audiences 
perceive the media’s role as one of scrutinising power? 
How do Samoan or PNG reporters flag issues of national 
interest to their audiences and relate them to metropolitan 
corruption? Perhaps developmentalist thinking is easier to 
absorb and the ‘watchdog’ metaphor less congruous. 
A watchdog media is meaningless unless audiences 
come along for the ride. Reaching audiences in a deeper 
sense is about meeting information needs and nurturing 
conversations within ‘language communities’ where partic-
ipants are both informed and feel they belong.  
Within this model, knowledge of say, ‘national security’ 
is not centralised within government agencies and drip fed to 
select media (divide-and-rule) but distributed, where media 
expertise enables channels for informed interactions. As 
these channels multiply and gain community traction over 
time, intangible networks of trust solidify within them. At 
this point, the media can offer a check and balance on 
executive power (deliberative democracy). In this scenario, 
‘security literacy’ for all participants rises on the same tide.  
Professional news reporting has the potential to be a 
‘journal of record’ for readerships. Rather than being purely 
episodic and attention-grabbing, news reporting can over 
time become the ‘first draft of history’ – not just recording 
history but preserving an historical memory that can mob-
ilise communities of interest that impact politics, including 
at election time. 
The efficiencies of access to digitised content are 
driving changes to media business models. Well-managed 
and creative use, re-use and re-purposing of digital content 
is what gives media businesses their competitive edge. But 
journalists are only one group of players. The global tech 
platforms are way ahead in terms of data capture and its 
creative re-use. Their model is to capture and monetise user 
data, not preserve historical memory. 
In PNG, the most important media organisation is the 
National Broadcasting Corporation, with its radio channels 
extending into all villages. And yet, after years of media aid 
and ‘capacity building’ NBC has no website and therefore, 
no means of capturing the rich storytelling of its citizens 
over time and making ‘the national story’ accessible online 
to new audiences, researchers, journalists and students.  
Other forms of storytelling 
Institutional media does not have a monopoly on storytelling. 
Nowhere is this more obvious than in the development space 
where NGOs have embraced ‘digital storytelling’. Com-
munication for Development (C4D) is now an academic field 
as well as a development practice. Media skills are harnessed 
not in the traditional journalistic mode of factual reporting but 
as explicit tools for educational advancement and empower-
ment. Creative production is based on participatory methods 
with a strong emphasis on visual storytelling. Behaviour 
change campaigns are both an information source for, and a 
content competitor with, mainstream news media. 
Every development organisation beyond a certain size 
employs media staff and contracts communication con-
sultants for specific projects. Their media products serve as 
public relations competing for eyeballs and funds. They can 
also become influential content in their own right beyond 
their stakeholder base. C4D initiatives coincide with and are 
driven by the democratisation of media; they contribute to 
the expansion of network technology through apps and are 
drivers of social change. 
Examples from PNG in recent years are Yumi Sanap 
Strong www.yumisanapstrong.org and Yumi Kirapim Senis 
(Thomas et al. 2018). Their rich visual storytelling has led 
conversations around gender-based violence and com-
munity security with accessible content that can be re-
purposed in various advocacy and educational contexts. 
C4D products impact news media in the Pacific and 
elsewhere in three ways: 
• the market for creative content, especially visual content, 
is exploding as it is for the skills required to create it; 
• creative media opportunities (jobs) have expanded just as 
traditional media business models are collapsing under 
pressure of re-invention; and 
• this pressure encourages innovation in media operations 
but Pacific newsrooms cannot invest to transform their 
systems like the New York Times can. Donor funds have 
rushed in to fill the gaps, sometimes successfully, but 
institutional decay haunts large nation-wide enterprises, 
old and new.  
Media and security 
Expanded notions of security are driven by island members 
pushing back against disempowering characterisations such 
as small, fragile and conflict-prone and promoting ‘large 
ocean states’ with stewardship over ‘the Blue Pacific’ 
(Tarte 2020:10). 
ANU scholar Katerina Teaiwa goes further and iden-
tifies those responsible: 
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The Australian media, and certain activists, scholars, 
policymakers and leaders, often present Pacific nations 
as corrupt or conflict-prone ‘failed states’ whose insta-
bility is viewed in simplistic and often racialized terms 
… Knowledge of the region’s historical and cultural 
contexts remains shallow (Teaiwa 2019:58). 
But what about the Pacific media’s ability and willing-
ness to track these shifting contexts and educate audiences 
region-wide about ‘the expanded concept of security’ and 
the common threats expressed in the Boe Declaration? On 
climate change, the region’s media has been successful in 
driving climate literacy and inter-island awareness around 
themes of ‘existential threat’ and ‘climate emergency’.  
Through powerful (mainly visual) storytelling, the 
Pacific media ecosystem, which includes its science com-
municators, has created social media friendly discourses 
that connect with like-minded youth networks in Australia 
and New Zealand. As Teaiwa puts it: ‘“vulnerable” does not 
mean “incapable”’ (ibid:67). Or as the former president of 
Kiribati urges:  
we have no choice but to engage even more aggressively 
internationally, because the key to our survival will 
depend on whether international action is taken on 
climate change or not (Tong 2015:24). 
It is a well-nourished field from which Pacific poli-
ticians can credibly speak with moral authority about col-
lective responsibility and in the same breath, criticise 
Australian domestic policies.  
Case studies of reporting Pacific security 
On 21 September 2017, Fiji Prime Minister Frank 
Bainimarama addressed the UN General Assembly as the  
president of the UN Climate Change Conference (COP23). 
He had come a long way from running a military-led 
dictatorship for eight years and an elected government for 
three. ‘It is clear that global warming changes our very 
understanding of what our national interests are’, he told the 
assembly as the first ever Pacific island COP president. 
Referring to Fiji’s long history of UN peacekeeping he 
added: ‘For 40 years, we have helped to make the world 
more secure – and now we are determined to make a 
successful contribution to the wider security of the planet 
through our leadership of COP23’ (Bainimarama 2017). 
It was a media masterstroke: the leader of a small Pacific 
nation encapsulating the hard and soft edges of security  
into its narrative of global environmental stewardship.  
Expelled from the peak regional body the Pacific 
Islands Forum (PIF) in 2009 (for not holding elections after 
its 2006 coup), Fiji established a rival body in 2013 – the 
Pacific Islands Development Forum (PIDF) – with funding 
which included that from the Peoples’ Republic of China 
(PRC). Fiji’s leader launched Fiji’s climate diplomacy 
through a vehicle that unlike the PIF, did not include 
Australia and New Zealand as members. The PIDF served 
Fiji’s post-coup foreign policy interests but never won over 
PNG or Samoa. While it held no annual meetings in 2017 
and 2018, the PIDF remained the primary medium for 
regional organisations to convey security perspectives. 
Having won elections in 2014 and 2018, Bainimarama 
returned to the PIF meeting in September 2019 with 
enhanced standing and found a platform from which to 
pressure industrial nations in general, and Australia in 
particular. At last year’s PIF gathering in Funafuti, Tuvalu, 
Fiji’s rehabilitation was complete and its leader continued 
his regional activism making speeches that captured the 
media’s attention. Addressing the Forum from which his 
nation had been evicted 10 years earlier, Bainimarama 
forged a pan-Pacific ‘coalition of the vulnerable’ against 
industrial nations (Bainimarama 2019).  
Standing shoulder to shoulder, Fiji, Tuvalu and our 
Pacific Island neighbours intend to do everything 
humanly possible to get the world to take the decisive 
action needed to save low-lying atolls like Tuvalu from 
the rising sea levels and extreme weather events 
associated with climate change. … But if…that effort 
fails because the industrial nations continue to selfishly 
put their own interests above our own, Fiji will offer a 
home to you – the people of Tuvalu. We have made the 
same offer to your neighbours in Kiribati (ibid). 
Such rhetoric spoke to small island grievances and 
fears and it niggled its ‘big brother’ member of the Pacific 
family at a time of intensifying geo-political competition – 
with the PRC in the main frame – it also made great media 
fodder. One scholar calls this a ‘more assertive, independent 
and innovative diplomacy by Pacific island states’ pro-
ducing a ‘different regional security narrative focused on 
climate change’ (Tarte 2020:3).  
Such were the mercurial workings of Pacific climate 
politics and its capture of public attention, frequently through 
media coverage over the last decade, that this shift in the story 
was formalised by PIF member states in 2018 in the Boe 
Declaration, which refers to ‘an expanded concept of security’ 
covering human security (aid, rights, health and prosperity), 
environmental and resource security, transnational crime, 
and cybersecurity (PIF 2018). 
Environmental reporting: Fiji 
Seven months before Bainimarama’s magnanimous Tuvalu 
statement on environmental refugees, a story broke on an 
online news site based in New Zealand. A hotel casino 
development in Fiji – the largest in the country – was 
accused of damaging the foreshore (fishing grounds) on 
Malolo Island in breach of numerous environmental laws. 
The Chinese developer is accused of donating to the 
government and receiving special treatment in return. 
An environment lawyer accuses the company of 
breaching its own lease and damaging land and reef over 
which it has no development approval. He is also quoted 
saying that government agencies were informed the previous 
year and supplied with drone photography but took no action. 
The developer, the story reports, ignored several stop-
work notices, including from the High Court. The lawyer 
used media to push for accountability: 
The Chinese development has not stopped. Nor has it been 
made to stop, which has raised serious questions about the 
Fijian government’s effectiveness or enthusiasm to admin-
ister its own environmental laws (Reid 2019a). 
 
126 Development Bulletin 82 
In a follow-up report a day later, landowners are calling 
for the eviction of the Chinese and local workforce. The 
report’s lead announces that the Office of Public Prose-
cutions would prosecute the developer. The environment 
minister revealed he referred the alleged damage to prose-
cutors several months earlier. An opposition parliament-
arian states: 
Enforcement is weak and the villages suffer…All arms 
of government have been negligent here by not fol-
lowing through on enforcement. They should cancel the 
lease and get the company to rectify and pay damages 
(ibid). 
By April, the same New Zealand reporting team were 
in Fiji investigating the same story but this time with a 
camera crew. The three-person crew were arrested. After 
being held overnight, the Fiji Government released them 
and went into damage control. ‘Rogue officers’, it said, 
were responsible for the arrests, following their release. As 
details filtered out about Fiji’s bureaucratic inaction in the 
face of the Chinese company’s impunity, the Fiji Sun ran a 
company press release under its own masthead defending 
the company and claiming it was investing in Fiji at the 
request of the Fiji Prime Minister (Maraia 2019). 
By late February, not long after the story broke, the 
Prime Minister was telling tourism operators that investors 
damaging Fiji’s environment would be banned. By April, 
the Malolo Island development approvals had been 
cancelled. The wheels of enforcement only started to turn 
after there had been widespread regional exposure. 
Restrictions on Fijian media 
Critically, it was a foreign news site that raised the alarm, 
not the local press. When we move from Pacific summitry 
to the grassroots, maybe large ocean states are vulnerable – 
including their media. 
Fiji’s media operate under the shadow of the Media 
Industry Development Decree and its implementing agency 
the Media Industry Development Authority (MIDA). 
[T]hat media legislation is more restrictive than any-
thing we’ve had in previous history. Prior to the 2006 
coup, media freedom in Fiji was seen to be almost on 
par with countries like Australia and New Zealand. But 
the 2010 Media Decree changed all that … The main 
problem with the decree is the fines and jail terms 
stipulated for publishers and editors. The fines up to 
FJ$100,000 [A$66,000], I believe, and jail terms of up 
to two years and five years if you fall foul of the decree 
(Singh 2018). 
Fiji’s editors and reporters live in fear of the Media 
Industry Development Decree 2010 that had its origins in 
the suspension of constitutional government, public emer-
gency regulations, and rule by military decree. Up until 
2015, in addition to editors and publishers, the decree 
provided heavy fines and jail terms for individual reporters, 
an imposition removed following victory at the 2014 
general elections. 
Singh believes that various internal problems afflicting 
Melanesian media more generally magnify the impact of 
external government restrictions. Poor reporting and errors 
when they do occur are evidence of ‘lack of capacity’ but 
also a weak institutional position manifest in low status, low 
pay and high staff turnover. He says: 
downplaying the internal threats is counterproductive 
since they are a serious impediment to media freedom 
and media development in their own ways (Singh 
2020:49). 
When government attacks are launched or restrictive 
laws enacted, the media’s position is further weakened, 
making it less likely to win audience support against these 
depredations. Most Fiji scholars and practitioners agree that 
punitive media laws including heavy fines and jail terms for 
editors and publishers are a recipe for a ‘captured media’ 
and self-censorship, not media industry development 
(Morris 2017:29). 
Environmental reporting: Papua New Guinea 
On 25 August 2020, PNG’s Post-Courier published an 
editorial on a recent taskforce investigation into logging 
operations in Northern Province, asserting that ‘companies 
who have no respect for the law of PNG and habitually 
breach them must be banned from operating in PNG’ (Post-
Courier 2020). It was referring to, among other things, the 
escape by aircraft of 16 foreign workers before the taskforce 
arrived at their camp. This must be, the newspaper guessed, 
‘the tip of the iceberg’.  
‘We must change the image of PNG as an easily pene-
trable nation that can be used, abused and exploited by greedy 
corporate entities’ (ibid.). Strong words from PNG’s leading 
daily. The violations sounded like a textbook case of non-
traditional security threats: foreign workers illegally breach-
ing PNG’s border, unregistered vehicles found at the logging 
site, police hired by loggers to secure their sites, bribes and 
gifts given to metropolitan officials, habitual lawbreakers left 
untouched, resource security imperilled and so on. 
But ironically, the substance of the editorial accusation 
could have been credibly made at any time during PNG’s 
decades-long history of timber piracy. And as is so often the 
case in stories of Pacific resource plunder, none of these 
entities is named! 
Similarly, Lasslett laments the lack of investigative 
weight carried by mainstream PNG news outlets to the point 
where he concludes in the case of yet another land grab: 
foreign citizens are better informed by their mainstream 
media about investigative research into improper or 
illegal commercial transactions in Papua New Guinea, 
than Papua New Guinea citizens (Lasslett 2015).  
National court judgements, commission of inquiries, 
public accounts committee reports, auditor general reports, 
and published research is literally teeming with information 
on corruption, illegal resource theft, police misconduct and 
human rights abuses. And names are named! Senior 
politicians, civil servants, business leaders and major cor-
porate brands are all explicitly cited (op.cit.). 
It’s one thing to access official documents but another 
to hold officials to account for them. Lasslett (ibid) 
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acknowledges this when he concludes: ‘the institutional 
structures are simply not in place to support professionals 
who want to engage in investigate reporting that scrutinise 
the dealings of the powerful’. 
The origins of impunity are not in the formal structures 
but in the actual interactions between elected officials, the 
bureaucracy and journalists. Long-time former ABC corres-
pondent in PNG, Sean Dorney provides a telling example. 
He recounts efforts by a news reporter from the state 
broadcaster NBC to discover how a Chinese consortium 
acquired a site in Port Moresby from PNG Telecom for their 
$414m Chinatown project.  
The reporter was passed from the Lands Minister to the 
foreign investor to the governor and on to the state vendor. 
And so it went on. How much did the consortium pay? No 
answers there (Dorney 2019:79–80). This form of stone-
walling of journalists is routine across the Pacific. It occurs 
elsewhere too but the editorial effort to get to the bottom of 
it is premised on the journalist’s persistent belief in the 
underlying news value of the story. But this belief is 
insufficient. They must be backed by their editors. Such 
efforts outside the Pacific islands are commonly better 
resourced and promoted and therefore, have more impact.  
Moving towards a new media paradigm 
Pacific journalists are as capable as any of producing 
impactful reporting on Pacific security. 
But reporting the region’s crowded and complicated 
security landscape does not occur in an institutional vacuum. 
National security reporters must track their countries’  
engagements on the regional and global stage so that their 
citizen audiences can make an informed judgment on how 
well their leaders are safeguarding the national interest. They 
must interpret their region with sufficient insight to tell 
credible stories of their nation’s unique place in it. 
Regional literacy 
The Pacific project at the Guardian Australia is funded by 
the Judith Neilson Institute for Journalism and Ideas 
(https://jninstitute.org/project/pacific-editor/). Judging by 
the quality of the published articles, it appears to be a 
genuine and practical effort to address regional illiteracy 
among reporters and audiences alike. The collaborative 
model of funding Pacific reporters on the ground to  
write long-form journalism for a different readership is 
admirable – if it can be sustained and extended. There are 
numerous shining examples of creative long-form journ-
alism that are transnational, of which The Panama Papers is 
only the best known.  
They expose and name international actors and net-
works that undermine national sovereignty, retard genuine 
development, steal national wealth and create victims. Such 
journalistic push back has been a reaction to national 
repression against independent media (Benequista 2019). It 
also makes sense that media professionals collaborate 
across borders when trade, finance, capital, labour and 
crime are all transnational. 
Regulating social media 
Professionalism alone will not protect journalists and their 
risk-averse business managers from targeted attacks and 
online influencers and their shadowy proxies. Considerable 
resources are arrayed against independent media whose 
core business is to focus audience attention on factual 
verification while telling a story.  
These were spelt out last year at a Melanesia Media 
Freedom Forum (MMFF) in Brisbane where delegates 
expressed concern at the increasing range of threats aimed 
at journalists. These threats, they declared in their final 
statement, were undermining the accountability role played 
by journalists in Melanesian democracies (MMFF 2019) 
Conventional journalistic methods can be over-
whelmed by the emotional bluster of the social media pile-
on. So often promoted as free speech, these viral moments 
produce the opposite – what I called ‘crowd-sourced 
censorship’. 
Worldwide governments seek to rein in social media 
often to clamp down on harmful abuses and sometimes to 
sandbag against unrestrained criticism. The social media 
ecology has become more complicated since mainstream 
platforms have been implicated in fake news, data theft and 
influence operations against democratic states. 
The Pacific has its own ecology with governments 
routinely threatening legislative measures, which just as 
regularly, are countered with libertarian objections. MMFF 
has led the objections. But significantly, last year’s forum 
declaration on social media was about literacy:  
The media is ready to work with all parties that want to 
improve the social media landscape: There is an urgent 
need for the media to assert its role as a source of 
accurate and impartial information and to play a role in 
building social media literacy and public understanding 
of how to identify credible sources of information. 
The statement sounds like a plea by media houses to its 
audiences to confront the social media scourge together. 
Rising media literacy will, the Forum hopes, make media 
consumers more discerning and more wary of the dangers 
of online content that manipulates, inflames and hijacks 
legitimate news narratives in ways that ultimately limit the 
online dialogue around issues that matter. 
On the other hand, Vanuatu’s Yumi Toktok Stret 
Facebook group has been successful at driving conver-
sations that hold leaders to account at election time. While 
not immune from criticism, it has avoided the polarisation 
and pile-ons that afflict so much online discourse. This has 
been possible because key officials have embraced the 
medium and invited democratic scrutiny. 
Elsewhere, in Fiji, institutional media have co-existed 
with the often anonymous postings and leaks on social 
media. According to Singh, social media has become a 
source and cover for media outlets to publish claims that are 
already circulating in social media channels.  
Governments have responded with social media regu-
lation such as in Fiji, where the Online Safety Act 2018 
targets dangerous online behaviour. Singh acknowledges a 
degree of public support for the legislation but fears  
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such laws can also ensnare reporters to the point where 
‘government is now killing two birds with one stone’ (Singh 
2018; Tarai 2019). 
On another level, social media bloggers who follow no 
other ethical code than their own compete with the more 
deliberative journalism of the major mastheads. This can 
lead journalists down a slippery slope as they try to keep up 
with what the public are fixated on at any given moment. 
Along with the pressure to feed the 24-hour news cycle, 
social media can have the effect of degrading professional 
ethical standards (Tarai and Drugunalevu 2018:5). 
Social media regulation is a global fact of life and will 
become more so. Increasingly, national security legislation 
encompasses cyberspace and the information warfare 
waged within it. National security threats are being viewed 
through the prism of cybersecurity. This has placed greater 
demands on journalists to probe what is by its nature 
hidden, hostile and hyper-partisan. For the profession, 
journalists require new precautionary skills to protect 
themselves and their sources (Benton 2019). 
The price of media freedom 
The Boe Declaration on Regional Security is a recognition 
of shared security threats and by implication, the need for 
coordinated strategies to meet them. To extend this logic 
further:  
countering these security threats expressed in non-
traditional terms rely on informed and vigilant publics. 
The national media sectors with their networks down to 
almost every town and village are well suited to surveil-
ling the security landscape and warning of impending 
threats to life, livelihood and living conditions. 
So critical to the quality and timing of information is a 
culture of information sharing between journalists and 
government officials. But it appears that the spirit and 
purpose of Boe does not translate well to the bureaucratic 
cultures of individual member states. The stonewalling and 
hostility by Pacific government officials referred to above 
is a symptom of the dysfunction between two different 
professional cultures. Last November, the Melanesia Media 
Freedom Forum complained: 
The unwillingness of politicians and officials to engage 
in dialogue is undermining the media’s accountability 
role: public figures are becoming more resistant to 
responding to direct questions from media, choosing 
instead to issue media releases, or statements on social 
media or to preferred media outlets (MMFF 2019). 
Hard conversations need to be had about the need for 
both sides to understand and respect each others’ role. More 
functional interactions will lead to unblocking information 
flow in ways that serve the broader national interest. 
According to Ben Bohane, Communications Director at the 
ANU’s Australia Pacific Security College: 
The only way to do it is to have government and media 
at the table working out the rules of the game to avoid 
this us-and-them mentality. We need to also remind 
government officials that the freedoms that are enshrined 
in their constitutions transcend individual leaders. 
Security and geography 
In the north Pacific, the critical flow of information between 
reporters and officials appears to be no more functional. 
Last August, Palauans were kept in the dark about the 
timing of a visit by US Defence Secretary Mark Esper 
(Kesolei 2020). The Republic of Palau, which has a 
compact agreement with the United States, is currently 
reviewing the agreement with its long-time underwriter, as 
are its Micronesian neighbours Republic of the Marshall 
Islands (RMI) and the Federated States of Micronesia 
(FSM). Current compact funding arrangements will end for 
RMI and FSM in 2023 and for Palau in 2024 (Firth 2010). 
The importance of these negotiations to the security of 
Micronesian peoples well into the future is obvious but the 
mere presence of such a high-level political actor in their 
region will always test the analytical skills of local 
reporters. Their written accounts are disadvantaged as long 
as they are unable to frame their own news agendas. Like 
an episode of Survivor, the location is a mere backdrop to a 
scripted message delivered to the world with the locals out 
of frame. 
Three hours after touchdown, the Defence Secretary 
was gone again with a minimalist 143-word Department of 
Defence statement released in his wake. No wonder the 
dominant story that spread globally was the letter to Esper 
from the Palauan president urging the US to set up military 
facilities on the islands (Carreon and Doherty 2020).  
The release of the letter played cleverly to different 
audiences and showed a Pacific statesman well versed in the 
‘new Pacific diplomacy’, combining traditional defence  
and non-traditional economic security agendas to amplify 
Palau’s strategic value as a large ocean state not to be 
ignored by great-power competitors in the north Pacific. 
Equally adept has been the joint call by the leaders of 
Palau, Nauru, Kiribati, RMI and FSM to threaten with-
drawal from the PIF if their Micronesian nominee for the 
next Secretary-General is not installed, according to an 
arrangement to rotate the position between the three PIF 
sub-regions (Carreon 2020). 
Over in Guam, Mar-Vic Cagurangan publishes Pacific 
Island Times, an online magazine that covers Guam, the 
Northern Marianas and Palau. She manages a team of about 
12 freelance writers who have access to local officials. 
However, even though Guam is a trust territory of the US, 
they cannot approach official sources based on the US 
mainland:  
The Joint Region Marianas is our direct contact to the 
military. We can ask them questions. If we get a 
response, we’re going to get a one-line or two-line 
response. But otherwise, it’s not as accessible as we 
hope them to be. The inaccessible sources [are] the 
national officials, national agencies. We do not have the 
same access to national sources in the same way our 
counterparts in the mainland do. 
In Palau, the information culture of government is more 
open but the journalistic culture underdeveloped to the point 
where, according to Palau-based correspondent and chair of 
media advocacy group Pacific Freedom Forum, Bernadette 
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Carreon, ‘they are not well informed yet to ask questions. 
That’s the tricky part here, confidence’. Professional 
interactions do not allow for reporters to build trust with 
their government sources. On the contrary, she says, ‘Most 
of the time they scrutinise the media.’ 
Both women by necessity are generalists in what they 
report ‘from politics to police’. This leaves few openings 
for developing specialist reporters in say, national security, 
diplomacy, or foreign affairs at a time when specialist 
knowledge and experience is most required. For the young 
reporters that Cagurangan supervises: 
[security is] kind of a strange concept for them since 
they’re new to this field. If they have an understanding 
at all of security issues, it’s very thin, not enough 
information for them to write a story that is as inform-
ative as it should be. 
Large ocean media 
Organised civil society has influenced how the new Pacific 
diplomacy frames regional interests – from ocean manage-
ment, trade policy to what rights need protecting. But non-
traditional threats compel us to recognise the media as civil 
society embedded in the fibre of an evolving Pacific 
regionalism. Protecting the oceans of the ‘Blue Pacific’ 
depends in part on staunching the flow of information 
pollution washing over the islands. A ‘Blue Pacific’ without 
these soft defences is as vulnerable as a small island unable 
to monitor and protect its vast marine habitat. 
With expanded concepts of security, we need an 
expanded role for media. And within the chaotic attention 
economy, there are opportunities for Pacific journalists to 
survey their rich and nuanced security landscape and expand 
their storytelling for a more integrated region, consolidating 
information markets by multiplying consensus-style dia-
logues underwritten by principles of free expression. 
This requires a confidence on their part to re-frame and 
re-package their own unique accounts and promote them 
through regional (and international) media markets. Media 
capacity building in the Pacific is nothing new but the speed 
and complexity of evolving security agendas will require a 
new way of telling to cut through the crowded and noisy 
transborder mediascape.  
This dynamic landscape has the potential to profoundly 
impact Pacific identities, forge new cross border alliances 
and lead to new demographic patterns for island cultures. 
Pacific journalists have a critical role in explaining these 
changes to their publics in ways that harmonise with local 
conceptions of security.  
Note 
1 Due to publication dates, this journal does not include two 
very significant events that occurred in the Pacific on 
February 5, 2021. These were the Micronesian countries 
leaving the Pacific Island Forum and the unexplained 
deportation from Fiji of the Vice Chancellor of the 
University of the South Pacific.     
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Telecommunication security in the Pacific region 
Amanda HA Watson, The Australian National University 
The telecommunication sector in the Pacific 
The telecommunication sector in the Pacific consists of com-
panies that provide services and governments that legislate 
relevant rules, often with an independent regulator that sells 
spectrum and ensures compliance. For consumers, the main 
devices used are mobile telephones, the internet, and landline 
telephones powered by an infrastructure that includes 
undersea, underground and overhead internet cables, tele-
communication towers, and internet exchange points. 
Across the Pacific region, there has been: 
dramatic growth in the uptake of mobile technology 
since around 2005, fuelled by competition, market 
liberalisation, network expansion, introduction of pre-
paid mobile services and [the] sale of more affordable 
mobile devices (Watson et al. 2017:117).  
Nonetheless, user uptake remains below potential, with 
only: 
38 per cent of the population [was] subscribed to a 
mobile service as at the end of 2018, [and] this trails the 
average for least developed countries (44 per cent) 
(GSMA 2019:3).  
There is substantial variation between countries, with 
the highest uptake of mobile telephony in Fiji (84 per cent), 
followed by Palau (67 per cent), New Caledonia (66 per 
cent), and Guam (65 per cent), and the lowest uptake in 
Marshall Islands (11 per cent), the Federated States of 
Micronesia (17 per cent), Kiribati (19 per cent), and Tuvalu 
(24 per cent) (GSMA 2019). The most populous country in 
the region is Papua New Guinea (PNG), also home to the 
largest number of people who do not own mobile tele-
phones (Highet et al. 2019). 
Despite the expansion of mobile telephone networks, 
internet access has remained expensive and unreliable 
(Cullen and Hassall 2017). In 2020, new undersea internet 
cables are predicted to increase bandwidth availability and 
speeds and possibly reduce prices in several countries. The 
Coral Sea Cable links PNG and Solomon Islands with 
Australia, while the Manatua Cable connects Samoa, Niue, 
Cook Islands and French Polynesia. In addition, mobile 
networks are transitioning from voice calls and text mes-
saging to an increasing focus on mobile internet capability, 
allowing Pacific Islanders to access the internet using 
mobile devices. Deployment of advanced mobile networks 
and the availability of cheap smartphone handsets are 
predicted to enable a third of the region’s population to have 
mobile internet access by 2025 (GSMA 2019). In addition, 
office workers in urban areas are increasingly likely to have 
internet access at desktop computers in their workplaces. 
Social media platforms allow internet users to interact 
with one another, share photographs, distribute videos, 
voice their opinions, and re-distribute materials they have 
received. Such platforms have grown in popularity in recent 
years: ‘as of November 2012, there were approximately 
700,000 Pacific Island Facebook users’ (Cave 2012:7). By 
November 2018, there were about the same number of 
Facebook users (approximately 750,000) in PNG alone 
(Highet et al. 2019). 
The Boe Declaration and the 
telecommunication sector 
The Pacific Islands Forum’s 2018 Boe Declaration on Reg-
ional Security included reference to information sharing – 
which could be aided through the use of telecommun-
ications – and called for an increasing emphasis on cyber-
security ‘to maximise protections and opportunities for 
Pacific infrastructure and peoples in the digital age’ (Pacific 
Islands Forum Secretariat 2018:n.p.). Increasing access to 
telephones and internet connectivity provides opportunities, 
but also creates security risks including cyber-attacks and 
transnational crime.  
Telecommunication sector regulation 
Telecommunication access supports many kinds of com-
munication and enables communication that can be viewed 
as ‘good’ – such as telehealth, remote learning and co-
ordination of logistics. Telecommunication access also 
enables communications that are criminal or deemed to 
be ‘bad’ – such as harassment, bullying, and child abuse. 
Criminal use of telecommunication requires responses from 
law enforcement, while other beneficial use can invoke 
personal or community responses, or legislative changes 
and policy shifts. It is worth noting that telecommunications 
can also be used to report crimes, for example, through a 
police telephone hotline in Lae, PNG (Putt et al. 2020). 
Pacific Island governments and donor partners generally 
view telecommunication access as beneficial, although there 
are concerns about negative impacts. In particular, social 
media platforms are viewed with concern. Pacific Island 
governments have attempted to regulate social media by 
devising legislation to prosecute cybercriminals and in some 
cases have tried to restrict access or threatened to do so (Kant 
et al. 2018). As Singh has explained: 
while governments could be accused of censorship, they 
have some real concerns about social media abuse, and 
the damage to individuals, communities and society 
(2020:55). 
For instance, the government of PNG introduced a 
cybercrime law in 2016 that ‘allows the prosecution of people 
who publish defamatory material or incite violence on social 
media, raising concerns that it could be misused to punish 
legitimate speech’ (Freedom House 2019:n.p.). Critics have 
pointed out that the law does not include wording that 
‘protects freedom of expression, specifically critical political 
discourse’ (Kant et al. 2018:70). Addressing such concerns, 
Dawidi has argued that the law is: 
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not the result of some sinister ploy by the Government 
to shut out our right to freedom of speech (which in any 
case, is a qualified Constitutional right) or opinions on 
corruption (2016:n.p.).  
In Nauru, Facebook was blocked for nearly three years 
(Kant et al. 2018) and in 2020, similar bans were proposed 
in Samoa (Wilson 2020) and Solomon Islands (Kekea 
2020). In 2018, the then PNG Communication Minister 
Sam Basil threatened to ban Facebook – a suggestion that 
received widespread criticism within the country (Kant et 
al. 2018, Matsakis 2018). A policy of mandatory mobile 
telephone registration has limited certain people’s access, at 
least temporarily (Watson 2020). 
Challenges for telecommunication 
companies in the Pacific 
For telecommunication operators in the region (or those 
considering entering the region), there are a number of 
challenges, including small populations, low population 
densities, widely dispersed islands, and the need for access 
to sufficient spectrum (GSMA 2019). In PNG, telecom-
munication companies face these challenges and are also 
hindered by: mountainous terrain; very limited electricity 
provision; low adult literacy rates; high costs of infra-
structure maintenance; re-fuelling and upgrades; frequent 
infrastructure vandalism; and disputes with landowners at 
tower sites (Highet et al. 2019, Watson, Miller and Schmidt 
2020). 
Market competition, liberalisation and 
persistent monopolies 
Twenty years ago, most Pacific nations had only one tele-
communication company in operation. Since then, there have 
been efforts to increase competition – a process known as 
market liberalisation – across PNG, Fiji, Vanuatu, and 
Solomon Islands (Foster and Horst 2018, GSMA 2019, 
Watson 2011). Not all efforts at market liberalisation have, 
however, been successful – an effort to introduce competition 
in Marshall Islands has had no success as yet (GSMA 2019). 
Introducing competition creates consumer choice, 
leading to reductions in retail prices. Sometimes – coincid-
ing with privatisation of a state-owned entity – competition 
can also lead to an expansion of network coverage, 
increased availability of telephone services, and increased 
efficiency (World Bank 2005). For example, after compet-
ittion was introduced to the telecommunication sector in 
Vanuatu, access to telecommunication services increased, 
‘reducing the costs of doing business and expanding  
business opportunities’ (Basnett and Brien 2009:54). 
According to the GSMA – a peak body for mobile 
telephone companies – ‘the most favourable market struc-
ture for promoting investment and innovation is one with 
two or three mobile operators’ (2019:11). In the Pacific 
region, small populations in island nations and territories, 
coupled with low population density, make it difficult for 
markets to support more than one or two players, thus 
limiting market competition (GSMA 2019). Out of 23 
countries and territories, 13 have only one active mobile 
operator and Guam is the only country to have four mobile 
operators (GSMA 2019). In PNG, Digicel is the only 
company offering mobile network coverage in rural areas, 
resulting in an effective monopoly because consumers there 
do not have the option of using other service providers 
(Suwamaru 2015, Watson and Fox 2019). 
There are numerous reasons why persistent monopolies 
are concerning. Monopolies present potential security risks 
because the people in such locations are dependent on one 
company for all of their telecommunication needs. If  
the company experiences technical failures, becomes insol-
vent, or decides for any reason to leave that market, the 
citizens may be left with no telecommunication services. As 
Suwamaru has explained, a monopoly coupled with a weak 
regulatory environment could mean that ‘citizens may be 
subject to the whims of the incumbent […], with associated 
likely impacts on price and choice’ (2015:1–2). 
Telecommunication sector vulnerabilities  
Aside from regulatory, operational and market issues, the 
Pacific region’s telecommunication sector faces two key vul-
nerabilities that could threaten the sector’s long-term via-
bility and sustainability – natural disasters and cybersecurity. 
The Pacific region is prone to natural disasters and their 
frequency and severity are likely to increase due to climate 
change (Australian Department of Defence 2016, Barnes 
2020, Conroy 2019). In addition, PNG and other Pacific 
nations experience earthquakes and volcanic eruptions due 
to tectonic plate movements. Earthquakes have been known 
to damage undersea and underground cables (Wall 2020). 
Overhead cables and towers are also vulnerable to storms, 
cyclones and landslides. Flooding can make roads impas-
sable, meaning re-fuelling and maintenance vehicles cannot 
reach telecommunication towers to keep them functioning. 
For instance, in Central and South Bougainville, vehicles 
often need to ford rivers to complete their journeys and this 
can be impossible if there has been heavy rain upstream 
(Watson et al. 2020).  
Cybersecurity is an important area of concern, due to 
the technology now available in the Pacific region. As 
stipulated in the Boe Declaration, cybersecurity requires an 
increased emphasis. An expected rise in internet access due 
to the launch of new undersea internet cables in the Pacific 
region ‘will require dramatic and rapid improvements to 
currently low levels of cyber maturity’ (Australian Strategic 
Policy Institute 2017:4). 
A computer emergency response team (CERT) had 
been established for the Pacific region in 2011, but its 
operations were suspended in 2014, due to lack of funding 
(Australian Strategic Policy Institute 2017). The Australian 
Government launched the Pacific Cyber Security Oper-
ational Network (PaCSON) initiative in 2018 that allows 
numerous Pacific nations, Australia, and New Zealand ‘to 
share cyber security threat information, tools, techniques 
and ideas’ (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 
n.d.:1). But even with this increased focus on transnational 
collaboration, there has been no meeting of the relevant 
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Pacific ministers since 2015 (Hogeveen 2020). Hogeveen 
posits this could be because cybersecurity is considered a 
national issue, rather than one requiring regional coord-
ination, and he also speculates there may be a level of com-
petition between Pacific nations that want to seize oppor-
tunities by advancing their technology expertise and 
capability (ibid). There are also gender implications to 
consider: 
The rapidly evolving digital connectivity across the 
Pacific brings many opportunities – for increased access 
to market information, better educational resources and 
political voice. But there are also well-known downsides 
of increased digital access, no less relevant in the 
Pacific. Social networking can bring cyberbullying, and 
more intense surveillance of partners. Where inequity 
between the sexes is already high these vulnerabilities 
are magnified. Empowering women to be aware of the 
pitfalls, and to make the most of the opportunities will 
require them to be at the policy table and able to access 
information about digital security. (Gillies 2020:n.p.) 
A review of the ‘cyber maturity’ of 25 countries in the 
Asia–Pacific region found that the four Pacific nations 
included were lowly ranked: Vanuatu was 17th; Fiji was 
22nd; PNG was 23rd; and Solomon Islands was 25th out of 
25 countries (Australian Strategic Policy Institute 2017). 
Within the region, ‘individual country responses to cyber-
crime vary significantly, and most changes are quite recent’ 
(Kant et al. 2018:68). According to Hogeveen, numerous 
Pacific nations ‘have reviewed, or are currently reviewing, 
legislation related to data-sharing, cybersecurity and uni-
versal access’ (2020:3). Hogeveen (2020) assessed the 
cybersecurity preparedness of several Pacific Island nations 
by reviewing their policy settings and whether they have a 
CERT. Table 1 summarises these findings, with additional 
information on cybercrime legislation from Kant et al. 
(2018).  
Cybersecurity has links to geostrategic competition and 
geopolitical tensions because Pacific countries import tech-
nology from third-party providers. For instance, Australia 
and several other nations have banned the Chinese company 
Huawei from participating in the rollout of their upcoming 
advanced mobile networks, mainly due to allegations ‘that 
the company’s products may purposely contain security 
holes that China’s government could use for spying 
purposes’ (Panettieri 2020). By contrast, the PNG State 
Enterprises Minister Sasindran Muthuvel has been quoted as 
saying that Huawei is currently the preferred commun-
ication equipment supplier for the country (The National 
2020). It is understood that a driver of Australia’s decision 
to fund the Coral Sea Cable was that it did not want China’s 
Huawei providing an undersea internet cable to PNG and 
Solomon Islands. Australia provided a domestic cable 
within Solomon Islands, but Huawei has built a domestic 
cable within PNG, funded with a loan from China’s EXIM 
Bank.  
Another example is a data centre constructed for the 
PNG government by Huawei through an earlier loan, 
which an Australian-funded report later deemed to be 
below expected cybersecurity standards (Grigg 2020a). 
China denied the implication that they were spying (Yafoi 
2020, see also Braddock 2020). The PNG Communication 
Minister Timothy Masiu has labelled the data centre a 
failure (Moi 2020) and said the loan for its construction 
should not be repaid (Grigg 2020b). The debt for the data 
centre project is in addition to other debts owed to China 
for communication sector initiatives, including the dom-
estic cable already mentioned (Wall 2020). 
Table 1: Cybersecurity in the Pacific 
Country Policy settings CERT status 
Fiji There is no 
cybersecurity strategy 
but there is a 
commission to oversee 
online safety. A 2018 bill 
‘focuses on countering 
irresponsible social 
media use’ (Hogeveen 
2020:17). 
There is no national 
CERT. 





A 2016 bill targets 
cybercrime. 
There is a national 
CERT. 
Samoa There is a national 
cybersecurity policy. 
Cybercrime has also 
been added to existing 
crimes legislation. 
Scoping activities have 




A working group is 
developing a national 
cybersecurity policy. 
There is a design of a 
proposed national 
CERT. 
Tonga There is cybercrime 
legislation. 
There is a national 
CERT. 
Vanuatu There is a national 
cybersecurity policy. 
There is a national 
CERT. 
Source: Based on Hogeveen (2020) and Kant et al. (2018). 
Large players in the Pacific 
Although there are several players in the Pacific telecom-
munications market, the dominance of two mobile network 
operators means the region is reliant upon their continued 
operation.  
Digicel was established by Irish businessman Denis 
O’Brien and commenced operations in Jamaica in 2001 
before expanding throughout the Caribbean and to nume-
rous countries in Central America over the next five years 
(Foster and Horst 2018). Digicel’s first Pacific market was 
Samoa in 2006, followed by its launch in PNG in 2007. 
Digicel also operates in Fiji, Tonga, Vanuatu, and Nauru. 
Digicel made a substantial investment to establish mobile 
networks in the Pacific and build goodwill through  
various initiatives – including sports sponsorship and the 
establishment of a philanthropic foundation in PNG 
(Foster and Horst 2018, Watson and Mahuru 2017, Watson 
and Seddon 2017). Within Pacific markets, Digicel’s 
dominance varies – it has 92 per cent market share in PNG 
(Highet et al. 2019) – but only a third of the market in Fiji 
(Foster and Horst 2018, McLeod 2020). As well as pro-
viding telecommunication services, in PNG, the company 
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also offers an online news service and pay television 
(Suwamaru 2015).  
A weighty concern regarding the sustainability of 
Digicel’s operations in the Pacific is the substantial burden 
of debt held by the parent company, Digicel Group. Denis 
O’Brien owns 99.9 per cent of Digicel Group (Brennan 
2020a), which reportedly had a large debt of US$7 billion 
as of June 2020 (McLeod 2020). Digicel Group offered its 
Pacific business as security to its creditors in a debt restruct-
ure (Needham 2020) that reduced its debt by US$1.6 billion 
(Brennan 2020a). Credit ratings agency Moody’s has repor-
tedly suggested that the company is effectively defaulting 
on its loans (Brennan 2020b). Digicel Group has indicated 
that it expects a downturn in earnings due to the impacts of 
the novel coronavirus of 2019 (COVID-19) (Brennan 
2020a). 
Amalgamated Telecom Holdings (ATH) is a public 
company listed on the South Pacific Stock Exchange in Fiji 
with mobile networks in American Samoa, Cook Islands, 
Fiji, Kiribati, Samoa, and Vanuatu. ATH recently received 
funding from the Asian Development Bank to set up a new 
mobile telephone network in PNG (Asian Development 
Bank 2020). ATH has a partnership with Vodafone in some 
markets, sport sponsorship arrangements in Fiji and Samoa, 
and operates a philanthropic foundation in Fiji. According 
to a March 2020 financial statement, the company made a 
profit in the preceding year but paid no dividends and 
considers regulation a threat to those profits, stating ‘profit-
ability can be significantly impacted by regulatory agencies 
which govern the telecommunication sector’ (Amalgamated 
Telecom Holdings 2020:48). The company also noted the 
uncertain impact of COVID-19, related travel restrictions and 
potential economic fallout. 
In small states, governments may not be able to 
effectively regulate the market or ‘have the capacity to 
enforce a licence breach against a company like Digicel, 
especially when the company has engaged a previously 
underserved population’ (Logan and Forsyth 2018:19). 
In order for Pacific nations to maintain access to tele-
communication services, it would be wise to balance the 
sustainability of corporations with scrutiny of their 
actions through regulatory oversight (Logan and Forsyth 
2018). 
Conclusion 
Availability of mobile telephones is a relatively recent phe-
nomenon in many parts of the Pacific and is a noteworthy 
development, given limited landline telephone penetration. 
The internet has recently become more available. The tele-
communication sector is crucial as an enabler of com-
munication, which has an intrinsic value: 
Communication has value of itself, not just as a means 
to other ends like increased access to markets or the 
achievement of development goals. (Watson 2011:277) 
Telecommunication companies operating in the region 
face numerous challenges, including damage to infrastructure 
due to natural disasters, and an immature cybersecurity 
structure. Pacific governments would do well to balance the 
need for cybersecurity with citizens’ rights to freedom of 
expression. Various actors could work together to address the 
need for more robust and secure telecommunications net-
works and markets. 
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Listening to Pacific Security Practitioners:  
Determination, skills and diversity 
Jay Caldwell, The Australian National University 
Overview 
The Boe Declaration provides an important catalyst for 
Pacific Island conversations on key security issues. This 
paper provides an example of a collaborative conversation 
that encouraged frank discussion on the priority security 
challenges across the region including how Pacific people 
prefer to address their security risks and how they perceive 
future security in the Pacific.  
In 2019, the newly formed Australia Pacific Security 
College (PSC) had an open conversation with Pacific 
security practitioners on the region’s security risk profile. 
The Pacific practitioners expressed a shared determination 
to take agency over their own security risks and build their 
capacity to respond – regardless of the threat. As a result, 
there was high interest in having the right human capital and 
skills mix available, whether that was within the national 
and regional institutions or through the relationship 
between formal and customary governance structures.  
The conversation was strongly focused on human 
security issues, including health and gender which were 
given particularly high emphasis as nationally destabilising 
and less well addressed and climate and environmental 
security as magnifiers of human security issues. The levels of 
harm arising from traditional security concerns were difficult 
to quantify. 
Setting up the conversation 
Between July–December 2019, the PSC leadership team 
conducted a series of conversations with 107 Pacific 
security practitioners to understand their security priorities 
in greater detail. All of the practitioners held formal roles 
as: government officials; leaders of regional organisations; 
political advisers; leaders of uniformed forces; leaders of 
non-government organisations; officials from multilateral 
organisations; and academics. The PSC directly consulted 
with leaders in seven Pacific Island countries, seven 
regional organisations, and with a number of Australian and 
New Zealand officials. Approximately 40 per cent of 
consultation participants were women. 
The objective of the conversations was to:  
1. identify the norms that govern behaviour and security 
activity; 
2.  illuminate the way that Pacific security systems are 
governed; and  
3. identify opportunities for collaboration (Jenz & Wofford, 
2008). 
Pacific leaders engaged in the conversation to shape the suite 
of activities that would form the PSC’s 2020 work plan, 
rather than as a research activity. This paper considers the 
aggregated messages from across the region rather than those 
from specific practitioners. The picture generated through 
these conversations was partial. Our highest volume of 
engagement was with Melanesia, some engagement with 
Polynesian states, and limited engagement with the small 
island state members of the Pacific Islands Forum. The 
limited reach was due to the travel disruptions associated 
with the COVID-19 pandemic. The PSC will progressively 
fill the gaps in this picture, as travel and digital engagement 
permits, to deepen its contribution to the Pacific security 
conversation.  
Determination to seize the agenda 
The first striking insight from our conversations was the 
determination to assert Pacific agency despite the com-
plexity of the security environment. 
At an individual, institutional and national level, 
Pacific security practitioners reflected on the broader 
paradigm shift that Fry and Tarte (2015) have labelled ‘new 
Pacific diplomacy’ – the confident assertion of collective 
Pacific identity and interests on the global agenda. It is 
reflected in the way Pacific leaders have used the Boe 
Declaration as an instrument to shape the narrative on what 
can legitimately be construed as ‘security’ in the Pacific 
region. It is echoed in public messages by senior Pacific 
leaders on the importance of the Pacific asserting its shared 
interests in a contested environment (Tuilaepa 2020; Taylor 
2019). 
Confidence at the regional level is percolating down to 
the national and institutional level. For individual prac-
titioners, the Boe Declaration was seen as a source of 
legitimacy, authority, and pride in a distinctly Pacific 
tailoring of security. Despite the complexity of the security 
environment, a number of confident practitioners also saw 
the geopolitical competition of the moment as an opportunity 
to leverage in negotiations with larger partners. This view 
aligned with the strong public messages from regional 
leaders about the opportunities that competition can provide 
to the Pacific (Taylor, 2019).  
While striking, there are some caveats to Pacific intent. 
The absorptive capacity of Pacific states for enhancing 
security capability was at – or in some cases beyond – 
limits. Some small island states with limited bureaucratic 
capabilities discussed feeling overwhelmed by security 
challenges that required sustained focus, coordination or 
high levels of multilateral collaboration. Indeed, the con-
versation with all Pacific security practitioners quickly 
turned to the skills and capabilities they needed. 
The priority is skills 
The second striking insight from our conversation is that 
Pacific leaders consistently focused on capability over 
threats/issues. The uncertainty and volatility of the security 
 
February 2021 137 
environment combined with the limited human capacity of 
governments are driving an increased appetite for skills 
development. If Pacific countries are to assert their own 
agency in addressing security challenges, they need to 
develop sovereign capability. 
Pacific practitioners identified the key challenge for 
addressing complex security risks as a lack of government 
collaboration and coordination. The desperately needed 
skills outlined by Pacific security leaders were leadership, 
deeper analytic capacity, security policy development skills, 
and international engagement capacity across government. 
Core public service skills and capacity such as writing, 
communication, and data management, were also identified. 
The priorities are captured in Figure 1 below. 
Figure 1: Skill requirements identified by Pacific 
security practitioners 
 
The call by Pacific security leaders for improved 
collaboration and coordination resonates with the ‘Blue 
Pacific’ framing. As Samoan Prime Minister Tuilaepa 
Aiono Sailele Malielegaoi described, the Blue Pacific is 
about more than healthy oceans; it is a regional narrative on 
the importance of connectedness, stewardship and taking 
responsibility (Tuilaepa, 2017). Collaboration is critical if 
Pacific security leaders are to address the complex security 
issues the region faces, but there is widespread recognition 
that the siloed operations of governments are inhibiting 
their ability to respond to threats or seize opportunities, 
particularly in relation to the development and imple-
mentation of their national security strategies.1  
Many of the practitioners saw the commitment by 
Pacific Island Forum countries to develop a national 
security strategy (under the Boe Declaration) as a useful 
mechanism to drive whole-of-government collaboration on 
security. There is a difference between developing a strat-
egy and implementing with impact. All countries still 
appear to be searching for the commitment, authority and 
supporting institutions needed to drive multi-agency 
collaboration and inclusion, such as National Security 
Committees (which allow ministers to integrate and align a 
whole-of-government security effort). While we heard 
strong interest in national security decision-making struc-
tures internationally, most felt that any architecture needed 
to be adapted to Pacific contexts in order to be useful and 
sustainable. 
Several security leaders noted their communities would 
be safer and stronger if governments could coordinate with 
customary authority structures such as chiefs, churches, and 
women’s associations. Many practitioners saw customary 
structures as having the potential to play a powerful role in 
responding to domestic security issues, e.g. health, food, 
and community-based law enforcement. However, there 
was frustration with getting very different social and 
authority structures to align. One example of success we 
heard in Fiji was the appointment of the Turaga Ni Koro 
(village headmen) as primary search and rescue (SAR) 
coordinators for incidents at sea, with the authority to report 
and initiate SAR activities (Fiji Government 2019). 
The most common direct request for assistance that 
PSC received from practitioners was to strengthen the 
national capacity to conduct strategic analyses. Pacific 
countries want to be able to say with confidence what their 
own security concerns are, rather than have someone 
external define them. They also want to engage decision-
makers and develop a shared picture of security threats 
between the political class and other relevant stakeholders. 
Several Pacific countries have ambitions to establish or 
enhance dedicated analytic capacity. Fiji established the 
National Integrated Coordination Centre (NICC) in October 
2019 to ‘contextualise risks that may develop into a national 
crisis and recommend mitigating measures … to manage … 
and allow for a better situational awareness’ (Kumar 2019). 
Importantly, the view from several security leaders was that 
analytic skills would only be developed and sustained 
through the creation of a career pathway for analysts. 
Policy development was a conversation that covered the 
design of new security policy and the challenges of imple-
menting whole-of-government policy. We heard some 
examples of practices that appear contrary to effective 
policy development, including security policy proposals 
being presented to Cabinet for decision with no form of 
costing, and no requirement for proposals to consider or 
align with policies/responsibilities already in place. We also 
heard examples of strong policy processes and Pacific 
countries forming and driving partnerships to achieve their 
policy development goals. Several donor countries are 
active in this space, providing training and partnering to 
support the development of key pieces of national security 
policy. Indeed, the PSC has subsequently begun a dialogue 
with the Fiji Government to identify and reflect on the 
strengths of Fiji’s ‘home grown’ solutions to national 
security policy challenges (Sovasiga 2020). 
Leadership was seen as a key requirement for Pacific 
countries and communities to secure their interests, although 
the characteristics of leadership required at the national level 
were not always clearly expressed. Pacific security prac-
titioners explained that leadership development was a 
fiercely contested area, as regional donors see it as an 
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opportunity for access to and collaboration with current and 
emerging decision makers. The loudest voices on the need 
for leadership were the regional organisations, with most 
offering some form of leadership training. 
There are a number of characteristics of leadership  
that practitioners believe are required to improve overall 
security outcomes: leaders need confidence and judgment 
in the face of political pressures; they need a vision for 
modernising operations and to be champions of change; and 
they need to plan, mentor and develop their replacements to 
ensure the strengthening of security capacity over time. 
There was a persistent sense that something was 
missing from the current capacity development offerings on 
leadership, but it was difficult to identify the gaps without 
wider consultations about needs. PSC in partnership with 
lead agencies in-country ran the facilitated multi-agency 
workshops to identify security priorities. In these work-
shops, Pacific practitioners identified that they wanted to 
strengthen their leadership capacity by improving their 
ability to facilitate a shared security conversation and their 
skills to provide their own strategic analyses.  
Practitioners also frequently raised the need for 
improved international engagement skills to meet the 
demands of a contested international environment. 
Practitioners noted that their countries could get more of 
what they need if their public services could better handle 
international engagement, diplomacy, and foreign policy. 
Some practitioners mentioned examples of where donors 
had negotiated projects directly with line agencies to take 
advantage of the limited understanding on the ground of 
strategic implications or broader national interests. One 
practitioner envisioned building a small cohort of policy 
advisers with the skills to engage donors and assess the risks 
arising from all new proposals.  
Coherence and diversity: Security threats 
The third striking insight from our conversations was how 
Pacific security practitioners defined the boundaries of 
security and what they identified as pressing threats. The 
security threats raised by practitioners reinforced the Boe 
Declaration categories of human, climate/environment, and 
traditional security. The conversations helped us to unpack 
how these high level categories were understood in the 
Pacific.  
Human Security: Human security was the biggest focus, 
even if practitioners were unclear on the definition. Human 
security coalesced most acutely on the issues of health 
security, gender, and youth. Some Pacific practitioners 
made passing references to economic security and even 
labour mobility as human security issues, but those ideas 
were not further developed in our conversations. Given the 
anticipated impact of COVID-19 on Pacific economies, we 
will be listening for a shift in the dialogue and whether 
Pacific security leaders consider economic resilience an 
element of human security. 
During the 2019 consultations – even prior to the 2019 
Samoan Measles Epidemic and COVID-19 Pandemic – 
health security was already the most prominent single 
security issue raised in all country consultations. Rather 
than infectious disease, practitioners prioritised Non-
Communicable Diseases (NCDs) such as heart disease and 
cancer as primary health security threats. Cardiovascular 
diseases, diabetes, cancers and chronic respiratory diseases 
account for more than 80 per cent of all deaths in the region, 
50 per cent of all premature mortality (those under 70 years 
of age), and impose heavy costs on economically cons-
trained Pacific governments (World Health Organization, 
2014; Magnusson and Patterson 2015). 
NCDs also have a direct impact on the capacity of 
security services to address national security risks. 
Practitioners noted that long serving staff are often taken 
out of the promotion stream early due to NCDs (e.g. gout 
and diabetes) at a time when they could be making a 
significant contribution. In 2019, Fiji Police identified that 
77 per cent of officer deaths from 2014–19 were from NCD-
related illnesses (Chaudhary, 2019).  
When gender-based violence was raised in our con-
sultations, most security practitioners described it as a 
characteristic of their environments that needed attention, but 
not specifically as a security challenge of focus. Samoa is one 
country that has explicitly addressed gender-based violence 
as a security threat, noting it has reached the point where  
the volume of violence is having a ‘serious impact on 
development’ (Department of the Prime Minister and 
Cabinet, 2018:12). However, gender was also raised in a 
number of conversations as a solution to security challenges, 
namely the need for women to take an increasing role in 
security leadership. The Pacific Islands Chiefs of Police have 
identified ‘diversifying their workforce’ as a key action 
needed to improve operational policing (Pacific Islands 
Chiefs of Police, 2020). 
The youth bulge was considered a human security issue 
of high concern in Melanesia. The effects of low youth 
engagement/education/unemployment on law and order are 
strongly on the minds of some leaders, though practitioners 
from other parts of the Pacific did not raise youth as a 
security issue.  
Climate/Environmental security: In the view of Pacific 
security practitioners, climate/environmental security covered 
a cluster of issues including climate resilience, disaster relief 
capacity, food security, and natural resource security 
(including fisheries). There was also widespread recognition of 
climate change as a systemic magnifier that is compounding a 
number of security issues in the domains of human and 
traditional security. 
The Boe Declaration states that climate change remains 
the single greatest threat to the security and well-being of 
the peoples of the Pacific. Climate resilience was raised 
only a small number of times as a stand-alone issue. This 
was not because climate change is not inherently important, 
but because it was seen as a pervasive variable affecting all 
security issues. The low profile of climate security in our 
discussions also appears to reflect the significant amount of 
donor activity already occurring in this space. A number of 
security practitioners noted Pacific governments were 
experiencing ‘engagement fatigue’ on climate risk. 
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For a number of security practitioners, the focus was 
beyond climate risk to the vulnerability that a lack of 
humanitarian relief and disaster response (HADR) capacity 
has created for Pacific countries. Some practitioners noted 
the challenges of coordinating joint disaster relief/recovery 
efforts between an increasing number of actors, including 
police, defence, border services, health, agriculture, rural 
affairs, as well as some NGOs. Several practitioners noted 
that the combination of high vulnerability and coordin- 
ation requirements had resulted in establishing the Pacific 
Humanitarian Protection Cluster, a unique United Nations 
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN 
OCHA)–coordinated system that operates on a ‘permanent 
standby’ basis rather than only activating in disasters. 
Practitioners across the Pacific also emphasised the need – 
but also the challenges involved – to bring civil society into 
disaster relief efforts. At a regional level, the PICP 
Secretariat has identified HADR response capability in the 
2020–24 PICP Strategic Plan as critical for implementing 
stronger security policy. 
For the majority of Pacific security practitioners, food 
security was an element of climate resilience, disaster 
response, livelihood security, or biosecurity. A minority 
linked food security and food quality to the broader issue of 
health security. Fisheries is a crucial part of the security con-
versation given its place as a crucial source of national 
revenue for a number of Pacific states (primarily offshore 
fisheries) and food security (primarily coastal fisheries). 
However, there was limited discussion on fisheries in 
isolation during our consultations. Similar to climate 
security, the assumption is that fisheries are an environ-
mental, transnational and livelihood security issue where 
Pacific countries are asserting their interests and are well 
served by extant partnerships to address and manage risks 
(Aqorau 2019). 
Traditional Security: The Boe Declaration lists trans-
national crime and cyber security as traditional security 
challenges in need of attention. The additional high priority 
issue raised during the 2019 consultations by Pacific 
practitioners was border security. Rather than as a specific 
security challenge, geopolitical contest was commonly 
referred to as the increasingly difficult context for pursuing 
security and an opportunity to be leveraged.  
The two pervasive transnational crime focal areas for 
practitioners were drug trafficking and human trafficking. 
Our conversations echoed academic concerns about the lack 
of quality data to measure the scale or impact of trans-
national crime in the Pacific (Chelliah and Prasad 2017; 
UNODC 2016). Practitioners in several Pacific states 
prioritised drug smuggling as a focus for law enforcement 
cooperation, however it was unclear what level of harm 
Pacific Islands states experienced as a result of the domestic 
spill over of trafficked drugs. A practitioner from an NGO 
working to counter people smuggling admitted the organ-
isation has a number of programs in place in the Pacific that 
are based on anecdotal evidence, with limited under-
standing of the true drivers of human trafficking in the 
region. Despite these concerns, there was still confidence in 
regional agencies such as Pacific Transnational Crime 
Coordination Centre, Forum Fisheries Agency, and the 
Pacific Community to address transnational crime.  
Cyber security was regularly raised in consultations, 
but the capacity needs in this area were unclear. The recent 
or forthcoming connection of undersea cables to Pacific 
states were a major driver of cyber risk perception. Security 
practitioners considered the Pacific’s cyber security risks to 
be: financial crime and identity fraud; sexual exploitation; 
risks to large financial organisations; and political/social 
defamation via social media. Notably, practitioners focused 
their attention on the cyber risks facing the community 
(cyber safety) and not state sponsored cyber risks. One 
Pacific academic working on technology issues considered 
that the size of Pacific states and institutions, the limited 
ability to support national Computer Emergency Response 
Teams (CERTs), and limited computer science capabilities 
created a sustained vulnerability for the region. As a 
relatively unformed area of security response, cyber security 
may be an area ripe for regional cooperation and further 
assistance from donors.2  
Pacific countries are approaching maritime and land 
border security with a range of objectives, including: 
asserting sovereignty and territorial integrity; addressing 
migration risks; mitigating transnational crime; managing 
health and biosecurity risks; and collecting revenue. 
Practitioners noted maritime and border security are issues 
of high donor interest and come with a volume of training/ 
education offerings. Practitioners appeared to have a degree 
of confidence that these partnerships offered Pacific 
countries some of the resources needed to strengthen 
border capacity. However, there was some concern that 
having multiple partners could contribute to fragmentation, 
disconnect in systems, and conflict over access.  
A stronger Pacific security agenda 
The Pacific is a crowded and complex space, but Pacific 
countries want to make the most of this moment of focus. 
The confidence from regional successes has percolated 
down to the individual security practitioner, resulting in an 
assertive security agenda. The uncertainty and volatility of 
the security environment has focused the conversation on 
skills development, particularly the soft skills of co-
ordination and collaboration, combined with leadership in a 
time of uncertainty, and deeper analytic capacity. 
There is a coherent conception of ‘Pacific security’ 
captured in the Boe Declaration. But the coherence should 
not be overstated as it buts up against national level 
diversity and complexity. Human security caused the most 
concern for practitioners, with climate/environmental 
security considered a pervasive and systemic driver of risk. 
Traditional security issues were of concern to Pacific 
leaders, but the level of harm arising from traditional 
security threats was difficult to quantify and there appeared 
to be greater confidence that these risks could be managed 
through partnerships. 
Pacific Island countries and leaders were remarkably 
open and candid during PSC’s initial consultations. It is yet 
another example of the willingness of Pacific practitioners 
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to take charge of the conversation and shape the 
environment towards their interests and security outcomes. 
The security conversation will need to be sustained as a 
growing range of threats emerge in the Pacific, some of 
which are existential. Through the conversation, the people 
of the Pacific are shaping the response to their security 
challenges, and building the tools and relationships for a 
more resilient future.  
Notes 
1  It was not all gloom on coordination. Pacific practitioners 
welcomed the re-establishment of a coordination mechanism 
at the regional level with the Pacific Islands Forum Official 
Sub-committee on Regional Security that was reactivated in 
2019. 
2  There are a number of donor initiatives already underway, 
such as Cyber Safety Pasifika funded by the Australian 
Federal Police https://www.cybersafetypasifika.org/  
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Achieving best practice through security cooperation: The Pacific way 
Jone Kalouniwai, Jack Moceica, Akuila Savu, Alipate Naulivou, National Security and Defence  
Council Secretariat, Fiji and Robert Styles, the Australian National University 
Introduction 
In a recent conversation with the National Security and 
Defence Council Secretariat in Fiji, Director of NSS Co-
ordination and Monitoring Akuila Savu asked the question: 
What will be the most effective forms of collective 
action we employ in response to COVID-19 that could 
be applied to the broader suite of security challenges we 
are facing now and into the future?’ 
It immediately drew our attention! One thing led to another, 
and we are now working together to try and answer this 
question.  
We are a consortium comprising the National Security 
and Defence Council Secretariat led by Brigadier General 
Jone Kalouniwai, the recently appointed Director-General; 
Director NSS Coordination and Monitoring Akuila Savu; 
Manager NSS Coordination and Monitoring Alipate 
Naulivou; and Jack Moceica, previously the Deputy Secret-
ary of Defence and National Security. This core team is 
working in partnership with Associate Professor Robert 
Styles from the Australia Pacific Security College at the 
Australian National University.  
Together we are working with representatives from a 
diverse mix of government agencies, NGOs, civil society 
and ethnic groups. We have embarked on a program of act-
ivities comprising an in-country, whole of government 
approach, with civil society dialogue and action research 
designed to enhance the country’s capacity to implement 
the National Security Strategy and effectively impact human, 
environmental and contemporary security challenges, and to 
strengthen partnerships within the country and ultimately 
across the region. In this paper, we outline our under-
standing of the challenges we are aiming to impact and the 
‘Pacific way’ in which we are pursuing our endeavours.  
Problems that beg a more adequate 
response  
In the 21st century, the global population is facing some of 
the most intractable problems it has ever faced. Problems 
that beg for a more adequate response, today and into the 
future. For example, in the Pacific, as across the globe, we 
observe seasonal swings in the weather with drought, floods 
and storms causing major natural disasters that at their 
worst wreak death, famine, loss of livelihood, epidemics 
and displacement of populations, as well as vast losses of 
personal and state-owned property. Looking forward, the 
vast consensus of reputable scientific opinion (IEA 2019; 
IPCC 2014; NIC 2017) is that climate and related security 
issues will significantly worsen in the absence of a radical 
response. The most severe effects will likely be experienced 
in developing and least developed countries. In recognition 
of this fact, in 2018 all leaders of Pacific Island Forum 
member countries outlined an extended security agenda 
(PIF 2018) where they articulated and agreed to the need to 
deal with the region’s most pressing security issues. 
Within Fiji, as in the rest of the region, the security 
environment is complex. The diverse and intractable nature 
of the security challenges we are facing represents a raft of 
significant transition challenges that we will have to tackle 
over coming decades. Further, the magnitude of this endea-
vour has been amplified as COVID-19 has exposed a lack 
of resilience as a result of a collective failure to assess and 
act on national risks and vulnerabilities. In this context, 
responding to our traditional and non-traditional security 
threats will mean addressing the lack of resilience across the 
country’s governance, economic, environmental, public, 
energy and infrastructure systems. Further, this lack of 
resilience needs to be addressed at the personal, community, 
business and all levels of government. It is about being 
better prepared and having the ability and the will to act 
collaboratively whenever necessary. 
We acknowledge that a shell-shocked society, with a 
ruined economy and depleted health system will need strong 
leaders at all levels, inside and outside of government, who 
can offer fresh and inspiring directions. ‘Where to next?’ is 
the live question! Unless we can collectively learn how to 
answer this question, we will not be able to address the 
security risks and vulnerabilities in an integrated manner. 
This is the nature of our work – to help leaders, with their 
people, answer this question.  
In Fiji, we are aiming for an integrated approach to 
national security inclusive of multiple actors that reinforces 
sovereignty and resilience at every level. This is a very 
complicated conversation to orchestrate! An approach that 
stands in stark contrast to the prevailing culture of ‘telling’ 
that has proven to have failed us collectively on many 
fronts. No progress will be achieved by trying to impose 
top-down expertise, as people are sick of experts. Rather 
than merely telling others what to do, our aim is to engage 
those we work with in a robust perspective-taking exercise; 
that is, change the way they ‘see’ and ‘listen’ to their world 
now and into the future, and as a consequence shift the way 
they describe and act in relation to it – change the discourse 
and consequent action. This is about having them re-
authoring themselves in their world over time; having them 
strategically qualifying an array of choices, values, trade-
offs and decisions that will impact over generations. At this 
juncture, there will be a very different array of options to 
those faced by previous generations, and that have affected 
our resilience today and into the future unless we change. 
Our social economy will be critical in this endeavour. 
We are keen to ensure that Fiji’s National Security Strategy 
adequately considers the human dimension. We must 
manage for change through people, rather than try to drive 
people to change. We see this as an essential role for both 
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government and community leaders. To help them take a 
more sophisticated approach than merely stating their case 
and expecting others to believe them. This goes for us as 
well. The experience of the last few years proves that facts 
do not stand on their own, e.g. the impact of climate change 
and the evidence does not necessarily persuade by itself. 
Indeed, the presentation of strong arguments often backfires 
and encourages people to disagree and resist even more 
strongly than they did before. 
Suppose Fiji’s National Security Strategy is going to 
orchestrate the behaviour of the system effectively. In that 
case, it needs to go beyond imported frameworks or off- 
the-shelf futures work and systems thinking to systems 
doing. This is a living process that requires a range of 
collaborative and experience platforms to sustain the active-
ities of different communities of practice as they leverage 
the best of what has historically and culturally worked and 
apply it in new and innovative ways. This is naturally 
pulling for new governance arrangements. These are emerg-
ing and will continue to do so over time. 
Further, the emerging strategies are being derived not 
to build ‘bridges to nowhere’ and generate short-term pay-
offs that soon become debt-ridden stranded assets. Beginn-
ing with maritime and climate security, we are focusing on 
those sectors and qualified opportunities with a future. The 
custodians of these particular spaces are being engaged in 
authoring their future, based on what is intrinsically and 
environmentally important. Critically, younger people are 
being involved in this process as much as possible as they 
will ultimately inherit and evolve adaptation and prevention 
measures. In this way, our program of activities is providing 
mechanisms for these groups of groups to ask and answer: 
What good ideas should be invested in? How can those 
ideas be worked to the benefit of all? 
What is the Pacific way? 
Our approach is about giving legitimacy and support to those 
responsible for a security challenge. It’s about affording 
power and authority that builds in purpose to act with sov-
ereignty and self-determination. This raises an important 
question: how do we understand ‘power-to’ get things  
done? 
For our purposes, we recognise power to be, ‘the 
capacity to mobilise resources to attend to needs’ (Kashtan 
2014:130). This definition of power suggests that we don’t 
use power or authority for the sake of it, we use it to satisfy 
needs, either our own or those of others. This distinction is 
central to our endeavours in Fiji. 
Power is, first of all, a capacity or ability or the poten-
tial to achieve specific outcomes by mobilising physical and 
cultural resources at our disposal. Second, power is the 
capacity to meet needs. So, what are needs? Within the 
context of our endeavours, needs refer to the most essential 
categories of what motivates us and what is necessary for 
life, not to the almost endless strategies of attending to those 
needs.  
There are four basic categories of need – physical needs 
(e.g. food and shelter), freedom, connection and meaning. 
These same four basic needs apply equally to the collective – 
environmental health (i.e. sustainable resources), sov-
ereignty, partnership and shared purpose. Furthermore, 
needs are understood to be universal aspects of experience 
that apply to everyone irrespective of culture or circum-
stance (Deci and Ryan 2008; Rosenberg 2003). It is this 
latter characteristic that makes them so useful for our pur-
poses. Focusing on needs automatically brings us towards a 
sense of shared identity and purpose. In this way, needs, 
along with purpose and values, define an essential aspect of 
what matters to us. Understanding what we need in this way 
can liberate us. 
With these distinctions in mind, we have adopted an 
approach to decision making that is based on collecting all 
needs relevant to a decision and engaging stakeholders in 
converting them to practical strategies that can work for all, 
now and in the future. This approach is resulting in robust 
decisions that are less likely to be sabotaged by those 
carrying them out.  
We believe that unless we consciously build our cultures 
and economies on direct caring for needs with an awareness 
of being always part of a larger whole, we are likely to con-
tinue to increase the suffering of people and the environment. 
A direct and insistent focus on needs can provide a blueprint 
for creating economies and lifestyles that nurture life.  
In this way, by exercising power-with others (versus 
power-over), including the protective use of force – force 
that is used to protect life, not to punish, shame, or hurt 
anyone – as part of our effort, it is shifting the focus from 
‘what’s in it for me’ to ‘what matters to us (including me)’. 
This shift in focus from the individual to relationship and 
community is catalysing a reweaving of community and 
relationship back into our lives, undoing the ravages of 
capitalism. This is the Pacific way! 
Our first steps on this journey 
During these times of rapid disruption, particularly with 
COVID-19, we are experiencing novel opportunities for 
change. To capitalise on this moment, we have actively 
foregrounded the need to be creative, to imagine new 
futures and seek ways to enable the Fijian Government and 
people to innovate together, not only to tackle the chal-
lenges of today but also to sow the seeds of a better world 
for future generations. Most importantly, doing it the 
Pacific way means we have put our people and their needs 
centre stage. Together, we are taking this as an opportunity 
to revolutionise how we listen, think and act.  
The first thing we did was to design an entry plan. A 
carefully sequenced set of 20 interviews and inquiry active-
ities with key stakeholders from across the Fiji maritime 
sector followed by a two-day structured deliberation invol-
ving over 70 representatives from 22 different institutions. 
This approach has demonstrated that gaining trust and 
credibility, and ultimately leading an organisation or system 
to improved performance, follows from a formal, planned, 
hit-the-ground-learning approach. This is contrasted with 
informal, ad hoc, hit-the-ground-running approaches typ-
ically taken.  
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This process catalysed a two-way, collaborative inter-
action aimed at examining and understanding the nature of 
current practice and formulating priorities for the future, 
those most effective forms of collective action. Our enquiry 
sought to understand the sector and people; what they care 
about and how they think and feel about their work and role 
within the system; whether they think the system is headed 
in the right direction and pursuing that direction in the right 
way; whether or not the system is working so together they 
can engage in fixing it; and, their expectations for leader-
ship. The question that gave the secretariat raison d’etre or 
Yavu1 for this program was:  
Vaka cokotaki ni vei Tabana Vaka Matanitu – What 
characteristics or current institutional practices (both 
government and non-government) would provide a 
degree of credibility to the implementation of a whole of 
government approach? 
By following this discipline of systematically sharing 
carefully collected data and interpretations publicly instead 
of keeping them private, we were able to invite those we 
engaged with to experience the same confrontation with 
complex reality. The resulting collective reflection on cur-
rent practice set the stage for new thinking that is now 
leading to new behaviour.  
The system we engaged with is being referred to in the 
Fijian vernacular as Yavusa.2 Within the Yavusa resides a 
number of sub-systems or Mataqali,3 each having its own 
strategic centre of gravity,4 i.e. a source of power that 
provides moral or physical strength, freedom of action, or 
will to act. It became apparent that should each Mataqali’s 
centre of gravity be correctly positioned within the broader 
security domain, or Yavusa, each Mataqali, comprising a 
suite of agencies, or Tokatokas,5 would likely choose to 
cooperate. Within each Mataqali, should there be an under-
standing of each agency or Tokatoka’s respective statutory 
roles, collaborative effort would be enhanced as they 
undertook national security preventative initiatives.  
Based on our enquiries we inferred the systems’ centre 
of gravity, a traditional characteristic, Vanua,6 was sig-
nificantly impacting the decision-making processes within 
and between the various Tokatokas or agencies, and their 
capacity for multi-agency cooperation. The challenge was 
to align the systems Vanua so it would reinforce a whole of 
government approach to security. In the Fijian vernacular: 
• Vaka rokoroko – Respect, encouraging organisational 
bureaucracy. This manifests as rigid policies, hier-
archical structures, centralised processes, no flexibility 
to out-source, delegation, top down approaches and a 
lack of new ideas. Our response was to create an epiph-
any (by discussing the benefits of new ideas and tools 
available) – Vei Vaka Dodonu Taki. 
• Ririko – Hesitation, a reluctance to share information. 
This manifests as sophisticated information systems, 
security clearances, restrictions, and a lack of awareness 
outside one’s own jurisdiction and broader spheres of 
responsibility. Our response was to create a wider sense 
of awareness outside each specific agency foci of 
interest linked to their specific challenges, link them to 
the outside world – Vei Vakararamatki.  
• Ka Makawa – Old/expired/past, linked to archaic 
policies. This manifests as old school leadership, a lack 
of confidence and reluctance to change. Our response 
was to create a deep desire for change, to advocate 
change management – Veisau ni Vakarau. 
• Duidui Vakasama and Veiliutaki Mataboko – Different 
understanding and blind leadership contributing to lack-
ing a sense of purpose and a diverse range of interests. 
This manifests as a lack of purpose, lack of necessary 
investment, lack of coordination, and not purpose driven. 
Our response was to create a sense of purpose –  
Veiliutaka Matata. 
• Sega na veivakabautiI – A lack of trust, lacking 
appreciation to invest in the multi-agency response 
mechanisms. This manifests as a lack of political will 
and communication breakdowns. Our response was to 
maintain an open and credible channel of commun-
ication, encourage information sharing, dialogue and 
networking – Veiwasei. 
Interestingly, not only did this structured enquiry illicit 
insights and catalyse strategically motivated multi-stake-
holder activity, these Vanua characteristics framed a general 
program logic for the secretariat’s engagements. The quality 
of dialogue and level of connection positioned the secretariat 
to become the preferred partner of choice. It is recognised as 
being able to provide sound intelligence and policy advice; 
build the capacity of the system by facilitating multi-agency 
engagements, workshops, joint working group meetings, 
consultations and networking activities; reliably assist and 
support agencies as they comprehensively responded to 
security issues; and drive the Government of Fiji’s National 
Security Agenda through coordinated whole of government 
approaches to national security. 
The two-day marine awareness multi-stakeholder del-
iberations took the form of a structured tabletop exercise on 
disaster preparedness. An activity that took participants 
through the process of dealing with four simulated disaster 
scenarios: oil spill, illegal fishing, civil unrest, and search and 
rescue. Each scenario was intentionally linked to the Fijian 
maritime domain and had a cascading impact on all aspects 
of the sea, air and land operating environments. How did it 
go? Reportedly, ‘The results were just amazing. Everyone – 
meaning all the 22 agencies after having been introduced to 
the roles, functions and challenges of every participating 
agency in the initial two days – was empowered with a 
greater sense of awareness of how they can respond with each 
other in an emerging opportunity.’ 
Over the two days, a huge amount of information was 
exchanged. The deliberations not only included the key 
maritime agencies of Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ports 
Authorities Fiji, Fiji Navy and border security agencies, but 
also extended to include iTaukei Affairs, Rural Develop-
ment, Ministry of Health, Ministry of Transport, Ministry 
of Fishing and others. Those involved learned the import-
ance of looking beyond their individual agency boundaries, 
to flexibly coordinate their effort, appreciate the availability 
of other agency’s capabilities and deploy technologies to fill 
capability gaps and deficiencies. The tabletop exercise 
increased their awareness of the complexity of various 
challenges at all levels of the security system. The planning 
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process and decisions employed during the exercise created 
an epiphany among these agencies. 
Significantly, there was an appreciation of the value of 
information sharing; the identification of various policies, 
protocols and existing platforms available to the system; 
and the identification of critical gaps and deficiencies lack-
ing in individual organisations during the various stages of 
a security response. Participating agencies successfully 
evaluated the applicability of their standard operating pro-
cedures and respective capabilities such that they were able 
to identify opportunities for interoperability. The system’s 
capacity, once coordinated, was recognised to be a credible 
multi-agency response mechanism. This approach to multi-
stakeholder deliberation is now becoming the forerunner of 
a government and non-government decision-making and 
planning process.  
Conclusion 
This experience has taught us that learning together to 
understand the emerging dynamics and complexities of the 
ecosystem is fundamental to any multi-stakeholder planning 
and risk mitigation measure. We aimed to design and make 
available tailor-made learning and collaboration platforms 
for those actors we worked with, the first responders to 
emerging issues. By empowering those involved to act in a 
more coordinated manner, we observed them gain control of, 
and successfully manage their responses to the emerging stra-
tegic complexities and subsequently reduce exposure to risks.  
Critically, we learned that when we embed ourselves 
within a group with a sense of shared purpose, we become 
part of an emergent field of exploration rather than a solitary 
cog in the system. This is about the Pacific way and is 
especially so when, within whatever community we find 
ourselves, we rise to the immensely challenging task of 
finding the willingness and capacity to share more emo-
tional and material risks, liberating ourselves bit by bit from 
being islands of independence struggling to satisfy our basic 
needs. By sharing our valuable resources in the service of 
meeting our collective needs as human beings, we can 
navigate our differences, deepen our freedom, create and 
attend to our systems of agreements, and much more. 
This endeavour has affirmed how effectively the Fiji 
National Security Strategy can respond to prevailing and 
expected traditional and non-traditional security threats, 
and in lieu of the Government of Fiji’s agenda, how the 
National Security Defence Council Secretariat can approach 
whole of government governance and capability require-
ments for strategy implementation. We have begun learning 
what a home-grown prototype design and potential res-
ponse mechanism for our secretariat will look like. 
In this way, our lives and work have become a living 
experiment in truth, rather than a codified set of practices 
that we are trying to pass on as ‘the way to do things’, which 
usually happens in traditional approaches to capacity 
building. As we move forward with our endeavours in Fiji, 
we have more trust that this approach will continue to pull 
us out of our social conditioning and into laying micro-
foundations for a social infrastructure for the future. 
Notes 
1  Yavu: Purpose, foundational belief for existence. 
2  Yavusa: Fijian traditional clan system comprising  
multiple clans with varying responsibilities, dependent  
on each other for their coordinated survival against other 
rival Yavusas. 
3  Mataqali: A single clan system (agency) consisting of 
various families (agency departments). 
4  Centre of gravity: The characteristics, capabilities, or 
locations from which a system or organisation derives its 
freedom, physical strength, and will to take action. At the 
strategic level, centres of gravity might include traditional 
security systems, an alliance or multi-agency organisation, a 
set of critical capabilities or function, or a national strategy 
itself.  
5 Tokatoka: A nuclear family system that extends throughout 
the patriarchal lineage of a family. 
6 Vanua: A reference to a strong sense of traditional ethics that 
characterise loyalty, humility, obedience, meekness and 
respect.  
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666 Networked security: Public police, private 
security and the changing shape of security 
governance in Papua New Guinea 
Sinclair Dinnen and Grant W Walton, The Australian National 
Introduction 
Introduction 
COVID-19 has highlighted the shortcomings of diverse aspects of government 
systems across the globe. As well as the enormous pressures placed on health 
sectors, a spotlight has also been shone on the national security agencies and, in 
particular, police organisations tasked with enforcing the raft of emergency 
regulations and measures introduced in response to the pandemic in many countries. 
In the Pacific Islands, this has placed new stresses on small police forces, some of 
which are seriously under-resourced and struggle to fulfil their normal workload, 
let alone taking on a range of additional responsibilities.   
The current predicament presents an opportunity to reflect more broadly on 
security governance in the rapidly changing Pacific Islands region and to consider 
what other possibilities exist to enable these countries better meet their policing 
needs. While the importance of security to development is well understood by 
governments and international donors, security sector reform remains narrowly 
focused on public security services, notably police and military. Private security 
continues to be largely absent from reform debates despite its prominence globally 
and regionally. In this paper we build on an earlier paper (Dinnen 2017) that drew 
attention to the dramatic growth of private security in Papua New Guinea (PNG) 
and its significant role in that country’s security landscape. Drawing on interviews 
with key stakeholders conducted between June 2019 and February 2020, this paper 
provides an update of PNG’s private security sector in light of other changes that 
have taken place in recent years. The latter includes growing public discontent with 
police performance and an apparent commitment to reform on the part of a new 
generation of government and police leaders. 
Our consideration of private security and its intersections with the police and 
other security actors also seeks to broaden the lens on security provision and 
emphasise its essentially networked character in a country like PNG. Such a 
perspective also strives to shift attention beyond a narrow preoccupation with the 
police as a discrete organisation, which is the traditional focus of governments 
and donors. Instead, we adopt a broader concern with policing as a set of functions 
or organised activities intended to promote and enhance safety and security. 
Policing, in this more expansive rendition, includes the actions of a range of actors 
whether government, private sector or, indeed, community-based, operating as 
part of a larger and dynamic network of security providers. A key feature of 
networked security is its fluid and dynamic shape and the interconnectedness 
between its constituent parts. Rather than hard divisions between, for example, 
public police and private security, or state and non-state providers, there is 
considerable overlap and interdependence between them in practice. 
A time for reform?  
PNG Prime Minister James Marape, who assumed office in May 2019, appointed 
Bryan Kramer, member for Madang Open as the country’s new police minister in a 
move that surprised many. Soon after his appointment, Kramer promised to reform 
PNG’s police force – the Royal Papua New Guinea Constabulary (RPNGC). The 
one-time member of the opposition and outspoken critic of the former O’Neill 
government outlined a range of measures including providing more opportunities 
for women, addressing corruption and improving discipline in the force. He has also  
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The reformist momentum is also highlighted by a cadre  
of younger officers who appear genuinely committed to 
improving the standing of the organisation with the broader 
public by tackling longstanding issues of ill-discipline and 
brutality. Prominent among them was the former Police 
Commissioner, David Manning, who was vocal about the 
need to clean up the RPNGC, including ridding it of what 
he calls ‘criminals in uniform’ (Post-Courier 2020).   
While the reforms promised by Minister Kramer and 
former Police Commissioner Manning are encouraging, 
improving policing and security in what is often depicted as 
one of the world’s most insecure countries will not be  
easy. The RPNGC remains massively understaffed, poorly 
resourced and heavily factionalised. PNG’s current police-
to-population ratio – 1:1,145 – is significantly below the 
UN recommended level of 1:450. According to a recent 
study for the PNG–Australia Policing Partnership, the 
RPNGC faces an average recurrent funding gap of K126 
million (A$50.8m) per annum and would require a one-off 
injection of approximately K3.9 billion (A$1.6bn) to  
enable it to deliver its service mandate (Deloitte 2020:5). 
Corruption within the force is another major problem. 
Kramer recently posted that on becoming Police Minister:  
I found our Police Force in complete disarray and 
riddled with corruption. The very organisation that was 
tasked with fighting corruption had become the leading 
agency in acts of corruption. Add to that a culture of 
police ill-discipline and brutality’ (Doherty 2020). 
Even if reforms can improve the performance and stand-
ing of the organisation, the country’s serious fiscal crisis, 
accentuated by the current global pandemic, means that 
reformers will also need to look beyond the RPNGC to find 
answers to PNG’s security problems. One possible place to 
start looking will be PNG’s private security industry. 
PNG’s private security industry: Growth and 
regulation   
As anyone who has visited PNG in recent years can attest, 
the private security industry is ubiquitous and booming. 
Office buildings are often only accessible by passing rolls 
of sharp barbed wire, pointed fences and uniformed guards 
with large caps. Many who work for donors, international 
NGOs or foreign embassies move from one secure com-
pound in cars tracked by security companies that deliver 
them to another well-guarded fortress.  
The potential for abuses of power on the part of private 
security actors renders effective regulation essential. As the 
industry has grown, so too have stories of violence, theft 
and other misdeeds by security personnel, albeit not on the 
scale of transgressions attributed to the police. When it 
comes to regulating private security, PNG is something of 
a regional leader as it was the first Pacific Island country to 
attempt to regulate its private security sector and is 
currently one of only three countries in the region (along 
with Tonga and Fiji) to have enacted dedicated legislation 
for this purpose.  
The Security (Protection) Industry Act 2004 provided 
for the establishment of the Security Industries Authority 
(SIA). Set up in 2006, the SIA has now been in existence 
for 14 years. Its functions under the Act include: 
• granting operating licences and guard permits to security 
companies; 
• specifying minimum standards of training and approving 
training facilities; 
• approving security equipment other than firearms; 
• ensuring that companies and guards operate in accordance 
with their licences and permits; and 
• drafting a Code of Conduct covering discipline and work 
ethics in the industry. 
This all sounds good in theory, however, the SIA faces 
a number of formidable challenges in practice. First, the 
agency only provides licences – and thus provides an osten-
sive level of regulation – to a relatively small proportion of 
firms. Although SIA figures from 2017 estimated that there 
were 219 unlicensed security companies with around 7649 
security guards operating illegally, unofficial estimates 
from industry sources put the number of illegal operators as 
substantially higher than this with some suggesting up to 80 
per cent of companies are operating without licences or 
permits. Where the SIA identifies unlicensed companies, it 
refers them to the Internal Revenue Commission (PNG’s 
tax authority) as these companies are failing to pay a 10 per 
cent VAT component that is payable on licence and permit 
fees. 
Despite the SIA only covering a small proportion of 
the industry, it has tried to increase the number of licensed 
private companies. Figure 1 shows a significant jump  
in the number of licensed security companies between 
2013 and 2014 that, according to the SIA, resulted in part,  
from their efforts to track down unlicensed security 
companies. 
Figure 1: Number of licensed security companies in 
PNG* 
 
Figure adapted from Isari 2019  
While the number of licensed companies has remained 
relatively similar over the past five years (the increase in 
2018 is likely due to the enhanced security for APEC and 
associated construction boom in Port Moresby) the SIA 
hopes to increase the number of licensed companies. In 
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turn, it has recently opened an office in Lae (comprising two 
inspectors, a driver and a secretary) that is expected to cover 
the Momase and Highlands regions. 
The SIA has a strong incentive to issue more licences: it 
gets to keep the fees from each company and security guard 
it registers. Given the profits to be made in the industry, fees 
are low, although they still provide the SIA with significant 
funding. For example, a licence for a company with over  
200 employees that provides extensive security services – 
including armed guards and guard dogs, as well as armed 
escort for payroll and cash-in-transit – costs K11,000 
(A$4700) per year. In addition to their licence fees, com-
panies are charged K22 (A$8.90) for permits for each 
security guard they employ. The growth of licensed security 
companies and guards provides an important stream of 
revenue for the SIA; in 2018 it licensed over 30,000 guards – 
a figure that has almost doubled since 2014 (see Figure 2). 
Figure 2: Number of licensed security guards in 
PNG* 
 
* Figure adapted from Isari 2019 
Despite this income, as with many other areas of state 
regulation in PNG, the biggest practical challenge with this 
regulatory framework remains the extremely limited capa-
city of the SIA to fulfil its designated duties. It operates out 
of a rundown former police building in Badili, in downtown 
Port Moresby, and is headed by a registrar, currently a 
former senior police lawyer. The SIA has a staff of around 
14 people, which include four regional security inspectors 
who are each responsible for one of PNG’s four regions 
(Momase, Highlands, New Guinea Islands and Southern). 
The New Guinea Islands and Southern regions are serviced 
from Port Moresby. These resources are woefully inad-
equate given the rapid rate of growth of the industry. It is 
simply not realistic to expect one inspector to regulate the 
industry in each of PNG’s four extensive and topo-
graphically challenging regions. 
It is not surprising that many security experts express 
frustration that the SIA is not living up to its mandate. For 
example, many bemoan the lack of or inadequate training 
for security guards, as well as the SIA’s limited powers of 
enforcement in the face of non-compliant operators. There 
is, perhaps, a glimmer of light at the end of this poorly 
regulated tunnel. Amendments to the Security (Protection) 
Industries Act have been proposed by the SIA to cater for 
technological developments in the industry such as the 
growth of electronic security, and surveillance and tracking 
technology, to extend regulation to foreign security con-
sultants and advisers working in PNG, to increase fees, and 
to empower the regulator to prosecute offending companies. 
While these amendments are welcome, implementing them 
is likely to prove challenging. This is particularly because 
many believe the weakly regulated nature of the industry 
benefits many PNG elites (including politicians) who have 
financial and other interests in this expanding and highly 
profitable industry. 
Internationally, there also exist a number of voluntary 
codes and agreements that provide another potential source 
of regulation for private security companies. These instru-
ments are intended to supplement State legal oversight of 
private security providers in the countries where they 
operate. The most relevant is the International Code of 
Conduct for Private Security Providers (ICoC) launched in 
2010 (Buzatu 2015). The code is articulated in terms of 
human rights principles, including in areas such as use of 
force, detention, identification and registration, personnel 
vetting, record keeping, weapons management and training, 
and incident reporting. It was designed to apply in complex 
security environments, such as post-conflict or following 
natural disasters, where the domestic capabilities are 
limited. While primarily drafted with private military con-
tractors in mind, membership of ICoC is open to different 
kinds of private security companies. An International Code 
of Conduct Association was established in 2013 as a 
mechanism to provide independent governance and over-
sight of member companies. Members of the Association 
comprise private security companies, civil society organis-
ations and states. Its main tasks are:  
a. the certification of companies under the code; 
b. human-rights-oriented monitoring of company perform-
ance; and  
c. supporting member companies to address claims alleging 
violations of the code.   
While development of transnational forms of regul-
ation such as ICoC remain at a relatively early stage, the 
most obvious limitation with such codes is their voluntary 
character. Other sceptics point to the risk of such mech-
anisms becoming dominated by powerful industry interests 
(MacLeod 2015). On a more optimistic note, membership 
of ICoC can also become a valued mark of differentiation 
in a notoriously competitive industry, whereby companies 
can flaunt their membership of this global framework as a 
sign of quality assurance to competitors and, significantly, 
potential clients. In this regard, the United Nations now 
require membership of ICoC as a mandatory requirement 
for the hiring of private security providers by UN agencies. 
It is likely that other international organisations and govern-
ments will follow. Guard Dog Security (GDS), PNG’s 
largest nationally-owned security company, achieved mem-
bership of ICoC in 2020, becoming the first local company 
in the Pacific Islands region to do so. Its membership is now 
prominently displayed on the company website. In a recent 
interview with the authors, the GDS Chief Executive 
Officer indicated that becoming a member highlighted and 
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reinforced the company’s stature and reputation as an  
industry leader in PNG and the broader region.   
Networked security in Papua New Guinea 
With its notoriously under-resourced and thinly-spread 
police force, researchers Craig and Porter 2018; Walton and 
Dinnen 2019; Forsyth and Hukula 2019 have argued that 
innovative responses to Papua New Guinea’s security 
problems are needed. Much of this analysis has focused on 
the importance of unofficial policing coalitions of State and 
community-based actors that operate in many parts of the 
country (Craig and Porter 2018; Forsyth and Hukula 2019). 
Given the resources available to PNG’s booming private 
security sector, we argue that they constitute another key 
node in these networks of security providers and below 
briefly indicate the intersections between these private 
firms and other security actors and organisations.  
Private security and the police: A close and increasingly 
interdependent relationship already exists between the 
police and elements of the private security industry and is 
most evident in PNG’s main urban centres. The larger com-
panies are involved in many of the same kinds of policing 
activity as their uniformed colleagues, including crime 
prevention, investigations and responding to incidents. 
Senior company managers often have police backgrounds 
and maintain strong networks within the RPNGC. Some 
companies are reputedly owned by retired senior police 
officers, and there are rumours that some serving officers 
have active interests in particular firms. Although not as 
prevalent as in a country like South Africa (which is often 
looked to for its extensive experience of private security and 
serious security challenges), some company employees are 
also reserve constables in the police, wearing uniforms and 
exercising the same powers as regular officers in this part-
time capacity. 
Relationships between individuals in the private sector 
and the police are widely acknowledged as mutually 
beneficial. Some larger operators provide food, help buy 
uniforms, supply fuel and maintenance for police vehicles, 
and, sometimes, allowances when working together. 
Informal networks facilitate critical intelligence sharing. 
Superior resources available to high-end private operators 
include sophisticated communications, surveillance and 
tracking systems that are unavailable to the RPNGC. It is a 
two-way street. Private providers are also reliant on police 
support when they apprehend suspected offenders or face 
violent confrontations in the course of their work. However, 
relationships between these two groups can occasionally 
deteriorate, with some industry insiders recounting instances 
of confrontation, sometimes violent, between the RPNGC 
and private security.  
Private security and communities: While private security 
firms provide their services for a fee, more established 
operators seek to maintain strong and enduring relation-
ships with their surrounding communities. Again, there is a 
powerful element of self-interest and mutual benefit. In 
urban contexts, firms want a secure base from which to 
operate from and where many of their employees reside. We 
know of one security operator that delivers community 
awareness around security issues and provides water to the 
adjoining settlement during times of drought. Some com-
panies provide sports equipment to local youth. Surround-
ing communities are also an important source of criminal 
intelligence and potential recruits. 
While the character of relationships vary within and 
between urban centres, different dynamics are evident in 
interactions between communities and security companies in 
rural areas. This is particularly so in the case of landowner-
owned security firms working around extractive, usually 
mining, projects. While offering potentially lucrative rewards 
and a welcome source of employment in underdeveloped 
regions, the kinship and other ties binding such companies 
and the communities in which they operate can lead to social 
complexities and challenges not encountered in the more 
heterogeneous and impersonal urban setting. For example, 
the employment of fellow tribesmen/women can make dis-
ciplining and managing employees difficult. As a result, 
some landowner security companies chose to partner with 
international or other ‘outside’ firms to help manage these 
issues. 
Private security and politicians: It is widely believed that 
members of the political elite are strongly invested in the 
private security industry. For example, MP for Lae Open, 
John Rosso, is a reserve police chief sergeant and owner of 
Executive Security Services (ESS), with a current work-
force of over 1500. Rosso started ESS before he became an 
MP in 2017. While social media is awash with rumours 
connecting PNG’s politicians, including former Prime 
Minister Peter O’Neill, to particular security firms, the 
exact number and nature of the connections are often hazy. 
However, there is no doubt that owning a security company 
can aid some political hopefuls. Employing large numbers 
of constituents can help guarantee votes, particularly in 
areas with few other employment opportunities. 
Some claim politically aligned firms are more likely to 
receive government contracts. It is also likely that firms 
involving politicians are more likely to be paid as MPs are 
in a better position to squeeze money out of an increasingly 
cash-strapped government than others. Indeed, our con-
versations indicate that many private security firms without 
political connections refuse to bid for government contracts 
because they worry they won’t get paid. On the other hand, 
political instability can mean companies that are closely 
aligned with political powerbrokers risk losing their advan-
tage, with changes in government and political leadership 
contributing to the noticeable fluctuations in the fortunes of 
a number of well-known companies. 
Networks within and between private security companies: 
The array of private security firms in PNG vary con-
siderably in size, services offered and the geographic spread 
of their operations. They range from small-scale local 
companies with one car and a few guards through to sub-
stantial multinational companies with a global reach. The 
latter can draw on an impressive array of transnational 
ideas, resources and cutting-edge technologies. For example, 
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G4S Secure Solutions (PNG) is part of the largest security 
company and one of the top three private sector employers 
in the world with over 570,000 employees globally and 
contracted sales of over US$9.76 billion (A$13.40bn) in 
2019 alone (Bizvibe 2020). 
While transnational connections within companies can 
shape security provision, relationships between private 
firms operating within the country can be fractious. There 
are occasional attempts to encourage information sharing 
and cooperation; however, private security firms are often 
fiercely competitive. We have heard numerous accounts of 
physical altercations involving guards from rival firms. This 
can happen when a business or government department 
replaces one security firm with another. When guards from 
the ousted security company lose their job, some take their 
frustrations out on the newly employed guards. 
In sum, while many think of private and state security 
as separate, our preliminary findings suggest that the private 
sector is thoroughly integrated within PNG’s broader  
security network. It is this broader network, comprising 
ever-shifting relations between different providers that 
determines the nature of security governance in PNG. In 
turn, if we are to move beyond the same old approach to 
police support that has been relied upon for the past three 
decades with singularly modest results we need to begin by 
acknowledging and responding to the networked reality of 
security provision in PNG. 
Are private security firms the answer to 
crime in PNG? 
While acknowledging the importance of private security 
firms for PNG’s security landscape, there are three key 
challenges in attempting to engage with private security 
organisations. First, private providers are highly exclu-
sionary. The industry is most visible in PNG’s rapidly 
growing towns and cities where government, business, and  
private wealth are concentrated. PNG’s prolonged natural 
resources boom in recent years has been a catalyst for 
growth, with a number of companies also operating in rural 
areas where the major extractive projects are located. 
PNG’s hosting of APEC in 2018 provided another major, 
albeit temporary, boost to the industry. As illustrated by the 
Paladin case, Australia’s off-shore detention facilities on 
Manus Island have been a particularly lucrative opportunity 
for a succession of private security companies (Knaus and 
Davidson 2019). In other words, these providers currently 
privilege powerful state and business interests over the 
security of ordinary citizens. Re-incentivising private pro-
viders to improve public security will not be easy and, 
indeed, might prove to be an insurmountable challenge. 
Second, as we have outlined the industry is poorly 
regulated. As well as reputable companies, both foreign and 
locally-owned, the industry has attracted its fair share of 
cowboys and fly-by-night operators. PNG presents a par-
ticularly challenging environment for those companies that 
strive to operate by the stated rules. Fierce political rivalries 
and nepotism play a significant role in decision-making  
 
around the allocation of government and other major 
contracts. The more established companies strive to do the 
right thing and have been lobbying government for a more 
transparent and effective regulatory framework. For others, 
however, playing by the unspoken rules of the political 
game remains a more attractive and profitable option. 
Finally, although extensive interaction between police 
and private security occurs in practice, there are concerns 
around encouraging further collaboration. These include 
sensitivities about private providers encroaching further on 
areas that many believe should remain the exclusive 
preserve of public police; concerns that the growing pro-
minence of private providers diverts attention away from 
the need to strengthen the police; and perceptions that 
public-private security collaborations tend to privilege 
business interests over those of ordinary citizens. 
While there are many potential risks, policymakers 
would benefit from better understanding this burgeoning 
sector. As attested by its global growth, private security is 
here to stay. In acknowledging the inherently plural 
character of security provision in PNG, policymakers 
should explore whether the strengths within the private 
security industry might compensate for the weakness of the 
RPNGC, and vice versa. For example, PNG’s police could 
benefit from better access to the resources, skills, tech-
nology and intelligence of large private security companies. 
The RPNGC and private firms already cooperate informally. 
Could the industry and government develop regulatory and 
operational frameworks that allow police and private firms to 
work together under certain circumstances, with mutual 
benefit for both? 
Ultimately, our focus needs to be on improving security 
outcomes for all Papua New Guineans, including its most 
vulnerable citizens. While seeking to strengthen the strug-
gling police remains a critical priority, exploring other 
options in PNG’s fluid and changing security landscape 
should not be denied because of a narrow devotion to one 
institutional form. 
Conclusion 
While PNG’s law and order challenges are long-standing, 
the COVID-19 pandemic and changes to the country’s 
security leadership provides an opportunity to rethink the 
country’s security landscape. Drawing on preliminary con-
versations with PNG-based security companies, we suggest 
the role of private providers in PNG’s networked security 
landscape will be crucial for reframing more effective and 
sustainable approaches to improving security provision in 
the country. Despite challenges around regulation, both 
national and transnational, and the sometimes fractious 
relationships between private security organisations and 
others, there is potential for greater and strategic col-
laboration between the private security industry, police and 
community organisations. The question now is how to best 
support these collaborations in ways that are low risk and 
provide greater security for PNG’s population, particularly 
the poor and marginalised.  
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Transnational and organised crime in Pacific Island Countries and 
Territories: Police capacity to respond to the emerging security threat 
Danielle Watson, Queensland University of Technology, Jose Luis Sousa-Santos,  
Massey University and Loene M Howes, University of Tasmania 
Transnational and organised crime is supported by complex 
and multilayered networks that are mobile, well-resourced, 
and strategically coordinated, enabling them to operate 
across international borders (Dandurand 2007, Le Mière 
2011) and making them a major threat to global security 
(Goldsmith and Sheptycki 2007, UN Office on Drugs and 
Crime (UNODC 2016). Many argue that such crimes are 
primarily opportunistic, facilitated by global connectivity 
and the potential for large profit margins (Madsen 2009). 
The perpetrators may assess opportunities for profit against 
the risks of detection, investigation, and prosecution by 
local, regional and international law enforcement agencies. 
In doing so, they weigh the perceived capabilities and 
limitations of such agencies and their likely willingness – 
or reluctance – to engage in complex and costly trans-
national investigations (Dandurand 2007, Williams and 
Godson 2002).  
Dialogue among scholars and practitioners about trans-
national and organised crime in Pacific Island Countries and 
Territories (PICTs) often only scratches the surface of the 
multifaceted nature of the threat posed to many small 
countries in the Pacific. PICTs are characterised by large 
geographic areas largely of ocean, porous maritime borders, 
and relatively small populations scattered across multiple 
islands. For criminal enterprises, the relatively low risks of 
detection of transnational and organised crime in this 
environment, along with its profitability, contribute to the 
growing attractiveness of the region as a potential crime 
hub.  
Adding to these challenges, policing organisations in 
many PICTs are often under resourced (McLeod 2009). The 
complexity of transnational and organised crime makes it 
notoriously difficult to detect, monitor, investigate and 
respond effectively to the illegal activities involved even for 
well-resourced police organisations. In PICTs, the chal-
lenges are exacerbated by the vast geographic expanses of 
ocean and the limited resources available for patrolling it. 
For many PICTs, the legal systems are not well equipped to 
deal with the magnitude or types of crimes taking place 
within their jurisdictions (Schloenhardt 2009). Some crime 
classifications are yet to be included in local legislation, 
further limiting the extent to which they can be adequately 
addressed. Organisations thus encounter myriad challenges 
in their attempts to mount appropriate responses to new and 
emerging threats. Dialogue at the regional level has raised 
questions about the response capacity of security service 
providers – including customs, immigration, and police – to 
deal with current and emerging transnational and organised 
crime threats. This paper considers the nature of the threats, 
existing legislation, policing resources and Pacific specific 
approaches to capacity development. We conclude that, to 
be most effective, capacity development must be led by the 
PICTs and undertaken in light of a nuanced understanding 
of existing capacities and limitations within the region. 
The threat of transnational and organised 
crime in the Pacific 
Limited data exist on transnational and organised crime in 
the Pacific region. However, available sources suggest sev-
eral prominent areas of concern, including: environmental 
crimes related to illegal fishing and resource extraction; sex 
trafficking, which is associated with resource extraction 
industries, such as logging; and trafficking in illicit drugs 
and their precursor chemicals (UNODC 2016). News 
reports suggest that shipments of illicit drugs facilitated by 
mafia style groups and destined for the ‘lucrative markets’ 
of Australia and New Zealand are finding their way into 
PICTs (see Lyons 2019), leading to forecasts of increased 
drug use (including of methamphetamines), financial crimes, 
organised motorcycle gangs, deported individuals with a 
history of criminal activities outside of their home country, 
and cybercrime (Holloway 2020).  
Legislation around transnational and 
organisational crime 
The sanctioning of key international legal instruments and 
alignment of domestic legislation with these instruments 
has been identified as key to addressing transnational  
and organised crime across the Pacific region (UNODC 
2016). A key turning point in recognising the need for  
new legislation occurred in 2004 in Fiji when a multi-
national investigation – Operation Outrigger – culminated 
in the seizure of the largest drug manufacturing lab in the 
Southern Hemisphere. The lab had been established in Fiji 
by members of the triad gang – reportedly from Hong Kong 
and Malaysia – to produce purified methamphetamine, or 
‘ice’ (Sunday 2005). The lab premises contained extremely 
volatile chemicals and reportedly had a potential explosion 
radius of up to 300 metres (ibid) – demonstrating the need 
for updated legislation to address the banning of precursor 
chemicals as well as the drugs that they produce. Fiji is 
reviewing its Illicit Drug Control Act, which will be 
presented to Parliament in 2020/21 alongside a National 
Narcotics Strategy that seeks to address the social and 
economic harms related to drug trafficking and usage in Fiji 
(Kumar 2020). 
Country specific legislative capacities differ and, for 
many PICTs, legislative reform remains a work in progress. 
In 2016, Papua New Guinea (PNG) customs officers pub-
licly raised concerns about the inability of the PNG’s law 
enforcement agencies to prosecute drug cases in PNG due 
to weak legislation. Financial, administrative and staff 
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challenges have prevented the development of national drug 
control measures in PNG – among the PICTs in which the 
possession and supply of some synthetic drugs and their 
precursors is not criminalised (UNODC 2016). Support has 
been provided to engage in necessary legislative reform. 
For example, in PNG, a Controlled Substance Bill was 
drafted in 1998 with the assistance of a United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP) advisor. The bill was 
not, however, adopted.  
The extent to which governments and organisations 
prioritise addressing transnational and organised crime 
differs across the region. In some instances, reforming 
legislation to address transnational and organised crime is 
not a priority – perceived as an externally imposed, rather 
than an internal concern. The non-prioritisation and low 
prioritisation of transnational and organised crime at the 
government level impacts on policing policies and the 
organisational capacity to respond. In some jurisdictions, 
this means these crimes are not yet formally identified in 
legislation, constraining law enforcement officers’ abilities 
to respond. For example, online fraud is categorised as  
theft for immediate response purposes. The Cyber Safety 
Pasifika program aims to address this issue by increasing 
police capacity to enforce laws and investigate and prose-
cute relevant crimes (AFP, 2018). The program also aims to 
strengthen legislation in line with international standards 
(AFP 2018, Cyber Safety Pasifika 2019).  
Police organisations: Resource 
considerations  
PICT police organisations are a primary subset of each 
country’s security apparatus. All PICTs have police services 
or forces that are affiliated with other internal and external 
bodies and employ a multilayered approach to transnational 
and organised crime involving local, regional, and inter-
national partners working across multiple agencies. Existing 
local and regional networks include: 28 locally staffed Trans-
national Crime Units (TCUs) in 20 PICTs (AFP 2019);  
the Transnational, Serious and Organised Crime (TSOC) 
Pacific Taskforce; the Pacific Transnational Crime Network 
(PTCN); and the Pacific Transnational Crime Coordination 
Centre (PTCCC). These regional networks are supported by 
Australia and New Zealand. Additionally, the Pacific Islands 
Chiefs of Police partner with organisations such as Oceania 
Customs Organisation, the Pacific Immigration Develop-
ment Community, the Pacific Islands Law Officers Network, 
the Asia–Pacific Group on Money Laundering, and the 
Pacific Islands Forum Fisheries Agency. This proliferation 
of agencies suggests the necessary architecture is in place 
to support increased cooperation on transnational and 
organised crime and the strong need for partnerships. The 
contextual applicability of the edict for these agencies, their 
legitimacy among intended stakeholders and the extent to 
which they are able to operate as intended are, however, 
likely to vary. 
The existence of multiple agencies focused on the same 
or closely related issues may, however, reflect a duplication 
of efforts and resources and may strain already limited or 
scarce resources. The scarcity of resources highlights a  
need for better efforts and coordination of agencies –  
and improved cooperation and collaboration – to increase 
chances of effectively addressing transnational and organised 
crime. Compounding these challenges is the substantial gap 
in information on transnational crime in the Pacific (UNODC 
2016) which in turn inhibits development of evidence based 
approaches to prioritise the allocation of limited resources.  
Despite the challenges of creating effective regional 
partnerships, the need to do so has been strongly affirmed 
and reinforced by the member countries of the Pacific 
Islands Forum. The Boe Declaration on Regional Security 
cites transnational crime – along with human security, 
environmental and resource security, and cybersecurity – as 
four key challenges to the Pacific (PIFS 2018). The Boe 
Declaration and associated Action Plan adopted by the 
member countries of the Pacific Islands Forum align with 
the UN Sustainable Development Goals (specifically SDGs 
8, 14,15,16) that address enhanced cooperation, inform-
ation and intelligence sharing – between law enforcement 
at both national and regional levels – and the ratification and 
implementation of relevant international conventions on 
transnational crime such as the Palermo Convention. The 
Boe Declaration and Action Plan also propose streng-
thening anti-money laundering mechanisms and combating 
corruption by public officials. 
Cooperation and information sharing across agencies 
remains, however, a work in progress. Some smaller coun-
tries have reported a one sided arrangement favouring larger 
and better resourced partners. Joint operations between 
national jurisdictions can become an exercise in selective 
intelligence sharing, justified by partners on the basis of 
information security concerns. In one recent case, a two year 
investigation was carried out on a planned drug import  
to Australia from PNG. The investigation involved the 
Queensland Joint Organised Crime Task Force, which 
included state and federal policing agencies, and the 
Australian Federal Police Criminal Assets Confiscation 
Taskforce in collaboration with the Royal Papua New Guinea 
Constabulary (AFP Media 2020). While the investigation 
resulted in the seizure of over 500 kilograms of cocaine in 
PNG and prosecutions of people involved, it is unclear how 
much intelligence sharing took place in practice, given 
concerns about intelligence being leaked to PNG elites with 
criminal connections (Vaka’uta 2020). Additionally, chal-
lenges arise when governmental organisations – such as 
police services – make use of generic yahoo or gmail 
accounts which may lack security features needed by organ-
isations working with sensitive information. For PICTs, 
adopting measures to improve the security of communi-
cations would help to facilitate more equitable information 
– and intelligence sharing arrangements.  
Although transnational and organised crime has often 
been regarded in PICTs as part of an externally driven 
policing agenda (McLeod 2009), some evidence suggests it 
is increasingly part of an internally recognised agenda by 
PICTs. For example, following discussions at the Pacific 
Islands Chiefs of Police Meeting in Nauru in August 2018, 
the Transnational, Serious and Organised Crime (TSOC) 
Pacific Taskforce was launched in February 2019, through 
the signing of a memorandum of understanding between the 
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Australian Federal Police, New Zealand Police, Fiji Police 
Force, and Tonga Police. The purpose of the TSOC Pacific 
Taskforce is to increase targeting capabilities, improve 
sharing of operational intelligence, and strengthen cooper-
ation to conduct expanded and complex investigations. The 
TSOC goals include enhancing information sharing bet-
ween participants of the PTCN, PTCCC, and respective 
TCUs (AFP 2019). Fiji has also signed a memorandum of 
understanding with Indonesia’s Narcotics Bureau to facil-
itate intelligence sharing – building on earlier agreements 
with Indonesia to provide training and information sharing 
(Kumar 2020).  
Pacific specific capacity  
Organisational capacity to respond to transnational and 
organised crime varies in PICTs, with some countries more 
reliant than others on support from external partners 
(Watson 2020). Many smaller countries across the region 
lack the capacity to conduct investigations and intelligence 
gathering, and some outlying islands and villages have 
limited immediate access to local police (Boswell 2010). 
Limited capacity for maritime surveillance, a dearth of 
technology to facilitate crime detection, and a lack of 
exposure to new and emerging crimes also leads to reliance 
on external bodies to compensate for shortfalls in skill sets.  
Police capacity development programs have been 
ongoing in PICTs for many years. These programs have 
primarily involved deployments of Australian and New 
Zealand police to PICTs to act in an advisory capacity or 
work alongside Pacific police to develop leadership skills 
and deliver general and specialised education and training. 
Large scale programs, such as the Regional Assistance 
Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI), have also included 
police from fellow PICTs (Putt et al. 2018). Smaller 
targeted programs have been facilitated by the Pacific 
Islands Chiefs of Police along with initiatives led by New 
Zealand Police – such as Pacific Prevention of Domestic 
Violence Programme (PPDVP), Partnership for Pacific 
Policing (3P) – and initiatives led by Australian Federal 
Police such as Pacific Police Development Program-
Regional (PPDP-R), Cyber Safety Pasifika and the Pacific 
Forensic Working Group. In 2019, New Zealand deployed 
additional police officers to provide training and technical 
assistance as part of a New Zealand–Tonga–Australia 
jointly funded program to combat transnational crime. The 
Australian Defence Force has a Pacific Maritime Security 
Program, which includes the provision of 21 new patrol 
boats to PICTs (and Timor-Leste) and integrated regional 
aerial surveillance (Department of Defence 2018). Training 
support is also provided in the form of specialist senior 
officers working with local officers in-country, and officers 
travelling to China for specialist training (Kumar 2018).  
Responding to transnational and organised crime 
requires organisational commitment to current as well as 
anticipated threats. At times, an external focus on trans-
national and organised crime has not reflected the needs 
identified within PICTs (McLeod 2009, Watson 2020)  
and strained resources necessitate that priority is given  
to immediate threats and/or to adjusting to external 
stakeholder or government imposed priorities (Watson 
2020). Natural disasters such as cyclones and, more 
recently, the COVID-19 pandemic, have revealed the level 
of organisational agility required. With scarce resources, it 
is not surprising that for some Pacific countries, addressing 
immediate needs takes precedence over engaging in organ-
isational planning and preparation, particularly if threats are 
deemed comparatively low risk. However, a lack of plan-
ning and preparation can impact the establishment of 
bilateral and multilateral agreements; result in cooperation 
imbalances; and impede the development of contingency 
measures (Department of Defense 2019, Watson and 
Dinnen 2020, Watson 2020). Notably, Fiji, Tonga, and 
Papua New Guinea are actively deploying resources to 
address high risk threats to the region.   
The issue of conflicting priorities between aid donor 
and recipient countries also presents challenges for police 
organisations (Dinnen and Peake 2013, Law and Develop-
ment Partnership 2013). These include a lack of flexibility 
to adapt to local needs and contexts, the imposition of 
external political priorities, and a lack of autonomy and 
control for local recipients. Police in PICTs must simul-
taneously navigate their organisations capacity develop-
ment priorities and donor and political sensitivities (Allen 
2006, Boswell 2010, ANU Enterprise 2007, Cox et al. 
2012). Collaborative approaches and mutual agreement on 
the aims of police development programs and how their 
achievement will be measured is essential, although it is 
inherently complex (Peake and Dinnen 2014). 
On the one hand, PICTs benefit from international 
assistance through training and upskilling of staff to res-
pond to transnational and organised crime (Australian 
Federal Police 2016). On the other hand, the challenges  
of identifying the most suitable people for these training 
opportunities, retention of trained employees, and local 
opportunities to use these new skills complicate national 
efforts. Smaller countries may find it more feasible to 
depend on external support to compensate for shortfalls in 
their resources – compounding their reliance on foreign 
capacity while maintaining a low level of local capacity.  
It may be more useful in the longer term to invest in local 
capacity development, despite a lack of perceived immed-
iate need. This issue is, however, complex because limited 
local resources must often be diverted to address immed-
iately pressing issues. The complexity of addressing trans-
national and organised crime, coupled with the resourcing 
and geographical constraints in the Pacific region, 
combine to make a strong case for regional approaches. 
Conclusion 
Regional capacity building for transnational and organised 
crime must align with the needs of police organisations, and 
recognise the nuances of current capacities and constraints. 
Regional collaboration requires honest and open dialogue at 
national and regional levels. Capacity development dis-
cussions with larger partners – such as Australia – need to 
be clear about how the resources for building capacity to 
respond to transnational crime will impact on operational 
capacity in other areas. These discussions need to be 
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culturally appropriate and context specific, recognising the 
differences within and between PICTs. 
Financial resources and feasibility issues continue to 
loom as deterrents to improving existing, or developing 
new, prevention and response capacity. Corruption and the 
potential for political gain from organised crime loom large 
(Watson and Dinnen 2020). Essential to addressing crime 
effectively, is a long term vision, planning that involves key 
stakeholders with a focus on local stakeholders, and co-
ordination of efforts across agencies. Understanding the 
complexity and nuances of these challenges is a necessary 
starting point for making further inroads into the capacity 
development and collaboration needed to address trans-
national and organised crime in the Pacific region. This 
understanding is a starting point for thinking about ways  
to explore contingency measures and develop stronger 
bilateral and multilateral agreements on mutual legal assis-
tance and regional law enforcement cooperation. 
A wealth of regional forums such as the Pacific Islands 
Forum (PIF) and the Pacific Islands Chiefs of Police (PICP) 
already exist, along with other regional bodies with a vested 
interest in protecting the Pacific from transnational and 
organisational crime threats. The idea of Pacific-led demand 
for capacity development at the regional level – within 
existing networks that facilitate resource sharing – is at the 
heart of improving regional response capabilities. These 
regional organisations enable the necessary dialogue at  
both national and organisational levels by way of existing 
platforms. Key elements of success in bolstering the capa-
city of local law enforcement to address crime threats will 
build greater linkages between Pacific law enforcement and 
other relevant agencies and build the necessary supporting 
systems within the health, education, and social service 
sectors to support communities and individuals.  
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Solomon Islands’ long summer of discontent: Security challenges 
Anouk Ride, The Australian National University  
Rising temperatures: Conflict factors 
It is the last quarter of 2023 and the Solomon Islands is 
unbearably hot. The road into East Guadalcanal is blocked 
by locals hurtling rocks at cars, particularly government-
plated and Asian-driven vehicles, in protest of a regional 
land dispute. Key services are now unmanned due to a 
planned protest by public servants in Honiara objecting to 
delayed pay and entitlements. A volunteer midwife service 
pops up to deal with women who are now unable to give 
birth in a hospital or clinic, while teachers’ attendance in 
schools is low and affecting the number of students able to 
graduate. Meanwhile, the government blames the global 
economic downturn for increases in opportunistic theft and 
the numbers of people begging for money around the main 
shops and markets in town. Parliament has only been in 
session twice in 2023, both times to approve increased 
entitlements for Members of Parliament (MPs) and dis-
cretionary funding. The business sector bemoans a backlog 
of needed reforms, unpaid government contracts, and rising 
taxes and duties.  
A male youth is accidentally killed by a logging truck, 
and he is from a family that was evicted from the land that 
the logging company now owns. The company also runs a 
hotel where it is widely known prostitution and sales of 
illegal drugs occur, but those responsible so far have evaded 
arrest and prosecutions. The Prime Minister, who is closely 
allied with the logging company and whose son in law is on 
the Board, states that the 2023 election will be delayed due 
to the hosting of the South Pacific Games and the economic 
effects of COVID-19. Locals attack the logging company 
premises, and people who have previously hurtled rocks at 
cars now advance on the first foreign owned premises they 
can find in East Guadalcanal and loot and destroy goods. 
Local security guards abscond from their posts at the Asian-
owned casino hotel hosting a meeting of current MPs, and 
soon security guards around other Asian-owned businesses 
follow suit, with a few forming their own groups and offer- 
ing ‘security’ services for the highest paying businesses. 
The civil conflict some people call the ‘second tensions’ 
begins.  
The above 2023 scenario is of course hypothetical,  
but each element of this scenario is based in causes of 
conflict in 2020. The civil conflict in Solomon Islands  
from 1998–2003, known as ‘the tensions’, was one which 
while small in fatalities (around 200) was great in its 
impacts on development. Solomon Islands is ranked 153 out 
of 189 countries (UNDPa 2018), according to the 2019 
UNDP human development index (HDI). The conflict  
also had a toll for neighbouring Australia, ultimately lead-
ing the Australian Government to fund a regional security 
intervention for disarmament and ‘restoration’ of law  
and order at a cost of $2.6 billion AUD (Hayward-Jones 
2014).  
2020 
It is 2020 and Solomon Islands is sweating, because of the 
effects of the global economic downturn following COVID-
19. Government responses to the pandemic, including lock-
downs prior to the arrival of any case of COVID-19 in the 
country, budget cuts, and redirections, have contributed to 
the turmoil. Increased discretionary spending by Members 
of Parliament of government funds allocated for agriculture, 
health and natural disasters, are paid for by cuts across the 
board to ministry budgets. Working people buy less food 
and grow or harvest more food themselves, worrying that 
restricted imports and government controls on informal 
markets will mean that they will not be able to feed their 
families. Those in rural areas find themselves often hosting 
more people in their homes and on their land as people 
return due to school closures and job losses. Land tenure 
reforms mean that many squatters are evicted, which adds 
to population pressures on already overcrowded areas of the 
city and peri-urban areas.  
While to date COVID-19 cases have been confined to 
quarantine, the country has operated under a State of Emer-
gency since 25 March with severe economic repercussions. 
The informal marketing sector, which provides the only  
source of household income for more than 80 per cent of 
vendors (Keen & Ride 2018), suffered erratic closures at the 
start of the year and at the end of the year the government 
announces its intent to suspend Facebook, despite its 
prominent use by small and large businesses for sales and 
promotions.  
With many losing formal jobs in industry and pay from 
civil service positions, the importance of informal incomes 
gained through markets or online marketing becomes even 
greater. A survey of 100 businesses by the Solomon Islands 
Chamber of Commerce and Industry in May finds 55 of them 
have laid off staff or are planning to lay off workers, and 34 
per cent of these have to lay off more than 40 per cent of their 
workforce. By July, 34 per cent of survey respondents say 
their business situation had worsened (SICCI2020).  
Essential services have also faced disruptions with 
schools closing for eight weeks, followed by suspensions at 
early childhood education centers. Nurses state they have 
overdue pay and unpaid entitlements (the nurses’ union that 
raised this issue was then suspended by the government, 
with an official release claiming that their sit-in was illegal 
according to the Procession and Public Assemblies Act and 
provisions of the State of Emergency).  
Transparency of budget spending is lower than in 2019, 
in part due to the unusual situation of COVID-19, increased 
funding to some areas under the State of Emergency (SOE), 
as well as the centralisation of power, and lack of govern-
ment oversight. Local residents are inquiring whether the  
government coffers are in fact empty and the treasury is  
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drawing on reserves, and who actually received ‘economic 
stimulus package’ funding of SBD$300 million. How much 
have Members of Parliament received in discretionary 
funding and how it has been spent? The Prime Minister’s 
Office meanwhile, staffed largely by political appointees 
(who are not subject to hiring and performance standards of 
public servants), manages a budget of SBD$71 million in 
development expenditure for 2020, as well as stimulus 
package funding. 
Communications are regular, with the Prime Minister 
making weekly or even more regular announcements, and 
the Ministry of Health and Medical Services providing daily 
social media updates on cases of COVID-19 and quarantine 
issues. However, confusion has also been rife at certain 
points. In the first lockdown on 10 April 2020, 63 people 
were arrested for breaching curfews imposed during the 
lockdown, but their cases were later thrown out because  
of incorrect procedures. Confusing statements were made 
about what time the lockdown started and stopped. 
Communication about the economic stimulus package also 
suffers from lack of clarity, with some potential applicants 
being told they needed to have a registered business and 
several documents, and others being told this was not 
necessary. Criticism of the government and swearing about 
officials on social media leads government to bring forward 
plans for legislation on internet use, and Cabinet to 
announce in November its intent to suspend Facebook.  
Meanwhile, several disputes simmer between provincial 
governments and the national political coalition. The most 
populous of the provinces, Malaita, has been in disagreement 
with the federal government over the decision to switch dip-
lomatic relations from Taiwan to China in September 2019, 
and over the Malaita Provincial Government’s call for greater 
autonomy in its affairs. In response, various operators affil-
iated with the Prime Minister’s Office and Malaitan MPs 
supporting the national governing coalition, have threatened 
to recall the Provincial Permanent Secretary; held up a dona-
tion of personal protective equipment (PPE) from Taiwanese 
groups; questioned the legitimacy of USAID given to Malaita 
for its agriculture sector; and allegedly offered bribes of 
SBD$10,000 to members of the Provincial Assembly to 
overturn the Malaitan Premier (which was voted down 24 
votes against and 9 in support).  
However, it is not just Malaita Provincial Government 
that has called for increased autonomy. Most of the large 
provinces have had substantive disagreements with the 
national government in 2020. In September, the Western 
Province Premier called for government reform to recognise 
greater power for the provinces and threatened to take court 
action if the government passed a bill that takes discretion 
from the provinces and formally centralises power. Even 
Guadalcanal Province has complained about the unfair 
burden of national government decisions about COVID-19 
including extending the emergency zone beyond the city to 
the province without proper consultation, and proposing the 
province run quarantine and COVID-19 testing centers when 
they have neither funding nor capacity to do so.  
The rising influence of the provinces and public airing 
of their grievances is a trend that has taken sections of the 
development sector by surprise. Provincial government 
staff used to complain about the lack of visits or con-
sultations from international NGOs to their offices, whereas 
in 2020, it seems a photo opportunity between the Premier 
of Malaita or Premier of Makira and an international NGO 
has become a far more regular occurrence. Previous aid 
projects that only worked at the national level now also 
work directly at the provincial level.  
While this might be new for some development actors, 
local conflict researchers have long pointed to the need for 
a system of sharing power between the national government 
and the provinces in order to prevent conflict. The Solomon 
Islands Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) has 
referred to many reports advocating a form of decentralised 
power and state governance and concludes that: 
none of these reports has made their way to a political 
agenda that would satisfy the demands of the Guadalcanal 
leaders for state government; this is the case until now… 
The Guadalcanal ex-combatants highlighted this potential 
for future conflict time and time again during the  
public hearing on 11 and 12 May 2011’ (TRC 2013:57). 
Guadalcanal being driven by and largely benefitting 
national politicians and structures was one of the motiva-
tions for violence by militants and their political supporters 
in the previous armed conflict.  
While there are no such organised militant groups in 
2020, there is an increase in the popularity of provincial 
governments ‘opting out’ of national government in antici-
pation of being more economically self-sufficient (with 
support from donor funded projects). Bougainville’s move 
towards independence and the election of its government is 
watched closely in Solomon Islands, with a degree of both 
admiration and anxiety about whether an independent 
Bougainville can ensure security and peace. During the 
Solomon Islands conflict, and in Bougainville’s own civil 
war, violent incidents involving Bougainvilleans in Solomon 
Islands occurred and the border between both countries 
remains quite porous, open to trade of both legal goods, such 
as canned fish and fresh produce, and illegal goods, including 
weapons during times of conflict.  
The Royal Solomon Islands Police Force is stretched 
thin responding to crime not to mention complicated issues 
such as weapons smuggling or the burning down of the 
Civil Aviation Authority in July and the Aola police post in 
October. Meanwhile, violence against women and girls – 
the most commonly experienced form of violence in the 
Solomon Islands – is more likely to be ignored than 
prosecuted. A review of 107 women who went to the police 
last year found that in 60 per cent of cases, women were 
given no information and there was no action. Only 43 per 
cent of visits eventually resulted in a Police Safety Notice 
or court case (Ride & Soaki 2019).  
The economic pressures of COVID-19 have doubled 
efforts by loggers and miners to extract and export natural 
resources. Tubi tree logs, a rare species banned from export, 
were again found this year and impounded; however, the 
company involved was merely fined and is still allowed to 
log and propose new mining activities. Logging companies 
seldom pay the applicable fees due to exemptions awarded 
by allies in government, others simply do not pay due to a 
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lack of respect for the provincial authorities, which in turn 
do not punish noncompliance. For instance, in Malaita in 
2016, outstanding logging fees totaled SBD$4 million with 
only 30 per cent of active logging companies paying their 
license fees (Minter et al 2016). This situation has been 
corrected under the current Malaita provincial government, 
which has reduced logging and required all operators to pay 
fees; however, in other provinces, practices such as not 
paying fees, or paying with bags of rice or other commodities 
rather than cash continues in 2020. Sexual abuse of young 
girls and women by loggers and miners is a frequent if 
underreported occurrence.  
Meanwhile, in 2020 landowners resisting proposals to 
mine in Choiseul, Isabel, Western Province and Temotu 
have the odds stacked against them. For local landowners 
to take an issue to court they would have to hire a lawyer 
for several appearances – a process and cost beyond the 
capacity and financial resources of rural people, the 
majority of whom are subsistence farmers and fishers. The 
few cases where logging or mining has been resisted by 
landowners tend to be those with access to legal aid or 
overseas support. There is currently no accessible legal aid 
system in Solomon Islands (the current Public Solicitors 
Office civil division has a staff of only four). The continued 
presence of extractive natural resource companies with poor 
records on environmental and social responsibility or 
abiding by the law will lead to future conflicts.  
In 2020, Solomon Islands is in a long summer of 
discontent. This summer heat will lead to spot fires of 
violence in 2023. In three years an election will be due, and 
elections and political transitions are a time for symbolic 
violence (Ride, 2019). The temperatures have risen in this 
long summer because of discontent about foreign extraction 
of and benefit from natural resources, housing insecurity, 
lack of economic opportunity for indigenous people and 
businesses, youth unemployment and exclusion, failure of 
government services to meet basic needs of education and 
health, corruption, growing food insecurity, land disputes, 
mistrust of and dissatisfaction with police, and a system of 
governance that centralises power within a mere 100 people 
or so (the governing coalition MPs and their political 
appointees) rather than sharing it with those representing a 
predominantly rural population in the provinces.  
Prospects for peace 
Local actors on the ground are indeed planting and main-
taining greenery that can lower the temperature in certain 
areas. These actors include chiefs and women leaders, who 
are responsible for local conflict resolution in Solomon 
Islands, but have varying levels of legitimacy and agency 
(with some local leaders respected and active, and others 
who serve as ‘chief’ in name only but have no capacity to 
solve conflict). The Royal Solomon Islands Police Force 
Crime Prevention Strategy builds on these local actors to 
form crime prevention committees that are reducing local 
crime in urban and rural areas. Social media and groups like 
Yumi Toktok Forum and Transparency International have 
provided forums to uncover information and discuss issues, 
which helps people let off steam and provides an outlet to 
expose cover-ups and other illicit behaviour. The provincial 
government’s role as frontline actors in solving conflicts 
(see Phillips 2020) has become more pronounced with 
COVID-19, and their moves towards financial autonomy 
will strengthen their role in peacebuilding.  
However, rain from the sky, in the form of aid from the 
national government and its key source of funding – donors 
– is also needed to cool down the conflict factors. Police 
reform, particularly establishing an easy-to-use complaints 
mechanism staffed by active and independent researchers 
and prosecutors that would make the force able to cleanse 
itself of corrupt officers, inactive officers and those with 
gender biases that prevent them acting on every crime, will 
restore public trust in police. Free legal aid and support for 
local communities, as a first step to introducing more social 
and environmental responsibility into the mining and log-
ging sectors, is also desperately required. Increased donor 
funding for a range of actors – civil society, provincial gov-
ernment, indigenous-run businesses, youth groups, women’s 
groups – can help provide alternative sources of power that 
can both increase calls for accountability and provide new 
potential political candidates and coalitions to influence 
the next governing coalition beyond 2023. Although 
fatigued by many conflict issues, these ‘cooling agents’ are 
all around us, supporting peace in Solomon Islands while 
watching for signs of rain that may help them survive. 
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Front: Carteret atolls off Bougainville where people are “the 
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